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This dissertation is an ethnographic study of the perspective and treatment of 
the city as a space imbued with charismatic power in Northern Thailand.  Reviving the 
city through channeling and re-imagining the perceived past prosperity of the city of 
Chiang Mai in the wake of the economic crash of 1997 became a matter of concern for 
architects, activists, city planners, and spirit mediums: each group respectively sought 
to control the negative effects of the economic downturn through reconstructing a 
latent potential within the city with explicit reference to Chiang Mai‟s “Lanna” past 
(approximately the 13
th
-19
th
 centuries CE). The various methods ranged from the 
attempts to redesign public space using models of urban design adapted from the 
Lanna period to the efforts of spirit medium devotees, who sought to stave off 
misfortune through reviving the literal guardian spirits of Lanna.  
However, such attempts at rebuilding both the physical as well as the spiritual 
integrity of the city carried with them the uncanny trace of misfortune made manifest 
in the ruins of pre-1997 buildings. These ruins stood alongside the shells of new high-
rise construction, providing an unwelcome resemblance that put a pall on the hope 
placed on the new buildings. Both sites, both newly constructed and abandoned, 
became sources of stories of ghosts and violent crime. I explore how ruins and failures 
of the past constantly stain and conflict with visions of the future, while at the same 
  
 
time this sense of “pastness” animates present-day images of the auspicious that drives 
urban planning in Chiang Mai. 
 Ultimately, I argue that the increase in attempts to “rebuild Lanna” as well as 
the increase in anxiety about a perceived decline in urban charisma can be traced to an 
atomized urban population and economically and politically uncertain times. As the 
future blossoming of a Lanna renaissance grows more and more in doubt, stories of 
ghosts inhabiting the shells of new high-rise construction grow alongside calls to 
define, edit, and revitalize the image of the past in Thailand‟s urban north. 
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INTRODUCTION:  The New City 
 The northern Thai city of Chiang Mai [เชียงใหม่ - new city] sits in the Ping river 
valley, a broad expanse of cultivated lowland in between two lines of green, forested 
mountains. To Chiang Mai‟s north and west lie several smaller cities (Chiang Rai, 
Mae Sai, Mae Hong Son) and beyond them the Burmese border. To the east is a 
handful of less populated provinces (Phayao, Nan) beyond which lies Laos. It is a city 
in a geographic bowl and a political corner.  
Approaching Chiang Mai from the south, the direction of Bangkok, one must 
first wind through the mountain ranges in Lampang province. The rail lines cut back 
and forth, climbing through dense green forest. The highway takes a straighter tack, 
and at the height of the pass, cars beep at a shrine decorated with statues of tigers, 
lions, and even giraffes, the home of Jao Pratuu Phaa [เจา้ประตูผา], Lord Granite Gate, 
the supernatural guardian of the mountain. Coming down from the mountains into the 
Mae Ping river valley, the roadside, previously mountainous and forested, explodes in 
light and gray concrete construction. Factories alternate with rice paddy, and massive 
billboards in Thai and English advertise for services in Chiang Mai. The majority of 
these are ads for housing developments: “Baan nai fun [บา้นในฝัน - The Village of 
Dreams]”, “Baan Choem Doi [บา้นเชิมดอย - Mountainside Village]”, “Lanna Thara 
[ลา้นนาธารา - Lanna Stream],” or, simply, the “Regent” or “Emperor” housing estates 
(see figures 1 and 2 for examples of housing estates). Other signs proclaim Chiang 
Mai‟s charms in a more official light: “Chiang Mai: City of Culture [เมืองแห่งวฒันธรรม 
- Meuang1 Haeng Watthanatham]” reads the slogan, written in the shaky “old-style” 
font rather than the bold, straight-lined fonts of other advertisements. As the 
superhighway approaches the city, the housing estates appear – some replicating 
                                                 
1
 This Romanization of เมือง as “meuang” is inconsistent with how other authors Romanize the word, but 
is consistent with the Royal Thai Phoenetic system. The vowel which I normally render: eua, other 
authors have rendered it oea or üa. The word is most widely rendered meuang, following Tambiah 1976, 
Davis 1984, Wijeyewardene 1984, and Morris 2000. 
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American suburbia next to the water buffalo and dragonfruit trees, some echoing a 
designer‟s idea of ancient Chiang Mai  
Figure 1: Gated community, Hai Ya district 
 
architecture (albeit carefully arranged in a grid), but most are simply under 
construction or abandoned, having halted construction mid-way. Past the housing 
estates, the highway crosses a line of “big-box”-style superstores: Big C, Tesco-Lotus, 
Carrefour, and Makro, as well as specialty superstores – the Index Living Mall (a shop 
for high-end home furnishings), Rim Ping Supermarket (advertising the best selection 
of European wine in the city), and others. Interspersed among the large parking lots 
and new highway underpasses are the shells of a past boom and expansion: abandoned 
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hotels and high-rise apartment buildings, or glossy new shopping centers with empty 
storefronts.  
 From the air, the latest boom in construction in Chiang Mai is glaringly 
obvious. The tracts of new housing developments circle the city, with their straight-
lined streets, monochromatic (but bright) roof tiles, and fences partitioning off 
farmland from planned  
 
Figure 2: Advertising model for gated community, Kaad Suan Kaew, Chiang Mai. 
suburban life. What is also visible from the air (and is far less so from the highway) is 
the old city: a square of brick walls roughly aligned on a north-south axis, set in 
between the Ping River and the green forested slopes of Suthep Mountain [ดอยสุเทพ - 
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doi suthep]. This square is set within the ring of the beltway, and is encircled by high-
rise construction and beyond that, the orange and blue roofs of the suburban 
subdivisions.  
 The image of the new city consuming the old is inescapable. In the city, 
community groups and academics have organized movements protesting the high-rise 
growth: “muu hao b’johp teuk suung” [หมู่เฮาบ่จอบตึกสูง - “our neighborhood doesn‟t 
like tall buildings,” written in Northern Thai, although likely legible to a Central 
speaker in the same way that “Northern folk music” (e.g. Jaran Manopetch, see below) 
is also legible] read a banner draped around the corner fence of a house. But the 
current crisis in Chiang Mai – the eating of the old by the new – was echoed in the 
concerns of the last century, as the author of the Chiang Mai Chronicle laments: “They 
built a new city swallowing the old. As if Rahu
2
  swallowed the old city.” 
(Wijeyewardene 1986:88).  The idea of the loss of something inchoate in the changing 
fabric of the city and the role of professional mediators in its restoration is something 
which I explore in this city. As the city undergoes radical changes, both spatial, 
ideological, and demographic, anxieties become articulated in the spectral form: in the 
persons of possessing spirits, ghosts of bad death, or in the form of an increasingly 
hypostasized “Lanna culture.” 
I did not arrive in Chiang Mai intending to study ghosts [phi – ผ]ี. When I 
began my field research, I was interested in ideas about middle-class constructions of 
urban space (a topic that I do explore here). It was in the times when I had let the topic 
of the city drop that other topics of conversation came in: friends‟ romantic troubles, 
jokes, political scandals, and, often, ghost stories. The fact that these stories were often 
connected both temporally within a conversation as well as spatially to the subject of 
                                                 
2
 Rahu is a mythological demon who is just a head – without a stomach, his urge to consume is never 
sated, and as such is a symbol of perennial greed and consumption. 
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urban change, urban chaos and the expansion of the city aroused my interest in the 
subject, and here I argue that my informants articulated anxieties and hopes about the 
city and urban chaos in the forms of spirits both new and traditional, spirits which had 
a hand in realizing or confounding the city‟s development.  
Hopes and anxieties were likewise projected onto the vague category of 
“Lanna culture” [วฒันธรรมลา้นนา - watthanatham Lanna], one increasingly used by a 
group of people that I here term Chiang Mai‟s “educated class,” those people who 
form the majority of my informants. Benedict Anderson in his influential essay 
“Withdrawal Symptoms” (1998) pointed to the divide between traditional middle-class 
sources of prestige (e.g. the military or the civil service) and the newly college-
educated middle-class, schooled at universities that had just become available. In the 
North, Chiang Mai University (founded 1964) provided a first step to expanding 
higher education to the provinces, but in recent years the North has seen a growth in 
other universities such as Chiang Mai Rajabhat (turned into a full university in 1982) 
and Mae Jo University (1996) as well as a number of technology-focused schools. 
While Anderson points to the divide between the recently educated middle-class 
students and their older, less iconoclastically-oriented middle-class parents 
undergirding the political unrest surrounding the 1973 and 1976 massacres in Bangkok, 
in the case of mid-2000s Chiang Mai, the previously generational division is now 
more social. Here, I seek to call attention to the divisions between those with 
education and those without in terms of the articulation of spirit beliefs and urban 
anxiety.  Members of Chiang Mai‟s “educated class,” referred to in Thai by such 
categories as “people with education” [คนมีการศึกษา - khon mii kaan seuk saa] or 
“people who have learning” [คนมีความเรียนรู้ - khon mii khwaam rian ruu], like many 
other educated Thais, point to a sharp division between the rationality of national 
narratives of culture and Buddhism on one hand, and local spirit beliefs and Buddhist 
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magic on the other (Pattana 2005:174). Yet such a rejection of the localized spirits of 
place does not necessarily disenchant, rather, it is my argument here that the discourse 
of culture serves to address the problem of anxiety and misfortune in the same way 
that mediumship does, by mobilizing an edited, reconfigured authority rooted in past 
ways of being for future benefit. 
 In this dissertation, I look at the mediation between past and present 
representations of Chiang Mai and parallel the action of spirit mediums (who purport 
to represent the spirit of past Chiang Mai for the benefit of the present) with architects 
(who also attempt to mobilize Chiang Mai‟s inchoate essence for the future). Such a 
link is not arbitrary – both mediums and architects incorporate a discourse of progress 
Figure 3: Abandoned high-rise building, Pa Daed subdistrict. 
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built upon an intangible cultural heritage. The hope represented by these two agents of 
(as they see it) progress is mirrored by the anxiety provoked by the very real 
architectural symbols of the economy‟s failures: haunted abandoned buildings (see 
figure 3).  The future paradise conceived of as being inherent in Chiang Mai‟s history 
is, however, always in danger of not becoming realized, as the abandoned – and, 
widely rumored, haunted – buildings scattered across the city attest. For those 
attempting to create a new city, Chiang Mai is in a continual state of becoming – 
Lanna is always about to re-emerge, yet somehow never materializing. 
The City 
Anthropological discussions of nations and regions cannot escape the idea of 
the city. Chiang Mai is no exception. In its history, it was the center of a polity defined 
by its cities: that of Lanna [ลา้นนา], whose subjects, at least since the 19th century, 
referred to themselves as khon meuang [คนเมือง – literally “city people”]. Yet, in Thai, 
this term meuang means far more than simply “city,” and as such I explore the idea of 
what a meuang represents for Thais both in the past and present. A meuang delineates 
“civilized,” Buddhist space, but also allows for the radiation of animist power through 
its guardian spirits (a distinction further explored below). Tambiah describes a meuang 
as “centered or center-oriented space (as opposed to bounded space) and typically 
stands for a capital town or settlement with the surrounding territory over which it 
exercised jurisdiction” (Tambiah 1976:112). As such, it is an example of a mandala 
system, following Wolter‟s description of an “often unstable political situation in a 
vaguely definable geographical area without fixed boundaries and where smaller 
centers tended to look in all directions for security. Mandalas would expand and 
contract in concertina-like fashion” (Wolters 1982:16-17). The power and political 
control of the meuang, personified in the form of the ruler and the guardian spirits of 
the city, brought protection and prosperity out to the countryside and neighboring 
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towns (Thongchai 1994:81). At its margins, towns might be within the radius of 
several meuang, and might pay tribute to them all. This centralized, rather than 
bounded, system was a constant source of conflict during the colonial period in 
Southeast Asia – as an example, when France attempted to determine the border 
between French Indochina and Siam in Cambodia, the Siamese king replied that both 
powers could rule Cambodia peacefully (ibid 92).
3
  
 Many scholars of Northern political formations have debated the idea of 
whether or not meuang have boundaries. According to Thongchai, one passes 
imperceptibly between one meuang to another, gradually entering a different realm, 
with a broad degree of overlap in between. Past the ring of cultivated fields 
surrounding the city center lies an undifferentiated region of forest that blends into the 
next polity – should a border be necessary, a guardhouse somewhere along the route 
may serve policing functions, but there is no need for a discrete boundary (Thongchai 
1994:76). Wijeyewardene disputes this, noting the Northern concern with boundaries 
in the system of ritual taboo (ขึด, kheut, see discussion below) and care in delineating 
city boundaries (2002:135). Wijeyewardene places the premodern boundaries of the 
meuang on those spirit shrines at the watershed points, homes of the spirits who, like 
jao pratuu phaa, inhabit the high, uninhabitable land in between fertile river valleys 
(ibid 133). Wijeyewardene claims that Thongchai‟s description of the “unbounded” 
meuang “is essentially from [the point of view of] the court in Bangkok, and 
subsequently that of Siamese officials” (ibid 131). While the abundance of the term 
pratuu [gate] in the names of the spirits atop mountain roads (e.g. เจา้ประตูเมือง - jao 
pratuu meuang – “Lord Gate of the City”) does tend to support Wijeyewardene‟s 
claim for a conceptual boundary, aside from this, other evidence tends to support 
                                                 
3
 In the latter part of the 19
th
 century, the Siamese government, fearful of losing ground to European 
colonial interests, began a process of determining borders and colonizing areas that had previously been 
semi-independent. Thongchai (1994) gives a detailed account of this process. 
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Thongchai‟s position: settlements on either side of the boundary would often belong to 
ethnic minorities practicing a very different regime of agriculture and lifestyle and be 
subject to a different king‟s rule (see, for instance, the treaty between Lanna and 
Karen kings in the Chiang Mai Chronicle (Sanguan 1972:545)), and it is only when 
one approaches the major towns in the valley that different polities presented 
themselves.  
Regardless of the presence of official boundaries on the borders of meuang, 
such a “galactic polity” (Tambiah 1976:103) has three layers, according to Tambiah 
(ibid 114). These layers include the capital city and that area which is unquestionably 
the domain of the king (e.g. Ayutthya); the regions surrounding the center, where local 
lords were directly appointed by the king (e.g. Phitsonalok); and the third, outer layer 
of states that pay tribute to the center (but may also pay tribute to other centers). It is 
this third, gray space that Chiang Mai occupied until the 20
th
 century in relation to 
Bangkok‟s meuang space – independent, and a minor meuang in its own right, but 
ultimately under Bangkok‟s influence, although feeling the pull of Ava in Burma or 
Luang Prabang in Laos. This system changed drastically as Siam moved towards a 
more nationally-integrated model of political control, removing Chiang Mai‟s need to 
be a charismatic center and turning Chiang Mai into an inseparable part of the Thai 
nation-state. Hence, the three points in time which were vital to the creation and 
negotiation of the meuang and the meuang‟s power are the Lanna period of warring 
city-states; the nationalist period when Chiang Mai fell under the aegis of Bangkok; 
and the present-day, as the expansion of urban life leads to new forms of baaramii. 
Charismatic Center 
  The meuang, as I have described, was in the pre-national period a sacred place 
that radiated prosperity outwards into the countryside, a countryside that arguably 
lacked specific borders. Cities in this system have in a manner similar to kings, monks, 
 10 
 
relics and sacred sites, a charismatic power that draws others to them, a power which 
was seen as ebbing in influence during the time of my fieldwork. This power – 
baaramii [บารมี] – in some ways corresponds to Weber‟s idea of charisma as “a 
certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from 
ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least 
specifically exceptional qualities.” (Weber 1964:329), although it applies not only to 
individuals but to places and things as well. Baaramii is, like Weber‟s charisma, 
acquired by closeness with ultimate being – in a Buddhist sense, this means 
approaching enlightenment. As individuals or places (indeed, as I detail later, cities 
often were thought of as having bodies and spirits) acquire more and more baaramii, 
their ability to favorably affect their own fortune and that of their followers increases. 
Yet, unlike Weber‟s idea of charisma (or perhaps more like his idea of the “charisma 
of the office,” Amtcharisma – see Weber 1968:xxi), the charisma of a place or person 
is hardly revolutionary to the established order of things. Rather, a person with 
baaramii causes the established order to function smoothly; he occupies the proper 
and central node in a system of attraction and it is the baaramii of the office which 
attaches to his person. This is to be contrasted with revolutionary or millennial 
movements more closely approaching a Weberian definition of charisma such as those 
of the phuu mii bun [ผูมี้บุญ] uprisings of Northern and Northeastern Thailand of the 
19
th
 century, and whose leaders were said to have bun – raw karmic merit, and not the 
more systematic baaramii – which rendered them particularly fit to lead a rebellion. 
The baaramii of the urban center (and by extension the center‟s ruler) was 
always in competition with that of other centers, and needed careful symbolic and 
spiritual maintenance in order to remain such a center and to keep its power active – 
such charisma was required to attract people in a region where labor power was 
scarcer than arable land. Accordingly, the system of guardian spirits and sacred sites 
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were places of both hope and anxiety for its residents, rulers, and developers – a city 
without charismatic power would lose the ability to attract inhabitants, lose fame, and 
diminish.  
 As I mention above, this meuang system involving exemplary centers and an 
unbounded periphery was incommensurable with the idea of the nation-state, as 
Thongchai Winichakul describes in Siam Mapped (1994).  Yet it was during the era of 
nationalism that Chiang Mai became doubly significant. While it was relegated from 
the “sacred center” (Swearer 1989) of an independent kingdom to a provincial capital 
and its symbolic/magical geography systematically and deliberately altered, it 
nevertheless came to occupy a central place in Thai ethno-nationalism: Chiang Mai 
was forever trapped in an bygone space vis-à-vis thansamai [ทนัสมยั - modern, 
literally: “equal with the times”] Bangkok, but also for the reason of its allochrony 
somehow more “authentic”. This “pure” culture also remains the selling point for 
Chiang Mai as a destination for tourists (both domestic and foreign) and emigrants 
from other areas of Thailand. 
 In the present time, Chiang Mai‟s power to attract remains as vital as it is 
insubstantial. Building and maintaining an image of the city in order to bring 
prosperity is a concern for the present day as it was in the 18
th
 century, and Chiang 
Mai, as a center for “cultural” tourism, national imagination, and past urban 
charismatic center relies more heavily than other cities in Thailand on the maintenance 
of this image
4
. In the present, however, this must be an image that not only recalls the 
Lanna past but also links that past with both a unitary idea of Thai-ness as well as a 
utopian, “developed” [เจริญแลว้ - jaroen laew] future. Lanna and Chiang Mai exist on 
an economy of hope and the promise of a better future laid upon the foundation of a 
glorious past – such a process of advancement is signified by the term jaroen [เจริญ] 
                                                 
4
 A parallel city might be the former royal capital of Luang Phrabang, Laos. 
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which forms a centerpiece to this manuscript. This hope, however, has its opposite in 
the revulsion and anxiety inherent in the hauntings of sites where this utopian future 
has met its failure – abandoned construction – as well as those elements of the past 
which new re-imaginations edit out. In this dissertation, I explore how Chiang Mai and 
those involved in constructing the, to use the words of Kevin Lynch, “image of the 
city” (1960) from multiple different vantage points and with multiple different goals 
navigate the dual poles of utopia and dystopia, of hope and anxiety. 
Lanna in Historical Perspective 
 “Lanna” – ลา้นนา [one million rice fields] – technically refers to the kingdom 
that existed at various times independently or as a tributary kingdom of Ava or 
Bangkok from the 13
th
 until the 19
th
 centuries. In modern usage, it also denotes to the 
geographical region and to Thailand‟s Northern provinces [phak nua – ภาคเหนือ], 
especially with reference to culture or cultural tourism. The physical geography of the 
Lanna region consists of river valleys separated by mountain peaks. These rivers: the 
Ping, the Wang, the Nan, the Kok, among others, flow into three larger river systems: 
the Chao Phraya (often referred to as the “Menam” river system, a word which in Thai 
simply means “river” [mae nam - แม่นํ้า]), which runs southward into central Thailand 
and flows into the sea near Bangkok; the Mekong
5
, which forms much of the border 
beween Thailand and Laos before flowing into Cambodia and Vietnam; and the 
Salween, which runs through Burma. Perhaps as a result of this geography, the history 
of the region is inexorably tied to the histories of those three nations: Thailand, Laos, 
and Burma, and Lanna‟s people, despite the pulls of nationalism and local 
exceptionalism alike, have roots in all three.  
 In the next two chapters, I will examine nationalist imaginings of Chaing Mai‟s 
history as well as exploring (lightly) some of the historical texts from the Lanna region. 
                                                 
5
 Or simply the khong [โฃง] in Thai, as mae [แม่] refers to “river.” “Mekong River” is thence redundant. 
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In proceeding chapters, I will deal with some of the problems facing a reconstruction 
of Northern Thai history, but here, I seek to provde a brief narrative for the reader 
unfamiliar with Thailand‟s north. 
  The region that forms the core of my study is the Ping river valley, an area 
that has the oldest large-scale settlement in the Lanna region as well as the city of 
Chiang Mai, which formed the central meuang of the Tai
6
 polity of Lanna off and on 
since the 13
th
 century. Before Chiang Mai, the area was home to both an urban Mon-
speaking kingdom and a population of rural, tribally-organized Lwa (Srisak 2002:40).
7
 
During the first millennium CE, Tai or Tai-Lwa warrior chieftains built a series of 
fortified cities along the Mekong to the north and began to move southwards. The 
most famous of these towns (or at least the most famous in modern historiography) 
was Yonok, which, according to palm-leaf texts, was founded in the first century CE 
in a place identified in the present day as near Chiang Saen (Saratsawadi 2002:19). 
Eventually the two powers in the region – the Tai and the Mon – clashed, and 
Haribunchaya was defeated by the Tai under the leadership of King Mangrai, who 
then founded the city of Chiang Mai in 1296 after an initial, flooded attempt at a site 
across the river, Wiang Kum Kam (Saratsawadi 2002:57). 
 Chiang Mai subsequently rose to become a powerful city-state in the region 
and a player in the regional politics at the time, for instance, supporting Luang 
Phrabang (in present-day Laos) against Vietnamese incursions. Chiang Mai‟s 
independence, however, was not to last, as in 1558 the Burmese took the city and 
Chiang Mai became a part of Burma for the next 200 years.  
                                                 
6
 Tai [ไต] refers to speakers of Tai-Kadai languages, while Thai [ไทย] refers to the Thai nation-state or 
Siamese language. 
7
 The identity of both the residents of Haribunchaya and the “Lwa” is a hotly-contested thing, and I 
explore academic debates over this issue in chapter two. Here, I follow the admittedly simplistic model 
of Buddhist Mon cities and animist rural Lwa populations presented by Saratsawadi (2001). 
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 Burma favored Chiang Saen over Chiang Mai as Lanna‟s center, and as a 
result Chiang Mai waned in influence underneath Burmese rule. Yet this time period is 
one of special importance in Chiang Mai‟s history owing to its startling absence in 
Chiang Mai‟s historical narrative (Saratsawadi 2002:109), a lack that reflects 
nationalist Thai antipathy to the prospect of a Lanna of non-Tai origins. Indeed, once I 
offended a historian at Chiang Mai University by musing over the subject of Chiang 
Mai‟s involvement with Burma: “If Chiang Mai was a vassal state of Burma during 
the Burmese conquest of Ayutthya [the former Siamese capital, the sacking of which 
in 1767 is a pivotal moment in Thai nationalist history],” I asked, “wouldn‟t that mean 
that Chiang Mai soldiers were also amongst those who plundered Ayutthya?” He 
responded: “It‟s true that at that time Chiang Mai was a vassal state of Burma, but you 
wouldn‟t say „Chiang Mai plundered Ayutthya!‟ It was the Burmese who did it!” To 
which I added “With Chiang Mai soldiers included,” and he countered, growing 
exasperated “You can‟t say that! [mai dai phuut baeb nan - ไม่ไดพ้ดูแบบนั้น]”. While 
the nationalist narrative of an oppressive Burma and a seething, dominated Lanna has 
some basis in accounts of revolts against Burmese rule, it is worth noting that the later 
founder of the future Chiang Mai royal family, Thipchang, received numerous 
accolades and titles from the Burmese and regularly sent war tribute back to Ava – in 
other words, historical reality, especially spanning 200 years – is likely too complex 
for a simplistic reading, nationalist or otherwise (Saratsawadi 2002:129).  
Destruction and Re-creation 
After Burmese rule in Chiang Mai, the city began to weaken owing to a 
confluence of factors - the Siamese king Taksin‟s campaign against Burma, Chinese 
[Ho] incursions, and a series of bad governors. Indeed, Chiang Mai‟s charismatic 
power weakened to the point that the city was entirely abandoned in 1776 and its 
people scattered to the countryside. As Taksin‟s armies entered Thailand‟s north, they 
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encountered support from local lords capitalizing on Burma‟s retreat, one of whom, 
Kawila, was to become the founder of Chiang Mai‟s “Seven Kings” [jao jet ton – เจา้
เจด็ตน]. After Taksin returned to Siam, he left Kawila in charge of restoring Chiang 
Mai, which Kawila did through making excursions into nearby war-torn areas (most 
notably Meuang Yong in present-day Burma), areas that are today part of Burma, Laos, 
or Sipsongpanna in China‟s Yunnan region (ibid 133). This process of rebuilding the 
city by the collection of war captives was referred to as “collecting vegetables to put in 
the basket, collecting serfs to put in the meuang [kep phak sai sa, kep kha sai meuang - 
เก็บผกัใส่ซา้ เก็บขา้ใส่เมือง]” (Kaisri 1965), a collection that still is evident in various 
ethnic communities of Lue or Yong in and around Chiang Mai‟s suburbs 
 The creation of an urban population out of nothing is common in mainland 
Southeast Asia during this time period. In addition to Chiang Mai and Ayutthya, 
Chiang Saen and Vientiane likewise were destroyed, depopulated, and then restored. 
But historiography such as Saratsawadi‟s Lanna triumphalist narrative ignores the 
dislocation and trauma associated not just with the destruction of a city, but with its 
repopulation. Kawila‟s raids into nearby city-states parallel similar raids that Siamese 
(and Burmese) forces conducted in neighboring regions. Anne Hansen cites the 
journal of John Crawfurd, an English diplomat in 1821 to 1822: 
 
[T]heir wars are conducted with odious ferocity. Prisoners of rank are decapitated, 
and those of the lower orders condemned to perpetual slavery, and labour in chains. 
The peasantry of an invaded country, armed or unarmed, men, women, and children, 
are indiscriminately carried off into capitivity, and the seizure of these unfortunate 
persons appears to be the principal object of the periodical incursions which are made 
into an enemy‟s territory (Crawfurd 347, cited in Hansen 2008:51). 
Here, the term “slavery” requires some clarification and contains nuances that 
Crawfurd is likely to ignore. While the violence and horror of forced dislocation is not 
to be understated, Southeast Asian life in that time period was never free of obligation 
to or dependence upon others. Thanet Aphornsuvan writes that, for nineteenth-century 
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Siam, “Freedom from other people, especially potential supporters and patrons, was 
not desirable or even imaginable. It was tantamount to suicide; one was looked upon 
as a thuan (raw, wild, untamed) [เถ่ือน – note Thanet‟s different Romanization] person” 
(Thanet 1998:170). One was always enmeshed in a web of dependency on one‟s 
patron (and/or subjects), thus never truly “free.”  
Kawila‟s “kep kha sai meuang” specifies the sort of slave which the war 
captive will become: a kha [ขา้], “servant”, to be distinguished from both a thaat [ทาส] 
(an absolute slave and what Crawfurd likely had in mind when he wrote that the 
captives would “labour in chains”) but also distinguished from a phrai [ไพร่ - a 
peasant or serf]. This term, kha, is still used to refer to a civil servant [ขา้ราชการ - 
kharatchagaan] or in the archaic Northern feminine pronoun kha-jao [ขา้เจา้ - meaning 
“your servant,” but literally “servant of the lord”]. Kha were people bound to a 
particular place and a particular trade. Many of the communities formed with the 
captives of Kawila‟s raids were called kha wat [servants of the temple] of a certain 
origin (e.g. Tai Lüe or Tai Yong) and tied to a certain trade (e.g. silverwork or 
lacquerware), often trade that then served as part of Chaing Mai‟s tribute towards its 
overlord at the time – Siam. These communities and their descendants are clustered in 
a crescent around the southern and southeastern edge of the city (for reasons which I 
explore later). 
 Kawila‟s rule began Lanna‟s long phase as a Siamese vassal state under the 
local rule of the jao jet ton, and their rule saw Lanna undergo radical changes. British 
and other European merchants began to aggressively exploit the teak forests of the 
North, and owing to this new influx of capital (in British colonial rupees), the Chiang 
Mai royalty and lesser lords [เจา้ - jao] began to lose control of their domains. As 
European merchants lobbied for teak contracts, jao, through greed or inattention, often 
granted multiple contracts to different companies on the same plot of forest (Pasuk and 
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Baker 1995:104, Saratsawadi 2002:169-171). Responding to complaints about the 
local lords‟ management of the forest, Bangkok appropriated the forests, removing a 
significant source of the jao‟s income. In addition, Siam began to apply direct taxes to 
luxury goods such as betel via tax farmers, further removing sources of income from 
the local lords in the process (as many such crops were traditional royal monopolies), 
and causing widespread anger amongst the population, directed towards the Siamese 
and the often ethnically Chinese tax collectors. This anger erupted into open revolt on 
several occasions around the turn of the 20
th
 century (Nopakhun 2003:13). While the 
Phrae uprising around this time is perhaps the most famous, a similar event happened 
in 1889 in the Chiang Mai suburb of San Sai, where a local leader [พญา - phaya] led 
an uprising of Shan and Northern Thais to Chiang Mai in order to rid the North of 
“chao jek tai” [จาวเจก๊ไต]้ – Chinese people and “southern” [Bangkok] Thais 
(Nopakhun 2003:15). Indeed, the revolt‟s grouping together of Thai and Chinese into 
a common enemy of Northerners and Shan proves a counter-example to Thai 
nationalist suppositions of a unitary ethnic consciousness supporting a union with 
Bangkok. 
 Other destabilzing effects of national integration were more subtle. As 
Bangkok attempted to deal with the jao and take control of the lucrative teak market, 
they allowed the jao to seize and lay claim to large tracts of farm land, land that would 
later become problematic with relation to its tenants (Pasuk and Baker 1995:315). One 
technique that local jao used to evict tenants was to accuse the owners of wanted land 
of harboring a witch-spirit [ผกี๊ะ - phi ka], a lineage spirit [ผปีู่ ยา่ - phi pu nya] that had 
become malevolent owing to neglect (see Anan 1984 and discussion in chapter seven, 
below). Those displaced by the jao became a landless class. 
 The antagonistic relationship between Siam and its “Lao” provinces (as the 
Siamese termed the North) continued as Siamese policy attempted to bring Chiang 
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Mai in closer accord with Bangkok through the implementation of Central Thai script 
as the only language used in education (passed in 1903) and the discrediting and 
imprisonment of a charismatic Northern monk, Kuba Siwichai in 1935 (Saratsawadi 
2002:212-3). Indeed, Siwichai remains extremely popular in the North, adorning many 
if not most Northern-owned establishments alongside images of the Thai king
8
 as a 
symbol of Northern spiritual power. In fact, a list of “charges” leveled at him by the 
Bangkok religious authorities remains popular as a symbol of the superior magical 
power of Lanna monks – it includes such feats as allowing the rain to fall upon the 
monk from Bangkok while Siwichai remained dry or walking several meters above the 
ground, while the Bangkokian monk had to tread on the earth (in the latter case, 
Siwichai‟s position in the air above the Siamese monk is one of magico-religious 
superiority – see discussion in chapter six, below). The image of a spiritually pure, if 
less cunning and savvy North juxtaposed with a worldly but impure Thai
9
, remains a 
common trope in both Northern self-stereotype as well as Bangkokian interpretations 
of Lanna history and culture, and it is one that I address in more detail below. 
Lanna history ends – in those terms, at least - abruptly in the 1930s. As Lanna 
became fully integrated into the Thai nation-state, at least in terms of governance, 
“Lanna Studies” [ลา้นนาศึกษา - lanna suksaa] end their scope of analysis. However, 
Northern Thailand continues as a part of the greater Thai state and in fact becomes 
reconceptualized as being a region that is in some senses “more Thai” than elsewhere, 
as I detail in chapter two, below.  
                                                 
8
 While this might seem to be a contradiction: a symbol of Northern resistance and a symbol of 
Bangkokian dominance next to each other, it is no longer such. Rather, much as white Americans in the 
Deep South can fly Confederate and American flags together without feeling contradictory, the images 
of Northern independence and Thai royalty have symbolically come together for reasons that I explore 
below. 
9
 Meaning “people from Bangkok.” Northerners, especially those from non-middle class backgrounds, 
often refer to those from other parts of Thailand as “Thai,” and themselves as khon meuang when 
speaking about internal divisions. Of course, in comparison to a foreign outsider (a Vietnamese, person, 
for example), all are “Thai.” 
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During the 20
th
 century, Chiang Mai grew at a stunted pace in comparison with 
Bangkok, despite the construction of rail lines in the 1920s and the establishment of 
Chiang Mai University in 1964. It remained primarily a rural capital, and as such was 
and is still in a similar position as Thailand‟s Northeast, a stronghold of poor peasant 
farmers and a source for migrant labor moving to Bangkok. Yet spurred by nationalist 
re-interpretations of Chiang Mai (that I detail below), another idea about Northern 
identity began to grow during the latter part of the 20
th
 century, in addition to the old 
idea of the North as a rural hinterland. Nidthi Aeusriwongse details the creation in 
Thai national discourse of a new “image” [ภาพ - pahb] of the North, one with beautiful 
women, cool weather, and flowers (Nidthi 1991). Such an image went hand-in-hand 
with the promotion of national and international tourism to Chiang Mai as a “city of 
culture”.  Roughly one and a half million visitors per year were listed as tourists by the 
Tourist Authority of Thailand‟s Chiang Mai office in 2006 and 2007, over half of 
them domestic tourists,
10
 large figures when one takes into comparison the fact that 
Chiang Mai‟s metropolitan area only holds about one million residents.  
The city‟s latest brush with fame was that former prime minster Thaksin 
Shinawatra was born in Chiang Mai, the scion of a wealthy Sino-Thai trading family 
and current political flash point. Accordingly, Chiang Mai has been (and, to date, 
remains) a stronghold of support for Thaksin and whatever name his allied political 
movements follow (TRT, PPP, UDD, or simply “Red Shirts”). During Thaksin‟s reign, 
new tourist projects such as the Chiang Mai Night Safari were proposed and (some of 
them) developed (see analysis in chapter eight, below). These sites were controversial 
                                                 
10
 TAT data show 54% of visitors as Thai. Other significant groups include Americans (8%), 
Malaysians (4%), British, Japanese, German, and French (3% each). The data are based upon hotel 
occupancy and reflect somewhat of an atypical year, given both the Floral Exposition for the King in 
Chiang Mai (2006-7) and the military coup of 2006. 
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to many activists and academics, but to many others they were a symbol of 
“development” finally arriving in Thailand‟s North. 
Chiang Mai has grown somewhat from the sleepy rural town to a medium-
sized city and today boasts two large shopping malls and an international airport. As I 
mention above, also transforming in the city is a glut of high-rise housing projects and 
luxury home furnishing stores supplying the emigrant (national or international) 
population living in its condominiums or gated communities – or, more specifically, 
these stores and spaces exist, ready to catch the expected emigrants once the flow 
increases. Such a discourse of waiting for the boom is widespread: as a real estate 
agent who became a friend and informant in Chiang Mai said, ever since the 1990s she 
has been flooded with poor landowners trying to invest in a second home (on credit) 
“pheua hai farang11chao” [เพื่อใหฟ้ร่ังเช่า – “for the Caucasians to rent”] in the hopes 
that this will make them wealthy.  
Despite its small size, Chiang Mai is Thailand‟s second largest city outside of 
Bangkok‟s metropolitan region and as such deserves to be mentioned in a study of 
urban life in Thailand. Indeed, Bangkok is somewhat of a world apart from the rest of 
Thailand, being the clearest example of a “primate city” – one city which holds a 
disproportionate amount of a country‟s urban population – in Asia, as it is home to 
72% of the Thai urban population and overshadows Chiang Mai by a factor of 33.4 
(Boonchuen and Ho 2006:119). Yet despite this, studies of urban life in Thailand 
invariably focus on the capital city (Akhin 1975, Boonchuen and Ho 2006; Askew 
1993, 1994a, 1994b, 2002), ignoring the smaller and mid-sized cities in the provinces. 
I hope to contribute to the discussion of urban Thailand by providing a perspective 
                                                 
11
 Farang is the general term used to denote Caucasians. It derives from the Persian ferengyi, meaning 
“Frank.” 
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from a different angle, from that of a modern meuang, rather than the central krung 
[กรุง - metropole].12  
Research methods 
 My methods involved a long-term, focused interaction with several small 
groups of people in field sites across the city
13
. Like Marc Askew‟s study of Bangkok 
(2002), I chose groups and areas which shared an orientation towards a particular 
theme rather than an intense study of a single coherent community (e.g. Hannerz 
1969).  For my study, focused on the process of mediation between an imagined, 
authentically “Lanna” past and a ruinous present, I worked primarily with 
professionals involved with this process of mediation. In this, I follow in the spirit (if 
not the system) of Boyer‟s (2002) study of German journalists and their engagement 
with an idea of German “spirit”. Rejecting an essentialist reading of culture as a thing 
which inhabits certain places (e.g. a temple) and not others (e.g. Starbucks), I chose 
both areas and groups of people who were identified to me as either representative of 
Chiang Mai‟s uniqueness or those specifically referred to me as representative of 
Chiang Mai‟s decline or the death of its culture.  
 Each group of my informants was tied to the production of knowledge about 
the city in certain ways. My primary group of informants was a diffuse community of 
spirit mediums in Chiang Mai‟s near suburbs. These mediums acted as the vessels for 
the literal spirits of houses and neighborhoods, ghosts that had come from the Lanna 
era or before explicitly to bring baaramii from this period of time forward into the 
present. Yet the mediums were not the only professionals acting as intermediaries 
                                                 
12
 I discuss the many and varied terms for “city” below.  
13
 Owing to the mobile nature of city life, specifying how many fieldsites I worked in and how many 
informants I interviewed becomes impossible – if I meet an informant in a café on one street and then 
travel with him to a temple across town, then go to a celebration at his home in the suburbs, is this three 
fieldsites? Is he one informant or does he, the café waiter, the monk at the temple, and his thirty 
relatives at his party make thirty-three informants? 
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between the imagined past and the imagined future. A group of artists living in Chiang 
Mai‟s fashionable suburbs, for instance, saw themselves as embodying a particularly 
Northern way of life, one which took place in a fashionable area of the city and 
involved coffee shops, galleries, and the like, all of which had within them, according 
to these artists, an aesthetic quality stemming from Chiang Mai‟s Lanna past and 
leading to a future city founded on aesthetics rather than commerce, an aesthetic often 
termed “Lanna style.” The artists, architects and others constructing this aesthetic of 
“Lanna style” saw themselves as rejecting a “frozen form” of a historical city but 
instead realizing the city‟s potential in utopian, high-modern architecture.  
My interviews and ethnography were nearly all conducted in Central Thai, 
indeed, for many of my college-educated Northern Thai informants, Central Thai was 
a more familiar language than Northern.
14
 For others, such as the night watchmen or 
spirit mediums, I used Northern Thai. A handful of the academics and perhaps two or 
three of my artist informants were entirely fluent in English, and in those instances we 
either used a blend of the two languages or spoke English.  
I conducted the main body of my fieldwork during a strange time in Thai 
politics, as the dates of my field research almost exactly coincided with the military 
rule following the ouster of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006. I arrived a few days after the 
military coup and left a few days before the People Power Party (a new iteration of 
Thaksin‟s “Thai Rak Thai” party) took power in 2008. The period of time when I 
conducted my fieldwork was a particular time of anxiety for many in the North. Many 
in the city saw the election of Thaksin as giving the city a link to national power, 
formerly confined to the capital, but with Thaksin‟s outser, the utopic future that 
                                                 
14
 Northern Thai differs from Central Thai in terms of some vocabulary, aspiration, the presence of a ny 
in addition to a y phoeneme, and some tonal shifts, such as “ไป๋” instead of “ไป” for “to go.” In many 
ways, Northern Thai shares more with Laotian or Northeastern Thai than Central Thai, but this 
statement is controversial for political reasons that become apparent below.  
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Northerners had imagined was about to emerge had been suddenly removed, leaving 
that hopeful sense suddenly soured. 
In the course of my fieldwork, I lived in a rapidly-expanding part of the city, 
near Srimangkalajan road or Nimmanhaemin road, by the larger Huay Kaew road. 
Here, I met many of my key informants: local youth living the lifestyle that they 
dreamed was along the lines of Bangkok or (as they often asked me) New York; artists 
from Bangkok trying to walk the line between having an “authentic” experience in the 
(perceived to be) rural, peaceful North and maintaining their lifestyle of middle-class 
consumption; foreigners from America, Europe, Australia, or Japan, seeking to re-
imagine their lives post-retirement or post-disillusionment; tribal people working as 
laborers, having migrated to the city from rural areas or fled from the military regime 
in Burma; architects and city planners, using the expanding edge of Chiang Mai as a 
canvas for their dreams of a “garden city”; and spirit mediums, articulating the literal 
voices of the places which were being overwritten and re-imagined. In the spirit of 
urban anthropology, each of these categories of people holds a different perspective on 
what it means to be a city: each perspective is necessary to arrive at a holistic image of 
contemporary Chiang Mai.  
Overview of the Text 
 Chapter one of this manuscript is an overview of various areas in the city with 
an eye towards how residents interpret the urban environment. In this section, I 
introduce themes, characters, and places which will recur later in the text as I focus on 
three rapidly-changing areas in the city: a section of the old city; the city‟s near 
suburbs, lying outside of the city square but within the outer walls; and an area of new 
growth, having been built largely since the 1980s and rapidly changing now. These 
divisions correspond with the way in which space had been divided during Chiang 
Mai‟s independent and vassal period (until the late 19th century), although this idea of 
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space, explored further in chapter five, has undergone radical changes. This chapter is 
intended to introduce a reader unfamiliar with the city to the different kinds of space 
and communities in Chiang Mai. Many of the ideas that I introduce in chapter one I 
revisit later in the dissertation. 
 In chapters two and three, I examine the ambiguous status of Chiang Mai in 
relation to Bangkok, both in historical perspective as well as in modern media. Such 
an analysis relates to the idea of the city in terms of Chiang Mai‟s transition from 
central meuang to regional satellite. In chapter two, I analyze the quality of jaroen 
[progress] in and how this concept connects Chiang Mai‟s urbanity to ideas about 
progress and development as well as the fear of the loss of these, a fear which will 
become important in the discussion of ghosts and spirits, those things which cause 
either the furthering or the hindering of jaroen.  
In chapter three, I examine how Chiang Mai has been troped in Central Thai 
literature in relation to the center. At various points in history and in various situations,  
Chiang Mai shifts from being cast as a foreign power, to being a rural backwater, to a 
reservoir of pure “Thainess.” These tropes – exotically Other, allochronous space, and 
national treasure – at present exist simultaneously, and are deployed at various 
moments for various purposes. Ultimately, Chiang Mai‟s position vis-à-vis Bangkok is 
paradoxical, as it is depicted in these texts: both pure reservoir for national culture and 
also as backwards, foreign “other.” 
 Chapter four moves to the discussion of “the image of Chiang Mai” in a 
formulation that I am taking from Nidthi (1991), as I examine the presentation of 
Chiang Mai in Thai films and in artistic representations by both Northern and Central 
sources. While academic texts have often emphasized a nationalistic view of Chiang 
Mai as the source of some “authentic Thai-ness,” lay texts often take a more 
ambiguous stance, casting this authenticity and purity, often represented through the 
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image of a beautiful but naïve Northern woman, as something in need of a civilized 
Central gaze – in other words, Chiang Mai‟s jaroen is in a state of pontentiality and 
not realization in these depictions. This idea sets the stage for my turn in later chapters 
towards looking at the process of mediation between past and present images. A state 
of potentiality requires a voice, a medium to articulate the potential in Chiang Mai‟s 
culture and turn it into jaroen.  
 Yet before I address the issue of mediation and realization, I must first 
examine potentiality. Therefore, in chapter five, I look at changing ideas about the city 
as “sacred center” (Swearer 1987) in Northern Thai history. The city in religious and 
magico-religious texts links urban potentiality to a system of spatiality – forest versus 
city, center versus periphery, and sacred versus profane space. Such ideas underlie 
beliefs about urbanity, whether they take the form of the supernatural legacy of the 
city or its cultural heritage. 
 Chapter six and seven address the process of mediation of Chiang Mai‟s 
spiritscape and the ways in which spirits (and their mediums) become the lens through 
which some Chiang Mai residents articulate their hopes and fears about the city. In 
chapter six, concerns about urban chaos and a fear of a loss of jaroen become 
articulated through ghost stories. I examine these stories both through culturological 
explanations of purity and the urban environment as well as a cross-cultural analysis 
of urban fear and the changing way in which the city is “read” by its inhabitants. 
Chapter seven deals in more depth the topic of benign spirits of neighborhood and 
space, specifically those spirit cults which have long played a role in mediating past 
and present in Chiang Mai. 
 The eighth and final chapter looks at other mediums in Chiang Mai – architects 
and planners who make reference to Chiang Mai‟s past as the vehicle by which the 
future will achieve its jaroen. Yet this rebirth is not unproblematic. Disparate voices 
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such as high-modern architects, urban planners, and community activists each present 
differing and conflicting goals. The discussion returns to the idea of culture [วฒันธรรม 
- watthanatham] and the re-fashioning and selective editing of elements of Chiang 
Mai‟s urbanity – what Herzfeld (2006) describes as “spatial cleansing.”  
 Ultimately, my argument is that beliefs about the spirits of the past – including 
the magico-religious cults of ancestor spirits, the malevolent ghosts of violent past 
events imagined or real, and the often-invoked “spirit of the past” which takes form in 
debates over cultural heritage [conceived of as watthanatham or moradok – มรดก] – 
recur as the causes for fortune and misfortune in the city. Yet the spectral nature of 
these forces allows for their continual re-interpretation and re-imgaining, so that they 
serve multiple and often contradictory purposes.  
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CHAPTER ONE: Situating the City 
 “Draw me a map of the city,” I demanded of Boon as we sat on the balcony of 
his hospital room. It was a tactic that I often used with my informants when I began 
talking about space in the city, but I had special hopes for Boon‟s map, as Boon had 
lived in Chiang Mai his entire life, and his family owned the oldest (at over 50 years) 
Hainanese-style coffee shop in the city. Business was rapidly declining, ironic given 
the concomitant rise in Starbucks and Northern-themed Thai variants (e.g. Café 
Waawee, Doi Tung Coffee, or the Bangkok-centered Black Canyon Coffee or Café 
Nero), and Boon saw in the decline of his family‟s business a profound change in the 
city. His map of the city was in some ways a map of these changes. 
 Boon sketched a square – the old city walls – pierced by five gates, followed 
by a broad curve from the southwestern corner to the northeastern – the earthen 
rampart. He moved on to draw the Ping River and Doi Suthep, then placed several of 
the major 1960s-era landmarks on or near the banks of the Ping (specifically, the 
French Embassy, the Montfort School, and the Prince Royal‟s College). Tha Phae road 
stretched out and connected these buildings with the square. Then, Boon drew his own 
neighborhood – Chang Pheuak, that region just north and outside of the old city gates, 
and eclipsed by another broad arc, this one in darker lines than before – the new 
highway stretching out across the north part of the city above Chang Pheuak, crossing 
the Ping River, and trailing off towards the south. The highway neatly enclosed the 
city of Chiang Mai: it began in the new, fashionable districts of Nimmanhaemin, 
where the new coffee shops had their epicenter, bound Chang Pheuak together with 
the old city, and wrapped around those landmarks near the river, neatly enclosing 
everything within Chaing Mai into one circle. 
 Afterwards, looking at the dark lines of his map, Boon reflected on the changes 
in the city: “It‟s hotter now than before, because all of the traffic.” I asked if the boom 
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had begun suddenly – the superhighway was certainly a new development. “No, no, it 
came steadily [เร่ือยๆ - reuay reuay], but each year it‟s hotter, more enclosed [แออดั - 
ae-at], and more chaotic [วุน่วาย - woon-wai].” 
 While on the surface Boon‟s comments seem like a failing shopowner‟s 
nostalgia for better days, coupled with global-warming-inspired anxiety, the discourse 
of heat, chaos, and, as Boon later related, malevolent ghosts, shared a connection – 
each of these forces were on the rise in the city. I explore this theme in chapter six, 
below, but here I wish to follow Boon‟s map in order to spatially orient a reader 
unfamiliar with the city.   
Chiang Mai sits in a valley, with mountain ranges to the north and west, the 
river Ping to the east, and low floodplain meandering off towards the ancient Mon city 
of Lamphun to the south. Mangrai, the city‟s founder, identified the site as having 
auspicious characteristics both geographical (well-drained soil, fresh water coming 
from the mountains) and supernatural (a colony of albino rats and deer). Such an 
attention to detail was doubly important upon Chiang Mai‟s founding, as the city of 
Wiang Kum Kam, Mangrai‟s prior urban project, had just been destroyed by a flood.  
 Here, I detail three neighborhoods in the city which correspond with three 
major divisions within Chiang Mai‟s urban area. I begin with an area inside of the old 
city walls, then one in the near suburbs (in an area repopulated by Kawila during 
Chiang Mai‟s 18th-century reconstruction), and finally the new, expanding 
neighborhood of Nimmanhaemin. Each of these zones captures a certain characteristic 
of the city, and each reflects the fast pace of change in urban Chiang Mai. Each of the 
three neighborhoods has also been cited by different groups as being somehow the 
home of a real “Chiang Mai identity” [เอกลกัษณ์- ekkalak – lit: “principal appearance”], 
and the different and contradictory images of Chiang Mai recur through my later 
chapters.  
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First I look at an area of the old city – that part of town bordered by the city 
gates and walls. Space is in the old city for the most part no longer associated with the 
tutlelary spirits of the gates and corners, although in some cases a cult or the memory 
of a spirit cult remains. Instead, it is a place where tourist dollars and the national 
cultural heritage industry promote their interpretation of local culture and the image of 
the city, yet the persistant remnants of spirit cults provides an example of the parallels 
between cultural heritage and of mediumship (explored in more detail in chapter six) – 
both the invocation of the city‟s heritage and the invocation of the city‟s spirits for the 
benefit of present and future prosperity. 
Next, I examine an area in the city outside of the city walls just beyond Saen 
Pung gate which had first been a suburb for Thai Lue war captives [ขา้วดั - kha wat] – 
part of the area where King Kawila used to settle the results of his efforts to “collect 
people to put in the meuang”. This neighborhood was an example of a “community” 
as conceived of by many city officials and other culture brokers in Chiang Mai: 
homogenous, easily- categorized and publicized. The last neighborhood is 
Nimmanhaemin - a newly-constructed area, cited by many architects and planners as 
being the city‟s most fashionable and having a clearly-defined identity (which I here 
problematize). For an idea of where these places are spatially, see figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 
 
The Old City [ในเวยีง -nai wiang] 
Wi Faa sold lottery tickets in front of the shrine of Lord Chiang Mai Gate [เจา้
ประตูเชียงใหม่ - jao pratuu chiang mai]. This was a spirit who looked after the market 
sellers at the nearby Chiang Mai Gate market and who lived in the southeastern gate.
15
 
A shrine to him leaned out dangerously into the busy street, but Faa assured me that I 
had nothing to fear. “If you go down there to Saen Pung gate, there are car crashes all 
the time
16. Lord Chiang Mai Gate doesn‟t let that happen here. People are good to 
him.” The spirit received offerings in the early morning from market vendors, 
                                                 
15
 The seup chataa meuang [สืบชะตาเมือง] ritual does not recognize such an entity and instead charges a 
deity of the four cardinal directions – jayabhumo, guardian of the south – with Chiang Mai gate 
(Sommai and Doré  1991:150). It is important to note here the difference between mediumship-oriented 
lay practice and Buddhist ritual – see Pattana 2005 or my discussion in chapter seven. 
16
 The significance of car crashes at Saen Pung gate is made more clear in chapter six, below. 
Figure 4: Simple map of Chiang Mai 
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although his altar had to be locked at night owing to the theft of some offering bowls 
last year. When I asked Faa where, other than the market, Lord Chiang Mai‟s 
supplicants came from, Faa grew more evasive. She said that residents from the 
central square downward to the gate used to make offerings to him, but that so many 
of the original inhaibitants had been displaced that the offerings were far less than 
before. Additionally, the shrine‟s medium had died and the spirit had not called on 
anyone else to replace her. She continued: “I still wai [ไหว ้-show respect for/ pray to] 
him, because I sell tickets here and because I used to live here. But we had to move 
because new people came into the city.” I asked who these new people might be, and 
she replied unequivocably: “Chinese people. Look around at these houses here, it‟s all 
Chinese people. You go back from here, it‟s all Chinese [จีนหมด - jiin mot].” Faa‟s 
accusation of “the Chinese” doesn‟t refer solely to overseas Chinese investors, 
although these were also a part of Chiang Mai‟s changing cultural mosaic. Rather, Faa 
is referring to business speculators, who in the parlance of many older resident, were 
inseparable with the figure of the wealthy Sino-Thai businessman. Whether Chinese 
nationals, Thai of Chinese descent, overseas Chinese Malay, or other, they were all 
simply “khon jiin [คนจีน]” to Faa17. What is significant here is how Faa refers to the 
neighborhood on the basis of its old allegiance to Lord Chiang Mai Gate and Faa‟s 
own perception that the old city has become a space where Northern Thais are not 
welcome or cannot live.  
Pattana Kitiarsa (2002) analyzes the connection between spirit mediumship 
and the relief of anxieties produced by an increasingly changing world (174). I analyze 
                                                 
17
 Faa is not using the common semi-slur jek [เจก็] here, although that remains in wide use amongst 
Northern Thai speakers. Perhaps this is because our conversations were primarily in Central Thai, or 
perhaps, while she was certainly dismissive of “the Chinese” in the old city, she made an attempt not to 
be openly rude or angry. Also, Faa is possibly, like many older Northern Thais, equating “Chinese” 
with “Central Thai,” an association which has a long history (see my comments on the anti-Central Thai 
rebellions above).  
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spirit mediumship in more detail in chapter seven, below, but here I wish to reconcile 
Faa‟s anxiety about the possibility of increasing car crashes owing to Lord Chiang Mai 
Gate‟s lack of a medium with the fact that the numbers of spirit mediums relative to 
the population are actually increasing in Chiang Mai as the city expands (see Irvine 
1984 for specifics of Chiang Mai‟s growth in mediumship, or Pattana 2002 for a more 
general overview). In fact, Lord Chiang Mai Gate‟s decline has more to do with the 
change in spirit mediumship and changes in social patterns with the city‟s expansion. 
As I argue in chapters six and seven below, an increasingly atomized population, 
while retaining a need for the kinds of psychological resassurance and recourse to 
magic that mediumship provides, moves towards more decentralized and 
charismatically-oriented mediumship (e.g. Lord Golden Coins) over place-based cults 
(like that of Lord Chiang Mai Gate). 
What is enlightening about Faa‟s characterization of the old city as being a 
space full of foreigners is not in its total accuracy, although the boom in Chiang Mai‟s 
tourist industry has rendered much of the city center prime real estate and caused a 
resultant surge in the number of Mexican restaurants, reggae bars, and used bookstores. 
Indeed, many of the sites most ritually important to Chiang Mai‟s Buddhist and spirit 
medium communities are located in and around the old city walls. But the sense of the 
decline of some inchoate force and its appropriation by foreigners that Faa articulates 
is something which echoes in many of my informants‟ discourse in regards to the old 
city. I explore this idea of appropriation and decline in more detail in chapters six and 
seven, below, although it is a theme which runs throughout this manuscript 
The Premodern Suburbs [ววัลาย - wua lai] 
Directly over the wall and across the moat from Lord Chiang Mai Gate‟s 
shrine is Wua Lai, the most famous of Chiang Mai‟s ethnic enclaves, those 
communities of war captives from the past century that I detailed in a previous chapter. 
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Thanon [major street] wua lai [ถนนววัลาย] marks a direct line from Chiang Mai Gate 
(the southeastern gate of the old city) to the kamphaeng din
18
 [กาํแพงดิน] at Hai Ya 
gate
19
, a breach in the dirt wall with an ancient cemetery just outside. Midway down 
the street, another lane crosses, forming an “X” at the heart of the community. Just off 
of the intersection are two main temples, both of which highlight the silver work done 
in the community, but in a traffic island in the direct center of the intersection is a 
statue of a cow [ววั - wua]. This statue is home to the guardian spirit of the community, 
and is propitiated with incense and garlands of flowers and would at one time have a 
spirit medium to act as a literal voice of the neighborhood. 
Yet this shrine has not had a medium for years. Like Lord Chiang Mai Gate, 
the guardian spirit of Wua Lai, while occasionally given garlands of flowers and 
incense, does not serve an active role in the organization of the community 
surrounding the crossroads. This is not because mediumship in general has declined in 
the city – to the contrary, Chiang Mai‟s mediums are more numerous than ever, yet 
mediumship attached to communities defined by geographic space has declined. 
 Despite the lack of spirit mediumship, Wua Lai would be the prime example of 
the sort of community which well-meaning friends, officials, and informants would 
have wished me to study. According to the narrative that many of my informants 
related, in Wua Lai there is but one ethnic group (Tai Khoen – war captives from 
Kawila‟s raiding expeditions), one religion (Buddhist), and one product (silver). 
Products and goods are commodified and sold for profit to tourists both local and 
foreign, but the character of the town – at least on the surface – is still distinct from 
other parts of the city. It is a place where culture – in the official, state version 
                                                 
18
 The term “kamphaeng din” is often synonymous with prostitution in Chiang Mai, much as “sanam 
luang” is in Bangkok, but the section of the dirt wall in Wua Lai does not now have that connotation. 
One must go further east from Wua Lai along the dirt wall before brothels appear.  
19
 See chapters five, six, and eight for a description of Hai Ya gate and its connection to the 
cosmological system of Chiang Mai‟s city plan. 
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[watthanatham] – is being promoted and developed, as opposed to the neighborhoods 
where I conducted most of my research.
20
 The community has a clear image, nicely 
categorized and parceled, and the lack of mediumship present at other, similar spirit 
shrines (see chapter seven) does not present a problem. Rather, as I discuss throughout 
this manuscript, a cultural image edited of elements that seem too “backwards” to the 
modern Thai is precisely what is being cultivated in Chiang Mai.  
The Modern City [นิมมานแหมินทร์ - nimmanhaemin] 
 Unlike the radial X of Wua Lai, newer, modern neighborhoods are laid out in 
grid patterns often aligned more or less on the cardinal directions. These 
neighborhoods were often the invention of a particular developer: whereas older 
sections of town (with the exception of the space within the city walls) had grown 
from a system of landownership defined either by a feudal layout or out of agricultural 
plantations, in these sections, large areas of rice fields from multiple owners had been 
bought and then converted en masse into a regular grid (for a discussion of gated 
communities in the suburbs, see chapter six).  
 One of the most distinctive of these, according to many planners with whom I 
worked, was the area around Nimmanhaemin road – indeed, several city planners 
singled out Nimmanhaemin road as a place with a clear “identity” [ekkalak]. This 
neighborhood had been at one time rice fields or orchards, but at its edge closest to the 
city the land included a royal mansion, the House of Seven Springs [คุ่มเจด็ริน - khum 
jet rin]. Like those of many of Chiang Mai‟s royal families, this house had fallen into 
ruin during the 20
th
 century as the residents amassed large gambling debts. The family 
attempted to pay the debts by selling off plots of land, and it is through this process 
                                                 
20
 Yet despite this representation, the homogeneity of the neighborhood was largely a fiction. Many of 
its residents were students at Chiang Mai University or simply residents who had moved into what had 
become an area very close to the city center. 
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that the land needed to create Nimmanhaemin area [ยา่น - yaan21] was purchased by 
the family of Kraisri Nimmanhaemin, the honorary anthropologist who was also 
responsible for the trademark blue shirt now worn as a symbol of the North (see 
discussion in chapter four, below). Ultimately, neighborhood gossip had it that the 
branch of the royal family was not able to absolve its debts, the husband and wife 
committed suicide (although one informant, an older, educated resident, hinted darkly 
that the suicide was not entirely voluntary on both sides), and the house fell into ruin. 
It entirely disappeared during the course of my fieldwork, to be replaced with a high-
rise housing complex.  
 Yet the rumors of this fallen royal land, acquired by developers unscrupulously 
capitalizing on the collapse of the Chiang Mai nobility, were paralleled by rumors 
about the opposite side of the Nimmanhaemin area. As land prices increase, so the 
rumors tell, the large empty stretches of untended woods that marks a paa chaa [ป่าชา้ - 
graveyard]
 22
 become valuable and at some point the allure of money overrode the fear 
of ghosts and these areas are purchased and built upon. This also created a fear of the 
new neighborhoods on the part of many of my informants, especially those who felt 
the most excluded from the new construction around Nimmanhaemin, as these new 
spaces were spots where a sense of moral obligation towards traditional spatial layout 
had been sacrificed for the sake of profit (paralleling the allegations made that year 
                                                 
21
 I deal with the term “yaan” later. Here, it refers to a neighborhood or a region defined in opposition to 
other regions. It is a term without a clear counterpart in Northern Thai (muu might be the closest 
equivalent) and my Northern Thai informants readily identified it as being a Central Thai word. 
22
 I was not able to verify that this area had indeed at one point in time been a charnel ground, but it was 
widely believed to be so. The fear of the unknown history of purchases of new land (which could in fact 
be a terribly polluted and haunted place) and stories about such events are common throughout Thailand 
– for instance, in the deadly New Year‟s Eve 2008-2009 fire of the Santika club in Bangkok had been 
rumored to be caused by vengeful Muslim spirits because the place had been built on a Muslim 
graveyard. Here, the point is not to prove or disprove that this place or that is a ป่าชา้ paa chaa [charnel 
ground], rather, I am interested in the ways in which rumors articulate fears about location and purity. 
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against Thaksin Shinawatra, that he had sacrificed his national loyalty for the sake of 
profit).  
Yaam,
23
 a guard outside of a high-rise complex was fond of making dark 
predictions about the expansion of residential zones into former sacred ground. He 
was specifically referring to the large, paved square behind the building, a lot that had 
changed hands several times and renamed itself from Kaad choem doi [กาดเชิมดอย - 
Nothern: the market at the edge of the mountain] to Prasert Land, this latter advertised 
in Thai, English, and Chinese – it was also the stretch of land on which many of the 
haunted high-rise buildings stood and where a new high-rise luxury condominium, the 
Punna buiding (detailed in chapter six, below), was currently being constructed. Yaam 
reiterated the rumors about Prasertland being a former cemetery and pointed to a 
statue as proof: a statue of the famous kuba [Central: ครูบา - khruu baa] srwichai [ศรี
วชิยั] in the middle of a traffic circle which was in turn in the center of the large, open 
square.  
 “See those trees there?” Yaam asked me as we leaned on the fence bordering 
the lot of the high-rise and the lot. He gestured across the concrete space to two 
withererd trees that grew incongruously from the concrete out of small squares of 
earth that had been spared the paving. “That‟s where the ghosts [ผเีฮ้ียน - phi hian]24 
live. There was a man who tried to cut them down once. They offered a lot of money, 
some thousand baht [Yaam meant a vague range from about $60 to $100], to chop it 
down. And they got someone! He stood up there with the chainsaw, and do you know 
what happens?” Yaam lowered his voice and gave me a small smile in anticipation, 
                                                 
23
 The name, like most names in this manuscript, is a pseudonym. Yaam [ยาม] simply means “guard.” 
24
 Hian is a malevolent spirit, generally synonymous with a [ผีตายโหง] phi taai hoong, a “ghost of bad 
death”.  See discussion in chapter seven, below. 
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“the chain broke! It came back and hit the man and killed him! Now, no one is brave 
enough to chop it.” Yaam smiled at me as he asked “would you cut it?”  
 While no one touched the trees, the lot underwent radical change during my 
fieldwork. At first, there were a few large music venues bordering the lot, using the 
pavement as a parking space for their customers. The empty space was used for police 
training exercises or as an open field for people to play badminton or fly model 
airplanes. But soon after my arrival new construction began. Two rows of bars sprung 
up, catering to college students and wealthier Thais, and the monk‟s statue 
disappeared. Additionally, the Punna broke ground in the center of the concrete square. 
 Back on Nimmanhaemin proper, Japanese restaurants and Italian-themed 
coffee shops lined the street. Nimmanhaemin had become in several short years the 
fashionable district for wealthy Bangkokians visiting the city and seeking night life, 
and expensive cars with Bangkok plates were a common sight travelling down that 
road.  As I mention in chapters six and eight below, the area was praised by many of 
my planning and architect informants for having a certain style, characterized by 
concrete buildings with large glass facades and a good deal of high-modern influence 
(see also Komson 2006:44). 
 Others were less gracious. Sohn faek [โซนแฟค - fake zone] and sohn krung 
thep [โซนกรุงเทพฯ - Bangkok zone] were some of the names given to the street by 
many of my younger interlocutors. Another telling sign of Nimmanhaemin‟s 
foreignness was the use of the Central term yaan [ยา่น] in reference to the area: yaan 
Nimmanhaemin. Whereas other areas of the city got their informal name from a 
nearby temple or market or even intersection, yaan Nimmanhaemin was always a yaan. 
Pam, a woman in her twenties working at a publisher nearby dissuaded me from my 
interest in the growing street. “That place is not Chiang Mai. Chiang Mai people won‟t 
go there, it‟s all Bangkok people. It‟s too expensive; Chiang Mai people don‟t need 
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that.” Yet despite her dismissal, she admitted to frequenting a few nightclubs along the 
street. 
 Her characterization of Nimmanhaemin as a place only for Bangkokians does 
not, of course ring wholly true. The place attracts Westerners living for a longer time 
in the city, especially NGO workers or foreign missionaries, who mingle 
uncomfortably with older expatriate men and their younger Thai partners. Japanese 
retirees also frequent a few high-rise buildings in the city, and there are enough in the 
area to support a Japanese-language radio broadcast. Yet another group of expatriates 
living along the street are less widely acknowledged – Burmese nationals working as 
illicit construction labor.  
 As in other expanding parts of the city, Shan communities cluster at the base of 
a construction site. In Nimmanhaemin, during my stay, there were two such mini-
cities hidden in the lanes behind the strips of buildings lining the street. That of the 
workers constructing the Punna building lay behind a corrugated metal wall. The 
homes were constructed of planks of wood and corrugated metal, and stood up off of 
the ground on stilts in an L-shaped row on the edge of the lot, with a platform for a 
shower and lavatory in the back. A house on the corner had been converted into a 
small vegetable and sundry store, supplied by periodic visits of a travelling Shan sales-
cart. In the center of the L stood a raised bamboo platform on which the men would sit 
and drink in the early evening. Near this was the spirit pole – a miniature version of 
the city pillar, in this case consisting of a tree with a small, corrugated-metal house 
nailed into its side. The owner of the sundry story would place a candle and some 
incense in the home in the evening, after the workers had come home safely.  
Nimmanhaemin represents a modern re-writing of the city much as the old city 
and Wua Lai do, although in Nimmanhaemin, the city is remade along straight lines 
and the rewriting of former meanings of land. Land, like the graveyard, that was once 
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unusable has gained use-value, but the old meanings of place (Yaam‟s old ghosts) 
remain as palimpsests much as Wua Lai‟s X or the shrine of Lord Chaing Mai Gate 
does. Indeed, Yaam saw in Nimmanhaemin‟s growth a dangerous ignorance of local 
history, much as Pam saw in the same a callous foreignness that was nonetheless 
attractive. 
 Nimmanhaemin, spatially, presents several contradictions at once. Unlike Wua 
Lai, Nimmanhaemin had no distinct center. The stores become larger and more 
expensive as one approaches the Rim Kham corner, and Nimmanhaemin‟s style 
continued in a fashion along the busier and wider Huay Kaew road towards the 
university with such university-oriented high-society places as MO‟C MO‟L 
coffeeshop and “resort restaurant” and the Maze Café, near Rim Kham corner. 
Nimmanhaemin also features a high-end tourist souvenier and home furnishings lane, 
several lanes with mixed homes and bars (causing a headache for residents who 
suddenly find the house next door turned into a nightclub), a gated community nestled 
deep in the lane, a gay massage parlor, a couple of high-end hostess bars catering 
primarily to Thai residents, and eventually Chiang Mai University‟s conference center.  
Nimmanhaemin‟s residents were largely transplants from elsewhere – doctors, 
professors, and wealthy professionals: most of the local residents that I interviewed 
had moved to Chiang Mai from Bangkok and selected Nimmanaheminda for its quiet 
atmosphere, an atmosphere that was in the process of radically changing from a 
residential zone to a nightlife and style-oriented zone. Ae and Moh were professors at 
Chiang Mai University who had lived on Nimmanhaemin since its founding. Moh 
recounted how the roads were, during the 1970s, bordered with rice fields. “It was 
dark, and dangerous,” he said, recounting how bandits would string a line up across 
the road in order to knock passing motorcyclists off of their bikes. Yet despite the 
fears of bandits, such recollections were tinged with nostalgia for a past time, and 
 40 
 
contrasted with dire predictions about the neighborhood now. Ae complained that her 
house – one of the first on the street – shared a wall with a bar, and the sound of 
people drinking, talking, and shouting kept her up all night, and Moh lamented that 
drunken youth were shouting and fighting outside of his house after the bars‟ closing 
times. 
 Indeed, noise was a constant presence on Nimmanhaemin. I rented an 
apartment on Nimmanhaemin for part of my fieldwork time, and the daily cycle of 
noise illuminated the street‟s varied demographics. At dawn, construction began on 
the high-rise buildings, and the sound of machinery and jackhammers filled the air 
until evening. Behind these noises, traffic from the nearby roads ensured that there 
was no moment of silence. At dusk, or during a rain shower, the work would cease, 
and noise dropped back to a dull hum of car and motorcycle engines. As the night 
deepend, the workers, having eaten, would begin to sing. Songs in Shan filtered up 
from the metal shacks, along with shouts and laughter. Then, around nine o‟clock, the 
street noise would increase and music from neighboring pubs (with names in English, 
like “Warm-Up,” or “Fine Thanks”) would increase: a mix of American and Thai pop 
songs. The music would remain constant, but the patrons grew more raucous until 
around two or three AM, fights often broke out. An impromptu contest of motorcycle 
engine-revving and racing down the street ensued after the bars closed and continued 
until the pre-dawn hours. In the quiet of the night after the bars‟ closing, from 3 AM 
until dawn, only the howling of street dogs or the rooster kept by the Shan laborers 
broke the stillness, until the construction began again. 
 Here, I have introduced several themes: the idea of tutelary spirits and cultural 
heritage in the examples from the old city or Wua Lai; migrant labor, criminality, and 
malevolent ghosts in the example of Nimmanhaemin, and all of these involve features 
of the built environment. In the following chapters, I address these topics in turn, but 
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first I must provide a common thread to each of these themes. One linkage between 
these seemingly disparate elements lies in the idea of khwaam jaroen [ความเจริญ] – a 
term that means progress, prosperity, and advancement. It is to this concept that I now 
turn. 
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CHAPTER TWO: Tropes of Progress, Culture, and National Belonging 
 
Chiang Mai is one of the centers of Thai tourism, second only to Thailand‟s 
beach destinations of Phuket and Koh Samui in popularity outside of the capital. What 
landlocked, mountain-bound Chiang Mai offers the tourist is not the sun and sand of 
the Andaman and Gulf islands, but the appeal rather rests upon some idea of 
encountering “authentic” culture (recall the sign advertising Chiang Mai as a meuang 
haeng watthanatham), a trope that holds true for both foreign and Thai visitors 
(Morris 2000:16 n.6). In this section, I explore how the “New City” [the literal 
translation of chiang mai] becomes thought of as such a reservoir for national 
nostalgia if indeed its history is “prior and independent of Bangkok‟s” (ibid). Chiang 
Mai is, in the discourse of watthanatham, a center for cultural resources, resources 
which are conceived of as existing as standing reserve for the good of the nation. Here, 
I examine these ideas of watthanatham and jaroen and show how they relate to 
concepts of both technological development and the supernatural.  
Watthanatham and culture 
The Thai term watthanatham is generally glossed as “culture,” in the sense that 
it refers to elements of society such as manners, art, and religion. But, unlike the 
agricultural origins of the term “culture” in English, watthanatham in Thai is not 
simply something which emerges spontaneously out of the folk. Rather, it is a quality 
which can be constructed anew, built, and improved upon. Change and modernization 
do not necessarily erase watthanatham, but rather historical and cultural elements 
presage and inform the present and future. Watthanatham, in the way that the term is 
used by culture brokers in Chiang Mai, is a quality that, when properly realized, brings 
forth jaroen: development, progress, enlightenment – in this way, the use of the term 
watthanatham could not mirror the use of the English “culture” to refer to something 
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negative, such as a “culture of poverty25.” Thai nationalist and localist discourses, 
detailed below, about Chiang Mai‟s watthanatham posit a golden past, one where Thai 
culture was “pure,” and one which will re-emerge in an equally utopic yet modern 
future. The seeds of Chiang Mai‟s imagined high-modern destiny, sown in its 
watthanatham, are always presented as being embedded in its history, only await their 
realization.  
A History of Watthanatham 
Current Thai conceptualizations of culture and nation have roots in the early 
20
th
 century modernization of the country. Watthanatham, a Sanskrit neologism 
coined during the latter half of the 19
th
 century, was taken up and promoted by luang 
Wichit
26
 Wathakan, a key figure in nationalist-era Thai image-making, as the artistic, 
architectural, and sartorial achievements of the nation and “the underlying basis of 
morals and behavior which led to „national progress and stability‟” (Barmé 1993:161). 
It was meant to be a nationalist alternative to a more royal-oriented arayatham [อารย
ธรรม]: “civilization,” literally “the dharma [ธรรม - tham] of the Aryans,” which, as is 
common in South and Southeast Asia, linked culture and civilization to a mythic 
“Aryan” people. Watthanatham, then, literally means “the dharma of progress 
[wattana].” Accordingly, watthanatham was a future-oriented idea, rather than the 
(pseudo-)historical construction of arayatham or even the folk-oriented idea of 
“culture” as in English.  
 In Wichit‟s formulation, watthanatham contained this dual nature of being 
both forward-oriented while referencing the past. Seeking to distance Thai nationalism 
                                                 
25
 I once said that visiting prostitutes was a part of Thai watthanatham, after I had referred to the fact 
that many of my male informants engaged in this activity. My interlocutor, a professor at Chiang Mai 
University, became suddenly cold and replied simply: “No, that is not part of Thai culture” in English. 
Later, she stressed that this was a problem, to be distinguished and differentiated from something which 
would be considered watthanatham. 
26
 Here I follow Barmé‟s Romanization rather than my own [e.g. Wijit].  
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from the Khmer-influenced monarchy, Wichit cited the watthanatham of the ancient 
kingdom of Sukhothai during the reign of the semi-mythical King Ramkhamhaeng as 
a period of time when watthanatham thai was more pure. Watthanatham for Wichit 
here meant things which were high priority for the developing Thai state: wide roads, 
a market economy, and thriving artistic culture – indeed, in the realm of 
industrialization, Wichit compared Ramkhamhaeng favorably to Mussolini (Barmé 
1993:162). Another aspect of Ramkhamhaeng‟s watthanatham that Wichit used as an 
example of Sukhothai‟s progressiveness was the fact that on the Ramkhamhaeng stele 
(the monument upon which much of Thai thought surrounding the ancient kingdom is 
based), the consonants and vowels are all on the same line, “western-style” (Barmé  
1993:161) – in other words, by writing letters that superficially resembled European 
alphabets, Sukhothai had somehow anticipated the progress and development that 
Wichit saw in the European powers, only to be stymied by the introduction of Khmer 
alphabet, with its super- and subscripts. Therefore, according to Wichit, Bangkok‟s 
modernization in both infrastructure as well as what he thought of as cultural 
modernization (i.e. Westernization) was simply returning to the roots of 
“watthanatham sukhothai” (Saichol 2002:9). Westernization was, for Wichit and the 
Phibun administration, simply the end realization of Ramkhamhaeng‟s original dream 
– making Thai history something both (almost supernaturally) forseen in ancient 
history and anticipating 20
th
-century developments, all orchestrated by a grand 
architect. 
“Westernization” here went far beyond industrialization and entered the realm 
of culture and habits – indeed, for the Phibun administration, industrial development 
and the cultivation of Victorian methods of comportment (e.g. wearing hats, wearing 
pants, and having men kiss their wives before they leave for work in the morning) 
were linked. As Jiraporn Witayasakpan claims, “the national cultural policy which 
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Phibun propagated was an embodiment of urban culture modeled after the lifestyle 
and etiquette of the European metropolitan bourgeoisie (Jiraporn 1992:232).” What I 
seek to highlight here is the link that Phibun and Wichit made between a supposedly 
ancient watthanatham thai and a developmentalist notion of Westernization and 
technological progress. In other words, like the idea of “Lanna” (as I describe below) 
is for those re-imagining it today, Sukhothai was for early 20
th
-century Thai 
nationalists a source of some intangible quality – watthanatham – that existed in the 
past in order to achieve its ultimate realization in the future of the nation. This is the 
reason why watthanatham only contains positive elements – those cultural aspects 
which are deemed retrogressive are signs of watthanatham’s failure to manifest. 
Watthanatham in the Present 
This formulation of watthanatham as something which is both past and future-
oriented still exists today. To understand how watthanatham is used in a national 
context, it is perhaps useful to analyze in-depth the policy of the Office of the National 
Culture Commission. As the English website and the Thai website present entirely 
different readings – a telling sign of the Thai “regime of images” (Jackson 2004) 
wherein certain scripts are present for local audiences and entirely other scripts are 
presented to foreign readers, I will provide the Thai script and my own English 
translation of it instead of the English-language text. The Commission‟s stated 
purpose is fourfold: 
 
1. ส่งเสริมการบาํรุงรักษาวฒันธรรมไทยทุกดา้นใหเ้จริญ  ดว้ยการศึกษา คน้ควา้ วจิยั ฟ้ืนฟู 
และพฒันาวฒันธรรมไทย เป็นเคร่ืองมือ สาํคญัสาํหรับการแกปั้ญหาการดาํเนินชีวติการ
พฒันาประเทศดา้นสังคม เศรษฐกิจ การเมือง และการป้องกนัประเทศ  ป้องกนัการทาํลาย 
วฒันธรรมและศาสนา และทาํนุบาํรุงศาสนาใหบ้ริสุทธ์ิ เพื่อเป็นหลกัในการพฒันา จิตใจ
ประชาชน [To support the promotion and preservation of Thai culture of every 
facet, to make it progress along with the education about, the research into, the 
revival  of, and the development of Thai culture. The Office is an important 
tool for correcting the problems in the advancement of living and development 
for the country and for the society, economy, politics, and protection of the 
country, to protect from destruction culture and religion, and to preserve and 
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develop religion in order to make it pure, as it is the development and mind of 
the population.] 
 
2. เผยแพร่วฒันธรรมไทยทุกดา้นนาํไปสู่ประชาชนถึงขั้นปฏิบติัใหแ้พร่หลายยิง่ข้ึน เพื่อให้
เกิดความรู้ ความเขา้ใจ ตระหนกัถึงความสาํคญัของวฒันธรรมท่ีมีต่อเอกลกัษณ์ ศกัด์ิศรี 
ความสามคัคีและความมัน่คงของชาติ ตลอดจนเกิดความเขา้ใจซ่ึงกนัและกนั ทั้ง
ภายในประเทศและระหวา่งประเทศ [To publicize every facet of Thai culture; to 
introduce it to reach the population more and disseminate it more, in order to 
bring knowledge, understanding, and awareness of the importance of culture 
towards identity, prestige, cooperation, and stability of the country, until it 
brings mutual understanding, both inside the country and internationally.] 
 
3. ส่งเสริมวฒันธรรมพื้นบา้นและวฒันธรรมของกลุ่มชนในทอ้งถ่ิน เพื่อใหป้ระชาชน มี
ความเขา้ใจ เห็นคุณค่าและยอมรับวฒันธรรมของทอ้งถ่ินซ่ึงกนัและกนั ก่อใหเ้กิดการ 
ผสมผสานทางวฒันธรรมอนัจะนาํไปสู่การอยูร่่วมกนัอยา่งมีสันติสุขในชาติ และมีความรัก
หวงแหน วฒันธรรมไทยยิง่ข้ึน [Promote local culture and culture of groups of 
people in the local areas, in order to make the population have understanding 
and to see the value and accept each other‟s local culture, to begin the blending 
of local cultures
27
 in order to live together peacefully in the nation, and to 
cause the people have more love and attachment to Thai culture.] 
 
4. สนบัสนุนส่งเสริมใหมี้การแลกเปล่ียนวฒันธรรมกบัต่างประเทศ เพื่อเสริมสร้างความ 
เขา้ใจอนัดีระหวา่งชาติ รวมทั้งรู้จกัเลือกสรรคว์ฒันธรรมของต่างชาติท่ีเผยแพร่เขา้มาใน 
ประเทศไทย หรือผลจากการแลกเปล่ียนวฒันธรรม โดยนาํมากลัน่กรอง ปรับปรุง ดดัแปลง
ใหเ้หมาะสมกบัวถีิการดาํเนินชีวติของคนไทยและความมัน่คง ปลอดภยัของชาติ [To 
promote cultural exchange with foreign countries in order to build 
understanding between nations. To be familiar with, choose, and build upon 
that foreign culture that is spreading in Thailand or the effects of this cultural 
exchange, by way of scrutinizing and protecting against change, so that it is 
appropriate with the way of life of Thai people and the stability and safety of 
the nation.] 
 
5. สนบัสนุนส่งเสริมใหห้น่วยงานของรัฐและของเอกชน ท่ีดาํเนินงานดา้นวฒันธรรม ได้
ประสานงานกนัอยา่งใกลชิ้ด โดยการระดมสรรพกาํลงัทั้งภาครัฐและภาคเอกชน เพื่อรักษา 
และส่งเสริมวฒันธรรมใหม้ัน่คง เป็นพื้นฐานของการดาํเนินชีวติของประชาชนตลอดจน
ร่วมกนั แกไ้ขปัญหาท่ีเก่ียวกบัวฒันธรรม เพื่อใหว้ฒันธรรมมีบทบาทสนบัสนุนการพฒันา
ประเทศอยา่งแทจ้ริง [To promote the ministries of the government and the 
private sector that are carrying out the work of culture to work closer together 
and to muster all the parts of the government and private sector to preserve and 
promote culture to make it stable. Culture is the basis of progressing the life of 
the people to come together. It will cure the problems about culture so that 
culture has a role in the development of the country for true progress.]  
 This statement contains within it some key assumptions that are vital to how 
Chiang Mai‟s watthanatham is perceived by local and national forces. First of all, 
culture is tied to religion [ศาสนา - sasana], a word which in everyday usage is nearly 
always synonymous with “Buddhist.” It is the job of the state to ensure that religion 
                                                 
27
 I.e. have each province understand and accept each other province‟s culture. 
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remains “pure” [บริสุทธ์ิ - borisut], because, as the Office states, religion “is the 
development and mind [จิตใจ - jit-jai]28 of the nation.” Such a call for the state to be 
involved in the promotion and development of religion (again, implied Buddhism) is 
reflected in government offices dealing with religious matters in the city hall. Indeed, 
during my fieldwork, the issue of whether or not Buddhism was to be Thailand‟s 
established religion in the new (2006) constitution was being decided (eventually the 
movement narrowly lost), and many times my Northern palm-leaf script classroom 
abandoned the particulars of Lanna writing in favor of an invective to “support sasana 
[religion]” in the constitution – again implying that Islam or other religions are not 
“sasana.” Such support is important because, according to the Office‟s statement, 
religion and culture are lak nai kan patthana [หลกัในการพฒันา] – bases of development. 
Indeed, the term watthana and patthana share a common Pali root. 
Secondly, according to the Office, it is the job of the state to act as a broker 
between cultures of disparate localities so that people have “more love and attachment 
to Thai culture” and “live together peacefully in the nation,” with nation here defined 
as the ethno-racial category chat [ชาติ](for a full description of chat and its 
development from a Buddhist concept of “being of a common origin” – e.g. chat phrai 
[ชาติไพร่ - born as a peasant], chat kasat [ชาติกษตัริย ์ - born as a king] – to the equation 
of chat with an ethno-racial category, see Thongchai 1994).  In this conceptualization, 
the sharing and blending of cultures within the chat helps to weave together the 
nation-state, pulling potentially fragmentary groups away from potential centers other 
than Bangkok (e.g. Isaan and Laos, Thailand‟s south and Malaysia). Such a concept, 
of a unitary chat with one religion and one culture, all mobilized in order to provide 
development and progress for the nation is, as I address below, both antithetical to 
                                                 
28
 จิตใจ here has within it the idea of thought and heart. I am tempted to translate it as something 
approaching the colloquial invocation of “soul” but do not, for fear of eliticing any overtly Christian 
ideas. 
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theambiguity and fluidity present in older Thai constructions of the meuang and also a 
continuation of ideas about cultural and religious value‟s usefulness in creating 
prosperity in the here and now.  
Watthanatham thai, as I mention above in connection with the idea of 
watthanatham sukhothai, exists on an evolutionary timeframe of prosperity [ความเจริญ
khwaam jaroen] and development [การพฒันา - kaan pattana] - in the same idiom as 
roads, bridges, and dams are signs of development. Here, prosperity and development 
is the end result desired from the bolstering of watthanatham, but, according to the 
website, watthanatham itself is not sufficient – otherwise the Ministry would simply 
have to “protect” and “preserve,” not “bolster” and “develop.” Rather, raw 
watthanatham must be developed and cultivated so that it can progress [jaroen]. This 
sort of configuration – of a raw watthanatham in need of development – becomes 
important to my discussion of “watthanatham Lanna” below, in chapter five. 
Such ideas make their way into the consciousness of everyday Thais, as 
educational systems reinforce such readings of linear, progressive culture (recalling 
Althusser‟s Ideological State Apparatus). It is through such systems that members of 
Chiang Mai‟s educated class came to see themselves as such. For instance, one 
example of this concept of an evolutionary framework for watthanatham and jaroen at 
play in my field research involved an exhibition of student work, where a group of 
undergraduate architecture students were asked to create a space that represented a 
certain idea. One student group had chosen khwaam jaroen [prosperity, progress] as 
their theme.  They had designed four cubes, each representing for the students a 
different stage in human understanding. The first was small and sat flat on the ground, 
representing, as one student explained, the (according to the student, synonymous) 
categories of ชาวป่า [chao pa], ชาวบนดอย [chao bon doi], or in official Thai parlance, 
ชาวเขา [chao khao] – non-Thai, non-Buddhist hill tribes inhabiting the forests and 
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mountains. The flat box had, unlike the others, nothing golden within it, nothing of 
value and no “understanding” [ความรู้ - khwaam ruu]. The next box was tilted and had 
within it a small golden ball – the seeds of jaroen, the student explained. This one 
represented a farmer, [ชาวนา] chao na. In the third box, the golden object was larger: a 
villager, [ชาวบา้น] chao baan, with a greater understanding of the world. The fourth 
box was large enough that it could be entered – thereby rendering it the box of the 
educated person [คนท่ีมีความเรียนรู้ – khon thii mii khwaam rian ruu], and recalling my 
drawing of a division in Chiang Mai society between the “educated classes” and those 
considered without. Significantly, this was the box that could be entered, marking it as 
the place for the project‟s presumed audience. Yet the box of the educated person, 
with his/her greater understanding of the world was not the final stage of jaroen. 
Through a small aperture the visitor could see the silouhette of a yellow figure dressed 
in a military uniform, giving a salute: the fifth position on the hierarchy of khwaam 
jaroen – the king. As one progressed along the series of boxes, one was in the process 
of jaroen
29
 (although significantly the fifth stage was unreachable by the observer), the 
observer (i.e. a student or professor – a member of the “educated class”) was assured 
that they had all of the knowledge in each of the previous boxes (i.e. that a student had 
more knowledge than a farmer) yet could never reach the last. 
Here, jaroen is both the end result of watthanatham and something which must 
be done to watthanatham – the two are interlinked. A hill tribesperson cannot jaroen 
himself, according to the students making the display; rather, he must be given the 
seeds of jaroen by those who already possess it. Implying from the Ministry of 
Culture‟s website, if watthanatham is the foundation for development, then the 
“undeveloped” tribes do not possess it – one way of saying “a civilized person” is [ผูมี้
                                                 
29
 Using a Thai word in English sentences raises the problem of conjugation. Jaroen is a verb, khwaam 
jaroen is the noun form. While the English-speaking reader may wish some form of conjugation 
(jaroen-ed, jaroen-ing), I refrain from doing so here. 
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วฒันธรรม] phu mii watthanatham, “the person with watthanatham.” Indeed, in one 
famous example of an attempt to develop tribal regions, the Thai queen, noticing that 
Karen people
30
 were making silver jewelry, “gave” patterns to Karen silversmiths to 
help them “develop.” In other words, indigenous Karen cultural aesthetics were not 
sufficient in order to inspire jaroen, rather, in this way of thinking, they needed an 
influx of watthanatham from a higher source.In other words, watthanatham differs 
from “culture” in that it exists on a gradient and is at some level interchangeable with 
other forms of watthanatham: the uncivilized do not have it while the civilized do, but 
it can be transferred from the haves to the have-nots across “cultural” lines without 
any significant alterations or loss. Culture is fungible. One can borrow watthanatham 
wholesale from another culture and therefore improve and increase one‟s own 
watthanatham, much as Wichit and Phibun sought to do by selectively appropriating 
certain aspects of European and Japanese powers. This idea of the free importation 
and improvement of culture becomes important to my discussion of Lanna style in 
chapter eight, below. 
Watthanatham, then, is not “culture.” Below, I compare watthanatham to the 
Italian idea of civiltà
31
, in that, like civiltà, watthanatham is a system of cultivation 
and refinement that has links to the city, but here I wish to draw attention to the fact 
that watthanatham contains within it a need for and a sense of development. It is the 
end result of tradtional practices [ประเพณี - praphenii] or beliefs that have undergone 
jaroen in a way that bolsters those elements that will allow national(ist) culture to 
develop and progress. Indeed, similar to watthanatham‟s Sanskrit root word watthana, 
khwaam jaroen, has in its Khmer (Cambodian) origins the meaning of “to expand until 
complete in a positive sense” (Thongchai 2000a:531), an idea that, though it 
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 The Karen are one of many groups lumped under the ur-category chao khao- “hill tribes.” 
31
 The reader should remember the links between Wichit and Mussolini here, in that both saw their own 
projects as rediscovering a fallen and tainted empire. 
 51 
 
originated in Buddhist thought, is now synonymous with technological development 
and progress.  
As I mention above, as watthanatham cannot be divorced from the idea of 
progress and utility, it also cannot be divorced from the idea of “the West.32” 
Thonghchai describes in detail the Thai elite‟s attempt to selectively imitate and 
reproduce European patterns of ettiquite, technology, and practices – all of that 
material that made Europeans “civilized” or, as the Thai elite put it, [ศรีวไิลซ์ – siwilai] 
(Thongchai 2000a). This imitation was a strategic positioning carried out in order “to 
attain and confirm the relative superiority of Siam” (ibid 529) vis-à-vis Siam‟s 
dependents (including Lanna) and neighbors. In addition, the Siamese elite‟s 
positioning of themselves as internal colonizers performed a similar sort of 
sympathetic magic as did earlier forms of city-planning which placed the king at the 
position of Indra (and which I detail below). According to Thongchai, by assuming a 
European role, Siamese elites attempted to acquire some of the Europeans‟ “cosmic 
power” (Thongchai 2000a:539) – having the trappings and appearance of an imperial 
power would thereby render Siam the equal (on some levels, at least) with France, 
Britain, and the Netherlands. While here I primarily deal with the Siamese elite, as 
Thongchai and other historians do, what I wish to argue later is that these discourses 
become the foundation for the boom in the Thai culture industry, as well as 
foundational elements of the instruction of Thailand‟s educated class (Peleggi 2002:1). 
Returning to the 19
th
 and early 20
th
-century Siamese elite, the absorption and 
imitation of Western norms and aesthetics occurred in a very different manner than in 
formally colonized spaces, such as Siam‟s neighbors. The lack of an absolute colonial 
                                                 
32
 I do not wish to suppose a division between a uniform category of “Western” thought and a category 
of “Eastern” thought – a tired trope - but I will refer to the West as an entity here when I am referring to 
early nationalist Thai thought, as Wichit and his contemporaries certainly saw the West as such an 
entity. 
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power allowed the Siamese elite to choose what they would adopt and integrate as 
siwiliai things and what they would not. This marginal (yet still independent) status 
vis-à-vis European powers is what Herzfeld (2002) terms “crypto-colonized” – Siam 
adopted European norms internally rather than having them directly imposed via a 
colonial state. Herzfeld notes that crypto-colonized countries (he includes Greece in 
this category) are characterized by an “aggressively national culture fashioned to suit 
foreign models” (Herzfeld 2002:901), but unlike colonial-derived models of culture, 
the origins of watthanatham are putatively local, therefore unable to be questioned - to 
challenge the idea of watthanatham is to be “un-Thai” (Herzfeld 2002:904).  
The idea of watthanatham, then, is vital to understand Thai conceptions of the 
mediation of past and future, as it forms the link between the two. This linkage is 
especially salient in Chiang Mai. As I mention above, tourist materials – from 
websites to brochures to the banner draped over the superhighway - depict Chiang Mai 
as a “cultural city.” Such a claim is repeated often in tourist literature and popular 
literature aimed at foreigners and Thais alike. As such, it is expected that foreign 
researchers should travel to that province to conduct cultural research, and I was 
received as just such a researcher when I began describing my project. I had been 
chatting via Skype with a Chiang Mai resident graduate student named Goong, 
offering some editing of her English in exchange for help with Chiang Mai‟s local 
dialect, kammeuang [Northern: กาํเมือง, Central: คาํเมือง. The term literally means 
“words of the city”]. When I first arrived in Chiang Mai and met Goong over coffe, 
she was enthusiastic about my choice of fieldsite: “Of course you‟d want to come to 
Chiang Mai. Farang [ฟร่ัง - Caucasians] like Chiang Mai! There are so many farang 
here. You will love it.” Such a comment seems unusual – suddenly I, a Thai speaker 
and PhD-seeking researcher - was lumped in with tourists fresh off of the night bus 
from Bangkok. According to Goong, we both “loved” Chiang Mai for the same 
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reasons. For Goong, my attraction to Chiang Mai was natural: I was interested in 
culture, tourists were interested in culture, the tourists and I were both farang, and as 
such my interest made perfect sense to her.   
 Of course, the realization that one, as an ethnographer, is anticipated and 
indeed replicated by consumer-interested groups (such as tourist or housing 
development promoters) is something which ethnographers have been noticing for 
years. Dorst describes his own experience working in rural Pennsylvania as “post-
ethnographic” (Dorst 1989:204) for that reason. The shock, for Dorst, is that not only 
have people been conducting research recognizable as “ethnographic,” but are often 
using the same sorts of resources as an “actual” ethnographer might (ibid). Holmes 
and Marcus term such figures “para-ethnographic,” referring to the kind of self-study 
which parallels earlier ethnographic concerns about cultural codification and 
categorization (2006:35). With the attention to codifying, describing, and celebrating 
the watthanatham of Chiang Mai, such figures abound in and around the city. For 
instance, the former police captain Anu Noenhaat runs a series of popular books called 
sangkohm meuang chiang mai [สังคมเมืองเชียงใหม่ – lit. “Society of Chiang Mai”] 
which have reached their eleventh volume to date, describing various aspects of 
Chiang Mai life and culture such as spirit cults (2003) or the local history of a certain 
street (2005). Other para-ethnographic works detail certain aspects of Northern life: 
historical and cultural sketches (Nathakaan 2001, Thanet 2001, Withi 2005), 
interviews with older craftsmen (Jaruphat 2007), even an entire book on Lanna ghosts 
and spirits (Mala 2008). 
Nationalism and watthanatham in Chiang Mai 
With watthanatham mediating between origins and future, Chiang Mai‟s 
polyglot origins as an independent kingdom full of Burmese and Lao influences might 
at first seem problematic to Thai nationalists, as the 1932 government‟s move towards 
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an state founded on a shared, “Thai” ethnicity required the category “Thai” to extend 
to the national borders, causing the “designation of individuals as Thais regardless of 
ethnic origins” (Peleggi 2002:53). Accordingly, in national and local texts, various 
groups in Thailand were supplemented with the suffix -ไทย [Thai, as in the nation] 
(such as the term Lannathai [ลา้นนาไทย] for Northerners from the original Lanna 
[ลา้นนา] – also note the transference of the political designation Lanna to an 
ethnonym), and the adoption of central Thai language and Western dress in public 
institutions (ibid). While at first “Western dress” may seem to be an outlier, in light of 
the previous discussion of watthanatham as signifying a progress-oriented (with the 
nearest example of progress being the European colonial powers) technology, the 
practice of adopting something foreign - but deemed beneficial to the state - was not in 
conflict with the process of rendering Siam‟s provinces “Thai;” such activities were a 
part of the national watthanatham in the process of being bolstered. 
What, exactly, did early 20
th
-century nationalists mean by this term, “Thai,” 
aside from membership in a putative ethnic unity with Bangkok? Not only was it now 
to refer to a particular ethnic group, but Wichit also promoted the idea that “Thai” was 
synonymous with “the free [people]” both to solidify the periphery‟s loyalty and to 
establish irredentist claims in French Indochina – according to his formulation, French 
Laos (and at times in Wichit‟s writing, French Cambodia) as a home of “Thai” people, 
was yearning for “freedom,” implying leaving the colonial European powers and 
joining the Thai state. But, according to Wichit, the symbolic center, to be contrasted 
with the political center, of the Thai people was not in Bangkok or even in the former 
capital of Ayutthaya, but rather it was located in a more murky origin in the 13
th
-
century kingdom of Sukhothai. Thailand‟s northern city-states became places where 
Wichit imagined the “true” Thai identity to be best preserved in the present time, 
removed from the Khmer influence which had dominated Ayutthya. This association 
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between Sukhothai and Thai authenticity did not diminish after the nationalist period, 
as the royalty staged a comeback during the 1960s. Rather, 20
th
-century Thai 
historiography came to link royalty with Sukhothai and, despite downplaying some 
aspects of the nationalist period‟s signficiance (e.g. republicanism), not their 
conclusions regarding the origins of the nation (Handley 2006:152). 
Wichit‟s drive to discover/construct the essence of what was Thai ironically 
drew upon the writings of late 19
th
-century American Christian missionaries – again, 
Wichit turned towards Western powers in order to construct the meaning of Thai-ness. 
The association of “Thai” with “the free” (and the idea of a steady decline in Thainess 
through the Ayutthaya period) becomes a common trope among both American and 
Thai sources, a trope that is still in wide use today.  While an extended discussion of 
how an idea becomes produced in the English-language press, moves to the Thai-
language press and there becomes accepted as a truism, which is then returned to the 
English-language press as a deeply-held national belief may seem like a digression, it 
closely parallels processes in Chiang Mai that I detail in chapter eight, wherein Chiang 
Mai‟s “image”, produced by Central Thai sources, becomes accepted as authentically 
“Lanna” in Northern Thailand. 
The idea that Chiang Mai holds a preserved reservoir of the Tai
33
 “race” 
becomes first articulated through the works of several Presbyterian ministers 
proselytizing in the area in the late 1800s – several decades before Wichit and the 
nationalist era. Despite initial conflicts with Chiang Mai‟s kings (which may have had 
more to do with larger conflicts over hierarchy between Bangkok and Chiang Mai‟s 
monarchies), the church in Chiang Mai (begun in 1867) was relatively successful, and 
                                                 
33
 Tai [ไต], in T/hai studies literature, generally refers to the greater ethnic family (including the Dai of 
China, Tai Dam and other minority groups of Vietnam, Lao, and Shan, as well as those residents of 
Thailand, the Thai. The term and its relationship to Thailand and Thai nationalism – i.e. whether or not 
non-Thai can speak with any authority about things Tai - is subject to a great deal of debate and 
nationalist histrionics (Thak 2007:244). 
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other missions were established in Lampang
34
 and Nan. Freeman‟s book An Oriental 
Land of the Free is an overview of the region and of various missionization attempts 
in the area. It is also an advertisement for support for the northern “Lao” mission 
effort,
35
 and should be read as such. According to Freeman, Chiang Mai‟s “Laos” 
retain the positive, independent spirit that is now lost from Siamese Thais, they 
“remain to-day practically unmixed in blood and unmixed in language… they call 
themselves Tai or „The Free‟” (Freeman 1910: 16). Here are two powerful tropes: the 
North as home for the pure spirit and “blood” which the Siamese have lost; and this 
Tai spirit as somehow “Free.” The latter idea, that “the Tai” somehow had a sense of 
“their own” racial identity as a collective group and applied the term “the Free” to that 
collectivity, obviously is drawn from 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century ideas about race and 
population, but, rather than taking issue with this, what I want to stress is this trope of 
the North as the pure source of some quality which is inherent in the nation.  
The etymological association between “Thai” and “free” remains unquestioned 
in national history or self-perception, but for scholars of Thai history, the question is 
firmly put to rest. Thanet Aphornsuvan explores the process by which thai [ไท] 
becomes associated with both Thainess and freedom as the product of nationalist and 
proto-nationalist historiography, originally begun by Thai historian Prince Damrong in 
an attempt to reconfigure Thai middle-class norms in a way that would render them 
always already commensurable with modernity in a way that presaged Wichit (Thanet 
1998:180). As an example of his revisionist history, Damrong writes of slavery in 
premodern Thailand – one practice that was particularly egregious in the eyes of 
                                                 
34
 Walter E. J. Tips, in his introduction to The Laos of North Siam, an account of Lillian Johnson Curtis 
of a mission in “Meuang Lakhawn”, claims that the city of “Muong Lakon” is “nowadays less 
prominent than in her time” (Curtis 1998 [1903]:i). In fact, the reason why he cannot find the city on a 
modern map is that “Lakhawn” is simply another name for Lampang.  
35
 Siamese sources at the time – before the idea of a grand unified “Thai people” - described Northern 
Thais as “Lao” generally and “ลาวพงุดาํ - lao pung dam” [black-bellied Lao, owing to men‟s tattoos] 
specifically. 
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liberal social theory. According to Damrong, slavery was originally a Khmer 
institution, which the Thais modified and softened owing to the fact that it was 
abhorrent to Thainess in its harsher Khmer state (ibid). If Thainess, then, has little 
indigenous meaning as “free”, how did it acquire this definition in the national 
narrative? How did the idea of “the Free” leap from Freeman to Thai-language 
historiography? 
Freeman‟s idea of a Tai racial consciousness was more clearly and famously 
framed by W.C. Dodd (Dodd 1996[1923]), another Presbyterian minister who traveled 
throughout the Tai region of southern China, Burma, and then French Indochina, 
attempting to describe the extent of the Tai peoples. Dodd‟s linguistic work in itself is 
of little value as a source of historical information – Dodd‟s lists of words and their 
differentiations is, to the Thai speaker, full of errors, discrediting it as an authoritative 
source. For instance, he marks a difference between the Siamese and Lao words for 
“chicken” as that between the, according to Dodd, Siamese luuk kai [I assume he 
refers to ลูกไก่ – Dodd does not use Siamese script, so Thai script provided here is my 
own] and Lao kai [ไก่], when in fact the words mean “baby chick” and “adult chicken” 
in both languages (albeit with a tonal difference between Thai and Lao that Dodd does 
not mark). When comparing the terms for “sun,” Dodd cites the difference between 
Siamese daed [แดด] with the Lao ta-wan [ตะวนั] – in fact, the former means “the heat 
of the sun” and the latter refers to the astronomical object. The mass of errors such as 
these also include insensitivity to tones in a family of extremely tonal languages, and a 
grouping of Chiang Mai kammeuang together with a general “Lao” language.  
Dodd‟s many errors were, as I detail below, overlooked by Thai nationalists in 
favor of the grandiose (and entirely unfounded) speculative racio-history that Dodd 
promotes for the Thai race on the basis of his travels. Accordingly, the figure of moh 
Dodd [หมอโดด - Doctor Dodd] or, more simply, moh farang [หมอฟร่ัง - the Caucasian 
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doctor] appears in much nationalist work as the source of the idea that “the Tai” were 
the descendants of a great kingdom in southern China that defined themselves by their 
“freedom”– an idea which has become inseparable from the national narrative 
(Anuman 1970). While I do not know for certain why nationalist authors such as 
Wichit or Anuman ignored Dodd‟s obvious flaws, such an oversight might well have 
been seen as “improving” the quality of Thai history in the same way that Wichit 
selectively appropriated certain aspects of watthanatham sukhothai: picking points 
which support the goals of the state and ignoring those which do not is precisely what 
the Ministry of Culture calls for “be[ing] familiar with, choos[ing], and build[ing] 
upon that foreign culture that is spreading in Thailand or the effects of this cultural 
exchange, by way of scrutinizing and protecting against change, so that it is 
appropriate with the way of life of Thai people and the stability and safety of the 
nation” (see full transcript above). 
 Dodd, writing from a 19
th
 and early 20
th
-century idea of race, assumed the 
existence of a racial consciousness (as does the contemporary anthropologist Cholthira 
– see below): the idea that all Tai peoples saw themselves as a unity, existing since 
time immemorial in the region. He also provides this unity with a memory of conflict 
against the Chinese and Khmer, as well as to that of the other peoples of the region. 
Throughout his quasi-historical narrative, Dodd draws continual parallels between the 
“racial” history of the Tai and Western history: “Rome existed but a trifle over 1200 
years, Greece slightly more than 1300. The Medo-Persian Empire was short lived. 
And even the great Babylonian Empire did not attain quite 1700 years. But from the 
time when the Ai-Lao [a Tai kingdom, according to Dodd] are first mentioned in An-
hui, already a well established race, until their final expulsion, was more than 2500” 
(Dodd 1996[1923]:15). This Ai-Lao empire, according to Dodd, expands, calling itself 
“Tai,” which until it comes into conflict with the Mongolian empire. “For,” as Dodd 
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writes, “it was a period of Dark Ages in the Orient as well as in the Occident”. After 
fleeing from the Mongols, the remnants of the “free” Tai empire are enslaved by the 
Khmer only to re-emerge at Sukhothai, “while Wickliffe was busily engaged in 
translating the Bible” (Dodd 1996[1923]:18). In summary, Dodd tells us that “Uneasy 
lay the head that wore the Tai crown, but through it all, the Tai race had been shaped 
by a beneficent higher Power” (Dodd 1996[1923]:17). What I wish to point out is both 
that Dodd‟s narrative fluctuates between examples from “Western” history and a Tai 
ethno-historical narrative, binding the story of the Tai‟s rise to (and fall from) power 
to the story of Christianity‟s rise; also, as will become significant below, this narrative 
of a flight from oppressive Chinese powers to a realization in northern Thailand 
becomes a persistent trope in nationalist discourse, reappearing spectrally in 
everything from contemporary Thai-language adventure fiction (Sanya 1988) to the 
origin stories of possessing spirits.  
 The Tai, according to Dodd, are a blessed people, with an inherent freedom 
that separates them from other Asian peoples. Such a gloss would serve well to 
advertise mission work in Thailand, as supporters elsewhere might be dismayed by the 
prevailing stereotype of Oriental despotism and Asian resistance to conversion. The 
Tai, then, would be a people that funders of missionary efforts might think more 
receptive to Christianity, being “free” and somehow, Dodd suggests, secret brethren to 
European Christianity, “shaped,” as it were, by a “higher Power” (Dodd 
1996[1923]:17). If Dodd‟s speculative history and promotion of “the Thai race” as a 
once-great and independence-loving people served as a promotion for Christian 
missionary work in the North, his characterization was taken up in earnest by Thai 
nationalists seeking to build a sense of belonging in what was then Siam. Gehan 
Widjeyewardene summarizes the process: “Dodd „discovered‟ the Tai family, spent 
much time travelling through China, and wrote a book… which was soon translated 
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and became the vade mecum of a movement to re-unite the Tai within a single nation” 
(1990:49). What had been speculative linguistic work written for an audience of 
armchair academics and sympathetic missionary organizations became the 
foundational work for a nationalist movement. To chart this change, then, I switch to 
Thai-language sources. 
Wichitmatra, in his 1926 seminal nationalistic book Lak Thai [หลกัไทย - The 
Thai Foundation], references Dodd‟s speculative linguistic work as he proposes that 
the origins of the Tai peoples in southern China predate even the arrival of the Chinese. 
Wichitmatra expands upon Dodd‟s already grandiose and speculative conclusions, 
implying that the Thai may have had a hand in establishing world civilization itself, 
and certainly formed the foundation of Chinese culture, but that this grand history was 
lost and only survives in creative interpretations of Chinese annals (Wichitmatra 
1926:7). Only the name “Thai” remains, interpreted by Wichitmatra and other ethno-
nationalist historians to have a connection with the Chinese term for “great,36” and 
signifying the sheer awe with which the Chinese perceived the grand Thai empire of 
antiquity (Sarasas 1960:2). Despite the fact that Dodd‟s and by extension 
Wichitmatra‟s speculative history reflects the sort of long-term ethnohistory of Thais 
popular in the 19
th
 century but which Wijeyewardene (1990:49) and others (le May 
1986[1926]:vi) do not take seriously today, Phra Sarasas, writing in English in 1960, 
still openly cites Dodd: “How did it happen that the Chinese came to possess 
themselves of the country of the Thai, whereas the Thai went to occupy the country of 
the Khmer? This strange fact was rescued from obilivion by the white race … among 
whom features prominently Doctor William Clifford Dodd… The Thai race can look 
upon the Bablylonians of Nemrod, the Assyrians of Bilus and the Egyptians of Menes 
                                                 
36
 Here, he refers to the character for “big,” 大, which is pronounced da in Mandarin and dai in a 
Japanese reading. 
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as youngster. Compared with these ancient races, Thai proves to be a greybeard… 
„Thai is the Chinese older brother,‟ declares Dr. Dodd” (Sarasas 1960:3).   
But one need not go as far back as the 1960s to find authors in both Thai and 
English citing Dodd‟s idea that “the Thai” are the true heirs to China. Hans Penth, a 
senior scholar at Chiang Mai University, repeats Dodd‟s claims, although he cites 
unspecified “linguistic work” instead of mentioning Dodd by name, as he suggests that 
“Chinese „high culture‟ is largely based on an earlier Thai culture” (1994:10).  Indeed, 
the return to these sources (and the ignoring of contrary sources) is a continual process, 
as evinced by Sanya Phonprasithi‟s (1988) attempt to create a new Thai epic, Su 
Phaendin Mai [สู่แผน่ดินใหม่ - Into a New Land] for popular consumption. Sanya, 
having described a long migration full of colorful characters (including Jamadewi, a 
Mon queen from Lamphun whom I discuss below) cites Freeman as one of the 
“scientific” bases of his book (1988:206). 
 But Dodd‟s conclusions, as I have suggested, reached their ultimate realization 
in the formation of nationalist ideology during the 1930s.  Luang Wichit relied upon 
Dodd‟s work in formulating nationalist ideology both in early nationalist and Cold 
War, Sarit-era contexts (Thak 2007:118). For Wichit, near the beginning of World 
War II, when Thailand was allied with Japan, the missionaries‟ equation between Tai 
and “free” was full of promise. The country had just changed its name from Siam to 
Thailand after the overthrow of the absolute monarchy, and the great nationalist 
project was to attempt to unite the various regions under the banner of chat thai [ชาติ
ไทย - the Thai nation/race]. The idea that to be ethnically “Thai” was to be inherently 
“free” resonated with Phibun‟s calls for Thailand to be free of European colonialism 
and Chinese economic interests, as well as supporting the aforementioned irredentist 
claims on French and British holdings in Laos, Cambodia, and the Shan states, with 
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the ultimate goal of a “new era of independence for the country” (Barmé  1993:147, 
163).  
 Wichit, in formulating this idea of a fundamental, core “Thai-ness” that unified 
an ersatz Thailand under the banner of “the Free”, conceived of its golden age, as I 
mention above, in Sukhothai, before the – as Wichit imagined – more despotic, 
Khmer-influenced Ayutthya period. Wichit writes: 
 
Thailand was a strong and vibrant nation in the Sukhothai period … and in the time 
that has elapsed since then we should have made great progress… [However] it was 
not possible since we cast off our fundamental culture. (Quoted in Barmé 1993:162) 
Here, the reader should note the theme of economic and developmental 
stagnation stemming from a loss of culture – this theme will re-emerge in chapter 
three and chapter five, where I discuss the fears of the loss of prosperity and the loss 
of culture, but here I wish to highlight the fact that, for Wichit, the living, uncorrupted 
heirs of Sukhothai would therefore be those “Thai” people who had been on Siam‟s 
periphery, retaining the “fundamental culture.” Indeed, the 1932 constitution reads: 
“Those in the South and the North speak more genuine Thai than we in the central part 
do. Our Central Thai has been influenced by Cambodian and Indian languages…” 
(Quoted in Saichol 2002:19). Returning to Dodd, we find a clear parallel: “The Tai of 
the North have come less into contact with other great races than either the Siamese or 
the Shans have, in the south. They therefore speak a purer Tai language, and are purer 
Tai in blood than the two smaller modern divisions of the race. They not only bear the 
old race-name, but are best entitled to it” (Dodd 1996[1923]:19). The association 
between a pure North and corrupt south persists through the mid-20
th
 century: as the 
travel writer Santha Rama Rau wrote in the 1950s, “people in Thailand are apt to insist 
that Chiang Mai is the most beautiful most truly Thai of their cities. It is saturated with 
Thai history and feeling in a way that even the greatest of the later Thai capitals are 
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not” (Ping 2000:16). Chiang Mai, then, according to the nationalist narrative, is more 
truly Thai than Bangkok. 
Chiang Mai and Thainess 
 This construction, of Chiang Mai as more “Thai” than Thailand, may have 
been perfectly palatable in Bangkok during the 30s and 40s, but in Chiang Mai it 
would have been gibberish. Richard Davis notes a Chiang Mai source from that time 
referring to a foreign “Meuang Thai,” meaning Bangkok (Davis 1984:24), a term 
which place Chiang Mai outside of the bounds of the Thai national sphere, at least for 
that person. As I mentioned above, my own informants in 21
st
-century Chiang Mai 
also routinely referred to people from the central region of Thailand as คนไท [khon 
thai] or คนไต ้[khon tai - Southerners], to be contrasted with คนเมือง [khon meuang], 
“city people,” meaning people from Chiang Mai. For instance, one spirit medium from 
a small suburb of Chiang Mai confessed that she had been reluctant to meet with me, 
as she was afraid that she uu thai b’ thohp [อูไ้ทบ่ถอบ - doesn‟t speak Thai very 
clearly] and was relieved when I understood her in the local dialect.  
Writing about Chiang Mai, Michael Rhum traces the origins of the local 
ethnonym – khon meuang – which Northerners use to refer to themselves and the 
people of what was Lanna:  
 
The term is thus contrastive in its significance; the khon meuang are “the people of 
this country” (as opposed to the peoples of the hills and other countries). This throws 
the antiquity of the term into some question. It is very likely that as an ethnonym the 
term is a modern coinage, postdating the absorption of the north into the Kingdom of 
Siam and primarily contrastive with khon tai (southerner) or khon Thai (Thai or 
Siamese), the people of the central plains. The original significance of the term is thus 
geographic rather than ethnic, and only became „ethnic‟ in the context of the modern 
Thai nation-state. In earlier times an individual‟s primary geographical identification 
would have been much more local in scope. Depending on the context it might be as 
narrow as a person‟s village of origin or as wide as a principality of origin (such as, 
khon lampang, a „Lampanger‟). It is also possible that the term khon meuang 
originated in the late 18
th
 or early 19
th
 century to distinguish Tai people indigenous to 
the region from resettled war captives from other Tai states. The earliest written use 
of the term that I am aware of dates from the 20
th
 century. (Rhum 1994:3 n 3) 
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What I wish to take from Rhum is the relatively late arrival of ethnic categories 
and also that such categories arose through an encounter with Bangkok. If we imagine 
Bangkok‟s relationship with Chiang Mai is one of colonizer and colonized, parallels 
with other Southeast Asian regions present themselves. For instance, Hirschman 
makes a similar argument for Malaysia: that it was only through the British census that 
Malaysia became divided via ethnic categories – that such categories as “Malay” (or, 
in this case, “Thai” and “khon meuang”), for all their modern-day power, were in no 
way indigenous to the region (Hirschman 2006).  
 Additionally, it may be useful in the light of Dodd and Wichit‟s speculations 
on the meaning of “Thai” as also “free” to contrast the term for the dominant khon 
meuang ethnic group: thai yuan [ไทยวน]37 with the neologism referring to the old 
Northern kingdom of Lanna in Thai-language works published since the 1960s: 
lannathai [ลา้นนาไทย]. Through a detailed analysis of the ways in which the term thai 
is deployed, it becomes evident that thai has shifted in meaning from a form which is a 
classifier for “person” to something which can be used as an adjective (e.g. “to be 
nationally Thai” or “to be free”). In the term thai yuan [ไทยวน], thai is spelled without 
the silent “ย” present in “Lannathai” [ลา้นนาไทย]38, but more importantly, thai 
precedes yuan, rendering yuan an adjective: the phrase “pen thai yuan [เป็นไทยวน]” 
would then mean “to be a Yuan Thai.” In this construction, one could (and 
Northerners regularly do) replace the term thai with the classifier for “person”, khon, 
to make the phrase pen khon yuan – เป็นคนยวน -“to be a Yuan person”. In the 
expression “lannathai”, “thai”, spelled in the same manner as “Thailand” [ไทย], 
serves as an adjective, rendering “lannathai” “One Million Thai Rice Fields.”  
                                                 
37
 Readers intimately familiar with Thai ethnonyms might be initially confused here. “Yuan” can be 
spelled in two different ways: ญวน and ยวน. The latter refers to this Northern Thai ethnic group. The 
former refers to a Khmer loanword for Vietnamese and is not present in Northern Thai. The Northern 
Thai and Lao word that refers to people from Vietnam is แกว - kaew.  
38
 It is also significant to note that ไทย signifies the nation-state. 
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The distinction is perhaps not obvious at first, but when one begins to examine 
other examples where the term “thai” falls into use in the northern region, a pattern 
emerges: the older terms thai kheun [ไทเขิน] and thai yong [ไทยอง] both refer to ethnic 
groups of people that were taken from the Kheun and Yong river valleys and brought 
to Chiang Mai as the result of warfare (the people that Kawila collected to place in 
Chiang Mai‟s near suburbs). Here, as well as in the yuan case, thai [be it ไท or ไทย] is 
interchangeable with “person” – khon [คน]. Just as one can say “khon yuan [คนยวน],” 
one can also say “khon kheun [คนเขิน - person from the Kheun river valley] or “khon 
yong [คนยอง – person from the Yong river valley]”, but in the example of lannathai, 
lannakhon [ลา้นนาคน] makes no sense: “One Million Person Rice Fields.”  
One can then conclude that “Thai,” like so many other terms that have been 
retrospectively applied to ethnic groups, simply meant “person” before its nationalistic 
re-rendering. Thanet supports this analysis:  
Originally tai meant human being or humankind, so that many groups of people living 
in mainland Southeast Asia called themselves Tai-Dam, Tai-Dang, Tai-Yai, Tai-Noi, 
etc. In the Sukhothai inscriptions, the word tai referred to non-slave subjects but not 
free men, for they were still servants of the king. Towards the end of the nineteenth 
century tai became increasingly synonymous with „free‟ in the modern sense. (Thanet 
1998:180) 
 
 As Thak Chaloemtiarana (2007) describes, the nationalist construction has 
received criticism in recent years as authors such as Nidthi Aeusriwongse and Sujit 
Wongthet have challenged the idea of a racial unity underlying Thainess (Thak 
2007:246-7), but the trope remains in common use even outside of Thai-language 
sources. In his survey of Tai Groups of Thailand, Joachim Schliesinger categorizes 
several Tai “groups.” Of the Central Thai, he says: “The Thai sometimes refer to 
themselves as Thai Khom or free people” (2001:170). I have chosen this example in 
particular because it contains within it another distinction which becomes important 
below, when I discuss the idea of the city in Thai historical records. Depending on 
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how one transliterates Khom into Thai letters, the meaning ranges from “having bowed 
head” to “a lantern,” but the most likely transliteration in the context of ethnonyms is 
ขอม, the Thai term referring to the ancient Khmer. “Thai Khom” would then mean 
“the Khmer Thai.” Such a category – thai khom - has two possible definitions, neither 
of which is “the free people.” The first possible definition of khom is “city dweller.” 
As Denes notes, khom had been used to refer to people from the larger cities by those 
on the periphery – an example from Jit Pumisak is how a Lue community from Chiang 
Rai referred to Bangkok as the home of the “Khom” (Denes 2006:123). Another, more 
likely in Schliesinger‟s case, reason for the term “Thai Khom” is the expression of an 
irredentist claim to ancient Cambodia – a framing of Thai people as the inheritors of 
Ankgor‟s glory and the supposed true builders of Angkor. Denes also supports such a 
reading, as she describes how Thai monarchs claimed dominance over Angkor owing 
to their having conquered Cambodia, and the loss of Cambodia is, in royalist discourse, 
one of the “twelve losses” of territory that “should” be Thai (ibid 93). Schliesinger‟s 
unsourced fragment of information is a brief glimpse into how irredentist and ethno-
nationalist discourse still survives, and the back-and-forth from bodies of English text 
to Thai (from Dodd to Wichit) and back (from Wichit to Schliesinger).  
Thainess as an Idiom of National Integration 
Returning to Thai-language sources, in a similar sort of survey of ethnically 
Tai groups in Thailand, Sip Haa Phao Nai Thai [สิบห้าเผ่าในไทย - Fifteen Ethnic 
Groups in Thailand], Seri Aajasaalii, continuing from Wichit‟s lead, locates the well 
of Thainess in Chiang Mai. He writes:  
 
Burma, which at the time controlled Nakhorn Ping [Chiang Mai – lit. „city of 
the Ping river‟], came to suppress Ayutthya but was not able to. King Taksin 
[of Siam at Thonburi r. 1768-1782] saw that the Burmese were already in 
control of Nakhorn Ping, which was very dangerous. So, wanting to quell 
this danger, but also with a feeling of unity [ร่วฝมือ - ruam meuh] with the 
Wiang Ping [Chiang Mai – lit. „walled fortress of the Ping river‟] people, 
that they were the same ethnic group [เผา่ - pao], Burma had to be driven out. 
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The Chiang Mai people fell under the power of Burma the last time for 11 
years, together with the loss of freedom before that for 181 years. But even 
though the time was so long, over 100 years, the blood of freedom [เลือดของ
ความเป็นอิสระ - leuat khong khwaam pen isarat] was still always there. When 
any opportunity arose, the Nakhorn Ping people will rebel up and continue 
the resistance for khwaam pen thai, and will not allow themselves to fall 
under slavery [ข้ีขา้ - khii khaa] of anyone, and they preserve Thainess [ความ
เป็นไทย - khwaam pen thai] up until today. (Seri 1966:94) 
The irony is of course that after its liberation from being a tributary state of the 
Burmese, Chiang Mai became a tributary state of Siam. Loos remarks upon the 
parallel between the European takeover of Malaysia and the Siamese takeover of its 
provinces in the name of rational civilization conquering barbarism, making Siam out 
to be an imperial power in its own right – a comparison that I would like to further 
here (Loos 2006:44-45). But in Seri‟s formulation, Chiang Mai‟s colonial status vis-à-
vis Bangkok is only natural – “Thainess” [ความเป็นไทย - khwaam pen thai] is what 
Chiang Mai fought for, and the apotheosis of “Thainess” was to be reunited with Siam. 
Indeed, as he later writes: “Chiang Mai people have ancestors that are the flesh and 
blood of the old Thais [เช้ือสายของไทยเด่ิม - cheua sai khong thai doem] from the south 
of China. Thai people that speak khammeuang [the language of Chiang Mai – i.e. he 
means to refer to Chiang Mai people without referring to them as “a people,” and 
rather as Thais who speak something else] have generous hearts. They love peace. 
They don‟t like pettiness or the theft of small things. In the middle of the night the 
doors of the houses are open and there are no thieves that steal. This shows the value 
of their watthanatham. It shows their morals [คุณธรรม - khunnatham]” (Seri 1966:95-
6). I cannot help but contrast this quote with another, this one from one khon meuang 
informant of mine from a small rural suburb of Chiang Mai. I asked her why she was 
putting a padlock on her door since we were just going two blocks away to her garden: 
“Oh! If I didn‟t lock it, bandits [โจร - joon] would carry the whole house off!” Clearly, 
Seri is promoting an image of Chiang Mai rooted foremost in nationalist ideology. 
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While Schliesinger perpetuates a racial division of groups in Thailand (often 
devoting sections to the differing physiognomy and “habitat” of different groups and 
bemoaning the fact that he has trouble telling them apart by their physical appearance), 
Seri freely ignores historical divisions in favor of a narrative that unites Chiang Mai 
and Siam under a shared racial banner of khwaam pen thai, thus framing as inevitable 
Siam‟s takeover of the former Lanna regions; for Seri, it is the inevitable outcome of 
Siam and Lanna‟s shared Thainess. It is also significant that in Seri‟s and Wichit‟s 
Cold War-era narratives, the assertion of Thainess as fundamentally freedom-loving 
serves to render Communist ideology un-Thai, as the terms “free” [อิสระ - itsarat –a 
word that, like “Thai”, also is of recent proveneance, according to Thongchai 1994] 
and “Communist” are used as opposites in Thai (and at present, as well), thus making 
semantically impossible the idea that one could have a “Communist Thai” party or 
individual. This formulation further mirrors Greece in Michael Herzfeld‟s “crypto-
colonialism”: in Thailand as well as Greece, a national, unifying essence is formed to 
distinguish (and homogenize) national insiders from an outside force, a force that is 
later identified with communism (Herzfeld 2002:904).  
Although the hidden political goals of khwaam pen thai changed from the early 
20
th
 century (where it served to legitimate an absolute monarchy) to the mid-20
th
 
century (where it served as a tool to unite diverse segments of the nation and 
delegitimate Communism), khwaam pen thai ultimately asserts a national right to 
exceptionalism. Khwaam pen thai, then, is that quality that is invoked to assert 
Thailand‟s right to differ on key points from the international mainstream – similar to 
the “Asian Values” debate during the 1990s. In a political sense, khwaam pen thai 
legitimates a dictatorship: a triad of the just ruler (a ruler who is expressly not a 
politician), the Buddhist priesthood, and the king. These would erase the need for a 
democratic government: the ruler would be absolute (so as to be above political 
 69 
 
conflicts and more efficiently able to manage his power), Buddhist (so as to be moral), 
and loyal to the king (so as to realize his place as a common person) (Saichol 2002:15, 
24). In an administration full of khwaam pen thai, there was no need for courts or 
parliament or law. Khwaam pen thai also mandated knowing one‟s place in the social 
hierarchy [รู้ท่ีสูงท่ีตํ่า - ruu thii suung thii tam] – e.g. knowing ones obligations towards 
superiors and towards inferiors as well (Saichol 2002:17). 
But the idyllic/oppressive order that khwaam pen thai mandated, described by 
Thak (1979) as “despotic paternalism,” was continually threatened by influence from 
the outside. Kukrit Pramoj, prime minister shortly before the military coup of 1976, 
warned that “we are increasingly forgetting our Thainess,” a call made ominous by the 
massacre of students later the same year by royalist and right-wing forces who had 
characterized their victims as being Vietnamese infiltrators in disguise.
39
 Kukrit‟s call 
was an attempt to divorce material progress from new social forms that might upset 
traditional hierarchies and to posit some inherent quality that must or could be 
preserved in the face of an influx of global ideas (Saichol 2002:19).  
Both Global and Anti-Global 
The perceived threat to khwaam pen thai continues. Currently, in the post-1997 
Asian economic crisis period, this threat is articulated as globalization [โลกาภิวตัน์ - 
lohkaphiwat] and the overwhelming influence of foreign culture (Kasian 2002). 
Chattip Nartsupa, an economic historian, warns that Thai communities are falling to 
“capitalist and individualistic values” infiltrating the country from outside (Surin 
1999:407). Therefore, the Thai state
40
 promotes a “return” to watthanatham thai – 
                                                 
39
 Readers should not take away from Kukrit‟s quote here that he in any way supported this violence: 
quite to the contrary. While Kukrit was a staunch royalist, his regime (and, indeed, his house) was 
attacked (often literally) by the Thai far-right during the 1970s for being “leftist.” Rather, the discourse 
of “non-Thainess is growing” was at large at that time, as it is at present. 
40
 In a political climate as volatile as Thailand‟s during the 2000s, I make no claim for a unitary “Thai 
state,” although many of the aspects which I detail here: attitudes towards watthanatham, etc., remain 
constant through different regimes (see, for instance, how the Ratchaphreuk project, detailed in chapter 
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albeit a watthanatham as conceived of by the state and the monarchy. As Surin 1999 
writes: “The monarchy is a primary source of Thai culture and values. Consequently, 
alien values are sometimes considered a threat and the monarchy invokes local values 
in its defence of the nation-state” (ibid), and, one might argue, in defense of itself.  
In this state of crisis over khwaam pen thai, attempts to promote khwaam pen 
thai have embedded within them particular ironies. For instance, for one such project, 
aimed at bolstering khwaam pen thai and historical consciousness, the monarchy 
supported two major film projects: Suryothai and Naresuan, both historical epics 
dealing with famous royal figures who battle the Burmese. The pro-monarchy feelings 
that were supposed to arise out of viewing these films were to be an antidote to 
rampant “consumerism” [บริโภคนิยม - boriphook niyom] and globalization in the same 
way as Purnima Mankekar writes in relation to the Indian state and the promotion of 
Indian television serials, “explicitly oriented to constructing a national culture 
„untarnished‟ by foreign influences” (Mankekar 1999:69). Indeed, the director of 
Suriyothai stated that “I hope Suriyothai, as a defender of our culture, will pave the 
way for others to follow. We are being colonized by Hollywood movies, Chinese 
movies. We are losing our cultural identity” (quoted in Jirattikorn 2003:299).  
The perceived need for these films not only reflected a sense of anxiety over 
“Thai-ness” at the present moment, but also a desire to engage with an “international” 
(perceived of as American and European) audience (Jirattikorn 2003:299). The 
director of both films, Chatrichalerm Yukol, made extensive use of European co-
                                                                                                                                            
eight, retains a symbolic unity through both Thaksin‟s administration and that of the military junta 
which ousted him). References to the state more often refer to general trends in Thai political discourse, 
including royal discourse. Indeed, the palace has often been the central critic of globalization and 
perceived foreign influence (see Handley 2006). As this fieldwork was conducted primarily during the 
post-Thaksin military government of Surayud Chulanont (2006-2007), most references to “the state” 
refer to this government. Sentiments such as “a return to Thainess,” however, remain constant, as they 
most often emanate from the palace (as was the case in the King‟s birthday address in 2007). I also 
conducted fieldwork during Thaksin‟s administration (2001-2006) as well as the post-coup 
administration of Thaksin ally Samak Sundaravej (2008), and Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2010). 
 71 
 
producers, composers, and other production crews in an attempt to increase the 
international appeal of the films, and they were each subsequently sent to the 
Academy Awards competition. As has pointed out, the films attempt to promote a 
sense of unique “Thai-ness” in a way that is perfectly commensurable with being 
international (Ingawanij 2007:189).  
In light of my previous discussion of watthanatham, the presence of the 
Western in these most explicit displays of “Thai culture” should not be surprising. 
Wichit‟s idea of watthanatham as being a hierarchical scale from underdeveloped to 
developed, and seeing its best (but not perfect) realization in Western powers, is a 
clear precursor to Chatrichalerm‟s vision for an internationally legible Suriyothai as 
the clearest expression of Thai “cultural identity.” In a constant trend (which I detail 
again in chapters four and eight), Thai watthanatham must be commensurable with 
global watthanatham, albeit glossed over with teak and gold-leaf. 
This formulation significantly omits the possibility of a non-Western 
modernization (as well as creating the category of “Western” as homogenous and 
unproblematized). It is notable that in Kasian Tejapira‟s “The Postmodern of Thainess,” 
the poem criticizing globalization in Thailand is only criticizing Japanese influence. 
The poet feels a loss of Thainess when seeing Toyotas and Hondas, but not a 
comparable loss when seeing a Mercedes (Kasian 2002:203). In other words, a 
Mercedes represents jaroen, progress in its absolute state, whereas something 
Japanese, while admirable, is ultimately a distraction from things which might be 
more truly “jaroen” – an example which also speaks to Herzfeld‟s characterization of 
Thailand‟s “crypto-colonized” status (i.e. Thailand is “crypto-colonized” by America, 
not by Japan). As Siriuvasak and Shin (2007) note for Korean (and Chinese and 
Japanese) pop in Thailand, other Asian pop genres are categorized in music stores by 
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country of origin, whereas music from “the West” [เพลงฟร่ัง - pleng farang] are 
categorized as “international” [สากล - sakon] music (2007:119).41  
The creation of proper “Thai-ness”, then, requires a blending and an editing of 
tradition, yet one that erases this process and presents itself as something intrinsically 
“Thai.” Kasian cites Anand Praphaso, a public intellectual speaking for a group of 
artists opening an exhibition at the Landmark Hotel in 1994 calling for: “the arousing 
and awakening of the consciousness of being a Thai so that it may come back in the 
form of „Thai Mai‟ (New Thai), which is in harmony with modern society. We hope 
that our collection will contribute towards linking up Thainess with technology 
smoothly. We hope that the children will know what is Thai art, what is a Thai, and 
that a modern Thai must be „a genuine Thai‟” (quoted in Kasian 2002:215). Kasian 
notes that the visuals accompanying the speech contained “a painting of a young Thai 
male in traditional northern Lanna Thai princely dress, with all the awkward trappings 
of ancient royalty” (ibid), and reinforcing Lanna as the key signifier for khwaam pen 
thai. 
 As Anand demonstrates, the assertion of (and search for) for the authentic well 
of Thainess continues, even as the content of “Thainess” remains undefined. 
According to both the missionaries‟ trope and that of the nationalists, Thailand‟s 
northern hinterlands are glossed as being one of these repositories of things which are 
truly “Thai”. They become the sites where travelers – tourists and researchers, Thai 
and non-Thai – go in search of an always-already imagined authenticity glossed as 
“culture” [watthanatham]. Yet this quality is not acceptable in a “raw” form. Rather, it 
requires mediation in order to be changed into something which can progress 
                                                 
41
 A quick trip to a video store in Thailand should support their observations – the local DVD rental 
place near my apartment in Chiang Mai had their videos divided into “Thai” (including sub-categories 
of comedy, horror, etc), “Chinese” (including Japanese and Korean films), and “International [sakhon]” 
(including all films from Europe or America). 
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[watthana], and here we see the role of nationalists, artists, and others in refining and 
properly articulating the raw potential present in Northern culture. In the next chapter, 
I examine the idea of Chiang Mai as a new creation, always already changed and 
changing to adapt the needs of the present. Returning from this lengthy discussion of 
nationalist tropes of Thai origins, I now explore Chiang Mai‟s origins in academic, 
popular, and indigenous sources.   
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CHAPTER THREE: Producing Chiang Mai 
“It is only an illusion, fooling the eyes” [มนัก็เป็นแค่เพียงภาพลวง หลอกตา – man koh pen 
khae phiang phap luang / lohk ta]. – Da Endorphine, “ภาพหลอกตา” [“optical illusion” – phap 
lohk ta], a pop song popular during 2006-2007. 
 
Chiang Mai has been the subject of a great deal of anthropological and other 
academic attention, yet of academic attention of a certain sort. English-speaking 
anthropologists working in Chiang Mai have typically been interested in religion – the 
North‟s blend of animism and Buddhism (Kraisri 1967, Turton 1972, Cohen and 
Wijeyewardene 1984, Davis 1984, Wijeyewardene 1986, Rhum 1994, Morris 2000, 
Tanabe 2002, among others). Another topic in studies from the 1970s to the 1990s is 
“social structure,” be it found in the matrilineal descent ancestral spirit [ผปีู่ ยา่ -  phi 
puu nya  (ya in Central Thai)] cults (Rhum 1994:54), or in village organization and 
life (Potter 1976, Davis 1984). What these studies have in common is a static, rural 
depiction of Chiang Mai – in their frame of analysis, Chiang Mai‟s connection to 
larger regional or international networks are a hindrance to anthropological knowledge.  
More recently, Katherine Bowie (1997) has expanded work in Chiang Mai to 
deal with issues of national integration and belonging, yet Bowie keeps her focus on 
rural life. Anan Ganjanapan‟s article (1984) describing a turn-of-the-20th-century 
plague of ผกีะ - phi ka (malevolent spirits of a certain sort – described below) similarly 
presents village life as dynamic and a product of its historical moment, yet it still shies 
away from urban Chiang Mai. The rural does play a significant role in my work as 
well, but I seek to break from prior literature by interpreting Chiang Mai as a city - an 
urban, diverse environment comprising populations and individuals separated and 
segregated from one another, and a wide variety of cosmopolitan ways of being.   
 Anthropological (indeed, any) research is not undertaken in a vacuum. The 
overwhelming anthropological interest of studies of the rural and an idealized “social 
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structure” in Thailand‟s north reflects the ways in which Chiang Mai has been glossed 
in other bodies of literature, as a kind of paradoxical place where local culture 
(variously glossed as watthanatham or “local wisdom”  [ภูมิปัญญาทอ้งถ่ิน – 
phumiphanya thongthin]) is conceived of as prior to but anticipating both Central Thai 
bourgeois norms and “Western rationality” (for examples, see the writings of Mala 
Khamjan, e.g. Mala 2008). The fetishization of the North – especially in recent years 
under the label of “Lanna” – creates a cycle wherein an image created by one party 
with a specific interest (tourist promotion, for instance) becomes constructed and 
promoted by culture brokers (by which I mean planners, architects, tourist agencies, 
NGOs, and others involved in analyzing and presenting an image of the city) in the 
city and then presented as an object of study, a process that historian Nidthi 
Aeursriwongse evocatively calls the “packing of Chiang Mai‟s dreams” [จดัฝัน - jat 
fun] from outside (Nidthi 1991:180).  
As an example of this favored emphasis on the ideal rather than the actual, 
people both in Chiang Mai and Bangkok would often respond to my statement that I 
was working in Chiang Mai by telling me how slow and polite the local dialect was 
spoken – a statement which is flatly contradicted by the rapid-fire kammeuang one 
hears, especially from lower-class or rural Northern Thais. When I protested the slow, 
artificially dreamy pace of Northern speech in a (Bangkok-produced) TV serial [ลกัคร 
- lakhon], a Northern friend of mine corrected me, claiming that the rapid way in 
which she spoke with her mother wasn‟t proper and wasn‟t polite [เรียบร้อย - riap rohy] 
enough for television.  
Another example has to do with architecture. Responding to rising protests by 
Chiang Mai‟s residents over increased high-rise construction stemming from Chiang 
Mai‟s growth as a regional center and as a tourist destination, the Bangkok-appointed 
governor [ผูว้า่ - phu wa] called for all buildings in the old city to “display the identity 
 76 
 
of Lanna-ness [ออกเอกลกัษณ์ความเป็นลา้นนา - ohk ekkalak khwam pen Lanna].” This 
vague proclamation was made concrete (often literally): “Lanna-ness” meant the kalae 
[กาแล] – crossed gables over the roof that had been a feature on some Northern homes. 
Thereafter, the kalae proliferated – pink kalae rose above pink buildings, square 
concrete rowhouses constructed line after line of kalae, and on some gable-less 
buildings, the kalae were sunk into the concrete of the wall. When I asked architects 
about what constituted “Northern”-style architecture, the most common response was 
simply, “the kalae.”  
 In sum: popular imaginings of Chiang Mai, like many other such cultural 
patrimonial centers, draw inspiration more often from marketing images taken from 
non-local artist‟s imaginations of the North rather than on local tradition, leading to a 
cycle in which these manufactured images (see the example of the indigo peasant‟s 
shirt in chapter four, below) ironically become signs of local resistance and identity. 
Chiang Mai‟s symbolic landscape is always images built upon other images. Given the 
long history of layering conflicting images atop each other in the process of creating 
an “identity” for the North, an overview of the history of the production of knowledge 
relating to Chiang Mai is in order – how is this historically-referential but futurally-
oriented watthanatham interpreted and constructed in Thai-language writing? Here, I 
examine key moments in time when this concept came into play. 
Premodern Historiography 
Given the political environment of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, the subject of 
history in and of Chiang Mai was never a neutral thing. Indeed, even in the local 
sources that there are before the 19
th
 century, historiography is also not simple. The 
earliest sources concerning Chiang Mai come from stone inscriptions and religious 
palm-leaf manuscripts penned by monks to mark a certain temple or chronicle a 
certain reign. Charnvit Kasetsiri divides these texts into two different varieties: those 
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celebrating a certain reign [พงศาวดาร - pongsawadaan] and those celebrating the 
development of Buddhism in the region [ตาํนาน - tamnaan], the latter predominating 
during the 15
th
-17
th
 centuries and the former after the 17
th
 (Bodhiransi 1998:3). David 
Wyatt further deliminates different sorts of tamnaan: ones concerned with local 
origins, universal history, or the construction of a specific monument or temple, 
although Swearer challenges the usefulness of such minute categorizations (ibid 4). 
Here, I deal primarily with tamnaan, as they are far more common in the North than 
the former.  
The most readily available texts for scholars (meaning reproduced and 
published in Central Thai or English) are the Yonok Chronicle, the Chiang Mai 
Chronicle, the Jamadewi
42
 Chronicle, and the Suwan Kham Daeng Chronicle, 
although many other exist in libraries, personal collections, and temples across the 
North, most not yet translated into Thai characters from tua meuang [ตวัเมือง].43  
These records have been mined by various scholars in the period immediately 
preceding World War II, beginning with the work of Camille Notton and George 
Coedès. Yet during this period such texts were contentious things: because of the 
potential challenge to nationalist historiography placed by local manuscripts, many 
were burned or tossed into the river by members of the hyper-nationalist khana leuat 
thai [คณะเลือดไทย – “Thai blood party”] (Somchote 1987:21). Also during this time, as 
a result of Bangkok‟s control over public education and the mandate of Central Thai 
as the language of public life and education, the population in Chiang Mai actually 
able to read the texts fell. While interest in the chronicles waned during the mid-20
th
 
                                                 
42
 Swearer and Premchit write Cāmadevī where I write Jamadewi. The Haas system of Romanization 
places a “c” for an unaspirated “ch” sound, which the Royal Thai system renders “j”, acknowledging 
that, to English speakers, the sound is similar to a slightly clipped j. Similarly, the Pali/Sanskrit v is 
turned in Thai and Northern Thai (but not entirely in Lao) into a w. 
43
 The original temple script of Lanna, still used by the tai khoen of southern China and Burma. This 
script was phased out of use during the early 20
th
 century. It shares little relationship with modern Thai, 
Burmese, Khmer or Lao script. 
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century, the founding of Chiang Mai University and growth in research related to 
Lanna allowed a number of translations to become available and sparked a resurgence 
of study, especially with the translations of Sommai Premchit during the 1970s 
(Wijeyewardene 1986, Penth 1994, Saenluang 1994, Wyatt and Aroonrat 1998, 
Bodhiransi 1998).  
For many researchers, the purpose of these texts was and is generally to derive 
historical truths from them (Wyatt and Aroonrat 1998:xl, Choltira 1991), but since the 
texts differ so widely among themselves, especially for those crucial periods of origins 
which are so enticing for scholars working in a nationalist or regionalist paradigm, the 
conclusions gained are of suspect use in this respect. Indeed, while such texts may be 
wealths of knowledge about the views and myths of their writers, their ability to 
accurately record history is doubtful. 
 Accounts of origins in the tamnaan follow some common themes. Most begin 
with an account of origins, generally the story of the Buddha‟s enlightenment. Texts 
such as the Jamadewi Chronicle then trace the movement of the Buddha in Northern 
Thailand (Bodhiransi 1998). The places outlined in these texts become pilgrimage 
sites for Northern Thai Buddhists, as often they are places where a Buddha “footprint” 
or relic lies. The footprints and other markers of the Buddha‟s travels in the North 
serve to tie the history of the North into the history of Buddhism, and tamnaan 
histories of specific areas create stories of auspicious beginnings and enhance the 
prestige of a meuang.  
After discussing the Buddha in the North, some chronicles proceed to chart the 
spread of Buddhism in the North after the Buddha‟s death, often pointing to the first 
Buddhist presence as the Mon queen Jamadewi, whose story I explore briefly here but 
in more detail in chapter two (Bodhiransi 1998). Jamadewi had been, by various 
accounts, raised by a giant [ยกัษ ์- yak] hermit on Doi Suthep and then sent to the Mon 
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kingdom of Lavapura (Lopburi), or she was in fact a queen from Lopburi called by 
hermits to settle the magically-built city of Haribunchaya (modern-day Lamphun). The 
story of Jamadewi centers on the conflict between her and the people of the jungle 
(Pali: milakkha
44
), whose king, Wilangkha, will not stop courting her. Because of the 
jungle-dwellers‟ strength, Jamadewi is frightened of their king, but she outwits him by 
various means. The tamnaan camadevivamsa [Jamadewi chronicle] relates a story of 
strategic intermarriage between the Mon and milakkha, but popular oral accounts 
contain a more graphic trick: Jamadewi gives Wilangkha a gift of a turban that has 
been made out of her menstrual blood-stained undergarments (Bodhiransi 1998:24), 
although many authors of tamnaan or studies of tamnaan fail to relate this element 
(Kraisri 1967:100). As menstrual blood is considered one of the most polluting 
substances in Northern Thai ritual, and the head the most sacred point, the act saps 
Wilangkha‟s strength to the point that it kills him (via a botched spear-throw)45. But 
Jamadewi‟s Haribunchaya is not to last. Descending on a silver stair from the heavens, 
King Lawajangkarat arrives in the region of Mae Sai in Chiang Rai province to found 
the royal line that will result in phaya [พญา - Lord] Mangrai, the king that founds 
Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, and defeats the Mon in Haribunchaya, establishing the 
kingdom of Lanna. The mythical era then enters the historical. Mangrai and his 
successors wage wars with Burmese, Lua (Lawa),
46
 Siamese, and Vietnamese (แกว - 
kaew) forces until the kingdom‟s fall to Burma in 1558. 
                                                 
44
 I do not provide Pali-script transliteration. 
45
 For more details on the dangers of inverting high and low, see chapter six, below. 
46
 The terms lua, lwa, lawa, and lao are subject to a great deal of confusion in the historical records 
owing to uneven orthography. There currently exist highland people in Nan province speaking a Mon-
Khmer language and practicing swidden agriculture that term themselves lwa or lawa. Another group, 
around Chiang Mai, speaks a similar language but has adopted largely Northern Thai ways – lowland 
rice farming and urban living - that calls itself lua. Lao – Laotian – people speak a Tai language, 
unrelated to that of the lua, lwa, or lawa. Problems arise in that there is no standard way of writing older 
scripts in tua meuang or other ways of writing in the North – vowels are especially tricky, and each of 
these words differs only in the vowel: ลวั is “lua”, ลวะ is “lwa”, ลาวะ is “lawa”, and ลาว is “lao” in Central 
Thai orthography.  
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 Such is the standard narrative of the founding of Lanna through a 
conglomeration of stories derived from tamnaan. But such a narrative glosses over 
differences within the texts – in some, Jamadewi does not appear, in others, a local 
spirit lord Jao Luang Kham Daeng or Jao Suwan
47
 Kham Daeng plays a major role. 
The Meuang Taeng chronicle has a story of origins wherein the first humans were 
from the original four ethnic groups: “kha tdjae” [possibly a hill-tribe group], “thai 
dam” [the name of an ethnic minority in Vietnam], “lao phung khaw” [Laotians “of 
the white stomach”, to be distinguished from Lanna “lao phung dam,” “Laotians of the 
black – e.g. tatoooed - stomach”], “ho” [a Chinese group actively raiding mainland 
Southeast Asia during the 1800s], and “kaew” [Hanoi-area Vietnamese] (Cholthira 
1991:5 – note that, as I cite Cholthira‟s reading of the tamnaan here, I do not provide 
Thai script, as she does not). This origin story is replicated in the Suwan Kham Daeng 
chronicle by a founding myth of four pigs that become the ancestors of human groups: 
the Ho, kaew, Northern, and Burmese peoples (Wijeyewardene 1986:82). In another, 
with a very different story of origins, Naga princes set up cities on the Mekong to 
battle against the khom influence in the area (Cholthira 1991:284). 
 What is striking in the tamnaan is their lack of cohesion and their clear 
engagement with contemporary events (the inclusion of the Ho in origin myths, for 
instance, reflects the prominence of the Ho during the 19
th
 century in the region). The 
reason that tamnaan were written was in order to celebrate a certain temple or ruler, 
and in order to do so, they altered and promoted certain interests over others, making 
their literal interpretation a dangerous prospect, but regardless of the continual 
alteration of tamnaan history to fit the needs of the present, those reading the tamnaan 
often take the information at face value, especially when it supports contemporary 
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 I detail this mythical figure later. Here, I note that the term luang in Northern Thai simply means 
“great,” and suwan refers to the Pali-Sanskrit word for “gold.” So the two names differ only slightly, 
from “Great Lord Burnished Gold” to “Lord Burnished Golden Gold.” 
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claims. French scholars identified Jamadewi with the Khmer (Bodhiransi 1998:18), a 
claim that at the time held political significance as the French had defined the 
boundaries of Indochina on Herderean ethno-racial critera; i.e. to claim that the North 
was in its origins Khmer (or khom) was to claim that the French had a right to rule the 
area.
48
  
 The identity of Jamadewi‟s opponents, the milakkha [“forest-dwellers”], is of 
special concern to scholars attempting to find traces of ethnic origins in the tamnaan, 
as the milakkha capital city was near the present-day site of Chiang Mai. As such, the 
origins of the milakkha would yield, for scholars interested in origins, the origins of 
the city. While the camadevivamsa only terms the original inhabitants of Chiang Mai 
“wild people,” many chronicles identify them with the Lawa. Kraisri Nimmanhamein 
draws links between Lawa settlements in Chiang Mai and legends of forest-dwelling 
giants to claim that the Lawa were “savage, head hunters who practiced cannibalism” 
(Kraisri 1967:95). Supporting a Lawa origin for Chiang Mai, the Suwan Kham Daeng 
chronicle states that Chiang Mai‟s city pillar was given to a group of forest-dwelling 
Lawa to defend against a plague of ghosts (Aroonrat 1981:4).  
Cholthira, working with Lawa groups in Naan, is explicit about accepting the 
historical veracity of the tamaan at face value and eschewing a mythic or symbolic 
interpretation. For instance, relating to the story of the Naga founding of cities on the 
Mekong, Cholthira interprets this as a factual account of Indian kings settling in the 
area (1991:288), basing her work on Sumet (1988), who suggests, rather unbelievably, 
that the founder “Naga” refer to settlers having taken to the water after rising sea 
levels during the end of the Ice Age forced them off of the land (Sumet 1988:138). I 
would be more inclined to interpret the term “Naga” to refer not to the Naga ethnic 
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 George Coedès refuted this, claiming that because Haribunchaya‟s residents chose to flee into Mon 
territory in present-day Burma when they were fleeing a cholera epidemic because they could speak the 
language as proof of Haribunchaya‟s Mon heritage. 
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group of western Burma and eastern India, nor to aquatic migrants, but rather to the 
race of mythical serpents which adorn every Northern temple, and which are revered 
as semi-divine figures across the Mekong region. Cholthira, however, has a certain 
point that she wishes to make: to subvert the Thai nationalist paradigm in favor of one 
focused on the Lawa. Basing her speculation on the Tamnan Meuang Suvarna Khom 
Kham, she claims that the Lawa (Lwa) are in fact the true source of Northern 
civilization and culture: “another ethnic group, the Lwa, who are most directly our 
concern, seem to be historically related to the Khom [as I mention above, the term for 
ancient city-dwellers or Khmer] and the Naga. It is the Tai who are aliens and 
invaders” (1991:289 emphasis hers). Based on tamnaan evidence, she sees a large 
Lawa kingdom spanning present-day Thailand, from Lopburi (Lawapura in Pali) in the 
central delta through Haribunchaya in the north (where she suggests that Jamadewi 
does not want to marry Wilangkha because he is her uncle – i.e. they are both 
ethnically Lawa), to the Mangrai dynasty (as she refers to Mangrai‟s ancestor as 
Lawajangkarat). In doing so, she accepts certain statements as fact (the 
aforementioned names and their link to a Lawa ethnonym) and ignores facts that do 
not agree with a literal interpretation or her own interpretation (e.g. the fact that 
Lawajangkarat descended from heaven on a silver stair
49
, or the fact that 
Haribunchaya‟s residents fled to Mon territory).  Cholthira‟s selectivity in choosing 
only those points which support her overall goal – a Thai history which is not founded 
upon Thai ethno-nationalist triumphalism – mirrors similar selective interpretations of 
Northern history and culture by those attempting to create a new “image” of Lanna as 
I detail in chapter eight, below. My point is not simply that I disagree with Cholthira‟s 
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 Indeed, Cholthira‟s attempt to selectively take up literal readings of mythic figures parallels the very 
nationalist narrative that she is attempting to dispel – for instance, interpretations of Sukhothai king 
Ramkhamhaeng as the culture hero Phra Ruang ignore the many mentions of Ruang‟s magical powers 
or shapeshifting abilities, factors which would make Ruang seem to be more of a mythical hero who 
brought wisdom to the people like Prometheus and less like an actual historical person. 
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selective interpretation of tamnaan, but rather that these texts have continually been 
sources of interpretations in order to bolster present-day concerns, a process that 
mirrors the selective interpretations of watthanatham.  
The anonymous writer (probably a monk) of the Chiang Mai Chronicle has a 
similar agenda in describing the fall of Chiang Mai to the Burmese. The event which 
the writer describes takes place in the 16
th
 century, but the author embeds within his 
account a political critique of 19
th
-century Chiang Mai government, foreshadowing the 
integration of Chiang Mai from being a vassal state into becoming incorporated into a 
full-fledged part of Siam, an incorporation that led to a change in the tax system, 
increased extraterritorial rights for British teak traders, and the repression of local 
religious leaders (e.g. Khuba Siwichai, whom I detail above). He writes:  
 
10) During the 9
th
, 10
th
, 11
th
, and 12
th
 months people are conscripted to cut and trim 
timber into logs of about a meter length (one wa) and are then ordered to drag them to 
the river. Whoever fails to turn up is given the death penalty. The logs are floated day 
and night, cut and dragged day and night. Small trees are not taken, it is the large trees 
they have to cut. They must work from the 9
th
 to the 12
th
 months before they can 
return home. During the 5
th
, 6
th
, 7
th
, and 8
th
 months they do not have to work – but 
they work every year. The wood that is floated down destroys the dams (faai) made 
by the people to divert water to the rice fields
50. In any year everybody can‟t plough 
and sow. And any river and stream not used for rice fields – timber is not cut there.  
11) The taxes on the fields by the king are too heavy. Citizens have nothing for any 
purpose. They all sit and suffer (Sommai and Phuangkham 1976:8-9) 
What is obviously striking is that the author gives specific, detailed concerns 
related to logging when supposedly describing events that happened three hundred 
years before the time of his writing – concerns which exactly match the situation in 
Chiang Mai at the time of his writing. Overtaxation and the too-rapid expansion of the 
teak industry are key points of conflict during the time in the mid-19
th
 century when 
the chronicle was written, as European teak companies moved en masse into the 
region and the local tax system changed to what locals termed the “Bangkok system 
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 Faai are also, significantly, the home of protective guardian spirits. 
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[รบบกรุงเทพฯ - rabob krung thep].”51 The comparison between the loss of the city to 
the Burmese and the loss of the city to foreign companies and the “Bangkok system” 
was certainly a dangerous comparison to make, even at that time, and contemporary 
criticism was disguised as history. 
In sum, the tamnaan texts are important historical documents that nonetheless 
have been written with a certain interest in mind: that of the party which they intend to 
promote
52
. Yet this trend, of historiography as a source of voicing contemporary 
critique or ideals, extends into other, later sources. For instance, a reading of Northern 
history to render it commensurable with nationalism and modernity is also present in 
Chiang Mai‟s national museum. The museum begins by introducing the visitor to a 
chronological narrative of Chiang Mai displayed through dioramas. After reading 
about prehistoric settlement, there is a diorama of a Lua village, complete with the 
cross-gable kalae that remains the architectural signifier for the North. Following the 
timeline forwards, the next gallery contains Queen Jamadewi and King Mangrai, and 
thence to a succession of coronations and audiences: King Tilokrat being the largest 
and most impressive. After this, a dramatic battle scene depicts the fall of the city to 
the Burmese, and suddenly, there is nothing – a blank gap representing two hundred 
years. The next diorama displays the liberation of Chiang Mai by the Siamese-allied 
King Kawila.  
 The exhibits grow in size as the timeline progresses and the museum unveils 
more of the story of Chiang Mai‟s progress. The section pertaining to the period of 
time when Chiang Mai was being integrated into the Bangkok system is of particular 
                                                 
51
 I deal with this change elsewhere, but in short: taxes which had previously gone to the local jao 
[lords] instead went to tax farmers under the command of Bangkok. These tax farmers were often of 
Chinese ancestry, and as such inflamed anti-Chinese sentiment and solidified the image of the Bangkok 
Thai person with the image of the Chinese businessman in the eyes of the local populace (Somchote 
1987:5). 
52
 See also the debate over thaksaa meuang [ทกัษาเมือง] in chapter eight, below. 
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interest: while there is a brief mention of conflicts between north and south over 
taxation, the overall focus is on a royally-centered unity with Bangkok – a unity 
revolving around the figure of Queen Dhararasamii – a consort (one of many) to King 
Chulalongkorn who was promoted to a high title when she bore him a child. 
Dhararasamii has become a figure in both the national museum, the “hall of art and 
culture” in the center of the city, and in her own museum in a northern suburb of 
Chiang Mai. She represents Chiang Mai as a subject and part of the golden era of 
Siamese nostalgia – the reign of Chulalongkorn, who, significantly, is the only 
monarch to have a large, active spirit cult centered on him. In the museum, 
Dhararasamii is shown in Victorian attire, fit for a queen of Chulalongkorn, and 
embodies a certain idea of what it means to be a Chiang Mai woman, an image which 
I explore in detail in chapter four, below. Her history (unlike that of, say, Queen 
Jamadewi or any of the later Chiang Mai monarchy) is also not potentially subversive, 
as it takes place in a subordinate position vis-à-vis Siamese royalty. Indeed, as I 
discuss below, the image of Bangkok as masculine, dominant, and wise and Chiang 
Mai as feminine, submissive but also cultured and pure is one which has parallels in 
how Chiang Mai is represented in popular media today.  
Chiang Mai as an ethnographic object 
Central Thai – Siamese53 – scholars began to take an active interest in the 
provinces during the period of time when Bangkok was aggressively integrating its 
outlying territories (such as Lanna) into the forming Thai state during the late 19
th
 
century. The Siamese elite began an aggressive campaign of ethnographically 
describing the provinces which they were then incorporating into greater Siam. In this 
process, two (occasionally competing) concerns reigned: first of all, Siamese writers 
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 Politically speaking, “Siam” refers to the country before the 1932 coup which removed the absolute 
monarchy, “Thailand” afterwards (ignoring the brief switch back to “Siam” during the 1940s). 
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wanted to demonstrate their similarity to European colonial powers as chroniclers and 
documenters of savage Others, and also to incorporate these Others into the Siamese 
realm. Historian Thongchai Winichakul writes:  
 
Alongside the colonial enterprise, the Siamese rulers had a parallel project of their 
own, concerning their own subjects, a project on the „Others Within‟. In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century (roughly speaking 1885-1910), travels had 
mediated the construction of an ethnographic classification in the eyes of the Siamese 
elite. Discursively formulated through travelogues and ethnographic notes, it was an 
abstract scheme which differentiated Siamese subjects spatially within the geo-body 
in relation to the superior space of Bangkok. The two principal categories of people, 
of „Others Within‟, are the chao pa, the forest, wild people, and the chao bannok, the 
multi-ethnic villagers under the supremacy of Bangkok… this Siamese ethnography 
of Siam was also a temporalizing practice, locating and juxtaposing people, including 
the elite themselves, in a new linear (progressive, temporal) cosmic order called 
civilization (2000b:41). 
For Fifth Reign
54
 elites, this ethnographic construction reaffirmed their place at 
the fore of Siam‟s siwilai [“civilization,” a loanword from English] and the provinces 
as the home of the backwards past. Thongchai notes how during the late 1800s, 
peasants were described by royal observers such as Damrong in his collection of 
village tales as literally voices from the past. Damrong‟s work, titled “Nithan 
Borankadi” implies that stories [นิทาน - nithan] from contemporary villagers were 
actually archaeological [โบราณคดี - borankhadi] relics, preserved in the modern day – 
they were Fabian‟s Other in time for the elite observers (Thongchai 2000b:536). The 
city, and especially the capital city, was the center of what it was to be progressed, 
civilized, and Thai.  
Khun Chang Khun Phaen – a Thai epic which originated in the oral tradition 
but was finally compiled and edited by Damrong in 1910 – portrays Chiang Mai as a 
place that is undoubtedly both foreign and lower on a scale of civilization than 
Ayutthya, in sharp contrast to how Chiang Mai is positioned in nationalist works just 
twenty years later. In Khun Chang Khun Phaen, Soi Fa, the daughter of the king of 
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 I.e. during the reign of Chulalongkorn, Rama V. This era was marked by rapid modernization and a 
centralization of the absolute monarchy.  
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Chiang Mai, laments having to marry an Ayutthyan Thai because of the gap in 
between Central Thai and Northern (called “Lao” in the epic) customs: “How can I 
manage a household in the Thai style when I don‟t know the customs? I‟ll be blamed, 
derided, and shamed…” (32:14)55. Her mother comforts her: “Though your partner is 
foreign and speaks a different language, and you‟re not even familiar with each other‟s 
faces, the main thing is he‟s a good person…”  (32:15). Yet Soi Fa‟s fears are realized. 
Once Soi Fa is at the court, she is regularly abused for being Northern: her 
grandmother-in-law scolds her: “You‟re making such a racket, you rude Lao, it fills 
the whole house, you busted beam. I‟m fed up with you, you seven hundred dogs, 
you‟re past loving. Just a tricky, noisy, Lao hillbilly” (37:4). 
In contrast to the nationalist period, when khwaam pen thai was located in the 
rural provinces, earlier formulations bemoan the lack of Thai sentiment in the 
hinterland and express the desire to promote it. King Chulalongkorn writes in 1893 of 
the need to end the division between “Lao” and “Thai” with regards to the North:  
 
I hope that this [education] will instruct and give knowledge to the kingdom, and 
[give to the Chiang Mai “Lao”] the knowledge that unity with the Thai is a good thing. 
This will come with mutual knowledge and understanding, and having the same 
viewpoint. I mean that I hope for progress [jaroen] in their city and unity. People that 
study have to be people that aren‟t so arrogant. The [Chiang Mai] Lao are slandered 
as all being more base and wicked than the Thai. We have to find the intelligence to 
teach them how to be servants of the Kingdom and of the same meuang as the Thais. 
If they do good they will receive good things, the same as the Thais. The schools have 
to teach about the benefits of the [Bangkok] government at all levels, just like the 
missionaries [teach about the benefit of Christianity in their schools]. They [the 
missionaries] use all levels [of society] to support religion…” (quoted by Saratsawadi 
1982:33, translation mine) 
 
Chulalongkorn sees a fundamental cultural or racial difference (his word is 
phuak – พวก, “group” or “party”) between the Northern “Lao” and the Central “Thai,” 
but a difference that can and should be overcome by emulating the Western 
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 Numbers refer to chapter and page. Translations and references are from the online English 
translation done by Pasuk and Baker and posted at 
http://pioneer.netserv.chula.ac.th/~ppasuk/kckp/chapters.htm accessed June 2009.  
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missionaries‟ success. He references the prior negative image of the “Lao,” and does 
not in fact directly contradict it, but points to its potential resolution in the “conversion” 
of the Lao into Thai. The Lao are uncivilized, but it is his noblesse oblige to welcome 
them into the fold of Thainess, here equated with knowledge and civilization. 
Relocating Thai Nationalism 
As we have seen, the dissolution of the absolute monarchy and the beginnings 
of the ethno-nationalist state required a change in historiography, which had 
previously been centered on the history of kingdoms and royal lineage (cf. Damrong), 
and while a royalist reading of Thai history re-emerged in the later half of the 20
th
 
century, it was coupled with the idea of a pure origin of Thainess in Sukhothai– indeed, 
Sukhothai‟s grand leader, Ramkhamhaeng, came to stand for the principles espoused 
by the Chakri monarchs since Rama IV. With the re-imagining of Chiang Mai from 
foreign power to ethno-national source, the Otherness of Chiang Mai was subverted: 
according to Rosalind Morris, in the nationalist formulation, regional cultures were 
“staged as the expression of a tradition that was then represented as the origin of a 
nation which both transcended and encompassed it (Morris 2002:64).” The nation was 
the inevitable future, but its glorious past was in the provinces.  Within this 
temporalized framework, the origins of khwaam pen thai were placed in the rural 
provinces. Now, chao baan nohk [ชาวบา้นนอก – provincial people, lit: “people of the 
outer villages,” what Thongchai Romanizes “bannok”] were to become the “true” 
heralds of khwaam pen thai. The only problem was, of course, that such a glorious 
heritage would have to be created before it could be projected upon the baan nohk.  
In the same way that tamnaan writers included the story of the Buddha‟s 
arrival in Northern Thailand in order to unify the twin auspicious foundation myths of 
religion and place, works on the culture of Chiang Mai during the mid-twentieth 
century unified national themes of Thainess with local examples. The fusing of the 
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“local” and the “national” created a narrative that was not intended to accurately 
reflect the past or current culture of the North, but rather to offer an ideal national 
narrative, one studded with gems of wisdom from what had by then been promoted as 
a well of Thai identity. 
I have already discussed the work of Seri Atsali in presenting Northern Thais 
as being naturally “freedom loving,” a term that in their case indicates not their desire 
to be independent of foreign influences (or, for that matter, devoid of any absolute 
hierarchical authority whatsoever), but rather their desire to live under Siamese 
hegemony (Seri 1966:94), but another work also deserves mention as recasting 
Northern history in light of inevitable Siamese manifest destiny, Sit But-in‟s 
Lokkathat Chao Thai Lanna [The Worldview of Lanna Thai People] (1980). Sit first 
provides a narrative of Lanna history that parallels Damrong‟s – a culture originating 
in Chiang Saen and reaching its apotheosis in Chiang Mai, which also acts as a 
contemporary and younger brother of Sukhothai. When Sit refers to “Lanna,” he 
generally uses the phrase chao Lanna [ชาวลา้นนา - Lanna people], although 
occasionally chao Thai Lanna [ชาวไทยลา้นนา - Lanna Thai people], or Lannathai 
[ลา้นนาไทย - Thai Lanna].  
 Sit‟s main point in The Worldview of Lanna Thai People is to lament the rapid 
disappearance of Lanna culture and admonishes the reader to focus on what is left 
before it is gone, implying that what is valuable in Northern Thailand is this quality 
called “Lanna” that stems from a point in the ancient past (Sit 1980:21). Yet this 
quality is an archive which Sit carefully edits. Sit presents Lanna culture, or what he 
refers to as the “social heritage” [มรดกสังคม - moradok sangkhom]56 of Lanna, as being 
those aspects of Lanna society that do not conflict with Siamese social mores – those 
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 The reinvigoration of the use of moradok in terms of spatial planning is addressed in more detail 
below, in chapter six, where I discuss Askew 1996 and Herzfeld 2005. 
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elements of Northern practice that do conflict, Sit dismisses. For example, Sit 
downplays the worship of lineage spirits, a matrilineal spirit cult documented by other 
scholars of Northern Thailand (and which I will discuss in detail in chapter seven): 
such practices, according to Sit, “still seep into the culture of Lanna, but only in a 
superficial way, as an outer shell that is not particularly meaningful [ไม่มีสาระ – mai 
mii saara]”. What is meaningful, according to Sit, relying upon aphorisms, legends, 
and proverbs to construct his argument, are Buddhist teachings and ways of interacting 
that Sit portrays as being an archaic form of free-market logic: Lanna people are 
continually weighing profit and the benefit that they will get, they “must have freedom” 
(Sit 1980:22) and cannot be forced to do anything, they are generous, they are cautious, 
they value fun and beauty, and believe in the reciprocity of karma
57
 (Sit 1980:22-4).  
Sit then expounds upon many of these traits in Northern life and interprets 
them for the reader as examples of how progressive Northerners were during the 
Lanna time – what positive qualities they many have now, Sit portrays as stemming 
from moradok [inheritance] drawn down from the ancient past. For instance, Sit 
introduces an often remarked-upon Northern taboo called phit phi [ผดิผ ี- slighting the 
ancestral spirits], meaning the curse (an illness in the family, or misfortune visited 
upon a household) levied by ancestral spirits upon an unmarried woman who makes 
physical contact with a courting man, “even so much as holding hands,” as many of 
my informants continually put it. In practical terms, it was a fine paid by the boy to the 
girl‟s family should she become pregnant before marriage, and it often was the first (or 
final) step in marriage negotiations. It is often referred to (in the “holding hands” 
euphemistic idiom) in accounts of Northern customs for general audiences as an 
example of the good, prudish, nearly Victorian morals of Northerners, ignoring the 
parts of the custom that involve premarital sex, marriage negotiations, or 
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 Sit ignores possible contradictions, such as generosity versus the continual weighing of benefit. 
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compensation for pregnancy. Following this trend, Sit uses phit phi to make the 
argument that Northerners‟ culturally-informed morality, rather than any sort of 
authoritarian parental fiat, governed unwanted behavior. To show the progressiveness 
of the North, Sit switches to English to describe the attitude expressed by phit phi: 
“live and let live joyfully” (1980:67-68). Here, Sit is implying that Northerners had 
somehow prefigured Western liberalism as another example of the purity of Northern 
culture and ideology. In the example of phit phi, it is not oppressive rules or a conflict-
ridden family structure that keeps Northern women chaste and pure; rather, for Sit, it 
is a form of inherent belief that renders them more Victorian than other parts of 
Thailand. Here, Sit‟s analysis recalls Wichit‟s reinterpretation of watthanatham 
sukhothai as being in its nature similar to Western norms: the hinterland prefigures 
Western powers. Sit‟s book is an example of how Wichit‟s thinking continues through 
the latter 20
th
 century.  
 In works such as Sit‟s, Lanna is presented as a repository for “ancient” truths, 
already mirroring capitalist and modern “Western” thought, that are nonetheless 
always already commensurable with Central Thai beliefs and norms. When a 
seemingly strange belief arises – the worship of the ancestral spirits of a household, 
for instance – the belief is rationalized by Sit as being intrinsically logical and 
forward-thinking (e.g. phit phi) and those elements which are unable to be rationalized 
(e.g. matrilineal spirit cults of the same ancestral spirits that Sit lauds in the prior 
example) are deemed “not meaningful.” The analysis of watthanatham is, for Sit, a 
way of seeing an ambiguous body and rendering it useful. Watthanatham is an 
instrument, a technique used to extract benefit from the body of belief, ritual, and 
writing that exists as standing reserve for the needs of the present. In readings such as 
Sit‟s, ambiguous or contradictory readings are downplayed, what is needed are those 
interpretations that render the object understandable and valuable in the eyes of the 
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modern reader. These explanations portray the watthanatham of the city as being wise 
information handed down from ancient times – an idealized phumipanya [ภูมิปัญญา - 
local wisdom], giving advice that is in modern terms logical and sensible (see 
Natthakan 2001, Jaruphat 2007 and discussions below).  
Rediscovering Lanna in the North 
Reading Northern history purely for the sake of building national integration 
has faded in importance since the end of the Cold War, but a reading showing an 
inherent progressiveness in the North and the North‟s contribution towards Thainess 
remains. Concomitant with the wave of immigration into Chiang Mai from other areas 
as Chiang Mai becomes a regional center is an increase in literature relating to Chiang 
Mai culture, reading it in ways that emphasize the unique or the different, yet with the 
continual requirement that Northerness be commensurable with modernity, fashion, 
and rationality (as I explore in chapters four and eight). This literature, produced by 
professors, academics, and local writers envisions the North and Northern culture as 
sites of refined stylistic consumption. Architecture magazines (e.g. Lanna @ Home) 
focus on interior design that is in some undefined way “Northern.” Books for the long-
term (Thai) tourist describe how properly to appreciate Northern culture (Jaruphat 
2007). Other, more scholarly works (Mani 1994, Nathakaan 2001, Thanet 2001, Withi 
2005, Jaruphat 2007, Mala 2008) focus on Northern history and culture, allowing Thai 
visitors and Northerners alike to tap into the well of Northern nostalgia, a concept 
which I will deal with in chapter eight. Northerness, read through these works, is a 
thing of façades and appearances: one can become Northern by dressing in the spirit of 
the North (a category open to interpretation – either wearing early 20th-century skirts 
[ผา้ซ่ิน - pha-sin], the indigo-dyed farmer‟s shirt, or simply baeb sabai sabai [แบบสบาย 
ๆjust taking it easy], according Joe, an artist and recent migrant to the North from 
Bangkok), decorating in a Northern style (dark wood with hints of gold), and speaking 
 93 
 
a few words of Northern (as Thai Starbucks demonstrated when they unveiled their 
“muan jai” [ม่วนใจ๋] blend – explicitly identifying the word muan, “fun,” with the 
North instead of with Isaan or Laos, other areas where the term muan stands in for the 
Central Thai sanuk [สนุก]).  
These examples come with a caveat. One must speak Northern enough, but not 
too much. “Yes” or “that‟s right” in Northern is the same as in Laotian: แมน - maen. I 
was practicing my Northern with Tim, a forty-something Chiang Mai woman who 
owned her own bead shop, specializing in Lanna-style jewelry. Tim styled herself as a 
Lanna woman, wearing the pha sin and rough cotton blouses along with heavy silver 
jewelry, and she was enthusiastic about talking about Northern watthanatham. I 
replied to a question of hers with an enthusiastic maen laeo [แมนแลว้]. She stopped 
and looked at me. “Now you‟re speaking Lao,” she said “or Isaan.58 Chiang Mai 
people say jai [ใจ]้,” using an unaspirated form of the Central chai [ใช่]. Using jai 
instead of chai would be consistent in a certain logic with a Northerner speaking 
Central Thai – many words that are aspirated in Central (kham – คาํ [word]) are 
unaspirated in Northern (kam – กาํ [word]), and people occasionally used jai and chai 
interchangeably. But I protested that many Northern speakers with whom I often 
spoke freely used maen and I was rather sure that that indeed was a Northern term. 
She was adamant: I had been speaking to Isaan people or perhaps Laotians. A polite 
Northerner (there was no other kind) would use jai.  
Tim‟s insistence on the use of jai shows the extent to which Northerness has 
been diffused. She is insisting on regional difference – her shop was evidence of that, 
and that she did use a variant of Northern dialect in her speech, but only so long as that 
speech remained sufficiently different from the Isaan dialect, a dialect associated with 
                                                 
58
 A region in the northeast of Thailand that is dominated ethnically and linguistically by Lao. It is also 
the poorest part of the country and supplies a great deal of migrant labor to Bangkok. The term “Isaan 
language” is a nationalist neologism: the language is identical to southern Lao (Enfield 2002:66). 
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the poorest region of Thailand and a place from which many unskilled laborers 
originate. It was more than just national belonging that was important for Tim – it was 
also stylistic consumability. Her shop and personal means of dress revolved around the 
idea of the stylish, graceful Northern woman, and to admit Northern connections with 
stigmatized regions such as Isaan would be decreasing the value of its watthanatham 
or, as many tourism promoters described the charm of Chiang Mai, saneh [เสน่ห์ - 
bewitching charm].  
In a similar example, two professors (whom I decline to name in this context) 
involved in Lanna studies fell to bitter arguing over the particulars of Lanna fashion. 
One professor, seeking to accurately recreate Lanna clothing, had staged a fashion 
show involving models dressed in Lanna outfits, which meant that some women were 
bare-breasted. The second professor confronted the first and accused him of causing 
“Lanna” to lose face in front of outsiders from Bangkok: “They won‟t think we‟re 
civilized!” shouted the second professor, a statement which recalls Herzfeld‟s work on 
cultural intimacy (2002) and Jackson‟s idea of the Thai regime of images (2004): 
certain images are appropriate for certain audiences, and this display of Lanna breasts, 
while historically accurate, was inappropriate when the judgemental gaze of Bangkok 
was upon them. 
Chiang Mai-based social critic and historian Nidthi Aeusriwongse mentions 
the process of managing the image of “foreign-ness” in popular literature in the 
introduction to one of many books about Chiang Mai (and Lanna) society and culture 
(Natthakan 2001). According to Nidthi, Chiang Mai is presented in Thai-language 
travel writings since the late 19
th
 century as a place of foreignness, but one where any 
sense of true difference must be downplayed. Chiang Mai must be foreign, but also 
similar enough to be comprehensible. He compares these new works with older ones: 
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[In these newer books on Chiang Mai], there is only one way of presenting 
Chiang Mai: Chiang Mai is a foreign land [meuang nohk; เมืองนอก literally “outer 
city”] because they dress differently, speak differently (but enough to understand), eat 
differently, travel differently, or to say it more broadly, it‟s because they have a 
different culture [watthanatham] from Bangkok. But the cultural difference is not 
different to the point that Bangkokians cannot understand it, because at least they can 
engage with each other.  
This attitude stems from the Fifth Reign and at that time was in the minority 
[the majority opinion would present the North as a land of barbarians]. As for 
writings about difference, (whether or not it was in an appreciative way or in an 
insulting way [ดูหม่ิน - duu min]), the writers were always from Bangkok, regardless of 
group, class, and background, etc., they produced writings like this and developed 
them further for a long time… 
The more convenient communications today make Chiang Mai follow the 
imagination [ติดต่างจิต - tit tang jit] of Bangkok until it‟s completely the same, just as 
thought it‟s  barely outside of Banglamphu [a district in Bangkok that also happens to 
be the Western backpackers‟ tourist center]. Nowadays, you don‟t feel that sense of 
wonder [อยากเห็นอยากรู้ - yak hen yak ruu] at Chiang Mai‟s “meuang nohk”-ness  [ความ
เป็นเมืองนอก]. Chiang Mai (especially within the old city limits) has had its difference 
from Bangkok decrease until the eye can‟t see the cultural difference. This is 
shocking to the sense of curiosity of a Bangkokian traveler. (Nidthi in Natthakan 
2001:14, translation mine) 
 
 Nidthi speaks in general terms and does not specify the works to which he 
refers, but his introduction in 2001 would have come at the crest of the wave of 
“Lanna studies” works [ลา้นนาศึกษา - lanna seuksaa] that emphasize more so than 
Cold War-era works Chiang Mai‟s difference in terms of watthanatham – a difference 
that, as Nidthi points out, is always processed and rendered palatable to a Bangkokian 
audience. This trend in writing began in earnest during the 1980s and was fired by 
both the growing national trend towards regional studies and the promotion of Chiang 
Mai as a site of tourism, and the literature pertaining to “Lanna” was interested in 
documenting this cultural “uniqueness,” presented as already in a state of collapse. 
The enemy here was not Central Thai customs and language (but see Thanet 1993 and 
some of Nidthi‟s own work as a contrast), but rather it lay in the homogenizing force 
of globalization as articulated through Bangkok‟s mass media. 
The key to saving Chiang Mai, according to many of these texts, lay in 
preserving local “identity” [เอกลกัษณ์ - ekkalak] or “wisdom” [ภูมิปัญญา - phumipanya]. 
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Such knowledge, while “different,” was never non-Thai, as the title of one popular 
book attests: Traveling to Lanna: Searching for Thai Local Wisdom [Thiaw Lanna: 
Taam Ha Phumipanya Thai] (Jarupat 2007). Local identity and wisdom was also 
conveniently the cornerstone of cultural tourism (consumed both by Thai and 
international tourists), so local knowledge was therefore often in the service of 
business, and the development of mass-produced Chiang Mai-related writings and 
Chiang Mai‟s tourist industry went hand-in-hand. In the process of producing 
knowledge about Chiang Mai, new objects were continually added into the corpus of 
watthanatham: new traditions invented, new rituals developed, all in accordance with 
the idea of watthanatham as a technology, one which can be invested in, promoted, 
and researched for eventual monetary gain. In Jarupat‟s book, for instance, no attempt 
is made to unify Lanna and Thai into “Lannathai” as we had seen in earlier works – 
their unity is already assumed. Rather, Lanna presented as being ancient Thailand, a 
backwater where “true” Thai local knowledge is stored.  
 As interest in Lanna images and the desire to create and consume them arose, 
new variations on Chiang Mai‟s cultural uniqueness were produced. The most famous 
of these is the khantoke – a dinner show of hill-tribe and Lanna dances developed to 
promote tourism in the North. Yet despite these clearly invented origins, the khantoke 
features in much of the Thai-language writing concerning Northern tradition:  
 
Lannathai is a region that developed along with art and culture from ancient times 
[โบราณ - boraan], and used to be the kingdom of Lannathai from the 18th-20th Buddhist 
centuries (13
th
-15
th
 AD). There was King Mangrai who was the first king of the 
Mangrai dynasty, and many other developments (patthana), such as government, 
religion, arts, culture [watthanatham], resting, eating, ordination, marriage, etc. The 
remnants of these are things that we should study in earnest, and have more people 
interested in them get others to write in many languages to study, and be an example 
for researchers. Here, I am speaking of the “Khantoke,” which is one part of the arts 
and one part of the tradition [praphenii] of the khantoke dinner, or the tradition of the 
khantoke of Lannathai. (Mani 1994:228 – translation mine). 
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 Mani, an anthropologist of Chiang Mai and khon meuang himself, highlights 
the differences between watthanatham and what anthropologists typically think of as 
“culture.” The term for “tradition,” ประเพณี – praphenii, is applied to an unabashedly 
invented tradition for the purpose of generating interest in Northern studies. In his 
work on Northern Thai rituals, Praphenii Sip Song Deuan Lanna Thai [Twelve Months 
of Lanna Thai Tradition], Mani places the khantoke along with animist ritual, 
Buddhist New Year‟s ceremonies, and other activities having come from “ancient 
times.” Invention is, then, clearly not a problem when thinking about Northern-ness, 
something which the future-oriented idea of watthanatham anticipates. I include the 
example of the khantoke [ขนัโตก] here to demonstrate how the invention of tradition 
and the creation of new knowledge about Chiang Mai are linked. In other words: 
writing about Chiang Mai often leads in a circular fashion: writing creates new 
traditions and sources of “culture,” which are then the subject of new written works. 
 The architect of the khantoke was the economist, businessman, and 
anthropologist Kraisri Nimmanhaemin. Kraisri was one scion of the powerful Sino-
Northern Nimmanhaemin family, one of a handful of Chinese families that migrated to 
the North during the 19
th
 century. Kraisri, having studied abroad at University of 
Pennsylvania and Harvard, became a spokesman for Northern Thai culture and history 
after having returned to the North to be the regional manager for Bangkok Bank, and 
became (along with Mani), one of the principal authors of the resurgence of interest in 
studies of the North. He was also its tourist promoter: during the 1950s, Kraisri 
introduced the khantoke into the Chiang Mai tourism scene and used the new tradition 
to bolster his local businesses, such as a garment factory that produced indigo shirts. 
In 1957, Kraisri called upon all khantoke guests to wear his factory-produced indigo-
dyed เส้ือม่อฮอ้ม [seua moh hom] as an “official” uniform of a Northern farmer (Thanet 
1993:45).What had once been one variety of a diverse array of male attire had become 
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monochromatic (ibid). Three years later, in 1960, the newly-appointed governor of the 
province,
59
 after having attended the kantoke, decreed that government officials should 
wear the indigo moh hom as a symbol of their regional pride (Thanet 1993:47). In 
1987, this call was echoed by the elected municipal office [เทศบาล - thaesabaan]. It is 
now the regional uniform for Fridays and as such most government employees and 
many private employees wear the indigo shirts on that day. 
 Hobsbawm and Ranger describe an “invented tradition” as “a set of practices 
normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic 
nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, 
which automatically implies continuity with a suitable historic past” (Hobsbawm and 
Ranger 1983). Herzfeld (2005:10) takes exception with a too-wide application of 
Hobsbawm and Ranger‟s argument as presented in the 1983 volume and its 
implication that invented traditions are invented by the elite in order to bind together 
the nation. But, while I acknowledge Herzfeld‟s problem with Hobsbawm and Ranger, 
the moh hom, khantoke, and the like do fall into their characterization quite well: they 
are things which are created by elite figues such as Kraisri or the phu wa jangwat and 
thence retroactively inserted into the archive of “Chiang Mai tradition”. 
In the Thai anthropological literature, Mani places the khantoke alongside 
ancient rites (such as the “praise ceremony” [ยกครู - yok khruu], which I will discuss in 
more detail in chapter seven, below) in full awareness of its recent manufacture. The 
khantoke‟s newness does not condemn it to inauthenticity, though, as the khantoke is 
intended to be instructive and to last. The khantoke is an example of the active 
construction of watthanatham, reminiscent of the way in which Thai monarchs would 
rebuild ancient ruins in order to increase their power - power was a force that had to be 
                                                 
59
 The phu wa jangwat [ผูว้า่จงัหวดั - provincial governor] is drawn from the ranks of the national 
bureaucracy and appointed by the central government rather than elected. Phu wa are not generally 
from the region that they govern. 
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continually replenished, and as such, historicity does not require changelessness, 
instead, it requires continual upkeep and renovation. As the tamnaan and their 
continual re-configuring of the past suggest, authenticity must be maintained and 
updated to meet the needs of the present. 
 This interpretation is perfectly in line with what John Pemberton (1994) 
describes for the construction of national symbols in New Order Indonesia. Mrs. 
Soeharto, designing an audience hall for the “Beautiful Indonesia” theme park, 
expressed hope that her structure would be imposing enough not to lose authenticity. 
According to Pemberton, “Although one might expect that over the years such a hall 
would gain an aura of authenticity, a sort of cultural patina, the First Lady assumed the 
opposite, a possible loss of authenticity over time. Within this framework, authenticity 
does not accrue, but, on the contrary, must be built in as a unique quality that will 
survive through time, in spite of time, so long as the building stands … a construction 
always already „authentic‟” (Pemberton 1994:159-160). Northern Thai watthanatham, 
likewise, is a thing to which new additions can be added without compromising its 
value, indeed, such additions render it more praiseworthy. I continue upon this 
discussion of the re-fashioning of Chiang Mai‟s “Lanna” image in the next chapter as 
well as in chapter eight, below. 
 From the tamnaan texts advocating the interests of various parties within 
Chiang Mai, to the royalist history where Chiang Mai exists as the undeveloped Other 
of the civilized Bangkok, to the idea of Chiang Mai during the nationalist period as the 
repository of lost proto-Thai truths, and finally to the image of Chiang Mai as the seat 
of a cultural resource to be mined and developed for the national good, each 
interpretation of what Chiang Mai‟s watthanatham means helps to shed light upon 
what residents, promoters, and government agencies mean when they term Chiang 
Mai a “city of culture”. “Culture” as watthanatham is a future-oriented quality which 
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must be continually constructed anew, and re-fashioned to fit the times so as to be 
beneficial for the future and for the nation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Lanna Images 
On a cool winter night I came downstairs from my apartment and begun 
walking towards the noodle stall on the street and encountered Lung – my nearly 
seventy-year-old landlord - returning from somewhere with two cups full of red wine. 
While Lung liked to drink in the early evenings as he watched the street traffic, wine 
was a new thing – he normally drank several cans of Chang beer. “Anu,” he said60, 
“you should go across the street! They are giving away alcohol! Free!” He smiled 
broadly at having beaten the system and repeated: “You don‟t have to pay a thing!”  
 
 
                                                 
60
 Anu was my nickname, a shortened version of “Andrew.” 
Figure 5: Cotto Tiles shopping mall on Nimmanhaemin Road 
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The event that Lung described was a massive party for the opening of a store in 
a small shopping complex (see figure 5). Modern Dog, one of Thailand‟s more famous 
rock bands at the time, was playing a free concert, and a Thai television star was there 
to act as an announcer on a televised tour through the shop. All of this would have 
been ordinary enough for the opening of a new shopping mall, or perhaps a row of 
fashionable boutiques, but what struck me as unusual was the venue being opened: the 
Cotto Tiles Library. Cotto Tiles, a branch of the Thai Ceramic Co., makes (as its name 
suggests) various forms of tiles for home decoration, and the Library was a showcase 
for Cotto‟s projects and a place where prospective home decorators could go for 
inspiration (the word “inspiration”, in English, was the catchphrase for the party). 
While the combination of aggressive (if optimistic) punk-inspired rock and a home-
décor ceramic showroom did not seem a natural fit to me, the name “Cotto Tiles” was 
not unfamiliar: I had seen the words in large Roman letters adorning police boxes at 
intersections from Bangkok to Chiang Mai.  
 The event also featured architects working in Chiang Mai, both architects born 
and educated in the city and those who came originally from other parts of Thailand, 
but all of whom were university-educated and interested in avant-garde architecture.
61
 
These architects, a part of a larger community of architects, artists and would-be artists 
living in Chiang Mai, were key players in and symbols of the formation of Chiang 
Mai‟s image. They were actively trying to create a “new” Chiang Mai, one which was 
both the realization of Lanna‟s promise and at the same time current with global 
                                                 
61
 Tong, one of my key informants, was one of these architects. I repeatedly described his work as 
“high-modern” or thansamai [ทนัสมยั] as it consisted of concrete blocks, glass walls, and a radical 
break from both traditional architecture as well as the large, massive blocks typical of government 
buildings. To my layman‟s eyes, it evoked Corbusier or Aalto, but he repeatedly told me that he did not 
think of his work as “high-modern,” so I do not call it such here and instead use “avant-garde,” perhaps 
closer in spirit to how he thought of his work. By using this word, I do not mean to enter into debates 
about artistic genres. 
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artistic trends and flows. This image occasionally contributed to and contradicted 
other images of Chiang Mai presented in the Thai media during this time period.  
 The Cotto Tiles event was significant in that it lay at the confluence of various 
forces involved in re-making the image of the city. For one, the tile company itself 
was an active promoter of the construction boom going on in Chiang Mai‟s suburbs 
and the city, supplying tiles to many development companies. Also, the choice of 
venue was in the heart of Chiang Mai‟s new district – Nimmanhaemin. As Modern 
Dog played, they were flanked on one side by “Café Nero,” an Italian restaurant-cum-
coffee shop, on the other side by “Dai-Kichi,” a Japanese restaurant, and behind them 
(in addition to the Tiles Library) was the “BKK62 Grill”, a restaurant specializing in 
steak. The architects featured in the Cotto Tiles promotional material and in the 
posters lining the venue walls were those who were actively producing major high-
modern projects in the city (some of which I detail below): the Mo Rooms Hotel, 
Yesterday Hotel, Maze Café, etc. In the posters describing their projects, each 
architect listed his (they were all male) site of “inspiration” in the city – some 
mentioned the old railway station or other early twentieth-century buildings in the 
city; others (like Tong) mentioned the Ang Kaew reservoir or other natural features. 
While the group of architects and planners assembled at the Tiles event was not the 
sum total of architects in Chiang Mai, they represented those aggressively pushing for 
a new, globally-interconnected Chiang Mai, one unburdened but at the same time 
informed by the image of Lanna. 
The Image of Chiang Mai 
 At the Cotto Tiles opening, I picked up a free copy of a Cotto Tiles guide to 
Cotto-inspired modern architecture in the cities of Chiang Mai, Bangkok, and Phuket. 
                                                 
62
 BKK is the airport code for “Bangkok.” 
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I quote here my own translation of the Chiang Mai section, entitled 
“www.Chiangmai : Cultural Delight”63  
 
The skyline of the city of Chiang Mai when seen from above, from atop Doi 
Suthep, for instance, looks like it‟s not very orderly. But in fact, it‟s clean and easy to 
understand [เรียบง่าย - riap ngaai], and clear [ใสๆ - sai sai]. It differs from a big city like 
Bangkok. From the outskirts into the city below, you will see also that the image that 
you have seen from the top [i.e. a clear, easy, clean city] is in fact representative of 
the city.  
 This is probably the reason why so many people from Bangkok have been 
able to come to Chiang Mai each year to visit, or to change regions altogether! They 
are escaping from the poor manners of the capital city. [Maybe it is because of the 
reason that in Chiang Mai,] there are regular universities, like Chiang Mai University, 
for furthering one‟s education, and also a thriving society [ความเป็นสงัคมอุดม - khwaam 
pen sangkhom udom] because head writers, thinkers and artists have congregated here. 
Or maybe it‟s because the cost of living is less than in the capital but returns a high 
value of life and contentment that is equal to or perhaps greater than the capital! At 
the same time, one never lacks intellectual stimulation because there are a ton of 
bookstores, along with research seminars - there is no lack of choices! Or, if you are 
feeling hemmed in, there‟s nature. It might be because the air is free of pollution and 
cooler in Chiang Mai that makes people from other parts have to come fall under its 
sleeping spell until they cannot awaken. Or maybe it‟s because of the various foods, 
which have tastes that are just right for Thai mouths. Or, finally, what might 
ultimately convince you, you can be heading down a nature trail, when, in just a 
couple minutes, you can bury yourself in the city and be surrounded by diverse people 
to watch. Chiang Mai is a one province that doesn‟t disappoint!  
 For artists, the old culture [วฒันธรรมเก่าแก่ - watthanatham kao kae] still fills 
and informs Chiang Mai. Temples and monasteries might be more in number here 
than other provinces, and the city plan still separates the old city and the new city, 
showing off clearly the moat and four corners, which are still used in rites and 
maintained.  
 There is still too much more left about this city to tell, about the beautyof the 
Lanna kingdom‟s culture [watthanatham] as well as new trends. People have said that 
[Chiang Mai] is too much, that you can‟t possibly see it all, but all of this wouldn‟t be 
possible if the majority of people didn‟t preserve the local habits and culture 
[watthanatham] of the city. But it‟s not only their [พวกเขา - phuak khao – e.g. Chiang 
Mai residents] job, because we are all “khon meuang opayop” [คนเมืองอพยพ - 
immigrants, but with a play on khon meuang – quotations in the original] everywhere 
we go! 
It might be said that one can sometimes buy time, but Chiang Mai doesn‟t 
have to buy its slow and easy time. It flows easily, and they [the people of Chiang 
Mai] are happy to give you theirs  
 
 Here, a number of things demand analysis. First of all, the title, 
“www.Chiangmai” obviously resembles a web address in a superficial way, drawing 
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 The title was in English, although the text was in Thai. 
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an association between Chiang Mai and international networks in the same way as 
license plates popular in Chiang Mai at the time featuring a “D” underneath the circle 
of stars representing the European Union did – these plates were modeled on those of 
Germany (“Deutschland”), but for their Thai users (such as Boi, the owner of a wine 
shop in Chiang Mai‟s suburbs), “D” simply meant “ดี:” dii, “good,” or “well.” The 
symbol of the EU was also a sign of something cosmopolitan, something that set them 
apart from everyday Northern Thai life and included them in an international network 
– more importantly, a European network. 
 The Cotto Tiles description of Chiang Mai assumes a Bangkok-based audience, 
perhaps one that will move to the North and build a house using Cotto tiles. The reader 
is supposedly “hemmed in” by “the capital city,” and wishes to get into a more pure 
and clear environment, “free of pollution and cooler”. The environment is culturally 
pure as well: the old watthanatham is present, embodied not only by temples and 
monasteries, but also by the walls and gates of the old city (see my discussion on city 
walls in the below chapters). Despite the “new trends” – of which the book is itself a 
prime example - Chiang Mai people (here set apart as “that group” [phuak khao] to be 
contrasted with “us” [rao]) maintain the local culture. But this culture is not something 
that will appear foreign to the Bangkok-based traveler, indeed, echoing Wichit‟s 
characterization of the North as being “more Thai” than Bangkok, the Cotto Tiles 
book claims that Northern food is “just right for Thai mouths.” Finally, the booklet 
reminds the reader that Chiang Mai people are also not autochthonous to Chiang Mai, 
that, like the Thais from elsewhere, all Thais are migrants (recalling Chiang Mai‟s 
place in ethno-nationalist historical constructions of great southern migrations).  
 The idea of “slow and easy time” and the characterization of Chaing Mai as 
existing in an allochronous space plays upon the trope of the region having a charm or 
magic stemming from the past – that saneh which I mention briefly above and which 
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the Cotto Tiles booklet suggests (“magic sleeping spell”) but does not state explicitly, 
but this past charm also coexists with the idea of Lanna as embodying a peculiarly 
European quality. Moving from the Cotto Tiles event on to other large events in 
Chiang Mai, on one chill November evening there was a large outdoor festival in 
Prasertland (that haunted stretch of concrete mentioned in chapter one). The event was 
a festival for local restaurants, and the vendors competed with each other over their 
grilled fish. Next to the vendors, there was a display of royal portraits, and next to that 
were a Ferris wheel and a row of carnival games. The audience ranged from Shan 
youth from the temporary settlement next door to college students from nearby Chiang 
Mai University.  
 I sat in the central area – a vast collection of metal tables and chairs - as 
waitresses, each representing a different beer company and wearing its distinctive 
uniform, wandered here and there. As I and my small group of friends finished off 
several fish and a few pitchers of Chang beer, the entertainment went from a kathoey 
[กะเทย - transgendered person] beauty contest64 to a moh lam [หมอลาํ - folk music of a 
certain kind] concert, to the headline act: a new rock band from Bangkok. As the 
young lead took the stage, he marveled over the weather:  “It‟s nice and cool here! 
Now that I‟ve been to Chiang Mai, there‟s no need to go to Europe!” 
 Indeed, Chiang Mai‟s climate is often the first thing that Bangkok-based 
people would mention when I said that I worked in the North: “Oh! Aakhaat dii!” 
[อากาศดี - good weather]. The trope of Chiang Mai having somehow “European” 
weather repeats in many other venues - in another attempt to capitalize on the 
association, the Chiang Mai Zoo opened a “Snow Dome” (a large chamber cooled to 
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 While this might seem to be unusual entertainment for a family-oriented festival, this is not unusual 
for outdoor night markets in Thailand. According to my friends and informants with whom I was 
drinking, the entertainment lay both in seeing those kathoey who indeed looked like beautiful women 
and in those who failed utterly at the attempt, as well as listening to the repartee of the announcers. 
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produce snow) for tourists in July of 2009. In addition to temperature, other “European” 
elements creep into the newly-emergent image of Chiang Mai, elements that 
seemingly contradict but nonetheless coexist with the image of Chiang Mai as a rural 
backwater – a new hotel, the “Eurana Boutique Hotel,” advertises itself as a place that 
offers a fusion of European and Lanna styles of accommodation, a rather tricky thing 
to do, considering that traveller‟s accommodations during the Lanna period consisted 
of the local temple‟s floor. My point is that, for the hotel‟s designers, these two ideas: 
European and Lanna, shared something, some form of elegance and grace not present 
in something that is simply “Thai.”  
These examples: the young musician‟s knee-jerk association of Northern 
weather with Europe (and not, for instance, Japan or China or other cool climes), the 
zoo planners‟ (reacting to competitive pressure from the Night Safari) anticipation of 
snow-seeking tourists, and the boutique hotel‟s combination of European and Lanna 
aesthetics point to an association between Northern-ness and European-ness at large in 
the imagined worlds of middle-class culture brokers – those individuals involved in 
the artistic reproduction of the city, especially as it relates to the image of the city 
designed for consumption by Central Thai visitors. Such a construction hearkens back 
to Wichit‟s watthanatham sukhothai, where watthanatham always anticipated the 
development inherent in the process of jaroen. Accordingly, Lanna, as a bastion of 
watthanatham should, in this configuration, have elements which are progressive and 
thus similar to those in places which have khwaam jaroen, such as Europe.  
I do not mean to imply that a masochistic valorization of Europe and America 
or even “the developed world” is predominant in Thailand. Indeed, as I hope I have 
shown in the section on khwaam pen thai, Thai exceptionalism is often cited (e.g. in 
cases such as the monarchy‟s role in politics) as being superior (at least for Thais) to 
European or American models. While Herzfeld points to the differences between 
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wattanantham and siwilai, arguing that the former bears the stamp of the national 
while the latter posits the attempt to emulate the West (Herzfeld 2002:905), here, I 
point to the similarities between the two, recalling Wichit‟s watthanatham sukhothai, 
which Wichit claimed had prefigured elements that he had admired in Facist Italy: a 
free market, wide roads, men‟s trousers, a writing system without super- and sub-
scripts, and the presence of a “despotic paternalism” in King Ramkhamhaeng. While 
siwilai points towards the achievement of European standards, jaroen and 
watthanatham point towards a universal goal, one which European powers have 
moved towards (albeit imperfectly). In everyday speech, places such as America and 
Western Europe (and, to a lesser extent, Korea, Japan and even Bangkok) were cited 
as places that had jaroen laew [เจริญแลว้ – “already progressed”] as often as they were 
cited as having pattana laew [พฒันาแลว้ – “already developed”].  
What I detail here is the attention placed to Chiang Mai‟s image. In chapter 
five, below, I describe how premodern configurations of the city were done with 
attention to image to work sympathetic magic (e.g. by configuring the city to be like 
the heavens, the city would acquire some heavenly prosperity). Similarly, such an 
attention is key in the editing and fashioning of Chiang Mai‟s image in the present 
time. Here, I wish to describe the image of Chiang Mai as portrayed in various forms 
in the city, each playing off of the two tropes – Chiang Mai as having within it the 
seeds of jaroen and therefore somehow intrinsically European, and Chiang Mai as 
backwater vis-à-vis Bangkok. What these two contrasting tropes share is a 
construction of Chiang Mai as being locked in the past – even if it contains potential 
development and the seeds of something progressive, it exists in an allochronous state 
in relation to the capital.  
I use the term “image” here, referencing not only Lynch‟s Image of the City 
(1960), a book that was often cited by many of the city planners with whom I worked 
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in Chiang Mai, but also referencing Nidthi Aeurwongsie‟s article (1991) describing 
the changing paab [ภาพ - picture, status, image] of Chiang Mai, as well as Peter 
Jackson‟s work on the Thai “regime of images” (2004), by which he refers to the Thai 
state‟s attempt to manage what images were seen by foreigners and what Thai people 
were permitted to see. As Jackson writes: “public discursive activity conducted under 
the regime [of images] is not directed towards the seeking out of the genuine essences 
of representations or discovering the truth of statements. Instead, it works to construct 
and uphold the relationally determined prestige or baaramii [charismatic power] of 
representations and statements” (Jackson 2004a:204).65 For Jackson, authenticity is 
not the point, rather, “representations,” like watthanatham in my argument, serve to 
inspire jaroen. Building upon Jackson‟s observations, here I wish to point out the 
transformative qualities of ideal images as creating baaramii – that charismatic, 
attractive power of the city. By constructing the premodern city plan of Chiang Mai, 
for instance – the image (e.g. the city) acquires some of the power of the original (e.g. 
Mount Meru). Such is the process by which Buddha images and monks acquire their 
supernatural powers (e.g. bringing rain, bringing prosperity, duplicating themselves, 
granting charms, etc) – through their appearance as the Buddha, they acquire some of 
the Buddha‟s powers66. But unlike in the Lanna-era city described in the next chapter, 
where the urban image arose out of the attempt to create a magico-religious 
simulacrum of the cosmos for the benefit of the ruler, the current process of image 
production stems from disparate sources towards disparate goals. As I detail in chapter 
eight, the state, undertaking such projects as the reconstruction of the city walls or the 
creation of the Ratchaphruek floral exhibition, is one such player, but the private 
                                                 
65
 One should also note the compatibility of this statement with Fishel (2001)‟s analysis of baaramii 
versus transparency in Thai political discourse. 
66
 Indeed, note the classifier used for monks and Buddha images in Central Thai: ruup [รูป - picture, 
image]. 
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sector plays a larger role. Urban planning NGOs, with partnerships with Chiang Mai‟s 
universities, also attempt to manage the city‟s image – e.g. lobbying the provincial and 
city governments with some success to pass laws limiting the height of buildings near 
religious structures.
67
 
An example of Jackson‟s “regime of images” which has a bearing both on 
spatial and semiotic realms came when I was trying to make contact with the medium 
of the local spirit of Chiang Yeun neighborhood, just north of Sriphumi corner. There 
was a large spirit shrine in front of a square, well-kept and well-maintained with a 
sign: saan jao pho baan chiang yeun [ศาลเจา้พอ่บา้นเชียงยนื - The Shrine of Lord Father 
of Chiang Yeun Neighborhood], which was quite obviously a spirit shrine in the same 
way as Lord Chiang Mai Gate or the cow statue in Wua Lai were. Whether or not the 
spirit had mediums, someone around the neighborhood had to know about who took 
care of the shrine and maintained it I had previously asked around without any luck, 
but then I saw an old man cleaning the square. Excited, I called out to him: 
 
AAJ: Excuse me Uncle! Hello. Are you taking care of this shrine?  
Uncle: [No response] 
AAJ:  I have come here because I am interested in spirit shrines [ศาลเจา้ - saan jao] in 
Chiang Mai. Is this a spirit shrine [as I point to the sign that says “spirit shrine”]? 
Uncle: [No response] 
AAJ: I‟m sorry to have disturbed you. Do you know what this place is? Do you know 
the history [ประวติัศาสตร์ - prawattisaat – the academic term for “history”] of this 
place? 
Uncle: [Brightening] History? You should go to chiang man temple [วดัเชียงมัน่ - the 
first temple in Chiang Mai and the first stop on historical tours of the city]. That‟s a 
lot better than here. There are many farang [Caucasians] there. They have written 
things in farang language [he says this despite the fact that we are speaking in Thai 
together. He then proceeds to give me directions back into the old city]. Keep going 
until you see all the things in farang language.  
                                                 
67
 I detail comments by Professor Duangchan Jaroenmeuang, the head of an influential urban planning 
NGO which advocates for such cultural issues (especially in the Wat Gaet area) below. Other NGOs 
include the ภาคีคนฮกัเจียงใหม่ - pakhi khon hak jiang mai, a group which made the controversial decision 
to criticize Thaksin‟s development projects and thereby, in the polarized politics of the latter half of the 
2000s, ally themselves with the “Yellow shirt” middle-class movement. 
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AAJ: Oh, yes. I have been there, but today I‟m interested in this place. I am interested 
in jao pho seua baan.68 [เจา้พอ่เส้ือบา้น] 
Uncle: Jao pho? We don‟t have any jao pho around here. 
AAJ: What about this place? It says on that sign jao pho baan chiang yeun. 
Uncle: No, we don‟t have them . Chiang man is that way [again, he gives detailed 
directions]. Keep going until you see signs in farang language. There are farang 
filling that space [เตม็ไปหมด - tem pai mot].  
AAJ: I will go. But first I am interested in this place right here. 
Uncle: This place has no history [น้ีไม่มีประวติัศาสตร์เลย - nii mai mii prawattisaat loei]. 
[He gives me directions to chiang man temple again]. Just go right through there. You 
can get a guesthouse and everything. 
AAJ (frustrated): I have a house here. I am doing research [ทาํวิจยั - tham wijai] on 
community spirits.  
Uncle: Oh! Well in that case go right over there into the old city. It‟s right there! 
AAJ: What‟s right there? 
Uncle: Chiang man temple. It has all the history. 
What is striking about the man‟s response (here I call him “Uncle” as I did not 
meet him after this day and knew him only as “lung” – the respectful term for an older 
man) is his refusal to acknowledge the spirit shrine. He was standing inside the gated 
courtyard, sweeping up, and even when I pointed to the sign referring to the place as a 
shrine, he denied that it was anything of the sort. Less surprising is that he continually 
casts me as an outsider and suggests that I go where other farang have congregated, in 
a place of acknowledged watthanatham (albeit in this case the question is of “history” 
and not “culture”). Spirit shrines and spirit mediums have no place in his conception 
of Chiang Mai, or at least in the conception that he wishes me to understand. I, being 
in that space and time, am matter out of place, and he takes it as his task to put the 
foreigner with the foreigners and history with its source. I, by being in a spirit shrine, 
speaking Thai,
69
 and asking about spirits, was attempting to read a history of Chiang 
                                                 
68
 There are many opportunites here for a misunderstanding. Jao pho, literally “Lord Father” in Central 
Thai, can refer to a mafia godfather, although it is a common name for a guardian spirit both in the 
North and in Isaan, as Tambiah refers to the guardian spirit of his study village (1970) as chao pho khao 
[Lord Father White]. Also, he might have misunderstood เส้ือบา้น [seua baan, a term for guardian spirits] 
with ซ้ือบา้น [seu baan, to purchase a house]. 
69
 Another incident took a similar trajectory. I was on Thaep Sathit lane, looking for the offices of a 
urban revitalization NGO that had published material pertaining to city planning. Without a street sign, 
I stopped at a stall selling sundries that someone had set up outside of a house. “Excuse me, am I on 
Thep Sathit lane? [ขอโทษนะครับ ซอยนีช่ือชอยเทพสถิดหรึเปล่า]” I asked. The vendor responded, “I don‟t know 
what the name of this lane is. What did you say?” “Thep Sathit,” I answered. “Oh!,” she brightened, 
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Mai which was not compatible with his conception of how Chiang Mai‟s history 
should be read. As Jackson suggests, there are different cities for different readers, but 
this is not to say that all readings of Lanna can coexist: here is where architecture 
becomes particularly salient – one cannot have both tall concrete and glass buildings 
and a temple-centered, kalae-roofed skyline. 
Jackson‟s discussion of the “regime of images” relates to foreign/Thai 
contestations of image, but Nidthi, looking at the ways in which Chiang Mai has been 
depicted in television and other forms of media, comments upon the process of 
selectively creating an image of Chiang Mai. Nidthi claims that Bangkok – by which 
he means those writers and artists who have been formative in making films and 
television shows about the North - has pre-arranged the images of the provinces [จดัฝัน 
- jat fun: literally “organized the dreams”], a process that eventually results in the 
provinces themselves re-enacting the Bangkok-originating dream (Nidthi 1991: 182). 
The story that Nidthi references in his article is Saaw Khrua Faa [สาวเครือฟ้า], a 
reinterpretation of Madame Butterfly which places a Chiang Mai maiden in place of 
the Japanese girl in Butterfly and a Bangkokian soldier in place of the American 
soldier. The two fall in love, but the soldier eventually returns to Bangkok, leaving the 
poor Northern girl pregnant and alone, after which she kills herself by leaping to her 
death from the top of a waterfall. Yet for Nidthi, the aesthetics of the film are far more 
important than the plot – the artistic director and writer of the film invent Northern 
language, costume, and the image and décor of the city freely, without reference to 
                                                                                                                                            
“Doi Suthep [ดอยสุเทพ]! You want to go to Doi Suthep!,” Doi Suthep being Chiang Mai‟s biggest tourist 
draw and a prominent mountaintop temple, visible anywhere in Chiang Mai. I replied: “No, I am trying 
to find soi [lane] Thep Sathit.” She responded, speaking slowly: “You are saying it wrong. Say it slowly. 
Doi Su-thep [ดอย -  สุ – เทพ].” The exchange went on for a little longer, as I tried to explain that I only 
wanted to find a certain road, and not to climb the mountain, after which time we parted acknowledging 
our misunderstanding. It could be true that she had only set up her stall at the house, and did not in fact 
know the name of the lane, or it could be true that, as in many such places, the common name for the 
lane was not the official name, but what I find interesting is her inability to understand that I was 
looking for a street, and not trying to find a tourist location.   
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kammeuang or the city of Chiang Mai at all. Ultimately, for Nidthi, Saaw Khrua Faa 
is an important marker showing how ideas from the metropole have the power to 
rewrite the aesthetic of Chiang Mai.  
As I argue above, prior to the mid-20
th
 century, the attitude of central Thailand 
towards the periphery can be summed up in the term used by king Chulalongkorn – 
Rama V – “Lao”, an image which the writer of Saao Khrua Faa attempted to change 
from being hostile to simply being strange and exotically beautiful. This writer, not 
well-versed in Northern language or culture, added his own touches to help to build 
this image: significantly Chiang Mai gardens, which were traditionally composed of 
shady and old trees, became instead fields of flowers. These fields of flowers would 
exist in a cool, misty climate – another image removed from the reality of Chiang 
Mai‟s temperature-inverted, smoggy winter weather. Despite this disconnect between 
the image and reality, in a generation Northerners had come to accept this image as 
their own, a process that, as I mention above, Nidthi calls jat fun – literally translated 
as Bangkok “packing the dreams” of the North. 
 Saaw Khrua Faa retains a stamp upon the Northern cultural and geographic 
landscape - Withi claims that the figure of Khrua Faa is now often believed to be an 
actual historical figure (Withi 2005:97). Indeed, the waterfall where Khrua Faa
70
 
meets her doom (and would, therefore, become a ผตีายโหง - phi taai hoong, a kind of 
malevolent spirit which I describe in chapter seven, below) is in fact a waterfall that is 
supposedly haunted by the spirit of “Nang Bua” – a girl who met an identical fate 
when left pregnant by her Bangkokian lover. I do not know if the fictional story 
predates the name of the waterfall or vice-versa, but the question of causality here 
does not matter – Khrua Faa and Nang Bua are now one and the same. In addition to 
having become associated with a ghost, Khrua Faa is now inseparable with the idea of 
                                                 
70
 Saaw means “young woman.” 
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being a Lanna woman [ความเป็นหญิงลา้นนา - khwaam pen ying lanna], as reflected in 
the annual Khrua Faa beauty pageant (ibid).  
 While the actual film is rare these days – indeed, many of my informants 
complained that I was, in my interest in Saaw Khrua Faa, dredging up ancient and 
irrelevant films that nobody watched anymore – the same plot occurs elsewhere. For 
instance, in the lakhon [ละคร - telenovela] Mua Dohk Rak Baan [เม่ือดอกรักบาน - When 
the Love Flower Blossoms], the same plot repeats (albeit with a few alterations). Kan, 
a handsome young Bangkokian, is attending university in Chiang Mai when he attracts 
the attentions of Khlia and Mai, both Northern women but opposite in temprement: 
scheming and promiscuous, and pure and innocent, respectively; the first echoing the 
plotting witch Soi Faa from Khun Chang Khun Phan (see below) and the second Saaw 
Khrua Faa. When Kan returns to Bangkok, he unknowingly leaves Mai pregnant, and 
Khlia, also pregnant via her wicked stepfather, follows Kan to plead his family to take 
her in. When Mai comes to Bangkok to find out why Kan has not been writing back to 
her (Khlia had been intercepting the letters), she finds Khlia, obviously pregnant, at 
his house. Khlia, seeing the opportunity to defeat her rival, pretends that Kan is the 
father of her child and sends Mai away reeling with the shock. Mai returns to Chaing 
Mai and tries to throw herself off of a waterfall (thereby recapitulating the Saaw 
Khrua Faa story), but is stopped by a mutual friend, Tawan.
71
  
Here, again, is the Saaw Khrua Faa story, albeit with all the twists and turns 
expected from a 21
st
 century Thai lakhon: the Bangkokian young man goes to Chiang 
Mai and (appears to) take advantage of the innocent Northern girl, who then, realizing 
the deception, kills herself (or tries to). In this case, however, the whole affair is a 
misunderstanding based on the deceptions of that other Northern stereotype: the witch, 
                                                 
71
 The story continues into the next generation, as Kan and Khlia (chastely) raise Khlia‟s child – a boy - 
and Mai and Tawan (chastely) raise her child – a girl. This second generation falls in love, sparking a 
conflict between Kan and Tawan, who has in the meantime become a local mafia boss. 
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a trope which Nidthi claims was the image of Chiang Mai and Chiang Mai women 
prior to the invention of Saaw Khrua Faa.  
While the opposing stereotypes of Northern women are each present in Mua 
Dohk Rak Baan, how did the one transform into the other? How might these images of 
the North play out ethnographically, beyond a simply analysis of media?  Nidthi, in 
his analysis of Saaw Khrua Faa, also cites the character of the Chiang Mai-born lesser 
wife
72
 Soi Fa in Khun Chang Khun Phan. Soi Fa, the minor wife, is ignored by her 
husband, Phra Wai, in favor of his Central Thai major wife, Simala, and is mocked by 
her grandmother-in-law, who taunts her by comparing Soi Fa to a medium: “You 
dance as if you had a band playing, as if you were trembling under possession by a 
spirit. Who is it – pho luang?73 ” (Pasuk and Baker 2009: 37:10). What Soi Fa does in 
the spirit of revenge is quite similar to what Klia attempts – to turn the heart of the 
hero to her and against her rival. Soi Fa uses magic: 
 
Soi Fa happily raised the bowl above her head. „May this magic succeed in bringing a 
grave evil to its end. 
Please turn the heart of Phra Wai so he blindly comes to my room, so that he no 
longer yearns for Simala but hates her, so the mantra makes him infatuated with me.‟ 
After the wish, she washed her hair, and began to brighten up. The gloom disappeared 
from her face. (Pasuk and Baker 2009:37:20). 
 
 Soi Fa‟s magical treachery, while it has for the modern reader a certain 
justification, is not considered to be a measured response to her abuse in the story. 
Rather, her treachery is revealed through an ordeal by fire and she is sentenced to 
death (happily commuted to exile back to Chiang Mai). 
 Nidthi makes the point that the transition from the worldy, crafty and 
somewhat unlovely (in comparison to Simala) Soi Fa to the beautiful but naïve Khrua 
                                                 
72
 Soi Fa is a war captive and as such occupies a less auspicious status in the polygamous marriage to 
Phra Wai. 
73
 Pasuk and Baker speculate that this term might mean “guardian spirit” or “village headman.”  
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Faa marks a change in how the North is depicted in Central sources (1991:184). 
Rather than being cast as inherently barbarous and treacherous (i.e. “Lao”) as it is in 
the pre-20
th
 century epic, Chiang Mai as represented by “the Chiang Mai woman” 
becomes somehow inherently innocent – an object to protect, rather than an object to 
protect against. The depiction of the Northern woman‟s sexuality is also changed. 
Whereas Soi Fa desires the attentions of her husband to the extent that she engages in 
black magic in order to get them, Khrua Faa – or Mai, from Mua Dok Rak Baan – is a 
passive sex object: while she expresses emotional longing for Kan, in their love scene 
she has to be heavily coaxed by Kan in order to participate.  
In each case, Central Thai sources represent the North in the figure of a woman 
– as the National Museum does, providing vastly more material and space for 
Dararasamii (the consort of Rama V of Bangkok) than any other figure in Lanna 
history. Such representations continue in everyday examples as well. For instance, 
during my fieldwork,  series of paintings by a Bangkok-based artist grew popular in 
Northern markets oriented towards tourists both Thai and foreign. These were 
paintings of white-skinned young women in various traditional Northern costumes, 
some tribal (e.g. Hmong), some from ethnic minorities (e.g. Shan or Tai Lue), and 
some in Lanna outfits from the 19
th
 century, but generally in various stages of undress, 
with prominent breasts
74
. The women are bathing, dressing, or combing their hair, or 
simply sitting in front of verdant jungle and perhaps a part of a teak house. They each 
manifest East Asian facial features, large breasts, and long hair (see figure 6).  
Their whiteness is another feature that is striking. Indeed, many of my friends 
and informants both from the North and elsewhere commented (favorably) on the 
perceived whiter skin of Northerners (light skin being one of the features admired in 
Thai aesthetics). However, this characterization is dramatically different from that of 
                                                 
74
 I do not reproduce the image here as I do not have the permission of the original artist. 
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Isaan or Laotian women – indeed, the very features which informants such as Boon or 
Tim (mentioned above) remarked upon favorably for Northern women (pale skin, 
refined features) were the exact opposite of how they characterized Northeastern 
women (dark skin, flat noses), a characterization abroad in Bangkok‟s mass media as 
well.  
Nidthi‟s overall point is that, in the process of image production, what is 
chosen as a representative image for Chiang Mai remains largely out of the hands of 
any of the city‟s residents and quite rapidly comes to stand in stead of what had 
existed before. In Chiang Mai, for instance, the image of a garden city covered in 
flowers had no origin in reality, as traditional gardens featured groves of tall trees 
instead of plains of flowers (see the example of Ratchaphreuk in chapter eight, below), 
but owing to the influence of Saaw Khrua Faa, Chiang Mai University imports tons of 
flowers a year for its graduation ceremonies. Such a process extends to the academic 
realm as well: Thongchai writes that local history, originally touted as a means to 
subvert hegemonic historiography, instead reaffirms a Bangkok-centered narrative 
(Thongchai 1995:113). Instead of allowing for heterodox histories to form (e.g. a 
history highlighting Chiang Mai‟s long periods of cultural exchange and interaction 
with Ava), these histories reject outside influences in favor of “national integrity” 
(Thongchai 1995:114).  
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Figure 6: "Thai Yuan", tourist postcard, Chiang Mai walking street. 
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Yet one feature which Nidthi does not mention is the feminization of Chiang 
Mai in comparison to Bangkok present in all of these depictions. Chiang Mai is 
represented by women in each of these stories, women marked by a lack of 
development but – in Khrua Faa and Mai‟s cases – an underlying purity and innocence. 
This presentation of the North as a site of unrefined potential, of a place with an 
inherent watthanatham that is awaiting its realization pervades depictions of Chiang 
Mai. 
 Ultimately, Nidthi‟s analysis in his article “Saaw Khrua Faa” (1991), written 
for a popular audience, is too simplistic. It presents the author as an enlightened voice, 
speaking from a position of authority, safely away from these forces of image 
production and influence, as if the “real Chiang Mai,” as Nidthi puts it, is something to 
which he has access. In the years since the publication of his article, debates about 
what form the image of Lanna should take have been occurring amongst academics, 
designers, and other culture brokers both “local”75 and not. – Indeed, in art and design 
circles, as well as in some academic circles, Chiang Mai has altered far beyond the 
simple, naïve, but beautiful appearance of Saaw Khrua Faa, but it retains the element 
of an unsophisticated place which is nonetheless at its core more purely an heir of 
wattanatham than Bangkok. To explore this idea, I here describe several instances of 
image-making and Chiang Mai that go beyond the depictions in Nidthi‟s example but 
nonetheless revolve around the idea of potential and refinement – that duality which is 
bridged by the concept of watthanatham explored in previous chapters: a quality 
which is both progressive and historically-oriented. 
                                                 
75
 Here, the term “local” presents somewhat of a problem. Who is local and who is not? Is a wealthy, 
foreign-educated Northern Thai person “local” simply owing to his place of birth? Nationalistic or 
royalist Thais often deride academics who disagree with official axioms (such as the centrality of the 
monarchy to Thai life) as being หวันอก [hua nohk - “outside head”], a saying which supposes a true 
“inside” in contrast to foreignness in a way that silences opposition and paralyzes debate which I do not 
seek to replicate here. Can no one born elsewhere in Thailand become “local?” What about those 
Northern Thais – such as Kraisri Nimmanhaemin or Thaksin Shinawatra - whose heritage is Chinese? 
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Chiang Mai as backwater 
In the popular romantic comedy Rak Jang [รักจงั - “Love, Totally”76], the story 
begins with a careless Bangkokian superstar crashed and stranded on his way back 
from a vacation in the popular tourist city of Pai,
77
 just to the north of Chiang Mai. 
Having lost his memory, he is taken in by a group of hill tribesmen (who nonetheless 
speak in a sort of Northern Thai) played up for laughs. The star is pursued by an 
ambitious tabloid photographer who finds him selling mushrooms at the market and 
ends up falling in love with him, despite her ambition to acquire a photograph of the 
star in a shocking and embarrassing situation. The tribesmen fill the role of buffoons; 
indeed, the figure of the Northern tribal clown is a common trope in Thai comedies – 
they wander around cities, interpreting street signs overly literally,
78
 or act as bungling 
miscreants who inevitably receive a kick to the face (contact between foot and head, as 
it reverses the proper hierarchy of high and low, is considered particularly demeaning 
and therefore funny in a slapstick idiom). 
 Rak Jang was not intended to accurately capture local life in Thailand‟s north. 
Yet such a film shows a great deal about how the former Lanna region is troped in 
Thai-audience sources. Northerners, aside from their tribal stand-ins, are entirely 
absent from the movie: when the hero finds a café in Pai, he makes a point of asking 
the owner if she is a Northerner, to which she replies “No, I‟m a Bangkok person! 
                                                 
76
 “Love, Totally” is my own translation – I am not aware of an English-language title for this film. It is 
a difficult title to translate exactly, as Thai sentences do not necessarily need a subject (so rak could be 
translated as “I love you”) and the ending “jang” is a colloquial, youthful, urban way of shortening 
“jang loei” - “totally,” “a lot,” or “absolutely.” 
77
 Pai becomes another central point for tourism in the North, both national and international. For 
international circles, it is a sort of hippy destination, full of folk music and backpackers. For national 
circles, the image could not be more different – Pai is a cool, trendy, and luxurious spot for wealthy 
Bangkokians to explore the Northern mountains. For another film example of the wealthy Thai interest 
in Pai, see the 2009/2010 film Pai in Love, a romantic comedy starring young urbanites in the northern 
city. 
78
 Upon seeing a power-line repair truck [รถไฟฟ้า – rot fai-faa] in one film, the tribesmen are overjoyed 
at finding Bangkok‟s super-modern skytrain [spelled in the same manner] and proceed to sit on the 
truck as it drives around town. 
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[เป็นคนกรุงเทพฯ - pen khon krung thep]” before moving on to other topics of 
conversation. The exchange is orphaned from the preceding or anteceding parts of the 
conversation – it exists simply to explain existence of the café (a symbol of 
cosmopolitanism) and the woman‟s urbane manners and Central speech. But Northern 
symbols, if not individuals, are present in the film – outside of the city. Northern dress, 
speech, and rituals become those of the film‟s hill tribes. The tribesmen wear Karen-
esque outfits, but speak in a quasi-Northern accent and decorate their festivals with the 
long white banners [ตุง - tung] that mark a Northern Thai temple ceremony. 
 The association between Northern Thai culture and Karen or Hmong
79
 symbols 
is common in many other such casual uses. For instance, a line of blank CDs sold at 7-
11 had as its decorative theme “the Four Regions of Thailand,” featuring an image of 
male and female traditional dress and speech from each part. The Northern disc 
predictably featured a Paduang (“long-neck” Karen) woman and Karen man, speaking 
Northern Thai.
80
 Such associations are not limited to the occasional advertising 
reference: in a similar vein, the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, unpopular 
in Bangkok, was nicknamed “แมว้ - Maew” by the major Bangkok newspapers – maew 
being the derogatory term (in Thailand) for “a Hmong person.”  When I, thinking that 
this was Thaksin‟s nickname,81 referred to him by this name, a crowd of middle-aged 
ladies (all Thaksin supporters) suddenly adopted stony expressions and sullenly 
informed me that this name was used exclusively by the anti-Thaksin press. Of course, 
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 The Karen and Hmong are two examples of highland-dwelling populations. The Karen live primarily 
on the Thai-Burma border and have lived in Northern Thailand for several hundred years, while the 
Hmong are more recent arrivals from China and Laos. Neither Karen nor Hmong language is related to 
Thai and each group – while there are large numbers of converts to Christianity and Buddhism amongst 
them – practices their own respective form of animism. 
80
 Specifically, the characters use the Northern male pronoun อ้าย [ai] and Northern female polite 
ending jao [เจา้]. 
81
 In Thai, people generally have a formal name used in official situations (e.g. Thaksin, Somboon, 
Sureerat) and a short name, often the name of an animal or object and occasionally an English word – 
or just as often a quick syllable, used by friends and acquaintances (e.g. Goong [shrimp], Ae, Golf).  
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the implication that an association with Hmong and Karen groups is an insult contains 
within it an insult to the Hmong and Karen, or at least the implication that hill tribes 
occupy a low and ignorant place in human development. 
 By associating the North with tribespeople, such media representations play 
upon the older Fifth Reign stereotypes discussed in chapter two, wherein Northerners 
rely upon their southern brothers to escape poverty and ignorance. Indeed, Peleggi 
notes the way in which Bangkokian Thais mimic Western tourists upon visits to the 
“backwater” provinces, such as Chiang Mai and Pai (Peleggi 1996:437). But the North 
is not only backwater, instead, as we saw with Wichit‟s valorization of Northern 
culture as being quintessentially Thai, in the logic of nationalism, the untouched, 
allochronous, primitive space contains within it the kernel of authenticity. For instance, 
Saaw Khrua Faa both embodies backwardness (in light of her naïveté) and charisma 
(in light of her beauty). In other words, Khrua Faa‟s raw charisma is something which 
is natural, inherent, as opposed to something learned. Only with refinement can the 
true potential of such charisma be realized, a trope which echoes the drive to “improve” 
upon Lanna culture and which I discuss in chapter eight below. 
 Both the repetition of and sensitivity towards such representations pervaded 
many of my informants‟ discourse, especially those Northern Thais who were actively 
involved in Chiang Mai‟s artist community. As an example, I was drinking with a 
large group of Thai, Northern Thai, and European artists (and their friends) at a large 
house/studio in Chiang Mai‟s fashionable Mae Sa suburb. The house (a poured 
concrete, brightly-painted avant-garde-style place) was at the edge of a rice field. Joe, 
the Central Thai owner and a friend of mine, had moved to Chiang Mai several years 
ago after being an actor and artist in Bangkok for many years. He rhapsodized about 
how he was now a farmer [ชาวนา - chao na] and how he loved to stand in his rice field 
and gaze at the mountains. In the spirit of friendly, slightly drunken mockery, and 
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knowing Joe‟s elite Bangkok and international tastes (and therefore how unlikely a 
farmer he made), I asked him where his buffalo was at the moment. Joe responded, 
laughing, that he was in fact the buffalo, but his friend, Dao, a Northern woman 
roughly my age, took offense at the joke and switched between English and Thai as 
she chastised me: “Khwaai man phaeng wa [ควายมนัแพงวะ - Buffaloes are expensive]! 
Thai farmers don‟t use buffaloes! Buffaloes come from the Phillipines, not here!” 
 Obviously I had hit a nerve somewhere – a white foreigner making fun of a 
Thai person for being a farmer (nonwithstanding Joe‟s own joke to that effect 
previously or the obvious incongruity of a wealthy Bangkokian painter imagining 
himself a chao na) had violated what Herzfeld (2005) terms “cultural intimacy”: I had 
presumed an insider-ness and was quickly told that I was no such insider and had no 
right to be speaking about Thai buffaloes. Dao‟s claim that Thai buffaloes were 
nonexistent is, of course, patently false, especially in the North or Northeast – I (and 
she, presumably) saw them daily on the side of the road, being led to and from rice-
fields by local farmers, or ate them occasionally with Northern-style laab – ลาบ. What 
is significant is the fact that it is Dao – one of the only Northerners at the party - who 
displays sensitivity towards my characterization of Joe as a buffalo-driving farmer. In 
that crowd of mostly Bangkok-born, elite university-educated artists, mockery of 
Northern Thai customs and language as being backwards and uncivilized villagers or, 
indeed, farmers was commonplace. By closing the borders of Thainess against me by 
switching into English, Dao was presenting the North both to me and to Joe as being 
more industrialized and jaroen than we all knew that it was. In short, she was 
advocating the ideal image of the modern North, an image that I go into below.  
Chiang Mai as Europe 
 The Eurana boutique hotel in Chiang Mai claims on its website that it offers a 
blend of both European and Lanna styles, hence the name. Each is, for the hotel, 
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exotic in its own way, but yet they are somehow complimentary. Similarly, the 
Yesterday boutique hotel, catering both to wealthy youth from Bangkok seeking 
Chiang Mai‟s night life as well as foreign tourists, trafficks in nostalgia: the lobby is 
decorated with antique appliances, old photographs, and the like. The Thai-language 
webpage features computer-animated menus based around sepia-tinged Western-style 
rooms, implying that the “yesterday” that the guests will experience is not that of their 
parents‟ Chinese or Thai backgrounds, but rather the “yesterday” of old American 
films. Chiang Mai is transposed upon a farang past, becoming both other in time and 
in place to the Bangkok-based visitor.  
 As with the “tribal” motif, the casting of Chiang Mai as the past of Bangkok is 
also reflected in Thai films. In Jot mai rak [จดหมายรัก - The Letter, 2004], directed by 
Pa-oon Chantornsiri, the heroine, Dew, flees from the violence of Bangkok (where her 
friend has been murdered) to the teak-panelled, mist-shrouded idyll of Chiang Mai 
province. This Chiang Mai - in the film represented by a small town on the Burmese 
border - with its fresh coffee and air so cool that, as Dew says, she “doesn‟t have to 
use air conditioning [ไม่ตอ้งเปิดแอร์ - mai tong poet air],” and which allows her to wear 
fashionable, foreign-cut long winter coats, is inhabited by silent, old people who are 
only audible when she speaks to them, and then, they only speak in polite, slow 
Central Thai. Indeed, nighttime scenes of “Chiang Mai” in the video invariably have 
the actors dressed in ski hats and heavy winter coats, huddling around a fire.  
 In Chiang Mai, she meets Ton [“tree”], a quiet employee of a royal tree-
planting project
82
. He is genuine, kind, and unsophisticated – he does not know how to 
use email and does not own a cell-phone – a contrast from Dew‟s Bangkokian friend 
and her wild and sophisticated life (including her numerous lovers, one of which is her 
killer). Ton has spent his entire life in Chiang Mai, but does not speak Northern Thai, 
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 The significance of Ton as a royal employee in the North should not be lost.  
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not even with his fellow employees – the only Northern-speaking person is one 
worker‟s angry wife, who enters the scene in order to comically beat him about the 
head and berate him for being out drinking. The fact that Ton or most of the other 
male characters in the film do not speak with a Northern accent is not suprising: as I 
suggest above, in the Thai film imaginary, things Northern are female, be they angry 
witches or beautiful maidens.  
 What is also significant here as above is, like in Rak Jang, the erasure of the 
Northerners themselves. In the former example, the figure of the Northerner – what 
had in earlier times been the figure of the “Lao” – has been transformed into the hill 
tribesman. In Rak Jang, for instance, the Lanna region consists of cute, clean cafes 
(run and patronized by Bangkokians), roads winding through green mountains, and 
tribal villages. In “Yesterday,” Chiang Mai consists of a nostalgic, quiet, and more 
specifically solitary space to reflect. In The Letter, Chiang Mai provides a place for 
Dew to take on the role of foreign expatriate – a person of an altogether different 
nature than the allochronous, elderly people who shuffle about in the background.
83
 
Indeed, when Dew marries Ton and moves to Chiang Mai, the house she has inherited 
from her step-grandmother then suddenly changes from a dark teak structure inhabited 
by tokay geckoes (which in Thailand are considered particularly repulsive) to a clean, 
high-tech mountain home with bright colors, computers, and the like. In other words, 
for the potential within this place of good weather and good raw materials to be 
realized, Dew had to appear and bring modernity to it. 
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 For a rather different image, see Pheuan Sanit, a young “dramedy” about a (Bangkokian) boy torn 
between an old (Chiang Mai) flame and a new (Kho Samui) love. While the narrative still travels from 
major tourist destination to another major tourist destination with the male hero in the place of the 
tourist and women representing the provinces, the film uses subtitles with regional dialects (kammeuang 
and Southern Thai) and the film‟s action takes place in more ordinary and less hyperreal spaces (i.e. 
college dormitories instead of misty mountains).  
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 The casting of Chiang Mai as being a pseudo-European allochronous image is 
the descendent of Wichit‟s formulation of the North as being the repository for that 
aspect of Thai watthanatham which has been lost in modernizing Bangkok. Chiang 
Mai becomes home to the potential seeds of a developed, evolved Thailand – it has 
within it the utopian basis for what Thailand could have become, before misfortune 
(blamed on either an abstract “politicians,” “greed,” “globalization,” or other outside 
factor, depending on who one talks to – in the above examples I refer to the opinions 
expressed by Maew, a graduate student; Joe, an artist; and Anand, cited in Kasian 
(2002), respectively) drew Thailand astray. Chiang Mai is therefore a place where the 
Bangkokian tourist or expatriate can imagine a different Thailand – one which is 
undoubtedly in the past, but which has the potential of a greater jaroen than Bangkok: 
one which looks European, but is in fact more Thai than Thailand.  
The erasure or the Othering (as hill tribe or provincial) of Northerners in this 
image is not in fact a contradiction. Rather, they become those savages (noble or not) 
who are too embedded in the cultural wealth of the region to recognize its worth. It is 
those from the capital city are able to recognize what is of value. This is the reason 
why the coffee-shop owner is a Bangkokian – while the North contains seeds of 
jaroen, one must come from a place which is jaroen in order to recognize this. The 
North, then, is troped much as those hill tribes which were given silver patterns by the 
Queen (mentioned above) – they are living amongst the potential for advanced 
watthanatham, but for this potential to be transformed into real jaroen, a greater 
person must realize this. Here, I examine this re-configuring of Chiang Mai images. 
Possessing the Image of Chiang Mai 
 Ying was a wealthy aristocrat
84
 who had worked in both tourism and 
archaeology. She, while presenting at Chiang Mai University, began her talk by 
                                                 
84
 While “Ying” is a pseudonym, I wish to note that her last name marked her as minor royalty.  
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bemoaning the fact that her French friends joked about how Thailand had so many 
prostitutes. “We cannot deny that Thailand has problems, but we must focus on the 
wonderful aspects of Thai culture, especially how it adapts. Thais eat with chopsticks 
when we eat noodles, but a golden knife and fork when we eat other things. In ancient 
times [สมยัโบราณ - samai boraan] when we ate with our hands, we did so after 
washing their hands in flower-soaked water [Ying uses the word รับประทาน - 
raprathaan for “to eat”85].” She then lamented that finger-bowls were described as 
“spittoons” – a statement which seems to imply that spitting (when chewing betel, for 
instance) was not a common practice in classical Thai society; an implication which is, 
at least in regards to betel, incorrect. The most insulting thing that she saw, however, 
was in The King and I, when Anna Leonowens put a napkin into King Mongkut‟s lap 
– not only was the act a violition of the prohibitions surrounding kingship, but the 
royalty (who already had watthanatham) would have been no stranger to such things. 
Ying shook her head, reflecting on this, but brightened when she mentioned a project 
to construct a “traditional village” near Sri Satchanalai with people in period outfits – 
albeit with bodice wraps instead of bare-breasted. 
 Ying, speaking at a conference on cultural tourism at Chiang Mai University, 
expressed her anger at the misrepresentation of classical Thai culture and history: she 
is of course correct in suggesting that the tutor Anna Leonowens would surely not 
have been placing anything on the king‟s lap. At the same time, however, she 
misrepresents culture and history for her own purposes: while Thais in the past ate 
with their hands, contemporary Thais eat with golden knives and forks, and when they 
do, Thais raprathaan [dine], they do not thaan [politely eat], nor do they kin [eat], and 
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 The word is extremely high vocabulary. For instance, ordinarily people say “กิน - kin”, a white-
tablecloth restaurant menu or waiter might ask one to “ทาน - thaan”, while a rude way of saying “to eat” 
would be “แดก - daek.” “Raphrathaan” would be a term used only in the most polite register.  
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the certainly do not daek [eat like an animal]. When ancient Thais ate, they washed 
their fingers with rosewater and did not chew betel afterwards. Ying presents 
watthanatham Thai as being only those aspects which are progressive about both the 
present and the past, which promote the idea of a civilized Thailand, one which would 
be acceptable to a modern observer.  
Lysa Hong describes this trend in greater detail amongst historical narratives of 
royal women. Hong examines readings of royal history that attempt to render 
bourgeoisie values historically absolute. She looks at modern, middle-class-oriented 
articles from the popular/intellectual magazine Sinlapa Watthanatham [Art and 
Culture] – notably the same magazine in which Nidthi‟s “Saaw Khrua Faa” was 
published - that describe the lives of women in the past in an attempt to show how 
these reconstituted past images serve present middle-class constructions of women‟s 
roles. The authors of these articles sell “images of an exotic and unique Thai past” 
(Hong 1998:336), and using this “authority of the past, which is simplified as 
biographies of „good‟ women, to underscore the proper codes of behavior to which 
contemporary women should adhere” (Hong 1998:341). As examples, Hong provides 
two articles by Sansani, both of which detail the lives of royal consorts – Thiang and 
Wad - in the reign of Rama IV (Mongkut – that same king whose Hollywood version 
has a napkin placed in his lap by Anna Leonowens). In the first, Sansani presents 
Thiang and Mongkut as treating each other with the love, tenderness, and mutual 
respect of an ideal modern bourgeoisie married couple. In the second of Sansani‟s 
examples, Wad is selected for the harem not out of any romantic attatchment, but 
rather owing to her dancing skill and is subsequently promoted by Rama V 
(Chulalongkorn, Mongkut‟s son) to administer the harem after Mongkut‟s death 
(Hong 1998:339). If, in the articles, Thiang follows the model of an ideal bourgeoisie 
wife, Wad is characterized by hard work and success, thereby serving as the historical 
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antecedent of the modern career woman (Hong 1998:340). Hong provides archival 
evidence contradicting Sansani‟s interpretations of the lives of these women - Thiang 
is described in the archives as desiring favor and a rise in the internal hierarchy of the 
harem from Mongkut but not receiving it, and Wad is such a strict taskmaster that she 
is arrested for having a servant beaten to death and then hiding the body. Yet despite 
this, in Sansani‟s retelling, these stories serve to add historical legitimation to modern 
bourgeoisie life. In light of the above discussion of watthanatham, Sansani is simply 
eliminating those elements of court life that do not point towards watthana [progress] 
– that look backwards and not forwards. Again, this construction parallels spirit 
mediumship: quoting the spirit medium Kham (see chapter seven, below), when I 
asked her about the word atthan [อาถรรถ ์- cursed, haunted] that I had seen scrawled on 
the walls of abandoned buildings in Chiang Mai, “That [atthan] is a thing which isn‟t 
good. It‟s not beautiful [งาม - ngaam] to talk about. If we talk about what is good, if 
we talk about what is beautiful, then we are good and beautiful people and we don‟t 
have to worry about people who might be inappropriate or not beautiful”. In other 
words, speaking of misfortune invites its appearance, much as speaking of those 
cultural elements not compatable with modern propriety sullies the value of 
watthanatham and the charismatic power [baaramii] of the past. 
I detail these examples of watthanatham thai in order to provide a blueprint for 
how watthanatham lanna is re-imagined. Like the concern that Kasian and the Culture 
Ministry discuss about the erosion of Thainess and Thai culture, Chiang Mai similarly 
is in a point of crisis. The danger is similarly about reckless consumption and 
globalization, although the source of these dangers is seen as being located more in 
Bangkok and less in foreign sources (recall the poem quoted by Kasian 2002 and its 
demonization of Japanese products).  
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Re-Imaging Lanna Images 
Suntree Wechanon, a founding member of the urban planning NGO phakhii 
khon hak jiang mai [ภาคีคนฮกัเจียงใหม่] as well as a singer in the band of Jaran 
Manopetch – perhaps the most famous Northern Thai singer, has a large restaurant at 
the edge of the Ping River (see figure 7). It (in its new site) lies a good distance away 
from the city center, and is a massive wooden structure, with long white banners 
(reminiscent of the tung flags used in Northern ceremonies) with “LANNA” painted 
on them in the temple palm-leaf manuscript. The inside of the restaurant-cum-concert 
hall was cavernous, and massive wooden pillars propped up the high ceiling, 
reminding the visitor of the interior of a Northern wihaan [วหิาร - temple hall]. Suntree 
and her band played on a raised platform, well above the heads of the diners. The 
place was well-equipped to handle the tour buses that came from other provinces – 
Figure 7: Lanna-themed restaurant on the Ping River. 
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Jaran and Suntree‟s music had become famous to Thai fans of folk music outside of 
Chiang Mai and was normally termed “Northern Thai folk music.” But what makes 
their music “Northern Thai”? The lyrics are, admittedly, often in dialect, although 
blended enough with Central Thai to render it understandable by a Central speaker. 
The dominant musical instrument is an acoustic guitar, and the chords are often 
patterned after American folk songs. The music of Suntree and Jaran Manopetch 
belongs to the modern Lanna, one which blends Central Thai expectations and 
nostalgia, elements of Euro-American “past-ness”, and the nostalgic gaze of middle-
class Northerners themselves.  
The folk music rediscovery of Lanna in such figures as Suntree and Jaran 
Manopetch becomes a site of identification for middle-class Northern Thais seeking to 
re-connect with a lost Northern root (see Thanet 2003) or for Thais from outside of the 
region looking for something “authentically” Northern. The audience for this style of 
folk music does not include Kham or Noi (or others at the mediumship rituals with 
whom I spoke about music) – their tastes were more along the lines of luuk tuung 
[ลูกทุ่ง lit: “child of the fields”] or moh lam [หมอลาํ - upbeat, brass-band pop music, 
often in provincial dialect, which dominates rural festivals] instead of the Jaran‟s 
Northern folk, which, like so much of what falls under the Lanna style, shares an 
aesthetic with international tastes – in this case American folk and country: Northern 
folk singers played guitars and wore cowboy hats but at the same time donned the 
indigo-dyed moh hom shirt (as I discuss above, itself an “invented tradition” of 
Northern Thailand) and decorated Northern-themed bars and restaurants with water 
buffalo skulls in an imitation of the iconic Texas longhorn. The language, too, is not 
“raw” meuang, but is in that mixture of proper Central Thai with a word or two of 
kammeuang: e.g. mae ying [แม่หญิง - but, notably not using the phoeneme “ny,” 
present in Northern and Lao but not Central, as in “nying”] instead of the Central phu 
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ying [woman], hak [ฮกั] instead of rak [รัก - love], etc. The themes of the music – loss 
of cultural identity, loss of land, and loss of an imagined simpler and morally superior 
life (e.g. one folk song celebrates the life in the “baan bon doi” [บา้นบนดอย - 
mountaintop home], which has no Pepsi [บ่มีเป๊ปซ่ี -b’mii pep-si] but has kindness [lit: 
“the water of the heart” – นํ้าใจ๋ - nam jai]) - reflect some of the concern that I explore 
in chapter six, where anxieties about urban change took on a ghostly character.  
 I revisit the reconstruction of Lanna in later chapters, but here I wish to note 
how the content of the category “Lanna” and watthanatham lanna is strategically 
altered by those producing representations of the North to play upon allochronous 
tropes. Home to both noble and non-noble savages in these depictions, Lanna becomes 
a way to criticize certain global and national trends while at the same time affirming 
others. 
 While in these representations the trope of a noble but fading character to the 
city of Chiang Mai is at the fore, in other arenas of image production other tropes 
become central, especially as I examine Lanna images in the context of Northern Thai 
attitudes towards the city. I therefore now turn away from a focus on popular media 
towards historical representations of the North, the meuang, and their attractive power 
[baaramii] in both Northern and Central texts. Yet I retain the focus on what different 
agents seek to highlight in past representations, and what those representations 
ultimately mean for the future of the city and its inchoate attractive potential. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: The City and Origins 
 As I argued in my discussion of “Thainess” above, Chiang Mai is a place 
haunted by its origins. One is continually told varying answers to the questions of how 
Chiang Mai was built, how the city shaped Northern culture, how Northern culture in 
turn held some primordial Thainess, and how that primordial quality can best serve the 
nation. Here, I begin my own discussion of narratives of the origins of Northern Thai 
urbanity not in an attempt, as so many others have, of finding the “true” origins of the 
meuang or its people, but rather as an exploration of how the meuang has been reified 
in various discourses, both premodern and modern. As the diversity of the palm-leaf 
texts suggest and as I argue in chapter three, above, there is no one narrative of Chiang 
Mai‟s history, despite the attempt to create one. Certain versions and emphases in 
Chiang Mai‟s history favor a royalist reading, others a Buddho-centric perspective, 
and still others an animist framework, but here I will weave them together to show 
how various narratives of origin are discussed and posited. My object in this is to 
demonstrate a consistent idea of a progressive-oriented baaramii in the city, one which 
is (conceived of as being) informed by Chiang Mai‟s past and directed towards its 
inevitable futural realization. Indeed, for much of Chiang Mai‟s history, it is the split 
between the urban and the rural which provides the dividing line between people. 
The idea that the urban and the rural, and not differences of ethnic identity or 
religion, are the factors that define people is not at all limited to Southeast Asia. Here, 
I use the term urbanity to refer to that quality that distinguishes khon meuang [คนเมือง 
- city people – also an ethnonym for Northern Thais for the past hundred years or so 
(see Rhum 1994)] from khon pa [คนป่า - forest people], or, as the Pali-writing author 
of the tamnan refers to those khon pa making war on Jamadewi, milakkha. As 
Silverman describes the idea of urbanity in Italy (civiltà), “it is related to the „civic‟ 
and the „urbane,‟ but is not quite either of those. It is more like „civilization,‟ but not 
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quite so broad or so grandiose. In general, it refers to ideas about a civilized way of 
life… an urban way of life” (Silverman 1975:2), a definition that resonates with my 
above discussion of watthanatham and jaroen. Yet where civiltà differs from Northern 
Thai urbanity is in that the latter has its origins in the fame and prestige of the city‟s 
leader‟ charisma [baaramii], that of the city‟s guardian spirits [phi a-hak – ผอีรักษ์86], 
and the city‟s supernatural or merit-infused objects [sing sak-sit ส่ิงศกัด์ิสิทธ์ิ, mongkhol 
– มงคล]. As I explore in this manuscript, these ideas of fetishizing power are mirrored 
in the ways in which artists and architects (as well as other culture brokers) discuss 
watthanatham. In other words, there is an interested force behind urbanity – it is tied 
to kingship and religion in ways that civiltà is not. But in order to properly analyze 
Northern Thai urbanity, I must first define “the urban” in its Thai context.  
The Meuang 
Meuang, generally glossed as “city”, is a concept far more complex than this 
term. Meuang denotes a nation-state, often the Thai nation-state in informal speech 
[meuang thai - เมืองไทย] or in a more general speech a foreign (literally “outside”) 
land [meuang nohk – เมืองนอก]. The term meuang can also mean Northern Thai 
language or Northern Thai people, generally thought of inclusively to include all the 
various ethnic groups that have been subjects of Northern kings (yuan - ยวน, lue – ล้ือ, 
tai yai - ไทใหญ่,87 khoen – เขิน, often the Sino-Thai, etc), insofar as they speak 
Northern and have assimilated (and excluding those Shan who are recent arrivals from 
Burma, as I mention in chapter six, and also excluding hill-tribe members: people who 
are (generally, although by no means as a rule) non-Buddhist, (generally) upland-
dwellers, and speakers of non-Tai languages). Meuang is a catch-all term used to 
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 Readers of Thai will note that this reads “phi a-rak” instead of “phi a-hak”. I have written the word 
here in Central Thai, as Northern Thai no longer has a written alphabet, the tua meuang script having 
been suppressed for roughly a century. 
87
 I mention this group in chapter one, above – the “great Thai,” as they are called in Thai, of Burma are 
also called “Shan” in Burmese and simply “tai”[ไต] in their own language.  
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separate those various ethnicities who all pay tribute to the authority of Chiang Mai as 
well as separating the city dwellers from the forest dwellers. While, as I have noted, 
Rhum (1994) sees khon meuang as a recent invention, the point that I wish to make 
here is that, of all the various systems of categorization available to Northerners, the 
one which remained most salient into the present day was the divide between rural and 
urban.  
Translating meuang as simply “city” becomes increasingly problematic in 
historical context. Tambiah (1976) presents the meuang as what he terms a “galactic 
polity,” an urban center which in turn both orbits other centers and has minor satellites 
orbiting it. Such segmentary systems of identification are not unique to Southeast Asia. 
Evans-Prichard details the Nuer concept of the cieng: a system of organization in 
which a person is a member of a larger group (e.g. a tribe), yet at the same time a 
member of an internal sub-unit opposed to other such sub-units. Because of his 
opposition to the other segments, a Nuer man sees himself as Nuer when compared to 
other tribes, but not as Nuer when compared to other (“Nuer”) tribal segments (Evans-
Pritchard 1940:136-137). In this way, the cieng can be compared to the meuang: a 
modern-day Chiang Mai person is Thai when meeting a Korean, but at home identifies 
as khon meuang in order to distinguish himself from a Bangkokian – a difference 
might be the identification of a discrete center to each “galactic” center in the meuang: 
a guardian spirit [phi seua meuang – ผเีส้ือเมือง88], a king (certainly the case in the 
example of Thailand), or another repository of moral charisma [baaramii]. Georges 
Condominas, referencing the hierarchy of spirits from the kingdom, city, village, to 
household level, describes these as systems à emboîtement – where each level is a 
spirit of a similar type, which only differs in terms of scale (Condominas and 
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 Thai speakers might be startled to see a word which in Central Thai would have the meaning “the 
butterfly of the city.” However, in Northern Thai the term ผเีส้ือ does not refer to a butterfly, but instead 
to a guardian spirit. See Davis (1984) or Chalahdchai (1984). 
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Wijeyewardene 1990:35-6). Of course, the question remains as to the antiquity of this 
segmentary feature of meuang. As Evans-Pritchard notes, the cieng is a volatile 
system, and the meuang no less. As each segment of the meuang is potentially 
independent (able to orbit the baaramii of its own center), or potentially absorbable by 
other, larger segments (e.g. Chiang Mai could equally fall under a Burmese or Laotian 
sphere as a Siamese sphere), as the power of central meuang wax and wane, their 
spheres of influence likewise wax and wane. 
Meuang’s distinction from other terms for urban areas lies in the idea of an 
inhabiting sacred force (e.g. baaramii, watthanatham, or conceived of as various phi). 
While the meuang remains a special term with regards to urbanity, my Northern Thai 
interlocutors had additional categories in urban forms: muu [หมู่] or muu baan [หมู่บา้น] 
refers to a neighborhood or small community, and baan [บา้น] or mae [แม่] refers to a 
village (the former term also means “house,” and the latter also means “mother” or 
“river” and is used primarily in the North. The term bang [บาง], as in bang kok 
[บางกอก], denotes a canal-based town and is less common in the North).  Yet these 
terms share a fundamental difference with the word meuang. While muu, like meuang, 
have guardian spirits [ผเีส้ือบา้น - phi seua baan] in the Mekong region (including Laos, 
Northern Thailand, and Northeastern Thailand), a meuang is a center, while a baan is 
not. The contrast can best be brought out with the addition of the word “outer” – [นอก 
– nohk]. Baan nohk [บา้นนอก - outer town], which I detailed in chapter three, above, is 
a pejorative term akin to the English “the boondocks”: farmland without refinement, 
settlement without sophistication. Meuang nohk [เมืองนอก - outer city] means a foreign 
land – not necessarily an unsophisticated or uncultured place. The implication is that a 
meuang, unlike a baan, has a center – meuang (in this conception) have culture and 
civilization and radiate the same out to the countryside, while a baan, although not the 
utter wilderness of the pa, lacks urbanity without the influence of the meuang.  
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This distinction becomes important for understanding Northern Thai 
conceptions of urbanism.  Meuang are animated sites: centers of civilization, 
refinement (to varying degrees), and spiritual antennae that radiate prosperity and 
wealth to the countryside. They are the home of politics [การเมือง - kan meuang – 
“city-ing”, albeit a word of twentieth-century origin], of religion, and of rulers. They 
have within them a spiritual and civilizational force that the countryside and 
wilderness lack.  
While the term meuang can be used to describe cities up to the massive size of 
Bangkok, there are other terms for large centers, albeit ones more rooted in Pali and 
Sanskrit (and Central Thai) rather than in common parlance. Further up in size and 
influence from meuang are nakhorn. Chiang Mai is officially a nakhorn: the town‟s 
full name is นพบุรีศรีนครพิงคเ์ชียงใหม่ [nop buri nakhorn phing chiang mai – “Nine 
City
89, City of the Ping River, The New Fortress”] (Aroonrat 1983:3), a name that also 
uses the Pali term for “city,” buri [e.g. Lopburi, Saphanburi, Kanchanaburi]. The 
highest level of “city,” and one which shares with meuang the idea of a political center, 
in Central Thai is krung [กรุง]. Unlike nakhorn, krung is never used to refer to Chiang 
Mai (in a non-ironic sense) but only to Bangkok [กรุงเทพมหานครฯ - krung thep ma haa 
nakhorn]
90
 – a fact that is less surprising when the primacy of Bangkok is taken into 
consideration. Krung, to Chiang Mai residents, means a place marked by modernity, 
bustle, activity, and size. While a meuang or nakhorn is a center in the wilderness and 
a place where religion, art, and politics reach their peaks, the krung is a node in a 
world network, where cosmopolitan forces and international influences mingle. A 
krung is a metropole – a useage exemplified by the term krung rattanakosin [กรุง
                                                 
89
 In reference to the supposed nine Lawa tribes which lived in the area prior to the Tai conquest. 
90
 As Thai speakers well know, this “The City of Angels, the Great City” is but a fraction of Bangkok‟s 
true name. The city is typically written as simply krung thep and then with a character denoting an 
abbreviation: “The City of Angels…” 
 138 
 
รัตนโกสินทร์], in reference both to the city of Bangkok, Rattanakosin Island (site of the 
royal palace and center of Bangkok‟s government), and the absolute monarchy (which 
technically ended in 1932). 
 But, as the previous example suggests, the metropole previously had a broader 
meaning. As Thongchai notes, the term krung was used prior to 1914 to mean 
“country” in the sense of “nation-state” 91. England was called krung angkrit and 
Thailand (Siam) was called krung sayam (Thongchai 1994:50). In this formulation, it 
is the capital city (importantly for the concept of the mandala, the abode of the ruler) 
that defines the country and not its outer boundaries (O‟Connor 1990). Such 
boundaries only become significant during the late 19
th
 and 20
th
 century, and as a 
result a word formerly meaning “region” or “area” – prathet [ประเทศ] – becomes used 
to represent “nation-state” (Thongchai 1994:135). 
Returning to Chiang Mai, chiang mai uses yet another word for “city”: chiang 
[เชียง]. Along with its more commonly-used Northern and Lao word wiang [เวยีง], this 
term is reflected in the many chiang-named cities in the region (e.g. Chiang Mai, 
Chiang Rai, Chiang Saen, Kengtung [chiang tung, in Burma], Chiang Rung [in 
southern China], Vientiane [wiang jan, the capital of Laos]). Wiang or chiang 
specifically denotes a walled city, one which had been sacralized owing to the 
presence of a ruler. In Chiang Mai, (despite the fact that Chiang Mai has not had a 
ruler in nearly a century) people often say they are in the city [ในเวยีง - nai wiang] or 
outside of the city [นอกเวยีง - nohk wiang], referring to the physical walls of the city. 
The city‟s walls are an important signifier: they adorn tourist brochures, are replicated 
                                                 
91
 Indeed, English conceptions of space render it difficult to find a proper term to convey what I mean 
here. “Country” contains within it the meaning of rural space; “nation-state” contains the meaning of a 
modern state. Perhaps “polity” – with its implication of polis, the city – is closer to the meaning of 
krung.  
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in miniature around the town hall,
92
 and are often invoked to frame the city as a 
historical place, as on that billboard over the road proclaiming Chiang Mai a meuang 
haeng watthanatham [เมืองแห่งวฒันธรรม] superimposed over the city walls. As I 
mention in chapter one, above, a common tactic that I used during loose, unstructured 
interviews with informants was to have them draw a map of the city, maps that 
invariably began with the four walls. My point is that the walls of the city - what 
renders Chiang Mai chiang mai rather than mae mai or meuang mai – are potent 
symbols for how residents conceive of Chiang Mai‟s urbanity. That concept of 
sacrality which inhabits Chiang Mai, be it conceived of as either watthanatham or 
spirits – either “cultural” or supernatural, inhabits the walls. 
As the importance of walled space demarcated from external space might 
suggest, historical and mythic Northern representations of the origins of urbanity 
stress the city‟s magico-religious separation from the jungle. In many palm-leaf 
manuscripts the city faces a conflict between city and jungle, and between Buddhist 
and animist forces. Yet as the Buddhist city trumps the animist jungle, the city 
incorporates those elements of the animist world which were symbols of prosperity. 
The conflict does not simply make believers out of heathens, but instead narrates a 
drama wherein the conquerors adapt and appropriate the charismatic power of the 
conquered for the city‟s benefit, a process which recalls how Chiang Mai becomes 
troped in Central Thai discourse (e.g. as a source of unrefined potential, waiting to be 
realized). 
 
 
                                                 
92
 The amphoe [อาํเภอ] office, not the thaesabal [เทศบาล] office. In 2007, there were two governing 
bodies in Chiang Mai: a bureaucracy that is appointed by Bangkok to manage the city [อาํเภอเมือง - 
amphoe meuang] and an elected municipal government [thaesabal]. The former deals primarily with 
regulation and the latter with the provision of services. 
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Meuang as a Buddhist Center  
 The origin of Chiang Mai, according to most tamnaan manuscripts, originates 
in the conflict between Wilangkha, the king of the Lawa, and Jamadewi, the queen of 
the Mon. This conflict becomes a central point in texts such as the Camadewivamsa 
(mentioned above) as a struggle between the animist forces of jungle-dwelling Lawa 
and the city-dwelling, Buddhist Mon of Haribunchaya, modern-day Lamphun (Withi 
2005:33) - a conflict between animist nature and rising Buddhist culture. It should be 
noted that while none of the subjects of the Camadewivamsa are ethnically Northern 
Thai, the chronicle is written by and for Northerners nearly eight hundred years after 
the events it purports to chronicle, therefore highlighting the unimportance of ethnic 
(i.e. linguistic and biological) continuity with those considered ancestors and the 
comparative importance of religious continuity. Swearer notes that it was composed in 
Pali by one Mahathera Bodhiransi in the 1400s out of pre-existing materials written in 
a language that he considers “inferior and unsuitable for Buddhist city dwellers” 
(Bodhiransi 1998:xxi), presumably Northern Thai. 
Neither the Mon nor the Lawa are explicitly named as such in the 
camadewivamsa nor in other tamnaan of that time (although Saratsawadi 
(2005[2001]:21) notes a “Khun Lawa” [Sir Lawa] as the name of a local lord in the 
Chiang Saen chronicle). Haribunchaya has been identified by George Coedès as 
linguistically Mon based on the language of inscriptions dated to pre-Tai Lopburi (a 
city of which Lamphun was a colony) and later stelae found at Lamphun corroborate 
the use of Mon language, as does the fact that Lamphun residents fled to Mon Burma 
during an epidemic because they could speak the language (as I mention in chapter 
one).
93
 The Lawa are similarly identified as such because of the large archaeological 
                                                 
93
 Cholthira (1991) argues, based on Lawa kinship patterns, that Jamadewi is in fact Lawa, and 
Wasuthep (the scion of demonic giants [yak], a fact which causes Nimmanhaemin (1967) to identify 
him as  Lawa) her uncle, but the weight of evidence against this conclusion is, in my opinion, 
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presence of Lawa settlements around present-day Chiang Mai: as I mention above, in 
the tamnan they are referred to simply as milakkha, a Pali word meaning “jungle-
dwellers.” Instead of ethnicity, the object that defines Jamadewi and Wilangkha is 
their relationship with the city.  
Cholthira, a modern scholar, makes a similar leap to ethnic identification. She 
infers from the Pali name of Lopburi – Lavapura, which could be interpreted as “the 
Lawa city” – that Jamadewi and as well as the entire Lopburi civilization were 
ethnically Lawa (1991: 319). The Jamadewi / Wilangkha conflict was therefore, 
according to Cholthira, about Lawa marriage practices: Wilanghka was (according to 
Cholthira) Jamadewi‟s cross-cousin and therefore an ideal marriage partner, but she 
rejects him on the grounds that she has become a city-dweller (ibid).
94
 Cholthira 
attempts to invoke the Lawa origins of Northern Thailand to discredit other studies of 
Northern Thai spirit cults (e.g. Cohen and Wijeyewardene 1984) on the grounds that 
the data were collected from Lawa who had over time become assimilated into Tai 
                                                                                                                                            
overwhelming. All of this debate also carries the assumption that Jamadewi, Wilangkha, and Wasuthep 
were real individuals, a claim that is tenuous given the amount of magical and miraculous events in the 
tamnan (such a criticism can also be levied at the figure of King Ramkhamhaeng of Sukhothai). 
Ultimately, the question of Jamadewi‟s historical reality is irrelevant to my discussion.  
Cholthira‟s claims for the Lawa origins of Northern Thailand are on stronger ground with the 
lineage of King Mangrai, the founder of Chiang Mai. As Davis (1984:35n9) also notes, as the names of 
all of Mangrai‟s ancestors are prefixed by “Lao,” a word that is easily transformable to “Lwa” in 
Northern and Central Thai scripts, as I demonstrate above – such a process is much easier in Northern 
Thai plam-leaf texts, as some texts omit vowels altogether, causing the terms “Lawa,” “Lua,” “Lwa,” 
and “Lao” to appear identical. Davis makes the argument that this could imply that Mangrai‟s lineage is 
in fact the lineage of a Lwa chief.  
However, such arguments are ultimately pointless owing to the relative lack of anything 
resembling an “ethnic consciousness” in Southeast Asia at this time. Indeed, it is just as likely that 
being “Lwa” has more political significance than ethno-cultural, a fact which authors such as Cholthira 
or Coedès ignore.  
94
 This conclusion is contradicted by many scholars (Bodhiransi 1998, Coedès 1961) who point to 
inscriptions in both Mon and Khmer in Lamphun as identifying the population and ruling family as “at 
least carriers of the Mon language and civilization” (Coedès 1961:17). Further muddying the waters is 
the fact that Jamadewi is referred to as camadevakambuja (“Jama, Queen of the Khmer”) in 
Bodhiransi‟s Camadevivamsa (Bodhiransi 1998:74). In contrast to Cholthira, I argue that these 
ethnonyms in time of Bodhiransi, not to mention Jamadewi, likely did not have the absolute, “racial” 
meaning that they do in the present era. 
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society, but still retained the “collective unconscious” (Cholthira 1991:116) of their 
ancestors (ibid 21). 
This attention to ethnic origins over other means of identification leads to some 
confusion. Early scholarship on Jamadewi (M.P. Lefevre-Pontalis, for instance) 
identifies Jamadewi as being Khmer in origin (Bodhiransi 1998:18). Yet references to 
ancient Cambodia are misleading, owing to the fluidity of the word used to denote the 
Cambodians: the term khom [ขอม] – a term I have already discussed regarding the 
debate over Thainess. The term appears over and over in texts describing the ancient 
movement of peoples around the North, but is occasionally used synonymously with 
other terms, such as “Lao” (Cholthira 1991:282).  As a result Cholthira, based on her 
reading of the Tamnan Meuang Suvarna Khom Kham chronicle, writes that “the term 
Khom in Lanna perception, contra Siamese perception, connotes the meaning of a 
specific „culture‟ of the Mon-Khmer system in Lanna rather than a specific race” 
(Cholthira 1991:281). Her implication is that khom refers to the Mon-Khmer-speaking 
Lawa, but I would take her de-racializing of the term khom a step further. As Denes 
mentions (2006:123), and as I mention above, khom is also the term used by villagers 
from rural Isaan to refer to Bangkok. Khom, in this sense, does not refer to any “race” 
or “culture,” but simply refers to Buddhist and Hindu city-dwellers: khom is not an 
ethnic category, but rather one marking lifestyle. Khom live in urban centers – krung 
or nakhorn, milakkha live in the jungle. In an era when religion and livelihood matter 
more than ethno-racial identity (an era far from the imaginings of early 20
th
-century 
historians and anthropologists before the work of Leach), it is quite likely that the Mon 
would be called khom, in reference to their city-based agricultural way of life and not 
to their ethno-linguistic identity. 
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One need only recall Edmund Leach‟s work in the Shan region of Burma95 to 
note that ethnic identification is not and has not always been the principal means of 
distinguishing people. In Leach‟s study, Shan and Kachin populations continually 
exchanged members, while agricultural practices (highland versus lowland rice 
cultivation), not ancestry, were the principal means of determining whether or not one 
was “Shan” or “Kachin” (1965:37). Indeed, one could change one‟s ethnonym simply 
by changing residence (Leach 1965:39).  Criticizing the dominant anthropological 
concern with race in his time, Leach writes: “It can easily be established that most of 
these supposedly distinct „races‟ and „tribes‟ [Leach means Shan lowlanders and 
Kachin and Palaung highlanders] intermarry with one another. Moreover it is evident 
that substantial bodies of population have transferred themselves from one language 
group to another even within the last century. Language groups are not therefore 
hereditarily established, nor are they stable through time. This makes nonsense of the 
whole linguistic-historical argument” (Leach 1965:49). Yet authors such as Notton, 
Coedès, and Cholthira, not to mention the host of Thai nationalist authors mentioned 
in previous chapters, are principally concerned with the question of race, by which I 
mean an interpretation that links a certain historical moment to a certain modern-day 
people based on ancestry. Does ancient Northern Thai history “belong” to Cambodia 
(and, in Notton‟s time, to French Indochina); does it “belong” to the Lawa? In each 
case the argument is meant to destabilize Siamese political claims to the region, much 
as nationalist readings attempt to legitimate them. But this contest does an injustice to 
the source material. Religion and urbanity, not ancestry, is the principal means of 
dividing and categorizing people in ancient Northern Thailand. 
                                                 
95
 As I will discuss later, Shan and Northern Thai populations are not only closely geographically 
located – the population of the Thai province of Mae Hong Son, next to Chiang Mai, is primarily Shan, 
as is the region of Burma adjoining Northern Thailand – but they have had a long history of interaction 
and intermixing. Indeed, Shan refer to themselves as tai and the language is almost intelligible to a 
Northern speaker (but not so much as, say, Lao is to a Northerner).  
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Lamphun‟s founding myth highlights the struggle to create that urban center in 
the midst of what was (to the writer of the chronicle as well as to many modern Thais) 
savagery. It is the foundation myth of the North‟s urbanity, the story of the city-
builders: the khom. Lamphun, in the mythico-history of the tamnan, was created 
before it was inhabited – the urbs arose by itself via magic, not by a slow and natural 
concretion of formerly rural people. According to the Camadewivamsa chronicle, two 
hermits [ฤษี - reusii], Sajjanaleyya and Wasuthep, call a magical bird to fetch a conch 
shell from the sea (Bodhiransi 1998:53). Pressing the shell into the ground, the sages 
cause the conch-shaped city of Lamphun to rise, complete with walls and palaces, but 
lacking a ruler. Accordingly, they call upon Jamadewi to come and rule, as she was 
currently a princess in the Mon kingdom of Lopburi (although in some versions she is 
the daughter, conceived mystically, of Wasuthep himself before she was sent to 
Lopburi (Wyatt and Aroonrat 1998:5)). Other sources have the infant Jamadewi 
rescued from a hawk by Wasuthep and raised as his foster daughter (Bodhiransi 
1998:86). Jamadewi and Haribunchaya [Lamphun], as a Buddhist city, are now seen 
as being the predecessors (in terms of religion and “civilization”) of Northern Thais, 
and the Lawa, “possessing a culture obviously inferior to that of the Mon” (Kraisri 
1967:100), become the “forest people” of 19th and 20th-century Siamese ethnography 
(Thongchai 2000a).  
Several of my informants asserted that Wasuthep was, in turn, not human, but 
a demon [yak]. A statue at Doi Kham (the name of both a particularly sacred temple 
and a mountain peak just south of Chiang Mai) depicts him with tiny, polite tusks 
curling out from underneath his lip. He is, according to the local reading, the son of 
the demon spirits of the mountain, pu sae nya sae (Swearer et al 2004:84). This 
reading of Wasuthep‟s identity ties him into a yearly rite generally attributed by 
Northern Thai culture brokers to the Lawa, the feeding of pu sae nya sae [ปู่ แสะยา่แสะ 
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- Grandfather and Grandmother Sae] (Kraisri 1967). Initially a being of savagery and 
evil, Wasuthep is transformed into a benevolent and powerful sage through the direct 
interference of the Buddha, and he in turn transforms the jungle into urban space. He 
and his parents, who in contrast to their son represent the chthonic, wild jungle, are 
still honored today at the base of the mountain and their power over the natural world, 
as destructive as it may have been at first, is utilized for the benefit of the city in a way 
that reflects much of the future-oriented utilization of pastness that I discuss in this 
volume. 
 The story behind the dramatic rite is that the Buddha, on his wanderings in 
Northern Thailand, happened upon the family of yak, who were busily terrorizing the 
local populace. The Buddha stopped them from eating him (naturally out of the 
concern for the sin they would incur rather than out of any attachment to his own 
impermanent flesh). Awed by his power, the family agreed to become Buddhists, but 
the parents could not bring themselves to abstain from meat. They begged the Buddha 
to allow them to continue to eat human flesh, at least once a year. After some 
negotiation, the Buddha allowed them to eat the flesh of a buffalo once a year – at this 
ceremony (Swearer et al 2004:84). Their son, who was given a relic by the Buddha, 
became first a monk and then a hermit: the sage Wasuthep, the builder of Lamphun. 
The Buddha‟s relic passed from Wasuthep to Jamadewi when the city of 
Haribunchaya was founded, and remains there.  
Kraisri Nimmanhaemin sees ethno-history in the tale: “Though termed „giants,‟ 
in reality, they were human beings whose ancestors were Lawa aboriginees residing in 
the basin of River Ping long before the Mon people founded their Kingdom of 
Lamphun … The Lawa were savage, head-hunters who practiced cannibalism” 
(Kraisri 1967:95). Kraisri sees a process by which a primordial encounter between the 
Mon and Lawa as the source of the myth. The author of the camadevivamsa, Kraisri, 
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and the villagers propitiating the yak all identify the forest with savagery, violence, 
and cannibalism and the city with reason, Buddhism, and learning.  
 The urban Lawa have faded into Chiang Mai‟s multicultural mosaic now, but 
pu sae nya sae remain as spirits. They are the ancestors of a whole host of Chiang 
Mai‟s possessing spirits (about which I go into more detail in chapter seven), 
including jao kho moe lek [เจา้ขอ้มือเหล็ - Lord Iron Wrist] and others (Chalahtchai 
1984:67). 
 Rites of Propitiation 
Despite Kraisri‟s prediction in 1967 that the rite of propitiating the spirits “will 
soon pass as the [Chiang Mai] University brings modern learning to the coming 
generations” (Kraisri 1967:99), the ritual in June of 2007 was flooded with people. 
The road to the festival was difficult to discover, and I arrived on my motorcycle 
several hours late, but the pithii liang pu sae nya sae [พิธีเล้ียงปู่ แสะยา่แสะ - ceremony to 
take care of Grandmother and Grandfather Sae] had not yet begun. The rite was to 
take place in a clearing in the woods of Mae Hia subdistrict. A fenced-off area had 
several spirit shrines – the homes of the spectral attendants to Grandmother and 
Grandfather Sae, but what garnered the most attention from onlookers was a small, 
dark hut in the back of the field.  
 In this hut was one of the two principal spirit mediums of the rite. They were 
young men – unusual for Northern Thai spirit mediums, although there is an 
increasing trend of having gay or transgendered mediums
96
. One was heavy and had 
the dyed-blond hair of a fashionable young urbanite; the other was slim and wore a 
serious expression. Each was dressed in an “ancient” style: white shirts and checked 
                                                 
96
 The reason for women and gay men being mediums is generally ascribed to penetrability. Men 
normally have “hard souls” [ขวนัแขง - khwan khaeng] and do not accept inhabiting spirits as easily as 
women or gay men. Peter Jackson has written extensively on Thai gay and transgender identity, 
although he does not discuss mediumship. 
 147 
 
cloths wrapped around their waists, and red turbans
97
. Their attendants all wore the 
moh hom shirts mentioned in the last chapter. In the already-hot early morning of late 
May, the first medium lurched back and forth inside the hut, while visitors asked her
98
 
questions in low voices. Suddenly, letting loose a cry, she rushed out of the hut as 
people backed away from her. Coming out into the sunlight, she danced her way to the 
rows of spirit shrines, following a group of older men. A camera crew leaned in front 
of her as she visited each shrine. As she went on her rounds, a PA system alternated 
between a Pali chanting by the attendant monks and a sermon about the significance of 
the rite, mentioning a vague “nanotechnology” as a possible source of the mediums‟ 
powers, a mention that recalls the connection between supposedly ancient 
watthanatham and technological progress. 
The mention of nanotechnology was particularly evocative, as it recalled 
another conversation that I had had with a devotee of spirit mediums at a ceremony on 
a traffic median near Khuang Singh, in Chiang Mai‟s northern suburbs (see chapter 
seven for more detail on this ritual). The devotee, an older man, cited 
nanotechnology‟s invisibility as well as the fact that it was something jaroen residing 
within the body as the features which it shared with spirit mediumship. In this way of 
thinking, the spirit mediums have no need for technology (technology which is also 
delivered in the same idiom of rationality which denies their possessing spirits), 
instead they have their own connection to a source of jaroen. 
 To return to the rite, the main course of the day‟s rite for the audience was the 
eating of raw buffalo meat. The buffalo – already slaughtered and meat laid out on 
                                                 
97
 Notably, neither sported the “invented tradition” of the moh hom shirt, although their attendants did. 
98
 The use of masculine / feminine pronouns describing mediumship is problematic. The medium is 
male, but the spirit is female (in most examples of mediumship, this situation is reversed). Thai and 
Northern Thai third-person pronouns are gender-neutral (khao [เขา] and bun [เป่ิน] being the most 
common, respectively), but mediums will speak with the gendered language of whatever spirit they are 
channeling. They are likewise generally treated as the gender which they are performing, so in 
deference to this, I use the gendered pronoun of the spirit rather than the vessel.  
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skewers – was lying on a tarp on the ground along with the buffalo‟s head and empty 
(but still bloody) skin. Nya sae‟s medium, now joined by her counterpart pu sae, 
grabbed a hunk of bloody meat and ate it messily, slinging it around her neck as she 
did so. Grandfather Sae, after devouring a hunk of the raw flesh, sat astride the buffalo 
with a giant-sized toothpick, fixing the audience with a baleful stare. Men with 
cameras – one of them a European with an enormous moustache – leaned in close to 
each action of the mediums, who seemed unfazed by the attention.  
The rite continued to a climax, where Grandmother Sae buried herself under 
the skin of the buffalo, grubbing for more meat, and Grandfather Sae lifted a bucket of 
blood, drinking some, but spilling most down the front of her white shirt. Many in the 
crowd held cameras aloft to get a good shot of the spectacle. Buffalo devoured, 
Figure 8: Medium of Grandfather Sae, Mae Hia subdistrict. 
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Grandfather Sae then was escorted out of the cordoned-off area towards where a giant 
tapestry of the Buddha had been raised. He stood in front of the image, fixing it still 
with his unnerving stare, then fell to his knees with his bloody hands pressed together 
in a respectful wai (see figure 8). Kraisri suggests that, according to the ritual, the 
demon is tricked into believing that the banner is the Buddha, mistaking its waving in 
the wind for signs of life, and as such keeps his promise not to kill and eat humans 
(although one wonders what will happen if the rite is performed on a calm day). 
Grandmother Sae, after paying her respects to the Buddha, then passed around strips 
of string that had been blessed: the dangerous demons had been reinvented as good 
Buddhists, and would then share some of their fearful power with the visitors.  
 These spirits, so long as they are safely propitiated, guard the city from 
misfortune and ensure its prosperity. It is the slopes of Doi Kham and Doi Suthep 
(home of Wasuthep) that provided clear water and cool breezes to the city, presumably 
sent by the goodwill of these once-dangerous spirits. By appropriating the spiritual 
power of the jungle-dwellers, the Buddhist city is able to mobilize the natural world 
for its own good. While the clear water promised by the spirits has since disappeared, 
turning my motorcycle on to Suthep road outside of Suan Dok gate was always 
refreshing in the hot season. Suthep road led straight to the mountain, and in the later 
afternoon and evening cool air descended from the heights, rushing down the street 
and, on particularly hot days, making one secretly thank the demonic family (or 
perhaps simply the cool, damp forest in which they were said to dwell). But these 
spirits simply ensure that Chiang Mai is well aired and watered; it takes other spirits to 
make a city a city. 
Meuang as Fountain of Charisma 
While the Buddhist origins of Northern urbanism begin with the saga of 
Jamadewi, Chiang Mai‟s urbanism has other bases. Like many mainland Southeast 
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Asian cities and many small towns, there is a pillar standing near the center of Chiang 
Mai, the “city pillar” [which in Chiang Mai has the specific name sao inthakin - เสาอิน
ทขิล]. Unlike most Thai cities, the term lak meuang [หลกัเมือง - city pillar; lit. “base of 
the city”] is applied to shrines at Chiang Mai‟s corners instead of the central shrine at 
the center, but in both cases, it is the central pillar that houses the spirits responsible 
for urban “order and prosperity” (Wijeyewardene 1990:135) in contrast to nature 
spirits, who provide the raw bounty. This central pillar is modestly enshrined at one of 
the most important temples within Chiang Mai city: wat chedi luang [วดัเจดียห์ลวง - 
“the temple of the great stupa”]. This temple is the center of Chiang Mai‟s thammayut 
[ธรรมยตุ] sect – that branch of reform Buddhism that was formed by Rama VI 
(Mongkut) in the 19
th
 century in order to purge supernatural elements from 
mainstream Buddhism]. Accordingly, the coexistence of the monks and the pillar is an 
uneasy one, as the city pillar represents the most obvious example of that supernatural 
power that the Thammayut was designed to eliminate from Buddhism. As such, for the 
Thammayut, the city pillar is a symbol of all that is unrefined and unreformed about 
the North. Yet for the shrine‟s believers, it is a place where another primordial spirit of 
the city is worshipped: another demon [yak] that has been put into the service of a 
higher, beneficial power – in this case, Indra.  
The selection of Indra is not random. Indra is the god which in Thai Buddhism 
plays the most central role in matters of rule and kingship. As such, he is the most 
appropriate spirit to give gifts having to do with the establishment of a political entity. 
It is through his gift of the inthakin pillar (and, as we will see, the presence of a king 
who acts as Indra‟s surrogate on earth) that renders a Chiang Mai worthy of being 
Lanna‟s central meuang. Additionally, Indra is associated with kingship in Hindu 
cosmology, and occupies the central pillar in the royally-oriented geographic magic of 
the city in South and Southeast Asia (see Duncan 1990 and below in this chapter). 
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Indra is supposed to have given the sao inthakin to the people of Chiang Mai 
before the city was called such and while it was still a Lawa stronghold – the Suwan 
Kham Daeng chronicle describes how “Lord Lua [Lawa]” built Wiang Nopburi 
[Chiang Mai] before abandoning it and fleeing back up Doi Suthep (Saratsawadi 
2001[2005]:30). The invocation of the animist Lawa as the source of the 
Hindu/Buddhist-derived spirit pillar lingam might be initially confusing, but one must 
examine these legends as origin myths and not as history. The Lawa were often 
invoked by Northern Thai tamnaan writers as a surrogate for locality (Wijeyewardene 
1986:84-5). By invoking Lawa spirits, one is invoking an autocthonous presence at the 
site (and therefore origins and legitimacy) – another notable invocation of the Lawa 
occurred when a Lanna king was to enter the city: he must be preceded by a Lawa 
leading a dog, thereby recapitulating the creation of the city out of base nature (i.e. the 
Lawa and the dog). While Tai spirits are generally considered to have come from 
elsewhere (“Chiang Saen” was the typical response when I asked a medium where her 
spirit came from in life – see discussion in chapter seven), Lawa spirits represent the 
soil of Chiang Mai. By tracing the pillar back to the Lawa, the cult of the sao inthakin 
defines Chiang Mai as an indigenous part of the landscape, naturalizing a Northern 
Thai Buddhist hold over the area and appropriating the indigenous and animist powers 
of the Lawa for the city. The pillar in turn becomes an antenna by which the merit of 
the Lanna king radiates out to the countryside, bringing rain and causing the crops to 
grow. I will discuss the relationship between city and king shortly, but here I wish to 
address the pillar itself. 
The chronicle continues to describe how a Lawa city at the base of what would 
become Doi Suthep (the ruins of such a town exist: เวยีงเจด็ริน - wiang jet lin, bisected 
today by Huay Kaew road) was suffering under an invasion of ghosts. Indra, feeling 
sorry for the Lawa, gave to them magical fountains of gold, silver, and crystal and the 
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city pillar with its attendant yak (Aroonrat 1981:3). The pillar provided them with 
prosperity as well as chasing away the malevolent ghosts (such stories of ghosts 
invading into space which has no charismatic center will be significant in chapter six, 
below), and, while the Lawa later lost the pillar owing to their lack of faith, Indra 
forgave them and gave them a copy of the original to venerate instead (the current 
inthakin). The pillar is supposedly the same as is venerated today. 
Another story of the origins of the city pillar ties the pillar back to a spirit 
called เจา้หลวงคาํแดง - jao luang kham daeng (Great Lord Burnished Gold, see below 
in this chapter): as Mangrai planned the city, he noticed an albino rat and its followers 
living in a tree. The auspicious animals were, according to the king‟s advisors, 
servants of a powerful guardian spirit – a spirit who Notton associates with Kham 
Daeng, an association which would explain the presence of Kham Daeng‟s medium at 
earlier inthakin rites (Sommai and Doré 1991:147). Here, Mangrai, a foreign invader 
to the lands around the Ping, incorporates the sacred system of the indigenous 
population (who are themselves absent from this narrative but whose supernatural 
powers are here represented by Kham Daeng) into his Tai polity and uses both to 
create the city of Chiang Mai. 
Rites of Propitiation 
 In 2007, the rite for the propitiation of the sao inthakin was held for several 
days at Wat Chedi Luang in mid-June. Vendors lined the street leading up to the ritual, 
mostly selling food. I had arranged to meet with Mae Kham and her daughter Phi 
Noi
99
 at the festival, but as usual I arrived early. Dusk was settling in on the temple, 
                                                 
99
 Mae [แม]่ and phi [พ่ี] are terms of familial address – “mother” and “older sibling,” respectively - and 
were also the words I used most typically when talking with Kham and Noi. They, like most Thais, 
Laotians, and Northern Thais, also had common nicknames (of which Kham and Noi are pseudonyms) 
that mean things like “gold” or “small,” although could just as well be sounds or English words (e.g. 
“Benz,” “Bank”). Finally, they had legal names, Sanskrit words like “Sureerat” or “Thiamrat,” names 
which they rarely used in informal settings. Phi, meaning “older sibling,” and phi, meaning “ghost”, are 
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and it was a riot of noise and activity. As the rainy season had almost begun, and as 
the sky had been low and threatening rain all day, local people thronged the place, 
trying to accumulate as much merit as they could before they were washed out. Their 
worship may have been counterproductive in a certain sense, as the Buddha image at 
the entrance to Wat Chedi Luang was the Buddha of the Hundred Thousand Rains. 
 Despite the animist origins of the inthakin, and despite the antipathy with 
which the Thammayut sect of monks at the temple viewed animism, from the 
perspective of Kham and Noi, the animist and Buddhist aspects of the rite wove into 
each other seamlessly. They visited yak shrine, sao inthakin, Buddha image, monks‟ 
cremation relics, and received blessings from the abbot all within the context of 
“making merit” [tham bun - ทาํบุญ], which in their conception was a sort of this-
worldly wish-granting (an interpretation that clashes with orthodox Buddhist theory 
which would indicate that merit made in this lifetime is realized in the next).  
 We met and Noi presented to me some bundles of home-grown flowers and 
incense sticks she had bought at the market near her mother‟s house in Mae Taeng. 
These were cheaper than flowers bought from the vendors, and for Noi (a Nivea sales 
representative at the Tesco-Lotus megastore) and Kham (a spirit medium in her 50s 
who worked in a tobacco field during the day), bringing their own flowers made 
economic sense. We began our merit-making by laying these flower bundles at each 
corner of the hall housing the inthakin, and then Kham and Noi gave me their bundles 
to lay at the foot of the pillar itself. 
 They had given me these bundles because they were not allowed inside. Many 
sites in Northern Thailand that have to do with angelic spirits or autochthonous spirits 
bar women from entry, just as the area directly adjacent to a temple stupa is often off-
                                                                                                                                            
spelled differently [พ ีand ผ,ี respectively] and pronounced with different tones. No link is present for a 
Thai speaker, however similar the terms appear to an English speaker.  
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limits to women in the North. The arguments as to why vary, with the standard 
orthodox answer being that since the Buddha did not touch women, and since the 
stupa houses a Buddha relic, then touching the stupa would be just as defiling as a 
woman touching the Buddha. But this argument does not generally leave the academic 
hall and is designed more to be polite rebuttal to accusations of misogyny, which 
Northern temples had recently been accused of by a feminist Member of Parliament. 
In contrast, Noi echoed what I had heard before in less formal settings as the reason 
why she could not go in to offer flowers to the inthakin: “Women are dirty,” she said, 
“Not clean.” When I asked her to clarify what she meant she laughed: “Menstruation!” 
she said, using the English-derived men [เมนส์]. “You aren‟t allowed to be near sacred 
objects if you are menstruating, and they keep all women away all the time just to be 
safe.” This begs an obvious interpretation: the fertility symbolism of the pillar, derived 
from the phallic Khmer lingum, being offered flowers at the beginning of the rainy 
season seems obvious, as would the prohibition of women who are menstruating (and 
thence at that moment infertile), but the sexual aspects of the rite are not so obvious 
when compared with many other village rituals in Thailand (e.g. the phi ta khon
100
 [ผี
ตาคน] festival in Loei province, or the veneration of nang kaew hii luang101 [นางแกว้หี
หลวง] near Chiang Rai).  
I walked into the brightly-lit, bug-infested shelter of the inthakin and tried to 
find a spot to drop my flower bundle, feeling rather uncomfortable and obvious in my 
                                                 
100
 A Halloween-esque festival in Loei province, on the border between Thailand‟s North and Northeast, 
where revelers dressed as malevolent spirits parade, supposedly showing how even the worst sort of 
evil ghosts celebrated the Buddha‟s enlightenment. Parade-goers often engage in bawdy jokes and the 
costumes often have enlarged genitals. 
101
 This spirit is a fertility goddess whose devotees leave carved wooden penises at her altar (also 
recalling Thailand‟s Northeast‟s bang fai ritual, in which large penis-shaped rockets are fired into the 
clouds at the beginning of the rainy season). The name also shows the degree of linguistic hierarchy in 
Thailand – hii [หี] is considered to be the rudest way of referring to female genitalia in Central Thai but 
is not rude in Northern, and luang [หลวง], which means “large” or “great” in Northern Thai becomes 
“royal” in Central Thai. The name, then, would be rendered “Lady Crystal of the Great Womb” in 
Northern, but “Lady Crystal of the Royal Cunt” in Central. 
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foreign-ness. Complicating the matter were the multiple pairs of eyes on me: the 
caretaker drowsily looking up from where he had been sleeping in the corner of the 
shrine, Noi and Kham, hoping that I would put their offerings higher up on the pillar 
(so as to absorb more merit), and the other young men waiting to pay their respects. I 
put the offering on a middle tier, not wanting to fall accidentally upon the pillar trying 
to get to the top but in the process possibly thwarting Noi and Kham‟s wishes for the 
year.
102
 
After the three of us made our principal offerings and visited the abbot for a 
blessing, the rain began to fall in earnest. Noi, Kham and other refugees from the 
downpour waited on a porch in front of the hall where the abbot was blessing 
supplicants. An older woman, having recently moved from Bangkok, waited with us. 
She became interested in our trio, and started to question Kham about spirits. What 
sort of spirit did she channel? What kinds of advice did the spirit provide? Could she 
come and see Kham for advice? Kham demurred, suggesting that there were other, 
more skilled mediums who took customers. 
The woman from Bangkok‟s treatment of Kham as a counselor is part of a long 
tradition in spirit mediumship throughout Thailand, but Kham‟s reluctance to accept 
her as a customer bears some analysis. Kham was not a high-profile medium and 
channeled the spirit of a small community in Chiang Mai‟s suburbs. She was not 
hesitant at all to give out advice and blessings to supplicants from this community, but 
she was less comfortable taking supplicants from elsewhere. Although spirit 
mediumship in Chiang Mai is rapidly changing (an issue I discuss in chapter seven), 
mediums generally gave counsel to residents in the village, as opposed to spirit 
mediums from other parts of Thailand, who operate in a more free-market 
                                                 
102
 In fact, I may have. Noi confessed that she had been hoping for a husband, as she was thirty-three 
and nearing an age where she would have some trouble finding a husband. During the following year, 
no such suitor arrived.  
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environment where supplicants came from various locations, attracted by the fame of 
the medium. The woman from Bangkok was asking Kham to have her spirits step out 
of their place as local guardians and apply their powers and advice elsewhere, which 
might be the domain of other territorial spirits, hence Kham‟s discomfort. 
The woman from Bangkok also exhibits an interest in Northern spirits as she 
believes them to be more powerful
103
. The interest in Northern watthanatham and the 
interest in Northern spirits are linked to the characterization of Chiang Mai as existing 
in allochronous time. As a site where, as I discuss in chapters two and three, essential 
“Thainess” is more pure and watthanatham has more power, Chiang Mai exists as the 
reverse of Bangkok. While Mary Beth Mills (1999) has detailed the flow of women 
from the North (and Northeast) southward in search of modernity, the Bangkok 
woman travels to the North to find the pre-modern.  
The woman from Bangkok associated the festival with Kham‟s mediumship 
through a common link with magic [ไสยศาสตร์ – sayasaat]. It is an association which 
the abbot sitting behind her would prefer she did not make. As I mention above, the 
Thammayut sect was designed by King Mongkut (Rama IV) to be a modernizing, 
rationalizing reformation in what he saw as a monkhood rife with superstition and 
magical practices. As Rosalind Morris writes, “spirit mediumship is among the most 
reviled of ritualisms among conservatives of the thammayut patriarchy. In essence, it 
threatens the rationalist regime‟s claims to have achieved modernity through the 
sublimation of such beliefs, and the magicality associated with them” (Morris 
2002:79). In fact, according to Morris, the Thammayut monks of the primary temples 
within the city walls of Chiang Mai (Wat Chedi Luang and Wat Phrasingh) disavow 
                                                 
103
 Cambodian ritual is perhaps more famous for being “more powerful” in terms of magic than 
Northern Thailand, for much of the same reasons.  
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the validity of spirits and therefore of the inthakin pillar itself, although the popularity 
of the rite renders a ban on inthakin veneration impossible (ibid).  
Yet despite the Thammayut‟s best efforts, spirit possession and the inthakin 
rite do share a link in the minds of many. Morris describes a spontaneous possession at 
the inthakin festival in which the possessing spirit used the opportunity to lash out at 
high-rise construction in the area near the river (I address this opposition between 
spirits and high-rise construction in more detail in chapter six, below) (Morris 2000). 
Wijeyewardene (1986) notes that, although none that he interviewed remembered a 
time when this was common, spirit possession used to be a feature of the inthakin 
ritual, and the principal possessing spirit was that of the ghostly founder of the North, 
Kham Daeng. This spirit completes the triad of spiritual foundations of Chiang Mai. 
The indigenous (“Lawa”) pu sae and nya sae ensure the complicity of the natural 
environment in supporting Chiang Mai, the city pillar renders the settlement a meuang 
in the sense of radiating civilized power into the countryside, and Kham Daeng 
provides moral/royal authority to the lesser spirits of place. If Chiang Mai‟s kings (and 
now Bangkok‟s king) were the lords of people, the lord of the spirits was always 
Kham Daeng.  
The blending of animist and Buddhist beliefs at first evokes the idea of 
syncretism, and indeed this has been the prevailing model behind characterizations of 
Thai religious practice (e.g. Kirsch 1977, Terwiel 1994). Pattana Kitiarsa, however, 
criticizes the characterization of these practices as “syncretic,” as “syncretism” implies 
the fusing of two separate belief systems, resulting in something “contentious, 
unauthenticated, and impure” (Pattana 2005:484). Instead, Pattana highlights the fact 
that much of the development of beliefs surrounding tutelary spirits, for instance, 
occurs away from the purview of the state and it homogenizing force, and actively 
incorporates – and has been actively incorporating - elements from a variety of sources 
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(ibid). “Mediumship,” therefore, is not a unitary or timeless thing. Instead, Pattana 
favors the term “hybridity” to indicate that neither Buddhism nor the animist spirit 
rites were in any way pure or unchanged or even unified entities. My examples above 
and elsewhere in this chapter demonstrate the fluidity between “Lawa” animism, 
Hindu-Buddhist ideas of sacred urban space, and popular inventions of tradtion. 
Shadow Meuang 
In many popular stories and oral legends about the North there exists a 
shadowy time outside of the historians‟ linear progression of dates and dynasties. This 
alternate timeline includes a cast of characters that remain important to Chiang Mai‟s 
spirit mediums and popular local legend but nonetheless have no place in 
chronological time, yet their presence is inscribed on various sacred places around 
Chiang Mai. They are especially prominent at unusual or dangerous spots on the 
landscape. Along the various passes that the road takes to enter Chiang Mai, there are 
spirit shrines at the point of the watershed, the most famous being jao pratuu paa [เจา้
ประตูผา - Lord Granite Gate] in Lampang province, who claims responsibility for the 
death of a Burmese army and requires propititation (most often simply by the honk of 
a horn) in order to quell his urge to smash travelers passing by. Another, lesser but 
similar, lord is jao pratuu meuang [เจา้ประตูเมือง - Lord City Gate], the resident spirit 
of the pass on the road between Chiang Mai and Samoeng, a small town in the 
mountains that is currently the home to both mountain resorts and hill-tribe villages. 
Jao pratuu meuang‟s shrine sits atop the Chiang Mai/Samoeng watershed and houses 
a spring where travelers can get water believed to have medicinal qualities.  
The question remains: mythologically, socially, and religiously: who are these 
spirits? What is their relationship to mainstream religious practice and history? I was 
visiting a spring and cave complex to the north of Chiang Mai, in Mae Taeng district, 
near the grounds of Sri Lanna national park. A placard next to an amazingly clear blue 
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spring said that it had arisen through the will of the Buddha to nourish two princesses 
(Buatong [บวัทอง] and Buakaew [บวัแกว้] – “Golden Lotus” and “Crystal Lotus”, 
respectively) who were fleeing their kingdom‟s usurpers. The Buddha had also placed 
a terrible ghost [ผดุี - phi du] in the spring in order to to guard the water and protect the 
hiding princesses. Like all of these mythico-historical sites, the spring had a function 
for travelers-cum-pilgrims: one could swing a cup on an arm out into the water and 
bring it back - the water would have beneficial properties in terms of healing or luck. 
But one had to be careful: while the Buddha‟s residual presence near the spring, and 
the spirits of the princesses (who were later caught and killed) were positive influences 
to pilgrims, the phi du would torment those who acted in an inappropriate manner at 
the site. 
 What was interesting in this story was not the story on the placard, but its 
temporal setting: while it dealt with the fall of kingdoms and calamity, it did not fit 
into the sequence of events narrated by textual history – e.g. the chronicles or in any 
kind of official history (in other words, the story had nothing to do with the foundation 
of Chiang Mai and the nationalist narrative of the arrival of the Tai-speaking peoples). 
Nowhere in the official narrative was there a story about the total annihilation of a 
kingdom and the scattering of its people in the Chiang Mai suburbs. Chai, my friend 
and reader of the tamnaan in their original tua meuang, did not pay the story much 
credence, as it came from oral history and not from a tamnaan. “It‟s just people 
talking,” he said, and when I pressed him he shrugged and concluded, “Maybe it 
happened, maybe not.” Chai saw the tamnaan as an historical source of varying 
accuracy, but one which had its roots in history.
104
 These other stories, according to 
him, were mere local myth, invented to explain unusual features of the landscape or 
                                                 
104
 As my discussion of the tamnaan above suggests, such a reading is often problematic. 
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the names of places. But in this way, they do form a kind of history that is “written” in 
the geographical features of the landscape: a poetic one that is tied firmly to place. 
 Just past the spring where Buatong and Buakaew took shelter, there was a 
couple sleeping during the heat of the afternoon. They were repairing the footpath that 
led down to the spring and were taking a break while the concrete dried. The man was 
awake, so I stopped to ask him about the story. He knew the story quite well and 
pointed out the relevant sites in the story: Buatong‟s cave, the spring, and he chuckled 
mischievously when mentioning the evil ghost. “When did this take place?” I asked 
him. “Samai gon [สมยัก่อน],” was the simple reply, “samai boraan [สมยัโบราณ].” In a 
past age, an ancient time. “Before King Mangrai?” I pressed him. “Na ja [น่าจะ],” he 
said laconically in the afternoon heat, “probably,” adding “during the time of Great 
Lord Kham Daeng.”  
 Jao Luang Kham Daeng [Great Lord Burnished Copper] is the lord of Lanna 
during this nebulous period of history before the establishment of a Tai kingdom in the 
region. He is identified occasionally as Lawa, Shan, or more often simply not 
identified as belonging to a particular ethnic subset (and assumed to be Northern Thai). 
He resides in Doi Aung Salung (better known as Doi Chiang Dao), several miles to the 
north of Chiang Mai, and is the lord of the tutelary spirits (indeed, all the good spirits) 
of Chiang Mai. Rhum notes that “territorial spirits [like Kham Daeng] can be ranked 
according to the territory they protect in a hierarchy that closely parallels the 
traditional political hierarchy. At the top are spirits that protect whole principalities 
(such as Pu Sae and Nya Sae in Chiang Mai; see Rhum 1987). Below them are the 
spirits that protect capital towns, such as those associated with city pillars” (Rhum 
1994:43).  Turton, translating the name differently, describes Kham Daeng and his cult 
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as “the possibly historical culture hero cao luang khamdeeng (the Golden King)105 
who is regarded as having established or revived Theravada Buddhism in the North 
and having founded the first kingdom of Chiengmai. His cult is widespread throughout 
northern Thailand… the cult of the Golden King defines the nearest thing to a 
popularly generated supra-village political unit” (Turton 1972:67). I doubt Turton‟s 
final point: spirits often claim allegiance to Kham Daeng, and despite the fact that 
Kham Daeng‟s yearly propitiation is a large event, mediums of vassal spirits do not all 
come together in an organized fashion. Mediums will claim a link to Kham Daeng as a 
claim to indigenous supernatural power (as do textual sources cited previously in this 
chapter) rather than as an articulation of regional political organization, and while 
there does exist a chain of medium teachers and students (Denes 2006, Chalahtchai 
1984), it does not automatically imply that the medium of a spirit (e.g. Lord Iron 
Wrist) who claims to be the vassal of a higher spirit (e.g., Kham Daeng) necessarily 
considers herself subordinate to the higher spirit‟s medium (see chapter seven, below). 
But this is not to deny all aspects of Turton‟s point. Kham Daeng was referred to by 
many of my spirit medium informants as the ruler of the ghosts of Lanna, especially 
the tutelary spirits of neighborhoods and cities; even if the mediums themselves do not 
form a political unit, the spirits are conceived of forming this unit during their annual 
retreats inside of Chiang Dao cave. In other words, while the political group of 
mediums may in fact not exist, it is imagined to exist in the spiritual plane. 
                                                 
105
 Here, kham in refers to gold, although I disagree with Turton‟s translation of kham daeng as simply 
“gold” instead of “copper.” It should not be confused with the Central Thai word for “words” [kham - 
คาํ], as that term in Northern is the unaspirated kam – กาํ. Kham daeng means literally “red gold,” which 
most readers (but not Turton) translate as “copper.” In Turton‟s defense, it is possible that this meaning 
could be an import from Central Thai, as the Central term for copper is also thong daeng [ทองแดง]: “red 
gold”. Jao luang in Northern means “Great Lord,” although “luang” in Central means “official” or 
“royal.” 
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How Kham Daeng acquired this post was not the greatest of beginnings: the 
eldest son of the kingdom of Champa (near Phayao), he was advancing to attack an 
army coming from Ava, in Burma (whether Burmese or Mon is unclear and perhaps 
irrelevant to the story). Stopping near Doi Chiang Dao, he noticed a golden deer in the 
forest. Kham Daeng pursued the deer until it fell, exhausted, and assumed the form of 
a beautiful young woman. The places along Kham Daeng‟s path in pursuit are all 
named and specified: Advance Village, Intercept Village, [Deer] Corpse Village, 
Prostrate Creek (Swearer et al 2004: 65). The pursuit, like the travels of the Buddha, 
assign names and significance to specific places in the landscape, ties that bind the 
adherents of Kham Daeng to the physical landscape of the Chiang Dao region and 
give meaning to the mythico-history of Kham Daeng‟s domain in a way that is 
mapped upon physical space. 
 But the nude, beautiful woman that was Kham Daeng‟s prize was nothing of 
the sort. After a repartee in the style of young lovers courting (declarations of love 
from the man, doubts expressed by the woman), she invites him to visit her mother 
who lives in the massive Chiang Dao cave. Kham Daeng instructs his troops to wait 
several days for him, but he never emerges. The army returns to Phayao in defeat, and 
recount the story to Kham Daeng‟s father, also suggesting that the woman may have 
been Jamadewi. The father, doubting that Jamadewi was so beautiful, decides that the 
woman must have been the cannibal demon [yak] In Lao, and his son her meal 
(Swearer et al 2004:67).  
 Despite Kham Daeng‟s ignominious end, he rose to a new dominion after this. 
His spirit, postmortem, still had such power as to win over In Lao and all the spirits of 
the mountain. His spectral empire then spread over the surrounding region and down 
into what was to become Chiang Mai. In fact, with the exception of Hindu gods or 
spirits with other origins, those spirit mediums with which I spoke who self-identified 
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as having a local origin (rather than from, for instance, Chiang Saen – see discussion 
of possessing spirits and origins in chapter seven, below) marked Kham Daeng as their 
ancestor. It is to his cave that all the spirits retreat during the rainy season, the 
Buddhist Lent, when monks stay inside to avoid inadvertently stepping on creatures. 
With Kham Daeng reigning over the good tutelary spirits of Chiang Mai, Chiang Dao 
peak now acts as a shadow meuang, the domain of the righteous lord to which lesser 
lords pay their obeisance.  
 His dominion is recognized during the seup chataa meuang [สืบชะตาเมือง] rite 
– that ritual that normally expunges elements of mediumship otherwise (Morris 2002) 
- just before the rainy season. At this time, a string is stretched from Doi Chiang Dao 
to Chiang Mai, circling around each gate and corner, and also resting atop the sao 
inthakin, thus recognizing the mountain‟s peak as the well of sacred power that, once 
linked to Chiang Mai via the white thread, can be used to recharge the city‟s charisma. 
The battery analogy works well: the city pillar and pillars embedded in each gate and 
corner of the city (as well as lesser pillars at the center of lesser neighborhoods and 
villages) are like antennae, radiating out prosperity and spiritual power as well as 
protection from calamity and supernatural threats to the people living nearby. This 
process is identical to the relationship between meuang: greater meuang radiate 
prosperity and protection to lesser meuang, who in turn legitimate the authority of the 
central meuang. 
 The presence of spirits in the gates, corners, and walls of Chiang Mai presented 
a problem for official means of veneration in a similar way to how the inthakin rite 
conflicted with Thammayut readings of proper Buddhist practice. Indeed, the gates 
and corners are subject to two very different forms of veneration. Mediumship rituals 
at the gates and corners (one of which I describe in detail in chapter seven, below) are 
held in honor of such spirits as Lord Chiang Mai Gate (see chapter one), but the 
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official, state rituals honoring the gates and corners (such as the seup chataa meuang) 
are held at the same places for very different spirits – those angelic Brahmanist spirits 
from the canonical and textual, instead of folk, sources (Sommai and Doré 1991:158). 
The seup chataa meuang, intended to purge the city of misfortune and done each year 
currently in Chiang Mai (although originally intended only for times of war and crisis) 
involves members from Chiang Mai‟s higher society as well as state officials and 
monks, each set up at different points in the city (at each gate, at the central Chedi 
Luang temple, and at Chiang Dao cave, home of Kham Daeng) (Sommai and Doré 
1991:158). No mediums take part in the rite, although mediums are having their own 
ceremonies in the same month, honoring spirits of certain places (the gates and corners 
as well as pu sae nya sae). The seup chataa meuang is therefore a disenchantment of 
Lanna, a removal of those activities which have the mark of chaos or embarrassment 
in the eyes of the siwilai authorities (note the absence of nearly all mediumship-
centered rites from Sommai and Doré 1991 or Mani 1994). Yet, as I have argued both 
in previous chapters as well as chapter eight, below, such a disenchantment leaves 
with it a vacuum, one which is filled by the abstract quality of watthanatham. 
Chiang Mai as a Royal Capital 
In the preceding sections, I have danced around the issue of Chiang Mai as a 
meuang by describing how chronicle-writers such as Bodhiransi depicted Northern 
Thai meuang as Buddhist strongholds in a sea of paganism (e.g. Lamphun in the time 
of Jamadewi), or how meuang, at the same time as they are Buddhist, appropriate and 
radiate animist power into the countryside (e.g. Chiang Mai‟s sao inthakin), and 
finally how meuang can be conceived of as entirely spiritual entities, overlaying the 
countryside and providing an alternative to temporal power (e.g., Kham Daeng). Yet 
Chiang Mai‟s urbanity also refers back not just to the supernatural monarch, but also 
to its temporal ruler. 
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The construction project of Mangrai, Chiang Mai‟s first planner, is the pivotal 
point in the standard narrative as characterized by the displays in Chiang Mai‟s two 
historical museums: the national museum and the Art and Culture Hall, located at 
“navel of the city” [สะดือเมือง - sadeu meuang, the original home of the city pillar and 
palace of the kings]. Indeed, the Art and Culture Hall‟s location in the former spiritual 
and physical center of the city remains another sign of how watthanatham has taken 
the symbolic role vacated (partially) by supernatural forces, at least on the level of 
provincial and urban city planning (local belief, of course, being different, as I detail 
in chapters six and seven, below). 
In these displays, the city prior to Mangrai is on the periphery of Jamadewi‟s 
Haribunchaya, marking the present site of Chiang Mai a Lawa-inhabited jungle. 
Mangrai arrives and with the aid of two other kings – the “Three Kings” that adorn 
statues from the city center to the entrance of the shopping mall – constructs the city, 
beginning first, of course, with the wall and the moat. These two other kings are 
interesting in themselves: phaya Ngammeuang [พญางามเมือง – “Lord Beautiful City”] 
of Phayao and phra ruang [พระร่วง] of Sukhothai. Phayao, a small city to the east of 
Chiang Mai, was important in its time, and is the original home of Kham Daeng in life, 
although in death his home is at the fringes of Chiang Mai‟s meuang sphere. But 
Ngammeuang is sadly left overshadowed by his other compatriots: Phra Ruang is the 
Northern name given to King Ramkhamhaeng of Sukhothai, a famous and 
controversial figure who holds the central place in nationalist history as the founder of 
the (Central) Thai nation and language.  
The iconic statue of the Three Kings directly outside of the Art and Culture 
Hall and in the central square of the city is evocative of the present-day power 
relations between the Three Kings‟ descendants. The lifelike metal statues, built in the 
1990s, replaced an earlier sculpture which featured the Three Kings floating on lotus 
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blossoms. In this new, realistically-styled depiction, all of the kings wear Central-style 
royal regalia and stand with their heads close together, as if conferring over the future 
of Chiang Mai. Mangrai stands to the back, his arms spread and almost embracing his 
two friends. Ngammeuang stands neutrally, hands on hips, faded into the background. 
Both Mangrai and Ngammeuang look attentively at Ruang, who is pointing to the 
ground in an authoritative manner, as if saying “here is where the city shall be!”  
I mention Ruang‟s status as “controversial” to evoke the numerous academic 
debates surrounding his personage, but I do not wish to address these debates in detail 
here, rather than simply saying that that the characters of Ruang and his supposed 
alter-ego of Ramkhamhaeng of Sukhothai differ. Ruang occupies more of a trickster-
magician role in Northern Thai literature than Ramkhamhaeng does in nationalist Thai 
history – Ruang‟s shapechanging powers and magical abilities are well-documented in 
tamnaan, and, indeed, the invention of the alphabet (attributed to Ramkhamhaeng) by 
such a Prometheus-like figure would be well in keeping with other such trickster 
figures in folklore.  But even if the other bronze companion of Mangrai is 
Ramkhamhaeng – indeed, Ramkhamhaeng and Mangrai, according to stele evidence, 
were in fact contemporaries, and Sukhothai and Chiang Mai had a long relationship of 
trade (and occasionally war) – Ramkhamhaeng‟s identity and role in Thai history is 
also a point of sharp debate (Mukhom 2003, Reynolds 2006). Basically put, 
Ramkhamhaeng‟s identity as Ramkhamhaeng, king of Sukhothai (and not Ruang, 
trickster and magician), is linked to one stele discovered by King Mongkut in 1833 
(Mukhom 2003:9). It is this stele that is the foundation for Wichit‟s nationalist myth-
making surrounding the idealized Sukhothai society, and this stele is also credited with 
being the foundation of Thai script (ibid). Scholars such as Nidthi Aurewongsie and 
Michael Vickery have argued that the inscription was invented in the 19
th
 century in 
order to bolster Siamese nationalism, while others such as David Wyatt and B.J. 
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Terwiel have argued for its antiquity (Mukhom 2003:4-7). It is the latter argument that 
is dominant amongst everyday citizens of Chiang Mai. Indeed, Ramkhamhaeng‟s 
presence next to King Mangrai adds Thai nationalistic legitimacy to the founding of 
Chiang Mai. As the architect of the Thai nation guides the architect of Lanna society, 
Lanna‟s fundamental relationship with Thai origins is assured. Indeed, the monument 
suggests that while Chiang Mai was constructed by Mangrai, the basis of his 
knowledge was in fact stemming from the Central Thai king, the architect of 
watthanatham sukhothai and therefore Thainess. 
Ramkhamhaeng‟s contribution towards Chiang Mai‟s construction was to, 
along with Ngammeuang, keep Mangrai‟s ambitions in check. According to the 
popular account, Mangrai wanted to make a gigantic city shortly after his original 
capital of Wiang Kum Kam was flooded by the Ping River. The other two kings spoke 
cautioning words to Mangrai, and on April 12
th
, 1296, at 4 in the morning, 
construction of the city began at what was to become Sriphumi [“great place”] corner 
– the northeastern spot, a directionality that is significant (as detailed below in 
chapters six and seven) (Sarassawadee 2001[2005]:57). The site had been chosen 
owing to several auspicious signs: the appearance of a number of white animals, good 
drainage, the presence of fresh water (the Mae Kha stream and Nong Bua lake), and 
the nearness of Doi Suthep and the Ping River (ibid 61). Indeed, the city plan of 
Chiang Mai blended practical concerns (water, drainage) with supernatural ones (e.g. 
the careful attention to the hour of construction). While the former are undoubtedly 
important, it is to the latter that I now turn. 
With the meuang centered on the personal power and charisma of the ruler, 
city planning during the period prior to integration with Bangkok (that is to say, before 
the 1890s, a time which I term the “premodern” period) revolved around the body of 
the Lanna monarch. Specifically, the plan of the city delimitated a hierarchical series 
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of spaces and ethnic enclaves ringing the city. The organizing principles were 
hierarchies of high to low, center to periphery, north to south, and east to west. Peter 
Stallybrass describes an implicit hierarchy of the body in relation to the 19
th
-century 
European city, wherein the head and spirit is associated with certain parts of the city, 
and “low” parts of the body with others (Stallybrass 1986:145). In Chiang Mai, the 
association was explicit. The north – explicitly referred to as “the head” [hua wiang - 
หวัเวยีง] – was the abode of the ruler, the northeast [again, termed siphoom - บศรีภูมิ, or 
sriphumi in Pali, meaning “great place”] was the site of the auspicious tree, et cetera. 
Conversely, the southwest was the direction of poverty, where sewage flowed, and it 
was also the direction in which corpses left the city, making it the direction of death 
and pollution – the southwest gate in the outer wall is called hai ya [หาย ยา] gate: hai 
from the original หา้ย, to throw away, and ya [ยา], which today has the primary 
meaning of “medicine,” but is rooted in the term for “magic” (Suthep 1986:189). Like 
a flowing river, merit was allowed to enter the city from the northeast and pollution 
could be expelled to the southwest. This system remained a concern for city planners 
up until the early twentieth century, when city planning fell under the aegis of 
Bangkok-appointed commissioners and out of the hands of local people (Vatikiotis 
1984:45, Surapol 1986:176). 
The symbolic meaning of various directions, while it may seem an obscure 
point, is replicated in miniature form in everyday life. Suthep describes how not only 
is the east and northeast identified with sacrality [มงคล - mongkhol] and positive 
qualities (masculinity, the right hand, humanity) and the south and west identified with 
negative qualities (femininity, corpses, lesser people [ผูน้อ้ย - phu noi]) in religious 
texts, but this system of spatial hierarchy also exists in the layout of temples, where 
lay people place their spirit shrine (at the northeastern side of the house), and even 
where one lays ones head (pointing east) (Suthep 1986:189). 
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Chiang Mai is not unusual in South or Southeast Asia in having ritualized 
urban layout. Duncan (1990) describes a similar sort of sacred city planning for Sri 
Lankan royal sites, a plan that he also notes exists in Angkor Wat, Sukhothai, and at 
cities in the Shan states. Chiang Mai, being a contemporary of Sukhothai,
106
 is another 
example of this layout.  
Territorial space was structured in the image of celestial space. Many royal 
cities were explicity built to represent the cosmos in miniaturized forms, with the 
central part of the city representing the celestial city of the gods, high upon the cosmic 
mountain. These cities were built as a square or rectangle and fixed at the cardinal 
directions. The square form of the city was actually conceptualized as lying within a 
mandala, a circular cosmic diagram fixed at the four cardinal directions and archored 
by a fifth point in its center.  
By paralleling the sacred shape of the mandala, these cities were 
transformed into microcosms of the cosmos. The king, by situating his palace at the 
center of this mandala, occupied the center of the universe, and the summit of Mount 
Meru [the mountain of the gods], and hence maintained the liminal status of a god on 
earth
107
. By occupying this position at the center of the cosmos, he became a 
cakravarti who could control the world through the magical power of parallelism 
(Duncan 1990:49). 
A difference between Chiang Mai and other Thai cities (such as Sukhothai) is 
that while in Sukhothai, the city‟s primary temple (in most Thai cities generally called 
Mahathat, the temple of the great relic) lies at the city‟s center, in Chiang Mai the 
principle temple and site of the great relic lies outside of the city, atop Suthep 
mountain. This change in layout is indicative of what some of my informants 
identified as a larger point of difference between Northern Thailand and the central 
region: the separation of religious and mundane worlds. Noi characterized the 
distinction as one that mirrored the distinction between animism and Buddhism: 
“Monks are concerned with things about monks, but spirits are concerned with things 
about people.” Sequestering themselves from the everyday tribulations of humanity, 
monks are sources of spiritual knowledge and reflection – inappropriate sources of 
                                                 
106
 Chiang Mai and Sukhothai were founded roughly around the same time and both lie within 
Thailand‟s Northern region, although the latter is considered to be the direct ancestor of Siam by the 
nationalist narrative (which posits a line: Sukhothai – Ayutthya – Rattanakosin [Bangkok]).  
107
 It is worth noting that the common Nothern term for king – jao – is identitcal to that used for higher 
spirits and gods.  
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advice regarding love or finances. Spirits, having not yet relinquished their hold on 
material things, were all too ready to discuss love, sex, money, and other “polluting” 
things of the material world with supplicants. In a similar way, Suthep temple rises 
above the morass of the city, while the palace, city pillar, and people reside below. 
This is not to say that the city does not have a sacred character. Indeed, as I 
mentioned earlier, the city‟s walls have been a fetish for ideas about identity, purity, 
and prosperity from the premodern time to the present. The walls have been built and 
torn down multiple times over the course of Chiang Mai‟s history, but have largely 
kept to the same layout each time, and, as I detail below, the city‟s gates and corners 
each have within them guardian spirits which bring protection and prosperity to the 
city (see the descriptions of the seup chataa meuang, below). The walls began with 
Mangrai‟s square fortification, built in 1296 and consisted of a triple-layered square 
pierced with five gates
108
 (Penth 1986:10). This earthen fortification was bolstered 
with brick during the reign of King Phayu in 1345, but kept to the same square layout, 
keeping the city‟s reservoir at the northeast and two streams bringing fresh water 
around the city (ibid 11). Tilokarat, one of Chiang Mai‟s most ambitious kings, 
demolished part of the walls to make a sixth gate (location unknown) and a palace in 
the northeastern part of the town (see discussion below) (ibid 12-3). King Kaew 
(around 1516) repaired the damage that Tilokarat did to the walls and may have 
constructed the earthen wall [กาํแพงดิน - kamphaeng din], but this was not sufficient to 
defend the city from the Burmese (ibid 14). After the Burmese occupation, Kawila 
installed towers and gatehouses at each corner and gate (respectively), and this is how 
the city remained until the walls were rebuilt in the mid-1980s (ibid 15-6). 
                                                 
108
 A sixth gate – chang moi [ชา้งม่อย] – was constructed in a later reign, north of tha phae gate allegedly 
for the convenience of the king‟s mother. 
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The supernatural quality of the walls – that quality that imbued the brick with 
extra force - was and is preserved through a system of stones buried in each gate and 
at each corner similar to stones buried within a temple and rendering the space within 
consecrated and under the benevolent influence of a great power, be it Buddha or king 
(Thongchai 1994:24) (see figure 9). These stones are “recharged” each year through 
both animist and Buddhist rites: the former involve spirit mediums calling upon the 
long-dead and mythic kings of the region and the latter involve a group of monks and 
important city officials. Today, these rituals are a source of conflict, as the educated 
elite consider spirit mediums as not only being signs of a backwards superstition, but 
also as potentially criminal charlatans, and the mediums in turn see the officials as 
foreign (Bangkok) interlopers. This conflict represents a larger and long-standing 
conflict between animist religious practices and Buddhist orthodoxy, conflicts that are 
detailed elsewhere (Somchote 1987, Morris 2000). Yet conflict aside, each ritual 
reaffirms the importance of the city walls as boundaries that ensure the purity of the 
city.  
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Figure 9: Recharging the gate of the old city, Saen Pung gate. 
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Yet in the premodern time, in order for these structures to remain pure, 
foreigners were excluded. Robert Schomburgk, the British consul-general in 1857, 
was denied entrance into the inner wall of the city, and instead had to conduct all of 
his business near the river, well outside the sacred walls (Vatikiotis 1984:45, 
Wijeyewardene 1986:136). 
The system of auspicious locations and directions within the city was also a 
point of conflict (see also my discussion of current debates surrounding this system in 
chapter eight, below). The Chiang Mai Chronicle recounts how in 1465 an astrologer 
in the secret employ of Chiang Mai‟s enemies (the Chiang Mai Chronicle claims 
Burma, Hans Penth claims Ayutthya) convinced King Tilokarat to cut down a tree and 
build his palace at the auspicious northeastern corner of the city, with promises that it 
would lead to supernatural power (Wyatt and Aroonrat 1998:99, Penth 1989:11). The 
Chiang Mai Chronicle tells: 
 
King Tilokarat sought out all the high dignitaries… and all the foremen to 
come with all their laborers to raze the city wall which King Mangrai had built, and to 
fill the moat and level it. Then he had them cut down the banyan tree which was the 
glory [decha - เดช – see discussion of Sri Phumi – si phum in Northern – corner in 
chapter eight, below] of the city of Chiang Mai, with its wide and beautiful shaded 
canopy, from its crown down to its roots, and clear the area to be completely flat… 
Then he opened up the gate to the earthen city and named it the Si Phum gate. [Said 
the treacherous monk,] „the Si Phum [quarter] is filled with magical power; and 
sleeping quarters are auspicious. Whenever we hear that an enemy is attacking, from 
whatever direction, [you are to] arrange flowers and perfumed water and set them up 
above the royal throne in the sleeping hall, and knock on the [magical] pillar in that 
direction; and the enemy will flee from the majestic power of that magical pillar‟ 
(Wyatt and Aroonrat 1989:98-99). 
 But on the contrary, removing this tree and constructing this palace on its site 
caused Chiang Mai to become “a defiled place, as if the glory of the city had been 
sullied with urine and defecation. Harmful things befell the country, the ruling family, 
and all the high officials” (Wyatt and Aroonrat 1998:99).  
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A later example of treachery had a similar duplicitious monk in the employ of 
the southern King Borommaracha hiding “wood remaining from a coffin, a piece of a 
water-buffalo bridle, joists from a verandah, pieces from a pig-sty, a bottom step from 
a staircase, and the lintel from a doorway” (Wyatt and Aroonrat 1989:100) at the top 
of the gates to the city. Each of these things are obviously “low” things, associated 
with pollution and death, and having them placed high on the gate, where all had to 
pass underneath, would have caused the city to become polluted as well – luckily for 
Tilokarat, he noticed that the monk would not himself pass under the arch, and 
therefore became aware of his treachery.  
Even the renovations in the 1980s stirred up resentment amongst the local 
community. These renovations, undergone at the height of Chiang Mai‟s AIDS 
epidemic, were accused of allowing the disease to spread by an article in the national 
daily newspaper, Matichon: “Gates are AIDS in Chiang Mai [ประตูเป็นเอดส์ท่ีนคร
เชียงใหม่ - pratuu pen aids thi nakhorn chiang mai]” (Thammakian 1985). At concern 
was the loss of something sacred in the brickwork, as a less firey critic, Chaya, put it: 
“The new gate, even though it protects the old image [รูปหลกั - ruup lak], it is still 
something new, and as for the gate which was thrown away, it was not just bricks and 
mortar that were thrown away, but it was history that was definite [แน่นอน - nae nohn]” 
(quoted in Thiw 1989:37). What is significant here is how closely the discourse of 
cultural heritage parallels that of supernatural power: a denial of heritage permits 
disease to spread in the city just as angered spirits do. I explore this parallel in chapter 
seven, below. 
As the walled city [ในเวยีง - nai wiang] was reserved for the khon meuang (as 
mentioned above, the Northern Thai ethnonym
109
) the outer regions were for outsiders, 
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 The fact of, as discussed above, the recent origin of the ethnonym khon meuang and also the general 
lack of “racial” thinking in pre-20th century Thailand indicates that this category and therefore access to 
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outsiders who, should they settle in Chiang Mai, would be placed in certain specific 
locations. The outer wall that stretches in an arc from the southwest corner of the city 
to the northeast is termed the kamphaeng din – the dirt wall of the city. The space 
inside this wall – like many other areas in Chiang Mai‟s close suburbs - was filled 
with ethnic communities of artisans, bound as kha [ขา้] to a certain temple or district 
(Wijeyewardene 1986:120). They were there by no accident. As discussed in chapter 
one, above, Chiang Mai‟s kings, such as Kawila, in wartime would bring back with 
them captives of a certain trade and a certain ethnic group to place within the city. The 
diversity of the assembled collection of war captives and their handiwork would go to 
prove the wide-ranging power of the monarch: the immediate suburbs of the city 
became a trophy case to display the king‟s power. The more ethnically diverse the city, 
the more various nations pay tribute to the monarch, the greater his status.  
Michael Vatikiotis focuses on this ethnic pluralism by noting the ethnic 
affiliation of various temples in the near suburbs of Chiang Mai
110
. These temples 
were located towards the south of the city (including the area of Wua Lai), which 
Vatikiotis also notes was a site of bad luck and bad health (1984:52). Those living in 
these communities were largely the remnants of captive populations brought back by 
Kawila from regions in Burma and were ethnically Shan, Lue, Karen, and other (ibid). 
Vatikiotis also notes that these communities were specialized artisans, segregated not 
only by ethnicity but by their status as kha wat [ขา้วดั]: artisanal captives bound to a 
temple. The captives (Vatikiotis notes that their abject enslavement was unlikely as 
they outnumbered the yuan population of Chiang Mai (1984:56)) produced luxury 
                                                                                                                                            
the city probably had more to do with being a subject of the king and not  serf [ขา้ - kha] or slave [ทาส - 
thaat] nor not a subject of another king.  
110
 By “near suburbs,” I am specifically referring to that area that today lies within the ring of the 
superhighway and (for the most part) makes up the modern-day urban administrative district. In the past, 
this near suburb was most concentrated to Ping River towards the east, and to the outer wall towards the 
south.  
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goods (e.g. lacquerware, silver, and woodcarving) for the monarchy or for tribute to 
Bangkok.  
With increasing integration with Bangkok and with the influx of (British) 
Burmese and Chinese traders during the 18
th
 century, another ethnic community was 
set up, albeit one over whom Chiang Mai‟s lords had little control. Foreign merchants 
(be they Muslim, Chinese, or British Shan), missionaries, and diplomats were directed 
to settle towards the banks of the Ping, to the east of the old city, and it is here where 
Chiang Mai‟s central market grew. Chiang Mai‟s Chinatown and its Muslim quarter 
are still present around this area, as are the old structures of the American mission and 
the French and British consulates, but Vatikiotis also notes that the foreign settlements 
along Tha Phae Road were begun by a large number of ethnically Shan communities, 
remnants of merchant communities linked to British Burma (Vatikiotis 1984:83), an 
influence that has for the most part disappeared under the rows of concrete shophouses 
lining this street. 
The growth of foreign trading communities marked the last attempts to 
preserve the ethnically-segregated city plan of Chiang Mai. By the late 1800s and with 
the rise in the teak industry, Chiang Mai had become a place where people of many 
ethnicities intermingled: “Lao, Chinamen, Indians of many castes and races, and 
women of all descriptions, passed in a seemingly endless stream before us, some with 
the day‟s work manfully done, some perhaps with it never begun” (Le May 
1986[1926]:81).Vatikiotis also notes the decline of barriers to intermixing amongst 
ethnic groups and the rise of a plural society during the reign of Rama V, King 
Chulalongkorn, in Bangkok (1984:67). But the Chiang Mai monarchy had little power 
over the city‟s new residents. Despite local anger over the behavior of Europeans and 
Americans in the city limits (one doctor famously kept a harem of women) little could 
be done to censure farang who offended the local powers (Le May 1986[1926]:56). 
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Tensions reached a crisis point in 1866 when American missionaries converted two 
Lanna men. Enraged, then-king Kawilarot ordered the execution of the converts, 
claiming that while he could do nothing to the foreigners, he still had power over his 
own subjects (Le May 1986[1926]:126) – in his words, he was the Taker of Life [เจา้
ชีวติเอา- jao chiwit ao], who would order someone‟s beheading by saying “take” or 
“want” [เอา - ao] (Saratsawadi 2001[2005]:140). But this act was to prove the breaking 
point for the local monarchy‟s power, and Kawilarot was shortly thereafter called to 
Bangkok, where he died under mysterious circumstances. Kings following Kawilarot 
ceased using the term “Lord of Life” [เจา้ชีวติ - jao chiwit] and instead referred to 
themselves as “Great Lord” [เจา้หลวง - jao luang], and while Chiang Mai‟s kings since 
Kawila (and, indeed, since the Burmese conquest) had always been vassals, after 
Kawilarot‟s death they became powerless.  
I digress into narrating the fall of Chiang Mai‟s royalty in this discussion 
because, as I have previously stated and as Duncan argues for the whole of mainland 
Southeast Asia, the royalty and the premodern city were linked. The fall of the local 
monarchy, then, marked the fall of city planning placed around the body of the 
monarch. After Kawilarot‟s death, the Bangkok government purchased his royal 
palace (located at the north or “head” of the city) and converted it to a women‟s prison. 
The symbolic coup could not be more noticeable: what had been the ritually highest 
point of the city – the residence of the king - was now where criminal women were 
incarcerated. Another palace next to the “navel” of the city became the new city hall, 
and the remnants of the Chiang Mai royal family moved outside the walls to the 
eastern riverside – the Bangkok administration had moved into the literal heart of the 
city, and Chiang Mai‟s royalty had moved to a stretch of riverbank next to farang, 
Muslim, and Chinese communities; spatio-symbolically, the kings were turned into 
foreigners in their own town, and city layout began its modern phase. 
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The Charismatic City 
I have outlined four differing conceptions of the city: the city as Buddhist 
sacred center, the city as font of prosperity into the countryside, the city as 
supernatural entity, and the city as the body of the ruler. Each of these conceptions 
stems from a different body of knowledge, albeit all in some way involving Buddhist 
involvement (indeed, as the primary scribes of the tamnaan, monks could hardly help 
but be involved). The first primarily stems from a Buddhist triumphalist narrative of 
the conversion of Thailand‟s north told generally in Pali by ecclesiastical scribes in the 
19
th
 century but based on a revision and re-reading of local sources (indeed, recall the 
fact that Bodhiransi apologizes for the “unsuitable” original language). The second of 
these is sourced in that material which Bodhiransi presumably derides: Northern Thai 
folk Buddhism, again dominated by monks but now having a medium-centered focus. 
The third – the story of Kham Daeng – is rooted in a folk tradition with sources both 
monastic and oral and which formed the center of Chiang Mai‟s spirit medium 
community. Finally, regarding Chiang Mai‟s royal tradition, the system of guardian 
spirits and directions had its sources in fonts of power both temporal, monastic, and 
supernatural (i.e. the king, monks, and mediums), although Chiang Mai‟s royal rituals, 
such as the seup chataa meuang, are now performed by monks and provincial officials 
(having sidelined local royalty and mediums as not commensurable with being good, 
modern Thai subjects).  
However,the question remains, for all of the emphasis on space and sacrality 
from the 13
th
 century to the early 20
th
, what effect does the symbolic aspect of Chiang 
Mai‟s urban layout have upon life in present-day Chiang Mai? Indeed, Komson in the 
Association of Siamese Architects journal suggests that from a city planning 
standpoint, Chiang Mai‟s walls no longer have much meaning (Komson 2007:44). I 
argue that this is not entirely the case: meaning remains for some, be it in the form of 
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watthanatham lanna or in the form of a home for guardian spirits. Remnants of these 
various conceptions of the city exist, but, recalling Pattana‟s characterization of spirit 
mediumship and folk religion as ever-changing entities, they take new forms as they 
adapt to new times and incorporate new elements  Penny Van Esterik evocatively 
terms the traces of old order underlying new order in Thailand palimpsests, after the 
traces of older writing that emerge upon re-used parchment (Van Esterik 2000:9), a 
metaphor that I find useful in the case of Chiang Mai‟s city plan. But despite the 
varieties of interpretations, some spirit or spirits remain in Chiang Mai, whether it be a 
demon guardian sent by Indra to look after the city, the enlightened image of khruba 
siriwichai staring down from statues and storefronts to the street, or simply a nebulous 
force of watthanatham or khwaam pen thai that lingers about the place. In Thailand as 
elsewhere, magic can be both white and black; and what used to be a charm can recur 
as a curse - atthan. Here, I turn to more modern ideas of Chiang Mai‟s urbanity, but 
always with an eye towards the traces of past cities that continually bleed through. In 
the next chapter, I will explore the reverse of the topics and themes that I explored in 
this chapter. While I have described Chiang Mai as an ideal city in an ideal order, now 
I turn from utopia to dystopia and examine how certain spaces in Chiang Mai become 
home to malevolent ghosts and curses.  
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CHAPTER SIX: The City in and of Ruins 
 
“We affirm that Chiang Mai does indeed possess both a soul [jai] and a body [kaai], 
and that we must take care to keep them together in a balanced way” (Komson 
2006:50) 
The Cursed Meuang 
“Roong raem phi sing – Atthan [โรงแรมผีสิง - อาถรรพ]์ read the graffiti on the 
walls of the high-rise Boi Luang hotel along the ring road around Chiang Mai: 
“Haunted Hotel – Cursed.” The handwriting was better than the usual markings left by 
squatters or youth, but the Sanskrit-derived atthan was misspelled [the correct spelling 
would be: อาถรรถ์]. The text, though alarming, was unsurprising to me, as I had first 
learned of the hotel through its haunted reputation, confirmed by a conversation that I 
had had the day before as I waited to contact the owner of the building. As I sat on my 
motorbike outside of the gate waiting for the guard to return and let me inside, a street 
cleaner passed by. Getting desperate, I asked him if he knew how one got in touch 
with owner of the hotel. “That hotel? It‟s haunted! The ghost is really, really bad [เฮ้ียน 
- hian]!”  
“How do you know?” I asked him.  
“Because everyone who stayed in there was spooked [ถูกหลอก - thuuk lohk – 
literally “was tricked”]! And then it was a hospital, and now they take those cars and 
store them there,” he replied, referring to a long line of cars of varying ages, from 
vintage 1960s-era models to more recent varieties, parked in rows underneath the 
structure. 
“Oh, yeah, I see the cars. Why are they there?” I asked, peering through the 
grating. 
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“They take them from car crashes. Wherever there was a car crash they take 
the car and then put them in the basement of that hotel. Ghosts! It‟s full of them!” He 
laughed, shaking his head as he continued on his way. “You‟d better watch out, na?” 
The street cleaner wasn‟t entirely correct – while the hotel had indeed been a 
hospital, the cars were, according to the building‟s owner, not a toxic waste dump for 
malevolent spirits, but instead a sort of museum that one could visit for the hefty fee of 
one hundred baht a trip (roughly equal to a day‟s wage in the fields, or about three 
dollars – see figure 10). The cars were covered in a thick layer of dust and cobwebs, 
and the rest of the structure was devastated.  
The building was huge and rectangular, the concrete, after years of neglect, had 
settled upon a washed-out gray color. It loomed at the edge of the city, on the corner 
Figure 10: Abandoned cars in the Boi Luang 
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of the superhighway and the road leading to Sankamphaeng – a large satellite city of 
Chiang Mai and, significantly for the hotel, a popular tourist destination owing to its 
handicrafts center. Now, Tam and his wife, originally from Lampang province, 
guarded the hotel for the owners and capitalized on both its location and its large front 
lawn: the former by selling carpets, and the latter by grazing their cattle. 
The hotel sits at the intersection of the superhighway and the busy thanon 
Jaroen Meuang [Prosperity of the City road],  an area that highlights some of the 
sharp contrasts between space devoted to poorer urban dwellers, middle-class 
Northern Thais, wealthy Northern and Central Thai residents, and foreign tourists and 
expatriates. Just as the neighborhood stood at the boundary between urban space and 
rural space – out of the urban corona of Chiang Mai, and not yet to the smaller center 
of Sankamphaeng town, it also was a place which was not yet far enough away from 
the city for the luxury gated communities that had been constructed since the 1990s, 
while at the same time being too far for foot traffic from the city center. Buildings 
devoted to all classes lined the roadside: Sino-Thai shophouses selling custom-carved 
spirit houses [ศาลภูมิ - saan phumi] with or without the Northern Thai cross-gable 
architectural feature [กาแล - kalae], bamboo and palm-leaf platforms where vendors 
had set up noodle stalls, and the large concrete square of a brand-new coffee shop 
(albeit with chickens running through the aisles) catering to the most wealthy Thais or 
foreigners passing through. As I filled up my motorbike‟s tank at a gas station along 
the road, I noticed several people – some with obvious drug or alcohol problems – 
wandering from station to station and asking wealthy drivers filling their cars for 
money. 
 Across from the coffee shop rose the grey hulk of the Boi Luang. Locating the 
hotel was easy, but getting there was a problem. I went back between the rows of 
shophouses and travelled by motorbike around the streets of the neighborhood 
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[referred to simply as Jaroen Meuang 8, named after its position on the eighth lane of 
Jaroen Meuang road]. Like many other non-planned urban spaces, the area of Jaroen 
Meuang 8 follows neither the modernist grid logic of gated communities nor a pre-
modern radial pattern centered on a temple or spirit shrine. The neighborhood quite 
simply does not have the room for a form. Instead, it winds its way in between other 
constraining forces: the Chiang Mai Technology School, the Maitriijit Christian 
School, the superhighway, a factory, and the Boi Luang itself. But the hotel is and was 
not accessible from the neighborhood - it was an island in Jaroen Meuang 8, with tall 
fences (topped with razor wire) and overgrown grassy areas separating the 
neighborhood from the hotel. One reached the hotel via the superhighway, where a 
raised driveway terminated in a closed iron gate with a white cow looking 
incongruously out at the high-speed traffic.  
 This cow was how I first met Tam. I had returned to the gate after trying other 
ways to get inside and was reaching through the iron bars to stroke the cow‟s ears as I 
tried to peer inside. As the cow started licking my hand, Tam emerged from the 
shadow of the building and invited me in to look at his wares – he had set up a tent 
with synthetic carpets for sale inside the yard. After he tethered the cow and opened 
the gate, I pushed my motorbike in front of his tent. When I explained that I was 
interested in the hotel instead of the carpets, he presented a long sign-in sheet, several 
years old, covered in names of other people who had been inside – potential buyers of 
the property, Tam said, or tourists that became interested in the building after it had 
been featured on a haunted-house program
111
. I noticed several farang (Scandinavian, 
to be exact) names on the list which was otherwise filled with Thai names and asked 
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 Despite a great deal of searching, I cannot find this show. Tam did not remember the name.  
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about them – Tam replied that they were interested buyers who had come in to take a 
look around two years ago.
112
  
Inside the hotel, all of the glass was gone, as was all of the furniture, and 
concrete dust and bits of wiring littered the floor. As in a cave, the air was cooler 
inside than outside, but light still streamed in from the empty windows. Escalators - 
some still able to be used as stairs, others in less good repair - led up from the lobby-
cum-car museum to the upper floors, and as I climbed the escalator, I could see that 
there was still a sandstone mural depicting Buddhist stupas and kings in an Angkorean 
style; beneath it, the owners had parked a red 1980s-era Toyota, covered in dust. The 
lower floors had succumbed to the water table, and the parking lot ramp descended 
into black water, indicating that at least one level of the basement was completely 
submerged. At the top, a large round, (still) glass-enclosed restaurant used to be the 
hotel‟s crown jewel. From that point, the green stretches of Sankamphaeng district and 
the buildings of Chiang Mai – not to mention to spire of wat phrathat Doi Suthep – 
were all visible.  
On the lower floors, graffiti decorated the walls – some in Northern Thai (in 
Central script), some in badly misspelled Central Thai, some of it in Shan (which has 
its own script). Aside from the declaration that the place was haunted and cursed, there 
was a terribly-spelled lament by a young man, “Few,” about a girl, “Dow” – both their 
names written in Roman letters, although the rest was in Thai - who had onced loved 
him but whom he had let slip away: “I never thought that [วา้]113 I would have [ไต]้ this 
[นี] day, when a girl that I loved and who loved me I let go…”, and there was a 
                                                 
112
 Based on Tam‟s description of the two men – young men, arriving via motorcycle, I doubted that 
they were buyers. 
113
 I insert the misspellings in here, so that Thai speakers can see the sorts of mistakes that the author 
makes. The correct words are, in order: วา่, ได,้ น้ี, and the mistakes include a tonal error in two cases and 
the substituting of an unvoiced consonant for a voiced one in another. Other errors later in the text are 
of a similar order: vowel length, tones, and aspiration.  
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(comically?) angry threat: “Here you die! [Drawing of a gun] Daeng, your auntie is 
calling you! Daeng, I‟m going to shoot you in the ass! [Drawing of a penis] That old 
bitch [อีแก่ - ii-gae] is coming for you, you‟d better run home!”  
I present these examples of wall graffiti here in order to show that, like other 
abandoned buildings I describe below, the place was occupied or at least occasionally 
visited by groups of young men of the lowest social stratum – squatters, migrants – 
who either spoke Thai imperfectly (i.e. they were migrants, likely Burmese refugees, 
as were many of my informants) or were at least partially illiterate. As I discuss below, 
in these places, individuals on the outskirts of Chiang Mai‟s society can use space in a 
city hostile and foreign to them.  
Tam, the guard, took me through the hotel. He lived behind it in a small house 
with his wife. I asked him about hauntings. “No, there‟s no ghosts. People say that 
there are, but I‟ve never seen a ghost in here. Well, once I was frightened, but it wasn‟t 
a ghost. People come in, bandits [โจร- joon]. Burmese people. They take the wires out 
of the wall and the copper pipes. Once I saw a bandit and he saw me and we both 
thought that we were seeing a ghost so we ran.” 
“Did you confront him?” I asked. 
“No, it‟s dangerous! They give me a gun, but the bandit might have a gun, too. 
I‟m supposed to call the police, and the police will come and get him. I don‟t want to 
get shot!” 
We went to the rooftop as he narrated another chase, one where he pursued a 
Burmese
114
 bandit around the structure. Tam ducked in and out of empty doorways to 
illustrate how he and the intruder alternately pursued and evaded each other. He ended 
the story on the roof, where a round penthouse stood, now a mess of shattered glass 
                                                 
114
 I call the bandit “Burmese” according to Tam‟s specification, although the reader should note that 
Tam had no way of knowing the bandit‟s nationality. 
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and aluminum slats. The bandit had given him the slip up here, and escaped some 
other way. Story over, he stepped through the wreckage and looked out over the city.  
I pointed out the newest hotel in Chiang Mai across the way, the Mandarin 
Oriental Dhara Dhevi, a luxury hotel that rented rooms for over three hundred US 
dollars a night. The spires of the Dhara Dhevi, re-created temples and palaces in re-
imagined Northern style
115
, made a distinct impression against the white concrete and 
green trees of the Chiang Mai suburbs. 
 “That‟s not a wat [temple]?” said Tam, looking out [“b’maen wat goh?” - บํ
แมนวดัก่อ].   
 “No.” I replied. “They built it in the style of a temple – like a whole town from 
the past. There are buffalo in the fields and people on boats in the river.” 
 “I heard about this place!” Tam said. “They have people stay in the temple, 
like it‟s a hotel… That‟s not good. It‟s not appropriate to the religion [b’moh – บเํหมาะ]. 
Mua [มัว่ - a rude term for being sacreligious or disrespectful].” 
 From the top of the Boi Luang, the Mandarin Oriental seemed to be reflecting 
how Chiang Mai had moved on. The Boi Luang was to be the finest hotel in Chiang 
Mai urban area in its time – the Mandarin Oriental was now unquestionably the most 
expensive. But the two were from entirely different eras. The Boi Luang was a 
concrete mass topped by a swimming pool and a round glass conference chamber. It 
was to be an edifice that defied Chiang Mai‟s natural elements and asserted its 
modernity. The Mandarin Oriental, in turn, is a postmodern space. It re-creates the 
ancient style of the Mekong Tai era through re-building temple structures as 
residences and hiring locals to dress in “authentic” garb and engage in bucolic acts 
(like paddling a boat or grazing a buffalo) for atmosphere. Like the legend of the 
Buddha subjugating the yak (detailed in the previous chapter), the spirits of the 
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 For a discussion of the Dhara Dhevi, see chapter five. 
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ethnically Other North, once they have been sufficiently civilized via high modernity 
(represented by the Boi Luang‟s era of concrete mass structures), are welcomed back 
to provide for the city that they once ruled Northernness is safe for consumption once 
it has been purged of rural-ness – its “Lao” qualities.  
 The view from the top of the Boi Luang suggests this transformation: rural 
Chiang Mai tamed by modernity and then allowed to revert to a re-imagined 
“authentic” Chiang Mai. But before we can describe the re-invention or postmodern of 
Lanna (e.g. the Dhara Dhevi), we must first describe its taming. To do so, I now turn 
to what Rosalind Morris describes as the “ruinousness of the modern” (Morris 
2000:9): the cycles of boom and crash that have left the city littered with massive 
concrete edifices. As one architect put it, Chiang Mai is in the process of turning into 
“Detroit, where the soul [วญิญาณ-  winyaan – spirit] has been lost by 
uncomprehending abuse of its urban body” (Komson 2006:48). When I described the 
abandoned Boi Luang complex to an architect friend of mine, he smiled and shook his 
head, repeating a common saying: “pattana, tae yang mai jaroen” [พฒันาแต่ยงัไม่เจริญ - 
developed, but not yet progressed]. In other words, while the bricks and mortar appear 
modern, there is something insubstantial lacking, something which causes such 
misfortune as all that wasted capital and space. Here, it is useful to keep in mind the 
animating force behind the city: that charismatic property – articulated by the word 
watthanatham for some and embodied by the guardian spirits of the city for others - 
that allows for jaroen and the drawing-in of prestige, new immigrants, power, and 
wealth and which I describe in the previous chapters. This power, in the traditional 
idiom, contrasts atthan – cursedness, misfortune, the result of bad ghosts and spirits. 
 Each is selectively deployed in the new supernatural imaginary of Chiang Mai, 
as plagues of bad ghosts rise at the same time as upsurges in charismatic spirit 
mediumship – an alteration of previous forms of animism that coheres around a 
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particular personality rather than a particular place and which I describe in chapter 
seven, below, discussing these changes in the context of Jean and John Comaroff‟s 
(1999) idea of “occult economies.”  
 In this chapter, I examine this new supernatural imaginary in Chiang Mai as it 
relates to space, misfortune, and urban fear. I analyze the idea of impure space 
amongst two groups of my informants (as I mention in my introduction): those 
professionals belonging to the generation of Chiang Mai residents who were able to 
attend universities and those who did not, following Benedict Anderson‟s (1998) 
analysis of the political divide in 1970s-era Thai politics between educated 
bourgeoisie and those members of the middle class who drew their status from the 
more traditional forms of the civil service or military. While my data derives largely 
from my ethnographic research as well as a textual analysis of several palm-leaf 
manuscripts, for my analysis, I draw upon urban anthropology and sociology to 
explain the rise in urban fear in recent years, especially in the wake of the 1997 
economic crisis. 
High and Low 
Political science professor Thanet Charoenmeuang marks the beginning of 
Chiang Mai‟s construction boom in 1985 with the construction of the first high-rise 
condominium project, near the Ping River, a date that incidentally coincides with the 
reconstruction of the Chiang Mai city walls. Three years later, four new projects 
appeared; the year after that, in 1989, ten new condominium projects sprang up around 
the city (Thanet 1993:91). Opposition to the construction reached a key point in that 
year, causing a group of activists, monks, and spirit mediums together to perform a 
cursing ritual on those building the condominiums (Morris 2000:274). The this 
group‟s complaints were manifold, including environmental concerns (over-use of 
water, the blocking of those cool breezes which pu sae nya sae promised and that I 
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detail in the previous chapter), social concerns (which I address below), but also 
included concerns about the traditional hierarchy of space: as sacred things were 
above profane things, having living quarters where people would sleep, eat, defecate, 
have sex, and the like looming above the spires of Buddhist temples or animist spirit 
shrines – or simply looming above any passer-by‟s head – was an affront and 
potentially dangerous (ibid). This latter worry about the inversion of hierarchy was 
expressed as simply inappropriate [ไม่เหมาะ - mai moh] to “the culture” by those 
academics to whom I spoke about the condominium issue, but, as I detail below, had a 
much more direct and physical character for mediums. 
The rite itself played upon similar juxtapositions of pure and impure – it was 
an active violation of taboos and the direction of the ensuing misfortune at the 
condominium builders. The ritual [phithi hae phi
116
] is interesting in the ways in 
which it brings together both the wrath of the benevolent guardian spirits and the 
anger of spirits of bad deaths. Rosalind Morris is therefore worthwhile quoting: 
  
 The phithii hae phii shares much with the phithii saab chaeng in that it 
engages the powers of the dead and the violent possibilities of the netherworld to 
effect its goals. Officiants go to the cemetery and offer fruit, rice, water, sweets, and 
whiskey to the spirits, then ask them to come with them. The best spirits for such 
things are those who have suffered bad deaths because they will earn merit by 
enforcing retributive justice. The spirits of bad deaths are thought to be present in this 
world to an unusual degree, vulnerable and in need of merit to move out of the limbo 
that their accidental ends both presaged and induced. Like the phithii saab chaeng, 
the phithii hae phii requires widows and widowers to utter the words of invitation 
over incense. Then, the remains of the body
117
 (which usually include a few bones 
even after cremation) are exhumed and placed in a new coffin, and a kind of inverse 
funeral procession is carried out. In the case of the rite that followed Saeng Suang‟s 
possession, the coffin was marched through the streets and taken to the governor‟s 
mansion, where the governor was publicly threatened with the wrath of the spirits of 
the sya müang
118
, mediated by those of the bad deaths, if he did not act to prevent the 
destruction of Chiang Mai‟s beauty (Morris 2000:275). 
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 Morris does not provide Thai script. 
117
 Traditionally, as I mentioned above, those victims of “bad deaths” would not be cremated as they are 
today and as they are in Morris‟s account. 
118
 Morris here uses multiple transliteration styles here, which might be confusing to Thai speakers. The 
vowel that she renders ya in sya she then renders üa in müang, despite the fact that at the beginning of 
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 Morris continues from a description of this ritual to detail the conundrum that 
the academic community faced following this rite. While some (but not all) involved 
claimed that the rite only took place symbolically, at the level of watthanatham 
(2000:276), others expressed their fear at the power of the ritual, as less than two years 
later, a plane flying to Chiang Mai and carrying descendents of Chiang Mai‟s jao, the 
governor, and wealthy Northerners involved in condominium development crashed, 
killing all aboard (ibid). Some of those academics believed that they had inadvertently 
summoned the powers of misfortune, and these powers had manifested themselves.  
Whether or not the cursing worked to cause the condominiums to become 
atthan is, of course, debatable, but the boom in the Thai economy during the 1990s did 
lead to a crash. This crash was caused by a trend towards bad and overly-ambitious 
investments, and among them was land in the north. Speculators and would-be 
developers from Bangkok purchased large urban plots or wide tracts in the suburbs 
with the intention of selling off condominiums or lots to newly wealthy business 
people – also largely from Bangkok - seeking a home in what was to them the 
countryside. The names of these projects evoke the boom of the time. As I mention in 
my introduction, iconic of the housing estates were bucolic names in English: 
“Chiangmai Lakeland,” or “Chiangmai Hills”. The high-rises had similarly ambitious 
names: the “Chiangmai VIP Tower” or “Lilly Valley”. Each of these spots, like the 
Boi Luang, stands largely empty today, victims of the economic crash in 1997. As 
Bangkok‟s businessmen suddenly saw their fortunes collapse, they were no longer 
able to keep these second homes or condominiums, and property owners, unable to 
meet costs, abandoned the projects, sometimes mid-construction. The hulks remain 
                                                                                                                                            
In the Place of Origins she has stated that she will render müang meuang. The spirits that she refers to 
here are, in Thai script, เส้ือเมอืง. 
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standing, wires and glass stolen, as vine-covered concrete frames, as miniature 
versions of the Boi Luang.  
While the protests against the high-rise buildings were largely a product of 
Chiang Mai‟s middle class and academic elite, anxiety about the inattention to the 
hierarchy of space by profit-minded construction extended far beyond these groups: 
indeed, in many Northern Thai and Thai expressions, a metaphor of spatial hierarchy 
stands in for spiritual or social hierarchy. People who do not act appropriately around 
their superiors are accused of not knowing thi tam thi suung [ท่ีต ํ่าท่ีสูง - what is low, 
what is high]. Pillows used for sitting are not intended to cushion one‟s head (and the 
fact that I sat upon a head-pillow at home was a source of mild reproach from Noi, the 
daughter of Kham, the spirit medium whom I discuss in the previous chapter) – doing 
so would, according to Noi, make one sick. Things which are holy are tall, and things 
which are profane are low, a rule which extends into architecture no less than pillows. 
As Noi suggests, mixing with impure things or being in an inauspicious 
location (such as in the bottom of a building) could be dangerous. I often met Kham  
and Noi at Kham‟s house in the suburbs for lunch. The house, like many Northern 
houses, was a compound that included some crops as well – it should be noted that the 
term บา้น - baan, most commonly translated as “house,” refers to this entire compound 
just as it refers to a neighborhood [หมู่บา้น - muu baan], whereas the term เรือน - reuan 
or, in Northern Thai and Lao, เฮือน - heuan, refers to a building in which someone 
lives. One such building in Kham‟s compound was an ancient teak structure, perhaps 
forty to fifty years in age, up on stilts towards the rear of the compound. Kham‟s 
elderly mother, blind and deaf, lived alone in the large house, whereas Noi had built 
Kham a small concrete structure in which to live, as the spirit inhabiting Kham‟s body 
would not abide any sort of inhabited space above his head. The act of walking 
underneath the old heuan or approaching its stairs would, according to Kham, cause 
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her to fall terribly ill, and so she avoided passing near the tall house so as to spare her 
inhabiting spirit the indignity of having an old woman‟s foot taller than “his” head. 
While we were discussing the difficulties that the hierarchy of space presented, Kham 
asked me where I lived, and I replied that I lived in a high-rise apartment building. She 
chuckled and noted that entering such a place, where there would be twelve floors of 
feet above her head, was quite impossible for her and wasn‟t a very spiritually clean 
situation. “But it‟s all right [แต่บเํป็นอะย ัง๋ - tae b’bpen a-nyang119]” said Kham, always 
ready to downplay conflict, “The people that live there are Thai, they‟re not like us 
[Northerners]”.  
Kham‟s comment illuminates a certain feature of the tall buildings in the local 
imagination: they are nodes of foreignness, where foreigners live in spiritually 
polluted places, unable to be criticized because of their higher economic and social 
status (which are features of having jaroen), but suspect owing to their proximity to 
pollution. As such, they become sites where the benevolent spirits of Chiang Mai – 
those seua meuang which Kham and other spirit mediums channeled - cannot enter 
and over which they have limited power. Accordingly, they become places where 
malevolent spirits and spirits of disease and ill-luck congregate. 
These sites are also places where the neoliberal urge to turn empty space into 
profit has collided with a hierarchical/moral way of seeing space where certain places 
should remain fallow. An example of this conflict lies just outside of the southwestern 
gate – the “ghost gate” or “corpse gate” [ประตูผ ี- pratuu phi] in local terminology. As 
I detail above, the southern wall of the city has within it two gates: one of which 
(Chiang Mai Gate) is a “proper” gate, and the other of which (Saen Pung120) is not, but 
                                                 
119
 Again, the Central alphabet prevents me from properly writing the Northen Thai phoeneme “ny”. 
120
 The gate has a number of different names: saen pung, suan prung, suan pung, or pratu phi. I use the 
first of these, following the official city planning maps of Chiang Mai as published by the thaesabal 
office as well as the informal and Northern Thai pratu phi. 
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rather a back door which is in the system of spatial hierarchy [ทกัษา - thaksaa – see 
discussion in chapter eight]. As an inauspicious point in the city wall, Saen Pung is, in 
the thaksaa system, the only route by which to take corpses out of the city without 
damaging the city‟s palladium. Following corpses, it is the route through which ghosts 
and the misfortune that they cause exit the city. It also was, according to several 
sources, for the same reasons the site for executions by disemboweling (Sommai and 
Doré 1991:152). 
This exit – what is described in the body metaphor of the city as the foot or 
anus of the city as opposed to the city‟s head at Sriphumi corner – is now famous for 
traffic accidents.
121
 While the word thaksaa, referring to the system of urban planning 
magic that I discuss in chapter eight, was largely unrecognizable by most of my 
informants (aside from some who were familiar with the academic debate or palm-leaf 
texts surrounding the issue), the idea of Saen Pung Gate as an egress for corpses (and 
ingress for phi seeking to follow people into the city) was a common explanation for 
the numbers of deaths around this intersection. 
Across from Saen Pung Gate, there stood a high-rise building that was empty 
since the 1997 economic crisis. It had originally been a hotel, but closed that year 
when so much else in Chiang Mai closed. I asked Lung
122
 why the business had dried 
up. “People couldn‟t sleep,” he said, “there were ghosts passing through there all the 
time. That intersection is really no good – people fall asleep there when they‟re riding 
                                                 
121
 In addition to the narratives that I give here, see chapter one for an account of the neighboring 
Chiang Mai Gate‟s divinely-inspired safety in contrast with Saen Pung Gate‟s disastrous traffic. 
122
 I describe Lung elsewhere. He was a Northern Thai man in his 60s, relatively well-off but 
uneducated and owned a smaller high-rise building in the Nimmanhaemin area. He was a firm believer 
in spirit cults, although occasionally skeptical about the veracity of mediums. I lived for a few months 
in his building and would sit outside with him in the early evening, helping him to finish off a six-pack 
of Chang beer. While his favorite topic was Thaksin Shinawatra (of whom he was a supporter), he 
would also talk about his days as a monk in Lamphun, his patronage of diviners [หมอดู - moh duu], and 
his long litany of complaints about the direction of Chiang Mai‟s development. “Lung,” “uncle”, is, of 
course, both a pseudonym but also how I referred to him. 
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their bikes or they‟re drunk. It‟s a bad place. Their eyes close [หลบั - lap] and then 
boop! Crash! Lots of ghosts!”  In Lung‟s characterization, the ghosts were linked  with 
the fact that people fell asleep or were not wary when they drove past the corner, a 
characterization that fit with how Kham and Noi (a spirit medium and her 
daughter)both described the action of “ghosts of bad death” – ผตีายโหง, phi taai hoong 
– rather than appearing in a dramatic, corporeal manner (although the younger Chai 
and Maew, in their twenties, had stories about phi doing just that), phi caused 
misfortune: the reason why people‟s attention lapsed around Saen Pung was owing to 
evil sorcery by the ghosts of the site. Ghosts and misfortune are, for Lung, Kham and 
Noi, inseparable. 
Across the street from the haunted , kalae-studded high rise was a late-night 
noodle shop. The owner was a woman, Kao, in her forties and her Sino-Thai 
husband
123
 had been running the noodle restaurant for three years.  
 
Kao: The place is abandoned because the owner died and left it to his son, an 
engineer in Bangkok. In fact, the whole family isn‟t from here. The son isn‟t 
interested in the building. He doesn‟t want to fix everything up or spend the money. 
Instead, he comes and thinks of these very expensive projects to do with the place and 
then doesn‟t do them because he doesn‟t want to spend the money and then goes back 
home to Bangkok. But ghosts? No, we don‟t believe in ghosts. If we believed in 
ghosts, we wouldn‟t be in this building! 
AAJ: Because of the corner? 
Kao: Not only because of the corner. Right here in this building there was a murder. It 
used to be a travel agency, and then a man killed his young wife here and her lover. 
They died, the two of them [she paused].Well, the corner is bad, too. There are a lot 
of crashes there, but it‟s because when college students ride their motorbikes past 
there they don‟t look out. You shouldn‟t ride past there late at night. We don‟t let our 
daughter to ride past there at night. It‟s too dangerous! 
AAJ: Never seen a ghost here? 
Kao: Nothing. We sleep here, work here, and we haven‟t seen anything. 
AAJ: And across the way, in that abandoned [ร้าง - raang] building, no ghosts? 
Kao: Oh, it‟s not abandoned. It has an owner. There is a watchman who looks after it 
during the day. But ghosts? If you ask people around the neighborhood, they might 
                                                 
123
 I make this inference simply because she used Chinese terms of address when referring to him, using 
the Chinese loanword hia [เฮีย] rather than the Thai phi [พ่ี]. This latter term is not to be confused with 
phi [ผี], “ghost.” The terms differ in tone.   
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say that they‟ve seen lights in the windows or faces looking out at them, or ghost 
stories like this. As far as I‟m concerned, I haven‟t seen anything like that. And I‟m 
here every night! 
AAJ: But ghosts don‟t cause people to fall asleep driving here? 
Kao: [laughs] Could be! I don‟t know about that, but I think that the problem is these 
teenagers [วยัรุ่น -wai run] who drink and drive too fast and don‟t pay attention. 
 Here, Kao, even though she denies the existence of ghosts, mentions 
misfortune, violence, and urban fear based on stories of dangerous youth and violent 
relationships
124
. In these accounts, the improper use of space has caused an area to 
become a site of fear, whether that fear stems from ghosts or urban violence. What I 
find interesting in the woman‟s account is the intertwining of ghosts (mentioned here 
only as something that “others” find frightening) and urban violence, be it the 
teenagers who drive too fast or deadly domestic violence. Yet before I deal with the 
issue of urban fear, I wish to further explore the connection between a misuse of space 
and misfortune. 
Explaining Misfortune 
 I have hinted at the link between spatiality and fortune in the previous sections, 
but here I wish to analyze the magico-religious literature, specifically the idea of 
taboos surrounding space. These taboos – kheut (spelled ขึด in the Thai literature but 
pronounced ข๋ึด by my Northern Thai informants) – varied in their focus from social 
relationships to city planning, but in each case the governed the appropriate use of 
boundaries. The subject has become popular in Chiang Mai in recent years with the 
publication of a book (in its third printing) and several articles on the subject (Buntha 
et al 1996, Somchote n.d.). The discourse of kheut is used by modern academics and 
                                                 
124
 I address the question of “do Thais believe in ghosts?” in more detail below. Here, it suffices to say 
that nearly all of my informants who were migrant laborers, night watchmen, or, of course, spirit 
medium devotees professed a belief and fear, although they would often deny that ghosts resided where 
they worked (often asserting that elsewhere there might be ghosts). Middle-class shopkeepers, architects, 
and city planners often expressed a belief (“I was afraid of ghosts until I saw one,” said one architect. 
“Now I see them all the time, and they‟re not so frightening”), but just as often repeated a common 
phrase: “I don‟t believe in them, but I don‟t offend them either” (see Pattana 2005). A few, such as this 
woman, and Tong, my key architect informant, denied the existence of haunted places altogether. 
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activists to criticize new construction in the city and push for a “return” to a sense of 
space more sensitive to their version of Lanna aesthetics, ideas which are, in the 
discourse of Chiang Mai‟s “educated classes”, are always already commensurable 
with functional rationality. Yet kheut becomes cited in a very different sense by other 
groups in Chiang Mai as a cause of the hauntings which plague the city. The discourse 
of kheut allows for a moral criticism of urban growth as well as a justification for 
urban fear, fear which, as I argue at the end of this chapter, acquires nativist overtones. 
To examine kheut properly, however, I must return to the tamnaan – those palm-leaf 
manuscripts that I discuss in more detail in previous chapters. 
I do so with some caution. Palm-leaf texts should not be taken 
unproblematically as authoritative sources on local practices (as, unfortunately, they 
often are). As I explained in preceding chapters, the variety of perspectives in the 
palm-leaf texts (spanning centuries in time and several different languages) are often 
radically reinterpreted by modern readers with their own agendas. Additionally, using 
such texts as indicators of Northern “culture” is problematic at best, as most 
Northerners are today unable to read or uninterested in reading the works, and the 
degree of social, demographic, and cultural change that Chiang Mai has undergone 
since many of the texts were written render conclusions about modern-day attitudes 
based on palm-leaf texts a stretch at best. Nonetheless, when discussing kheut, many 
activists and monks pointed me towards such sources as reference points on 
construction, and, at least in the translated form (i.e. translated from Northern or Pali 
into Thai), some reflect the anxiety felt by many of my informants regarding 
abandoned and new modernist buildings.  
 Amongst those in what I term Chiang Mai‟s “educated class”, kheut was either 
dismissed or reconfigured along a rationalist, functionalist line: one could not express 
an unqualified belief in spatial taboos, but could appreciate them as examples of “local 
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wisdom” [ภูมิปัญญาทอ้งถ่ิน – phumiphanya thong thin]. An older doctor, who had come 
to Chiang Mai from Bangkok during the 1950s and lived along Nimmanhaemin road, 
looked confused as I asked him about the role of kheut in the changing urban 
landscape of the neighborhood: do people believe in kheut, did he believe in it, was it 
an issue that people discussed in relation to the changes in the Nimmanhaemin area? I 
repeated the word kheut, changing the tone.
125
 “I don‟t know what you‟re talking 
about,” he said dismissively, but then noticed his Northern Thai gardener in the yard. 
“Wait, wait,” the doctor said and called to her. “Have you heard of this word?” he 
asked. She brightened and ducked into her apartment in his compound, pulling out the 
same book that I was reading [ขึด: ข้อห้ามในล้านนา - Kheut: Koh Haam nai Lanna – 
Kheut: The Subject of Forbidden Things in Lanna, by Buntha et al 1996]. The doctor 
w flipped through the book before changing the topic of our interview with a brief, 
dismissive “The North isn‟t the same.” 
 Tong, a young architect who, despite being not yet thirty had his own business 
and had made quite a name for himself as a radical high-modern architect in Chiang 
Mai
126
, had a take more typical of khon meuang [person native to Chiang Mai – lit. 
“city person” – see discussion in previous chapters] of Chiang Mai‟s educated classes. 
“It‟s the same as in America,” Tong said, eager to de-exoticize Chiang Mai to his 
friend from New York. “When you [here Tong means Americans] make a tall building, 
you don‟t have a thirteenth floor. Kheut is like the number thirteen, things that people 
don‟t do because they‟re superstitious.” After I asked him if he believed in it or not, he 
laughed and said no, “It‟s the modern age now, we‟ve given up those things.” Such an 
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 In Central dialect, it is impossible to have a word begin with a kh sound and end in a t or d sound (a 
closed syllable) that has a rising tone. Hence, rising tone of kheut marks it as a word in dialect or a 
mispronounced tone, which would be a common mistake for foreign speakers such as myself, hence I 
believed that the doctor‟s misunderstanding had to do with my own pronunciation. 
126
 I deal with Tong and his work in detail in chapter eight. 
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argument, albeit in a frustrated tone, was reflected in a group of webboard postings
127
 
pertaining to the subject of Lanna (my translation follows the original Central Thai): 
 
ข้อความ : ขึด ....  
คาํน้ีไดย้นิบ่อย ๆ ...ห้ามทาํอยา่งนั้น ห้ามทาํอยา่งน้ี เพราะวา่มนัขึด   
หากจะถามต่อไปวา่  
"ทาํไมถึงขึด.....?" . ..ก็จะเงียบไปสกัพกั แลว้ตามมาดว้ยคาํวา่  
"เออ  .....น่า ขึดก็ขึดสิ จะถามอะไรนกัหนา"  
 
ใครเคยเป็นอยา่งน้ีมั้ง  
 
ทาํไมจึงมีขึดมากมายเหลือเกิน  ...แทบจะกระดิกตวัไม่ได้   
เคยสงสยักนัไหมวา่ ท่ีวา่ขึดนั้น เพราะอะไร  
อาจมีเหตุผลอะไรบางอยา่งท่ีแฝงไว ้  ...แต่วา่มนัหายไป ..ในช่วงต่อจาก รุ่นหนึงไปสู่อีกรุ่นหน่ึง   
 
The topic: kheut 
[We]
128
 hear this term a lot … [One is] forbidden to do this because it‟s kheut. 
If [one] asks further 
“Why is it kheut?” [The person who has been questioned] will be quiet for a moment, 
and then what will follow are the words: 
“Um… Kheut-ish [the prefix naa (น่า) renders a word an adjective] things are kheut! 
Why do you ask so difficult questions?” 
 
Who hasn‟t experienced this? 
Why do [we] have the residual idea of the meaningfulness of kheut?  [The situation is 
such that] there is no room to wiggle! 
[I] have been concerned [with the question]: those things/places which are kheut, why 
[are they]? 
Maybe there [had been] some purpose hidden inside [the prohibition], but it has 
disappeared in the transition from one generation to another generation. 
 Tong and the webboard poster each echo the frustration of a younger 
generation stymied in their attempt to reconcile their high-modern ambitions with 
“local” belonging in the way that seems so unproblematic in representations from the 
state (e.g. the monarchy‟s call to be both full of “Thai” tradition as well as being 
future-oriented) or from mass-media (e.g. the fusion of “Lanna” with global 
cosmopolitan forms that I discuss in chapter three, above, and chapter eight, below. 
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 http://board.dserver.org/L/LannaBoard/00000077.html . Accessed 2/2010. 
128
 Informal Thai often omits pronouns and subjects altogether. I have inserted them for English 
readability here. 
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Yet for others kheut was a concept full of promise insofar as it could be recociled with 
a rationalist search for use-value.  
Duangchan Charoenmeuang
129
 had a view echoed by much of the academic 
writing on kheut (see also Mala 2008, Jaruphat 2007) – such topics are also notably 
absent from Cold War-era writings. “These are things that people knew about in the 
past. They don‟t tell you why you shouldn‟t do something, just not to do it. But they 
are usually things that are good advice – for instance, if you build a house out of new 
wood and old wood, that is kheut. Why? Because the new wood will change shape at a 
different rate than the old wood and your house will break apart! It is also kheut to 
build your house with one wooden post buried inside a termite mound.” She finished 
by asking rhetorically, “Now, why would that be?” For Duangchan, kheut taboos are 
common-sense prescriptions based on ancient trial-and-error made to preserve 
harmony in both infrastructure (the house), health (e.g. according to a temple 
manuscript, it is kheut for pregnant women to go to the toilet at night. Why this might 
be so is not specified, but Duangchan reasons that at night a woman might slip and fall 
and injure the baby, Duangchan suggested) and society (according to one palm-leaf 
text, greeting someone who is eating meat is also kheut – Duangchan suggested that 
this was to prevent people from selfishly doing so just to be invited to share in the 
meal). For Duangchan, kheut ultimately has a rational function. 
 Such functional explanations by Chiang Mai‟s educated class differ from those 
given by lay people. Pa,
130
 a Northerner who had not attended any secondary 
schooling, provided a more structural reason for kheut. I asked her if she knew the 
word, and she responded. “Kheut?” she said with a Northern rising tone and heavily 
                                                 
129
 While my other names are pseudonyms, Duangchan is a scholar of city planning at Chiang Mai 
University and I use her real name here, as she is a public figure. I also use her own orthography to 
write her last name, เจริญเมือง, which I would normally render Jaroenmeuang. 
130
 Pa [“auntie”] was the wife of Lung [“uncle”], whom I mention above. 
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voiced uvular fricative. “Yes of course,” she said. “It‟s things that you shouldn‟t do. 
Suppose you were to touch me on the head. It‟s not appropriate, because you are 
younger than I am. That would be kheut.” Pa made no attempt to dismiss or downplay 
kheut or provide a culturally-specific narrative or functional reason why certain things 
are kheut and others are not, but instead she gave a structural explanation: there is a 
hierarchy of high and low embedded in hierarchies of age and the body, and to violate 
these (e.g. by having a young man‟s hand touch the highest point on an old woman‟s 
head) is to violate the way in which the world is ordered. I asked Pa what might 
happen should I touch her on the head. She still refrained from replying with a 
“disenchanted” explanation along the lines of what Duangchan provided - e.g. that 
society would frown upon the disrespect shown to the wisdom of the older generation 
– or from the predictions of the Lannaboard poster – i.e. that she would not be able to 
provide an answer. Instead, Pa simply said “[she would] get sick.”   
The lack of an explicit reason for why some things are kheut and others are not 
leaves blank space for people to insert their own meanings. While those born outside 
of the North, such as the doctor or many of my friends and informants in the Chiang 
Mai art community, simply had no idea about kheut, those embedded in a discourse of 
rational progress (e.g. Tong) dismissed it as mere superstition, and those promoting 
local revivalism (e.g. Duangchan) made pains to gloss kheut as something with social 
or environmental (or common-sense) functionality, older people such as Pa or Kham 
referred to kheut in a more holistic, cosmic sense: kheut refers to the violation of 
boundaries that keep the universe ordered, healthy, and in line and as such it cannot be 
separated from other elements such as (the endangerment of) health, happiness, and 
luck.  
Misfortune brought by the violations of order is doled out by spirits: either 
beneficial spirits that have become offended (such as those living within Kham‟s 
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body) or by malevolent spirits (such as those living within the Boi Luang) who are 
allowed to enter owing to the beneficial spirits‟ ire or weakness. As I mention 
previously with regards to the hierarchy of high and low, spatial orientation also has 
an effect on the actions of malevolent spirits. Incorrect orientation in space might lead 
to a spirit attack: “You should always sleep in-line with the roof beams,” warned Mak, 
an architect (not affiliated with Tong‟s company). “If you sleep like this,” he 
continued, making an X with his hands, “you‟ll see the house ghost [ผบีา้น - phi baan]. 
You‟ll wake up in the middle of the night, and it will be there, standing upside-down 
on the beam, staring down at you.”131  
In a similar story, Ya, a vendor at Chet Yot Temple, described the fate of one 
hapless youth who positioned himself above a guardian spirit: 
 
I saw aguardian spirit [ผีเส้ือ - phi seua] once. There was a youth [นุ่ม - num], 
younger than you, who had come to the temple for a temple fair [งานวดั - ngaan wat]. 
He was right over there, by that spirit shrine. He didn‟t know what he was doing [i.e. 
he was being drunk and/or foolish] and climbed on top of the tiger statue over there 
[pointing to a plaster statue of a tiger]. Suddenly, he jumped up and climbed that tree 
[pointing to a large tree next to the shrine]. Not in the manner of a person! Not like a 
person! Faster than a person could do it, he went up, making sounds like an animal. 
He was up in that tree for several hours. The guardian spirit had entered him. He was 
doing something he shouldn‟t have done – climbing on top of that statue – and it 
possessed him. When he came to, he was so frightened he wouldn‟t come down! 
The youth acts in the same way as Pa suggested would invoke supernatural 
retribution: he, a young man, places his body above something more sacred: he climbs 
on top of the dwelling place of a spirit and calamity results. The boy inverts high and 
low, and the once-friendly guardian spirit turns vengeful. 
What emerges from a study of oral and (some) written accounts of kheut is no 
one definitive list of things which are permissible and things which are kheut, instead, 
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 Ghosts, as inverted things, walk on the ceiling. Him, a Thai friend of mine studying in Helsinki, 
recalled seeing a screening of the Thai ghost movie Nang Nak in Finland. In the film, the spirit Nak 
appears standing on the ceiling, glaring down at her victims. The Finns in the room laughed, but Him 
recalled that as the most frightening scene in the film: “That‟s when you knew for real that she was a 
ghost.” 
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we have a system which is primarily concerned with boundaries, directions, and 
hierarchies, especially as relates to architecture, which in the rural North of the 19
th
 
and early 20
th
 centuries (when most of these manuscripts were written) would be 
limited to houses, temples, temporary huts, and agricultural structures (e.g. granaries). 
Most are negative (e.g. “it is forbidden to do X”), few are positive (e.g. “X is an 
auspicious thing to do”), but almost all are concerned with the mixing of the old and 
the new or attention to directions or things which are high and low. 
Some examples include (translations mine):  
- The building of a new house that faces south near an old one that faces 
north is not good, it is kheut (Buntha et al 1996:69). 
- If you have a small old house that you expand to make wider than before, it 
is not good, it is very kheut (Buntha et al 1996:77). 
- There are two kinds of “dead houses” in which one shouldn‟t live. The first 
is an abandoned house that hasn‟t had people living in it and then one 
comes and builds upon that house
132
. The second is taking old wood from 
lots of different houses and combining them to make a single house.  These 
aren‟t good, they‟re kheut (Buntha et al 1996:81). 
- Even if [your] homes and cities are well,133if [you] have a market that sells 
things in the city for a long time, and behind that market is an abandoned 
space, this is not good. It will cause the city to not prosper [jaroen], 
because that space will become a home for ghosts. Ghosts of violent death 
[ผีข้ีร้ายตายยาก - phi khii rai taai yaak], hung ghosts, phong ghosts, and phrai 
ghosts will all live there
134
 because they will come to eat the food that is in 
the market, like raw meat or raw fish. It will make it so that you cannot eat 
the food. The ghosts will trouble the entire city, making people and beasts 
suffer much (Buntha et al 1966:12). 
- Cities, temples, monastaries, house compounds, gardens, or homes are well. 
If one is going to build a home [เฮือน - heuan] around there, do not build it 
right next to a river, or build it next to a large or small road, or build it in 
the sightline [สายตา - saay taa] of a temple, or in the sightline of a demon 
[ยกัษ ์- yak, e.g. a spirit shrine]. Doing that is not good, it can be kheut 
(1996:1). 
The final example is a significant one. The Social Research Center, and 
Duangchan, one of its leading professors, play a central role in protests against 
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 Here we again see the association with an abandoned building with misfortune and ghosts. 
133
 บา้นก็ดี - Baan goh dii is a common opening for statements of kheut. There is no smooth English 
translation. 
134
 Northern Thailand – indeed, all of Thailand – has a lively and varied assortment of traditional spirits. 
While I will discuss some of these spirits later, I have neither the time nor the data to adequately do 
justice to the diversity and range of these ghosts. I would direct the interested reader to Robert Textor‟s 
Roster of the Gods (1973) for a full menagerie.  
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overdevelopment in Chiang Mai. Early conflicts, as I describe above, surrounded the 
building of hotels and other structures next to the Ping River and next to temples. In 
this they were partially successful: such places were off-limits to tall buildings and 
high-rise structures for much of the 2000s, but recent legal changes following 
Thaksin‟s ouster have removed much of these prohibitions.135 
Violation of kheut depends on the scale of offense. While minor offenses 
trouble the offender, larger ones increase in scale, affecting the neighborhood and, in 
the final two cases, the entire city [ขึดเมือง - kheut meuang]. The punishment is often 
not specific, limited to a simple “the city will not prosper” or “people will suffer.” 
Often this is because of the work of evil spirits, as evidenced in the fourth example. As 
an example of the consequences of kheut meuang, Chaing Mai residents, according to 
the Thai-language daily Chiang Mai News, attributed a series of damaging 
earthquakes in 1989 to bad fate acquired via the construction of tall buildings, 
buildings that violated kheut (Morris 2000:274). 
As might be expected in a 21
st
-century city, very few places constructed today 
follow kheut guidelines. Homes and markets are built within the sight-lines of temples 
and next to waterways and roads and, while many Northerners that I spoke with knew 
about kheut and could give a handful of examples, few, apart from spirit mediums, 
local historians, persons from rural areas outside of the city, or urban activists thought 
that kheut applied to shopping malls or high-rise structures. These buildings were 
exempt because of their success – kheut‟s dire predictions would seem to indicate that 
such buildings would be sites of bad luck and misfortune, but instead many of these 
structures looked to be doing quite well.  
                                                 
135
 Not, of course, to imply that Thaksin was a champion of anti-sprawl concerns. The anti-Thaksin 
“Love Chiang Mai Group” in many leaflets documented the massive scale of environmental and social 
problems engendered by Thaksin‟s projects such as the floral exhibition, detailed below. 
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Yet as Comaroff and Comaroff argue in their analysis of “occult economies” 
(1999), prosperity built upon a seeming violation of spiritual authority carries with it a 
deferred sense of menace, a sense which manifested itself in the form of those ghosts 
that plague abandoned spaces (such as the Boi Luang) and construction sites (such as 
the Punna building, as I describe below) alike.  
Ghosts and Foreignness 
That the phi taai hoong [ghosts of violent death] haunt both abandoned 
construction and yet-to-be completed construction is no coincidence. Visually, the 
former are dark mirrors of the latter: empty concrete frames in each case – but another 
parallel which struck my informants as far more disturbing was the link between those 
people inhabiting the abandoned buildings and those being constructed: migrant 
laborers, refugees, and squatters, often all labels referring to the same groups of people.  
The Comaroffs note the worldwide proliferation of ghosts that suck organs or 
other vitalities from people, ghosts which represent the “relentless process that erodes 
the inalienable humanity of persons and renders them susceptible as never before to 
the long reach of the market” (1999:291). Such creatures are not unheard of in 
Thailand: Mary Beth Mills (1995) describes a plague of “widow ghosts” that attack 
male Thai laborers in their sleep – ghosts that resemble the fashionable, attractive 
young women gracing television commercials and billboards. For Mills (1995), the 
figure of the young woman as malevolent ghost represents for poor Northeastern 
farmers an uncanny return of modernity [ความทนัสมยั – khwaam thansamai]. The 
emphasis in media representations on a sexualized, high-modern young woman in 
addition to the switch in migrant labor (from Isaan to Bangkok) from a male-oriented 
system towards female-oriented labor created a sense of unarticulated fear surrounding 
the image of “the modern woman.” The widow ghosts are the uncanny return of the 
failures of the market to deliver on promises of nationwide prosperity. In the case of 
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Chiang Mai, I argue that phi taai hoong inhabiting abandoned construction represent 
for those fearing them the fragility of the economy and its basis on the exploitation of 
migrant labor as well as fears about the deleterious effects of urban life on the young. 
In fact, such anxieties and fears appeared as the precise inverse of the hopes for 
urbanity promised by such concepts as jaroen and watthanatham detailed in chapters 
two, three, and five.  These ghosts, then, whether they haunt new or abandoned 
construction, are the uncanny reminders of the exploitative foundations of the middle-
class lifestyle for the dwellers of the newly-constructed buildings and also the 
justification for moral superiority by those finding themselves excluded from the new 
city.  
Haunted Construction 
The Boi Luang hotel was perhaps the most emblematic of Chiang Mai‟s 
abandoned buildnings, but there were many other haunted and abandoned high-rise 
buildings dotting the landscape. I spent some time with the caretakers during 2006 and 
2007 and spoke with them about the buildings. Specifically, I visited and toured eight 
high-rise structures that were either entirely or (in two cases where a handful of 
absentee landlords still owned rooms in an otherwise-abandoned place) partially 
abandoned. Additionally, I visited and toured five abandoned or partially abandoned 
gated communities in the outskirts of Chiang Mai. At these (thirteen) sites, I cultivated 
a relationship with those working or living in and around the buildings where I was 
able: from security guards, people who used the concrete structures as residential or 
social locations, people living or working nearby, and the owners of the properties. 
To many (including both the caretakers as well as my other friends and 
informants in Chiang Mai, and notably excluding those who lived and socialized in the 
abandoned spaces), the empty buildings and the sites themselves were tainted with 
vague memories of past misfortune, even if they never contained occupants, they 
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contained ghosts. These ghosts were always nameless, generally that of young people, 
and always malevolent (for more on malevolent ghosts, see my discussion in chapter 
seven).  
 As I mention above, I argue that the figure of the ghostly youth represents a 
similar anxiety over modernity and its effects in creating urban chaos. The centrality 
of the urban and the relationship between cities and progress [i.e. khwaam jaroen] here 
is, like Mills‟s example of “modernity” (Mills 1995), something which is not often 
openly contested, even though jaroen, as is the case with modernity in Mills, offers 
contradictory messages as the social fabric of the city rapidly changes.  Hence, 
anxieties about urban change and the way in which urban life is constructed (i.e. upon 
an exploitative labor system) emerge in a ghostly form. 
A night watchman at one high-rise told me a long story about another high-rise 
that stood at the edge of town
136
. According to his story, a couple in the high-rise fell 
to arguing (in fact, the domestic dispute is a common beginning to many ghost stories). 
Enraged, the man killed his wife and left her body  in one of the rooms. It was months 
before she was found, and the guard then launched into a description of how he 
imagined the building smelled afterwards. Nowadays, he said, no one is brave enough 
to enter the building because of her ghost, and even the night watchman has to stay in 
a small, separate structure out of fear. 
The watchman in question denied that he stayed away out of fear, and denied 
the existence of ghosts in the building. “They just say that there are ghosts because the 
place was dark-colored,” said the guard, “it looked scary. But I‟ve never seen anything 
here.” When I asked him if he‟d like to live there should the place be rebuilt, he 
responded with an emphatic no: “Of course not! But the problem isn‟t ghosts – the 
                                                 
136
 Gathering stories about other buildings became a rule – watchmen that I interviewed never offered 
stories about their own workplaces, but were often very forthcoming about nearby places.  
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problem is that you have a small wall separating you and another room, and who 
knows what‟s going on there! Someone could be laying with their feet at you right 
there, inches from your head, and you wouldn‟t know it. Or you could hear strange 
sounds and not know what was happening…” While he denies the existence of ghosts 
in the building, the guard suggests that someone could be inverting the high-low 
hierarchy by having their feet (the lowest and least sacred part of the body) aimed at 
the head (the highest). He also expresses anxiety about having an unknown space, 
filled with strange sounds, so close. 
As was the case with Saen Pung gate, the discourse of ghosts and the discourse 
of urban chaos and impurity parallel each other. Such concerns were often repeated 
regarding high-rise structures, both abandoned and occupied. Another parallel between 
Saen Pung gate and the ghosts of abandoned buildings is the ghosts‟ mobility. Ghosts 
can appear at the site of death, but often then move towards quiet, abandoned spaces 
nearby, especially those places which are for some reason inauspicious: as both the 
kheut warning about abandoned markets and the street sweeper speculating about the 
origin of the Boi Luang‟s abandoned cars suggest.  
More stories of urban violence and chaos as both cause and consequence of 
ghosts abound. A girl was crossing the road near an occupied high-rise when she was 
struck by a car. Her spirit now haunts a room in the structure, where she will shake 
awake anyone sleeping in the bed at the hour of her death. At the Monkey Club, a 
discotheque in Chiang Mai‟s “Bangkok Zone” of Nimmanhaemin road, a young police 
officer killed his friend accidentally. A group of young people were being loud and 
knocking against him, causing the drunken officer to fly into a rage. He pulled out his 
gun and was pointing it at the youths but his friend tried to intervene. The gun went 
off, and the friend was killed on the spot. According to local rumor, the bar was too 
cheap to pay an exorcist, and a girl was subsequently killed in traffic after accidentally 
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treading on the spot where the friend‟s head fell to the floor. Sam, a night watchman at 
a high-rise building, regaled me with ghost stories as I sat with him at night while he 
drank instant coffee to stay awake. “Where there is people, light, noise, these things, 
there you won‟t have ghosts. Where there is dark and quiet, that‟s where the ghosts are. 
There are a lot here in the city, especially Chiang Mai. Seven hundred years! There is 
seven hundred years‟ worth of ghosts here in this city. People are dying every day, too 
– killings, drugs…” He pointed towards the Monkey Club. “What time is it now, two 
AM? [It is] quiet and dark. The ghost of that police office is back there, right now. [He 
was] hiding when people were there, but now he‟s standing in there. ” 
I heard these and many other such stories from people of many different 
occupations and social classes, including architects, university students, shopkeepers, 
office workers, as well as night watchmen, taxi drivers, and food vendors. They had 
backgrounds that were Thai from the North, Northeast, and Central region as well as a 
handful of Shan laborers. Interestingly enough, the one night watchman at an 
abandoned highrise to entirely dismiss the idea of ghosts haunting any of the buildings 
was ethnically Karen
137, a recent migrant from the Burmese border region: “The city 
doesn‟t have ghosts,” Oo flatly stated, contradicting my own retelling of another 
guard‟s story. I then asked him if he believed in ghosts, to which he replied: “I 
believe! But ghosts live in the jungle, not the city.”  
The stories that are retold about the high-rise buildings are symptoms of a time 
when car-crash and suicide victims live on after death, spreading sickness, heat, and 
disaster. The modernity represented by the growth and development of the city and the 
construction of high-rise buildings across Chiang Mai‟s skyline has in it an uncanny 
double in the form of modern ghosts: ghosts of young women killed in traffic, young 
                                                 
137
 An upland minority with populations in eastern Burma and western Thailand. 
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couples living together outside of marriage, police officers shot in drunken brawls, and 
victims of drugs and suicide. In short, they reflect urban fear. 
Stories of Urban Fear 
What is common to all of these stories is the theme of strangers – a facet of 
urban life noted by many writers on and about the city, from Baudilaire to Simmel. 
The haunted places are unknown spaces, where the signs of strangers‟ intimate lives 
can be seen and heard. The high-rise buildings place one in uncomfortable closeness 
with people whom one does not know, while at the same time they force one to exist 
as an individual, rather than as a part of a community.
138
 
The isolation of high-rise life and the dangers thereof are reflected and 
amplified in the news media. Local ewspapers such the Chiang Mai News as well as 
popular national papers such as Thai Rath splash gory photos of suicides or victims of 
crime on the front page, often interpreted by readers as a morality tale about the lives 
of the youth when given too much reign. These stories themselves emphasize the 
loneliness of youth living in these complexes, but many residents also interpreted the 
crimes as being symptomatic of a life cut off from familial ties and parental 
supervision.   
Examples of these cautionary tales abound, often tending towards the graphic 
or the bizarre: “Mysterious Death” reads the title of a story in the Chiang Mai News 
(the city‟s daily Thai-language newspaper), the article continues to tell the story of a 
young man dead without a known cause in a high-rise building in the middle of the 
city (Chiang Mai News 2007b). Another story, “Playboy Kills Self With Drugs, Sad 
Over his Fled Wife,” tells of an unfaithful husband who, after his wife left him, rented 
                                                 
138
 Naturally the separation of the individual from the community is seen as being a good thing by some. 
Many of my informants and friends who resided in these high-rises cited their freedom from the eyes of 
their family as welcome aspects of the high-rises, and, living in a high-rise for the year and a half of my 
fieldwork, I appreciated the freedom from constant surveillance that anthropologist friends living with 
families or in small communities faced. 
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a high-rise apartment building in the center of the city in order to commit suicide. The 
newspaper is careful to note how police were alerted owing to the terrible smell 
(Chiang Mai News 2007c). Other articles describe in detail severed necks, perforated 
gunshot victims, and disemboweled stabbing victims, all in exquisite detail for the 
greater shock of the readers (Chiang Mai News 2007d). The stories act as something 
which the readers can refer to: “This, this is what happens in those places!” 
Stories of urban fear circulate through newspapers, television and radio news, 
email forwards, and, most of all, word of mouth. In the case of email forwards (which 
I received and still receive often from Thai friends and informants), the message often 
begins with a plea for help or for others to take caution from someone close to the 
victim of crime (a husband, for instance). Then, the narrative begins in a style similar 
to the way in which ghost stories are narrated: a focus on normalcy (“My wife was 
sitting, having lunch as she normally does”139) in an everyday setting (“in the food 
court of the shopping mall”). Again, in the same manner as a ghost story, the normal 
scene changes with the introduction of an unusual circumstance, something which 
brings the individual slightly out of the ordinary (“a pretty woman of about the same 
age asked if she could sit down with her”). But this new element has within it 
strangeness (“After eating, my wife began to feel faint”), which makes the ordinary 
scene uncannily horrific (“The woman and another man, who came from somewhere 
else, pretended that they were helping my wife out of the mall, but no one knew that 
she was being led away by two strangers”). Occasionally the story has a serendipitous 
rescue from the danger (“Luckily, my wife‟s aunt was passing through the entrance 
just as the three were going out”), occasionally the story does not. 
                                                 
139
 Excerpted and translated from actual email forwards that I received in 2008. Owing to the 
anonymous nature of these forwards, they are impossible to cite.  
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These stories form a part of what Setha Low describes as the “urban fear 
discourse,” the repetition of and focus on elements of society that artificially inflate 
the perception of crime (even if the reality is, in the case of Setha Low‟s project in 
suburban the United States, that crime is declining) “reinforces residents‟ claims for 
their need to live behind gates and walls because of dangers or „others‟ that lurk 
outside” (Low 2001:45-6).As Sally Engle Merry has argued for urban communities in 
the United States, the sense of lurking menace engendered by “others” outside is not 
limited to suburban communties (Merry 1981:63, 71). While Low states that the 
causes for urban fear and the establishment of gated communities differs from place to 
place (she cites racism in South Africa and fear of violence in Kenya), there are 
obvious common threads – the perception that one is building of an island of order in 
the midst of a dangerous, hostile, chaotic space, filled with dangerous others both 
human and – in the Thai case - supernatural.  
Urban Change 
Key in Merry‟s analysis is the atomization of her informants – those 
individuals who feel the most fear are those who are isolated from other members of 
the community. They inhabit a space with little social cohesion and their isolation 
leads to their sense of fear. But this insight is not one limited to Merry, indeed, the 
estrangement of the individual from everyday life as a result of an interaction with the 
city is one which many early scholars of the city have noted. Georg Simmel saw the 
urban experience as something requiring a complete alteration in how an individual 
deals with others: the sheer amount of other people requires a new psycho-social 
mechanism, one which creates new possibilities while at the same time creating new 
problems. Ultimately, the city is dangerous in its atomizing effect: “one never feels as 
lonely and deserted as in this metropolitan crush of persons” (Simmel 1950:334). 
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 Simmel saw the urban encounter as creating anxiety and alienation through 
overstimulation, culminating in an urban character with “reserve with its overtones of 
concealed aversion” (Simmel 1950:332). The individual in defense of his individuality 
intellectualizes and rationalizes interactions, to the detriment of emotional 
relationships, yielding a worldview where all things are objectively evaluated. Such an 
outlook, “the atrophy of individual culture through the hypertrophy of objective 
culture” (Simmel 1950:338), is for Simmel the root of exchange value and the money 
economy: everything can be traded and nothing is unique.   
 Louis Wirth builds upon Simmel‟s suggestion that the increase in social 
interactions yields a fundamentally different state of being for the individual, yet 
Wirth applies Simmel to the larger social level. The urban mode of life for Wirth 
entails increased specialization and differentiation among individuals, but these roles 
and categories are “tangential” (Wirth 1938:16) to each other: because interactions are 
so fleeting, individuals are fragmented into multiple roles, each of which only contains 
a segment of the self. Because of the individual‟s “virtual impotence” (Wirth 1938:14) 
in any of these roles, he must proceed as a representative of a category: in the city, one 
becomes simply a uniform, and is not perceived as a whole person (ibid). It is this last 
point that later theorists take from Wirth: the decline of the individual in the sea of 
other individuals causes the rise of institutionalized groups and images stripped of 
their collective meaning. 
For urban planners, an underlying assumption behind urban design was that the 
individual (and not the community) was the primary actor – while Simmel‟s idea of 
atomization has buried within it a critique of the urban way of life, for planners, this 
atomization was the liberation. According to Lefebvre, an early example of such a 
viewing of population as a mass of individuals can be found in Hausmann‟s 
renovations to Paris during the reign of Napoleon III (Lefebvre et al 1996:77). This 
 213 
 
new design had the unintended consequence of changing the notion of habire from 
meaning to take part in a community to simply living in a space. Yet, according to 
Lefebvre, Paris‟s new planners “were not proposing to demoralize the working classes, 
but on the contrary, to moralize it. They considered it beneficial to involve the workers 
(individuals and families) into a hierarchy clearly distinct from that which rules in the 
firm, that of property and landlords, houses and neighborhoods. They wanted to give 
them another function, another status, other roles than those attached to the condition 
of the salaried producers” (Lefebvre et al 1996:77). Segregation of classes into owner-
occupied housing would lead to their liberation, at least in theory.  
This idea – the penetration of light and reason into a dark urban morass – 
characterizes modern city planning. The triumph (and subsequent fall) of modernist 
urban design is perhaps most evident in Latin America, where both colonial and post-
colonial planners thought that the establishment of a modern, rational city plan would 
create a social utopia: according to Goldstein, “the physical orderliness of the town 
would somehow translate itself into the social orderliness of the town‟s inhabitants” 
(Goldstein 2004:7). Yet, as Holston (1989) shows for Brasilia, the opposite is in fact 
true: residents impose their own idea of proper spatial use upon the planner‟s work, 
adapting the blueprint for (the planner‟s idea of) utopia to better fit their own lifestyle. 
Indeed, an individual orientation toward the city allows for as many images of Chiang 
Mai as there are residents. 
In a more concrete vein, Herzfeld compares examples of the “social and 
cultural evacuation of space,” (Herzfeld 2006:132, emphasis removed), what he terms 
“spatial cleansing” in Greece, Italy, and Bangkok. In his examples, various forces 
(governmental or private) have erased “messy” heterogenous or contradictory 
elements in favor of a rationalized, monumental architecture that nonetheless purports 
to better serve national heritage. This is a result, Herzfeld argues, of “the globalization, 
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paradoxical though it may seem, of a sense of national heritage, calibrated both to the 
demands of an exigent neoliberal economic system and to the politico-cultural as well 
as financial forces that it has unleashed” (Herzfeld 2006:128). Such an idea of 
“national heritage,” reified and put into use for the neoliberal present, is what emerges 
from Chiang Mai‟s culture industry. But in Chiang Mai‟s case, the problem is not 
simply that the Thai state has appropriated the symbols of the North and deployed 
them in a way to create a narrative of Thai triumphalism at the expense of local 
residents, rather, as I have shown above and in chapter eight, below, this “exigent 
neoliberal economic system” works on most sides of the political fence: from localist 
to leftist to nationalist.  
Vidler, in his discussion of “the architectural uncanny” (1992), describes the 
attempt to monumentize the city as a form of urbanism beginning in the Renaissance: 
the thinking of the city as a “memorial of itself” (1992:179)140 and the planning of 
cities to “perpetuate the myth of memory as installed for keeps, so to speak, in the 
heart of a metropolis that is (finally) rendered significant and speaking to its people” 
(Vidler 1992:179). Such an image maps the idea that planners have of the city onto the 
actual urban landscape and – as is glaringly evident from Herzfeld and Askew‟s case 
studies – pays little attention to the way in which other populations living in the 
neighborhoods interpret or make use of the space. A system of atomized living and the 
creation of an individual (rather than a collective) relationship between the resident 
and the community – e.g. “Chiang Mai” or “Lanna” – allows for the adoption of those 
parts of the symbolic which fit with an individual‟s expectations or hopes and the 
purging of those parts of the symbolic that are incompatable. Given Chiang Mai‟s 
                                                 
140
 Such a phrase makes the mistake of assigning agency to “the city,” something which Herzfeld is 
careful not to do. Of course, with the Northern Thai idea of an inhabiting spirit directing the course of 
jaroen for the city, such agency comes into being, but in that case there is always the question of “who 
properly speaks for/channels the spirit of the city.” 
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planners emphasis on individual use of space rather than community, city planning 
remodels the city in a way that renders the space a place for consumption.  
In a similar vein, Askew (1996) laments the disappearance of Bangkok‟s 
yaan
141
 – an informal community loosely clustered around a central point and sharing 
a common sense of residence that cuts across socioeconomic class. These yaan 
allowed for “different land-uses and activities” (Askew 1996:194) in ways which are 
incompatable with a city plan oriented around the dweller as individual – in a similar 
example from the Chiang Mai suburbs in my own research, Kham farmed garlic and 
flowers for her own use on a small plot of land informally used by the members of her 
community for collective agriculture.  
According to Askew, Bangkok remained more or less yaan-centered until the 
1960s, and only with the rise of the discourse of มรดก [moradok -heritage] did the 
yaan decline. Bangkok, then, is not undergoing modernist revision; rather, the city is 
undergoing postmodern reconstruction, by which I mean a renovation that highlights 
the image of the premodern past while fundamentally changing the meaning and 
relevance of “community” to create an urban environment that is oriented towards 
spectacle – towards the unmooring of signifiers from their signifieds. In Lefebvre‟s 
terms, “old „ways of life‟ become folklore” (1996:72), stripped of their relevance 
towards everyday life and redesigned for consumption. The new plan is not designed 
to erase the past, but on the contrary, to make the past more clear, salient, and 
consumable – at least to the urban bourgeoisie.  
Thai urban renewal shares with the modernist movement the desire to bring to 
light things which are considered to be shrouded in uncean darkness. Herzfeld (2006) 
                                                 
141
 Following the Royal Thai system, I transliterate the term ยา่น word as “yaan,” although Askew‟s 
article refers to “yarn”. The “r” that Askew places in the word makes sense for speakers of British or 
Australian (or, for that matter, Boston) English, but an American might hear the pronunciation more as 
“yahn”. . 
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has worked on the preservation of a poor yaan near Mahakan Fort on Rattanakosin 
Island in Bangkok which was faced with destruction in the name of historic 
preservation and urban beautification. When faced with a city official who claimed 
that the commuity was not worth preserving as it did not produce any one coherent 
product nor was composed of a distinct ethnic group, Herzfeld, attempting to highlight 
the ridiculousness of the complaint, compared the official‟s characterization with the 
government‟s OTOP project, wherein one tambol [administrative division at a village 
level] would produce one product for sale. To his surprise, the official agreed 
wholeheartedly with the characterization. A true community, according to the city 
official, was one that could be summarized briefly, with one coherent ethnicity, 
religion, and product (Herzfeld pers. comm). The incoherence and “messiness” of the 
yaan was, ironically, not compatable with a truly historic city. 
Here, I have criticized the vision of developers as being one based upon their 
own assumptions of what constitutes urban life, a construction that emphasizes the 
individual and national over the community and regional. Yet their attempt to create 
the city as “memorial of itself” is not automatically crass attempt to expand 
nationalism and neoliberal capitalism, rather, the architects and planners with whom I 
worked had their own utopian ideas about creating a future city. This future city is the 
city as ideal, the jaroen city where the promise inherent in the watthanatham has been 
realized. Here I explore one such project in depth, not only focusing upon the 
atomized nature of new urban planning (bearing in mind Merry and Low‟s link 
between such a pattern of living and urban fear), but also exploring the developer‟s 
own aspirations towards khwaam jaroen. For a complete discussion of architects in 
Chiang Mai, see chapter eight, where I explore the attempt to fashion an 
architecturally “Lanna” image that is both modern and traditional. 
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Consuming Lanna Spaces 
Herzfeld notes that planners do not imagine a collectivity inhabiting their 
spaces (Herzfeld 2006:138), rather, their attention focuses on the individual‟s aesthetic 
interaction with the space, an area inhabited by the (as Herzfeld notes) strangely 
European-appearing flâneurs drawn upon planning diagrams, moving unhurriedly 
through uncrowded streets (Herzfeld 2006:138). One planner whom I interviewed as 
he was in the process of  building a luxury condominium building and shopping mall 
off of Nimmanhaemin road called the “Punna” [ปันนา, Romanization by the 
developer], boasted that it was going to transform Nimmanhaemin into Thong Lor – a 
fashionable section of Bangkok. His billboards featured farang faces and large slogans 
in English and Thai emphasizing both the building‟s safety (“Lock and Leave,” read 
one) and fashionableness. Despite the numerous Caucasian faces in the building‟s 
advertising campaign, the Punna mostly catered to Bangkok-based Thai customers
142
. 
The property advertises itself as re-creating some aspect of community from the Lanna 
past, but what that thing is remains undefined. Here I provide the concept statement 
for the project in the original Thai, my English translation of the Thai, and the site‟s 
English translation, as each contains within it a different nuance. 
ปันนาในความหมายดั้งเดิมของไทยแปลวา่เมือง หรือชุมชนและน่ีคือท่ีมาของช่ือ ปันนา 
เรสซิเดนซ ์จากบรรยากาศของชุมชนลา้นนาผสานกบัวถีิชีวติของคนยคุใหม่ ออกมาเป็น
ชุมชนของคนทนัสมยัท่ีมีความสะดวกสบาย หรูหราและปลอดภยัท่ียงัคงไวซ่ึ้งความเป็น
กนัเอง เอ้ือเฟ้ือเผื่อแผแ่บบวถีิคนลา้นนา  
 “Punna143” in the ancient Thai meaning means “meuang,” or “community” 
and is the basis for the name “Punna Residence,” arising from the atmosphere of the 
Lanna community [ชุมชนลา้นนา - chumchon Lanna] mixed with the way of life of 
modern people [ยคุใหม่ – yut mai – “of the new time”]. These combined create a 
community [ชุมชน - chum-chon] of modern people [คนทนัสมยั – khon thansamai] 
who have convenience, comfort, style, and safety that you can be confident of, with 
the generosity of the people of Lanna.  
                                                 
142
 At the time of my interview, the building had, out of 75 total units: 46 Thais, 4 British, 3 Korean, 
and 2 Japanese residents, with 20 rooms empty. 
143
 The development group Romanizes the word ปันนา punna, although I would write “panna”. The term 
means “thousand [pan] rice fields [naa]” in the same way that “Lanna” means “million rice fields”. 
Central Thai would alter the word by aspirating the initial p in order to keep the same meaning 
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The English-language part of the site is also illuminating: 
 
Punna is a Thai Lanna word meaning town, or community, something wich the 
creators of Punna Residence firmly believes in building [sic]. Punna Residencce aims 
to create a community for people who wish to enjoy comfort , convenience , luxury 
and security in their live. [sic] 
Here, the developer highlights the “Northern” aspects of Punna life and the fact 
that by living there, one can be a part of the Lanna community – a community which, 
it should be noted, is in the website text mutually exclusive with being “modern”: the 
site specifies that the Punna will take the Lanna way of life and combine it [ผสาน – 
phasaan] with a modern one [using thansamai – ทนัสมยั - the same word that figures so 
prominently in Mary Beth Mills‟s ethnography]. Such a theme – the invocation of 
historical authenticity, modified for the benefit of a future ideal state – should be 
familiar after the above discussion of watthanatham as well as examples such as kheut 
and the indigo-dyed farmer‟s shirt. Yet here I wish to focus on what the developers 
mean by the terms “community” [ชุมชน – chumchon] and “city” [เมือง- meuang].  
What, for the developers, means “community”? The site claims to be re-
creating a meuang, but how? The gallery of images on the website, in the building‟s 
kiosk at the shopping mall, and in the development office are largely devoid of people 
– it is only on the billboards around the city that one sees people: young, Caucasian, 
attractive, and professional people in addition to a few computer-generated people (of 
indeterminate race, sex, or age) walking alone through the computer-generated 
planning images. The promotional materials state that this community will be 
comprised of those who are “ในยา่นของคนท่ีมีกาํลงัซ้ือสูง” [“nai yaan khong khon thii 
mii kamlang seu suung - in the yaan of people who are spending a lot of money”] and 
are shopping, having coffee, meeting business partners, or the like. A modern 
“community”, then, is for the Punna Residence and Punna Place, a gathering of 
shoppers, a grouping of individuals of a similar economic class. 
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This recalls a comment made to me by an architect who had designed a high-
modern café for, as he hoped, “modern, stylish people.” When I asked him how his 
café could be so exclusive, given the open doors, he boasted that “poor people won‟t 
come in! They would take one look at it and they wouldn‟t dare [เขาไม่กลา้ - khao mai 
klaa]!” Space and image have the power (as they do with Kham, above, with regards 
to high-rise buildings and Chai, below, with regards to a “Lanna”-style café) to make 
explicit hierarchies implicit in social life, and as such serve to alienate many 
Northerners from spaces designed in “their” image. In short, this was not a meuang 
built for them. 
This community, then, is not one that is centered on space. By this I mean that 
it does not include all residents of the Nimmanahaemin yaan, such as those the Shan 
Figure 11: New construction along Nimmanhaemin. 
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laborers working on the building or on other high-rise projects nearby, nor does its 
audience include Northern Thais, or at least those who identify as such – as I asked a 
sales representative who their customers would be, she responded: “I think that most 
of them will be Thai.” “Khon meuang or from another province?” I asked. She 
answered: “Thai people! People from the meuang already have places to live!” The 
new sense of community advocated by the Punna and similar developments is one 
centered on consumption, indivudal existence, and a separation between classes, a 
model of urban habitation that would be very familiar to Herzfeld, Askew, or Vidler.  
Reactions to Nimmanhaemin‟s growth (of which the Punna was to be a 
significant part) were varied. The editor of one popular Chiang Mai magazine raved 
that “ดิฉนัอาศยัอยูบ่ริเวณถนนนิมมานเหมินทม์าสิบกวา่ปีแลว้รู้สึกประทบัใจในการเจริญเติบโต
อยา่งมีชีวติชีวาของท่ีน่ีถนนนิมมานเหมินทน์บัเป็นถนนท่ีน่าใชชี้วติอยูแ่ห่งหน่ึงในเมืองเชียงใหม่” 
[“I have lived around Nimmanhaemin Road for ten years now and I have felt 
impressed by the prosperity [jaroen] and diverse [ชีวิตชีวา - chiwit chiwa] growth of 
Nimmanhaemin Road – it‟s the one place to live in Chiang Mai!”] (Punna website 
2009). But the Punna was one of many such projects scattered around the 
neighborhood: several miniature shopping malls, nightclubs, boutique hotels, or high-
rise apartment buildings were crowded into the relatively short street (see figure 11). 
Despite the density, the street was still only in the beginning throes of becoming walk-
able: the sidewalks, where they existed, were rendered useless by giant planters 
(placed to shield patrons of a hostess bar from the prying eyes of jealous wives), trees 
planted in the center of them (to prevent motorcyclists from using the sidewalk as an 
additional lane), or, in one case, the sidewalk simply became more and more narrow 
over the course of two blocks until it was pinched into nothingness. 
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The Uncanny Return of Misfortune 
The Punna and other such projects along Nimmanhaemin were, for a certain 
segment of the population (see chapter eight, below) examples of the city‟s jaroen, the 
prosperity of the city beginning to take root. However, as I foreshadow in chapter one, 
not all saw these developments as being signs of prosperous. Indeed, one night while 
sharing a drink with a night watchman and the group of Shan laborers building the 
Punna, they shared their thoughts on the place.  
“One day at work, a man died,” said a middle-aged laborer, “A beam fell 
through his head and he died bup! Just like that. Now these days at night you can hear 
him sometimes. I went over there with the guard from up the road and we heard it. It 
wasn‟t a noise like any animal would make, or any person, another kind of noise. 
That‟s why this place will never jaroen! There are too many ghosts around here!” 
Other buildings along the road had other ghosts: according to Maew, a college 
student living on Nimmanhaemin, an old farang [Caucasian] man supposedly plunged 
to his death from the top floor of a condominium and now he floats (Thai ghosts have 
no feet) in front of the window out of which he jumped. Boon, the owner of a coffee 
shop on the other side of town related the story of how a teacher shot herself in a 
condominium room and now shouts outside of the doorway of people staying on that 
floor. Muu, a pickup truck taxi driver, mentions a female ghost who appears in mirrors 
and knocks on the doors of residents in a nearby hotel – Muu also noted its violation 
of kheut as a reason for its haunting: the hotel had been built next to the old city‟s 
corner and had subverted an urban planning law designed to prevent tall buildings next 
to ancient sites by selling off the five-foot strip of lawn directly adjoining the corner so 
that the hotel itself was not – technically – next to the site. 
These uncanny reactions to what the Citylife magazine editor advertizes as 
examples of the neigborhood‟s prosperity present the mirror image to that of the 
 222 
 
planners: the planners are attempting to create the attractive image of the city, one 
which will invite jaroen and one which is, as the Punna claims, based on the city‟s 
watthanatham, but by doing so they also risk generating its opposite. Those outside of 
the planner‟s imagined community of shoppers (Yaam, for instance, Muu, Chai, or the 
large majority of my informants that I quote here are all people who, being local 
residents and as they are not “people who spend a lot of money,” they are not a part of 
the Punna‟s “chumchon”), while expressing their hope for the city to jaroen, see the 
condominiums as turning a would-be utopia into its reverse- a haunted, poor, city of 
empty rooms. Vidler also remarks upon the slippage between the sublime – the 
messianic promise of utopian architecture – and the horrific, as those projects with the 
most potential for a radical transformation of the city and the urban way of life 
Figure 12: Gated community, Doi Saket district. 
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additionally have the most potential to become uncanny reminders of its failures 
(1992:20-1). What creates the inchoate sense of prosperity, attractiveness, and charm 
associated with the city (whether articulated in a supernatural or cultural idiom) can 
easily be rendered unfamiliar and destructive. 
Suburban Life 
The picture painted thus far deals with changes within the city proper, but the 
effects of new construction and new spaces of habitation spill out into the countryside 
as well. Like the high-rise buildings, the first gated community dates from the early 
1980s, and was called Sri Watthana [lit: “the great progress,” note that วฒันา, 
“watthana” is also the root word for watthanatham]. “Chiangmai land” soon followed, 
but the real boom was in the pre-crash 1990s, reflected in a recent resurgence (see 
figures 1 and 2). Gated communities in Northern Thailand (see figure 12) feature 
bucolic names, artificial lakes, “traditional” Lanna architecture, and linear streets, but 
one feature is common to all: they are internally homogenous with regards to 
economic class. As one billboard said to advertise its development: “Come to a place 
with people of your level [ระดบัคุณ - radap khun].” Residents of gated communities 
agreed that this feature of gated life was one of the chief lures. One architect boasted 
that on his street were all architects, and a store owner characterized her community‟s 
informal slogan as “There‟s only doctors [มีแต่หมอ - mii tae moh]”. Along with this 
idea of being in a community of peers comes with the idea of security. As Low shows, 
the lack of familiarity with people who are not “of your level” increases the fear and 
uncertainty when one ventures outside of the walls (Low 2003:70, 116). In Chiang 
Mai, gated communites are both fortresses against chaos and fashionable items of 
consumption in themselves, being advertised in shopping malls alongside fashionable 
brands from abroad and other markers of a cosmopolitan middle-class identity. Being 
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unmoored from traditional places of dwelling allows one to approach the choice of 
residence as a consumer, placing community in the logic of the free market.  
Yet not all are satisfied with these communities. Tim had enough money to 
buy a house in the gated communities, having been enticed by this idea of living in a 
community of wealthy intellectuals. She found a spot on the outskirts of the city, in 
San Sai district – relatively close to the neighborhood where Kham‟s spirit shrine was 
built (see next chapter). The community had been recently built but was not yet full of 
residents, and though Tim lived in the house for several months, the promised sense of 
community never materialized. Ultimately, she found the experience frightening. “At 
night, there were no sounds,” she told me as I sat with her in her shop. “You sit there 
in the room and it gets dark outside and you don‟t know what‟s out there because you 
don‟t hear a thing.” She laughed, “It was like you were not in the real world.”  Tim 
moved back to her condominium in the city. After she left, her house sat empty.  
Som, a woman in her early twenties from a lower-class background, had a 
similar reaction. She was married to an American man in his late fifties, a Halliburton 
employee who spent half of the year in Iraq and the other half in Chiang Mai. Som‟s 
house was in a gated community in fashionable Mae Sa. The neighborhood was 
encircled by a moat and surrounded by a low wall with a guardpost. Inside, the streets 
were quiet and empty. The house itself was large, but the couple had not had the time 
or the inclination to fill it with furniture; only two rooms were furnished. When her 
husband was in town, Som lived in the gated community, but very soon after he 
returned to Iraq, she moved to a friend‟s apartment in downtown Chiang Mai. “I can‟t 
do it [ไม่ไหว - mai wai],” she said. “So many of the houses there are owned by 
foreigners or Bangkok people, and they are gone most of the time. It‟s so quiet at night, 
the house is so big and the streets are so dark. It‟s frightening!” 
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The gated communities continue to expand, forming replicas of an imagined 
American-style suburb outside of Chiang Mai. These communities involve a massive 
input of labor, complete with working fountains, artificial lakes, and transplanted 
shade trees, yet for many of the communities much of this labor goes to waste (see 
also my discussion of the Royal Flora exhibition in chapter eight, below). Manicured 
and treated lawns soon fill with the nests of termites and stinging ants, unused planters 
in the middle of the street become the haunts of stray dogs, and in several cases the 
suburban services fail after a few years – gate guards being among the first to 
disappear. While Tim and Som both moved into newly-built or building suburbs, the 
neighborhoods were still largely empty. Tim and Som both cite the suburbs‟ silence 
and lack of community as the reasons why they cannot bear to live there. As the 
suburbs fail to fill with the expected residents, and as people of the same class fail to 
form a natural community in the suburban streets, the emptiness becomes a frightening 
thing. While Tim does not mention a fear of ghosts – she simply describes it as “unreal” 
– Som forbade me to discuss the possibility of ghosts in her neighborhood for fear of 
calling attention to them.
144
  
The idea of living exclusively amongst people “of your level” is quite different 
from the concept of habitation in the suburbs that existed before the boom in Chiang 
Mai. A suburb of the prior sort – a rural version of Askew‟s yaan - is a small 
community surrounded by rice fields around a central focal point – generally a temple 
and perhaps a market, depending on the size of the community. The community 
contains within it a hierarchy – there are both “big people” [ผูใ้หญ่ - phu nyai] and 
“small people” [ผูน้อ้ย - phu noi], and social hierarchy is embedded in daily life: lesser 
people associate themselves with ties of patronage or labor to their superiors in a 
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 Ghosts were, for Som, very real. She later told me a long story about how in her hometown she had 
called the police after someone had spotted a filth ghost [ผีกระสือ – phi kraseu] floating in the rice field 
near her home.  The villagers called the police, who arrived and shot at the ghost, frightening it away. 
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network that, while enforcing inequality, binds the village together (J. Potter 1976:51). 
Indeed, the vast majority of ethnographic work written about Thailand‟s north has 
focused on rural village life and its social structure – largely framed as an attack on 
Embree‟s (1950) “loose structure” concept (Kingshill 1965, J. Potter 1976, S. Potter 
1977, Davis 1984, Rhum 1994). Such debates are long since passé in Thai studies 
circles, but what this work demonstrates is a sense of collective investment and 
fetishization of the village as a community – be it a fetishization that is manifested as a 
“village spirit” [names vary by community, but common ones are: ผเีส้ือบา้น – phi seua 
baan, ผอีารักษบ์า้น – phi a-r(h)ak145 baan, ผเีจา้นาย – phi jao naai, among others] or not 
(see chapter seven) -  that occurs in “traditional” settings. 
These guardian spirits have a shrine near the center of the community, 
occasionally within the temple grounds or more often at a private house nearby, where 
the spirit is propitiated. During these yearly ceremonies, often sponsored by the elder 
of the community, the spirit descends into the body of a medium, generally an older 
woman of modest means. The spirit then offers advice, blessing, or makes demands. 
These events are normally quiet affairs, as people from the neighborhood trickle in to 
ask for a blessing or to share a problem with the spirit, but occasionally they have the 
ability to provoke harsher emotions. Chai recalled one such ceremony that was held 
after a mad dog had bitten several people in the town. The spirit came down angrily, 
admitting that he had allowed the dog in as a response to the villagers‟ laziness in 
(not) holding the yearly ceremony, and that he would gladly summon the dog again if 
they did not keep up lighting incense and offering food at his shrine.  
I do not want to offer a facile argument wherein mediumship and traditional 
community planning offers the powerless a chance to critique the powerful and 
                                                 
145
 As I mention above, “r” is often pronounced “h” in Northern Thai. I provide here the Central Thai 
spelling rather than writing the word as would be pronounced in Northern Thai (i.e อาฮกั). 
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question social hierarchy. As my mention of “big” and “small” people suggests, social 
hierarchy and exclusion do very well in the traditional suburban community. What has 
changed is the network of mutual obligation and communication that makes up a 
community in favor of the generalized grouping of like lifestyles envisioned by the 
developers of high-rise buildings and gated communities. In Henri Lefebvre‟s terms, 
the gated suburbs, as opposed to the older, class-integrated suburbs, become simple 
habitat, stripped of any notion of to inhabit (Lefebvre et al 1996:79). In Thai 
cosmology, it is little wonder that they become sites of fear (as Tim and Som‟s 
experiences demonstrate).  They are areas that lack a community, just as they lack a 
guardian spirit and are thence vulnerable to chaos (whether conceived of as arising 
through a lack of social or supernatural protection).  
The Lurking Population 
I had brought back photos of the graffiti in the Boi Luang and other abandoned 
buildings to discuss with Chai, a Northern Thai engineer who had grown up in the 
rural Chiang Mai suburbs and retained a strong interest in Northern Thai history. I 
wanted to show the pictures to him as I couldn‟t make out everything that was written 
and wanted to get another person‟s perspective.  Chai read the script and then 
shuddered. “What is it?” I asked him, hoping for a good horror story. “It‟s not what 
he‟s saying,” said Chai, “it‟s everything. Half the letters are misspelled; you can tell 
he‟s not Thai. And he‟s got something terrible pressing down [กดดนั - kot dan] on him. 
Looking at this, I feel like I have no idea of the person that wrote it.” The horror that 
Chai felt was that someone whom he found himself unable to identify with was 
secretly dwelling in the abandoned spaces in the city. 
I explained Chai‟s reaction to Choke, a young, Bangkok-born junior faculty 
member in architecture at a local university and a friend. He nodded and identified 
Chai‟s fear as a fear of the pratchagon faeng [ประชากรแฝง], the “lurking population.” 
 228 
 
This was the term he used to apply to the unknown people that share our space in the 
city – an issue which is particularly salient, according to Choke, when people live in 
high-rise, tight space. They are feared because they are imagined, according to Choke, 
to not have any sense of moral or social duty – indeed, their very existence depends 
upon their being able to blend into the general Thai populace without being seen. 
Being unknown, they are unseen and assumed to be therefore capable of criminal and 
immoral acts, and when their existence is revealed through these acts, the resulting 
image is uncanny. While in a previous generation this fear of the lurking alien would 
be the fear of the Communist infiltrator, in the present time the locus of fear is more 
disparate – the imagined criminal has no goal or purpose, he simply exists to sow 
chaos and destruction. 
Stories of squatters, lost youth, and ghosts reinforce each other, as each are 
signs of spiritual pollution and resultant misfortune.  It is my argument that the empty 
spaces always contain a trace of someone else, an unknown person who represents the 
strange, the foreign, and the menacing. This chaos becomes most readily personified 
in the form of the Shan construction worker – that figure who both builds and haunts 
the new suburban and urban spaces.  
The image of the Shan construction worker has been continually recurring in 
my descriptions of these neighborhoods for a reason – the new middle-class life 
epitomized by the high-rise and gated communities is built with (largely) Shan labor, 
and the fearfully criminal squatters (as they are perceived by the same middle-class 
potential habitants) of abandoned high-rises are Shan. The term “Shan” here refers to 
an ethnic minority speaking a language almost mutually intelligible with Northern 
Thai – indeed, many Northern Thai heroes such as phaya Phap (a Northern lesser lord 
who led a small revolt against “Chinese and Thais” in the early 20th century – see 
Nophakhun 2003, Somchote 1987) and, by some accounts, jao luang kham daeng [a 
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guardian spirit whom I discuss in chapter five, above] are identified as Shan – thai yai 
[ไทยใหย]่ in Thai, the “Greater Thai” as opposed to the Siamese thai noi [ไทยนอ้ย], 
“Lesser Thai.” But these migrant workers and refugees are not referred to by most of 
my Northern Thai informants by this word or the word Shan use for themselves: tai 
[ไต], or the Northern semi-slur ngiaw [เง้ียว] (currently used to refer to those Shan who 
were in Chiang Mai before the recent wave of migration) but as the term that Tam, the 
guard at the Boi Luang used: Burmese nationals, khon phama [คนพม่า]. 
The Shan communities of tin shacks at the foot of rising skyscrapers (see 
figure 13) are semi-nomadic, moving from site to site for the length of the construction 
project. As illegal migrants, they can be dislodged or shaken down for bribes at any 
Figure 13: Shan construction workers plant crops in a vacant lot while the Punna 
building rises in the background. Nimmanhaemin road. 
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time, and they have little to no rights under Thai law. From people surrounding them, 
anti-Burmese sentiment is rife, and migrant communities are always associated with 
drug runners crossing the border. I was warned many times to be on the lookout for 
khon phama, who, I was told, were identifiable by the yellow powder they used as a 
sunscreen (a practice that rural Northern Thais use as well, albeit with a white powder). 
Underpaid but still seeking a social outlet, many of these migratory workers 
congregate in some of the abandoned buildings which their labor helped to create. In 
the abandoned buildings – as I have described in the case of the Boi Luang - graffiti in 
both Burmese and Thai adorn the walls, and signs of squatters abound. Several Shan 
refugees from Burma told me that they chose these places as sites to socialize, drink, 
play music, and meet friends after work, and the sites show all the marks of groups of 
youth in search of space for social activities. The abandoned buildings become a 
refuge of a sort, albeit one that is plagued with the dangers that come from others 
seeking areas for illicit activity. 
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Somboon had a noodle stand at the base of such an abandoned building. The 
stand and the building were at the edge of a highway, at the entrance and guard‟s post 
of the “Sparkling Gold Neighborhood” [บา้นทองประกาย - baan thong prakaai], a gated 
community just outside of Chiang Mai. The place had been almost completely 
abandoned (with the exception of two houses and Somboon‟s stall) ten years ago, with 
the Southeast Asian economic crash in 1997. The building was once a nice concrete 
and glass two-story structure complete with swimming pool, but had seen ten years of 
decay when Somboon took me on a tour of the place (see figure 14). The swimming 
pool had turned into a small swamp, with shrubs rising out of the stagnant green water. 
Inside, graffiti covered the walls: a devil face drawn in green and graphic cartoons of 
genitalia. The floor was littered with smashed beer bottles, abandoned sandals, and 
Figure 14: Abandoned gated community, Mae Rim district. 
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cigarette butts. Somboon said that the damage and the fact that it was an old building 
kept away any Thai buyers – Somboon characterized Thai buyers as being more 
concerned with the place‟s fortune (or lack thereof) as the reason why the place was 
still owned by a Bangkokian businessman, but although two Westerners had come to 
see it and been interested in buying it. “The owner won‟t sell!” Somboon wondered as 
we looked onto the green morass of the swimming pool. “I don‟t know why he won‟t 
sell. I don‟t know who is interested in it now…” He turned a mischevious smile to me: 
“You want it, koh?” I reminded him I was only there for the tour, the conversation, 
and the pork-ball noodles.  
 But even though the houses had deteriorated, the neighborhood still had 
occupants. Somboon told me about how the building behind his stall had been 
occupied by roving gangs of Burmese squatters just recently. “They had their 
motorbikes filling the yard, they were out drinking and taking yaa baa [ยาบา้ - 
methamphetamine]. They were not good people.” Somboon said, relating the night 
that his apprehension of his new neighbors became too much, and he called the army 
barracks a short drive down the highway. “They got fifty at once! Taai mot! [ตาย
หมด]146” Somboon said, “then the Army captain gave me a gun, just in case they come 
back.” They had not - better, I thought, for both parties.  
The Mob 
This sense of inchoate fear of the hidden mob fused with the figure of the ghost 
brings to mind the work of James Siegel in A New Criminal Type in Jakarta (1998). In 
Siegel‟s work, the Suharto regime created the image of an internal enemy in the form 
of communists and, later, an abstract, inchoate criminality [kriminalitas] and then 
appropriated that power as its own via the extrajudicial killings of suspected criminals 
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 Literally “all dead,” although Somboon meant it (it is my hope) in the sense of “they got absolutely 
captured and taken away,” although I was intitally quite shocked.  
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(Siegel 2006:179). This process led to a new sense of fear in Indonesia, one identified 
in the bland, everyday faces of criminals featured in daily newspapers (Siegel 
1998:112). Siegel argues that these criminals took the place of ghosts as the locus of 
fear surrounding death; a transposition is worth quoting at length: 
 
Criminals … are turned into something that resembles ghosts. Ghosts are connected 
with death and death is the subject of the story. The criminals [in the newspaper story 
that Siegel is analyzing] brought a corpse into the village, so death becomes the 
subject of the upper-class invasion of the peasant world and the occasion for 
reconciliation of classes. Death in the world of West Javanese rubber tappers would 
invariably bring to mind ghosts. Here ghosts are denied and criminals take their place. 
The substitution is perhaps possible because of similarities between the two. Ghosts 
always want one thing, whatever else they might demand. They want to show up, to 
appear or to be present, restoring themselves in an impossible way to their condition 
in life. Which is to say that they remain ghosts because they can never be fully 
present again. They are always both there and not there at the same time. For ghosts, 
living persons are the means they need to register their appearance. Most ghosts, or at 
least Javanese ghosts, have no animus against particular living persons. Those they 
haunt are haunted only because of conincidence. They have somehow intersected, 
quite unintentionally, the places ghosts haunt. The villagers in this story come across 
the criminals only by accident. These criminals, being murderers, bring death with 
them in the form of the corpse. They are unlike ghosts because, among other things, 
they are mobile, traveling between places rather than haunting particular sites in the 
manner of specters. But there are enough resemblances that it would be natural to 
think of ghosts, and natural enough for a villager, reportedly, to have spontaneously 
denied that ghosts are involved (Siegel 1998:98). 
However, Siegel notes that the realization that ghosts are not involved does not 
ease the villagers‟ anxiety – rather, anxiety increases because at least one has 
techniques to be rid of ghosts, whereas the new menace of kriminalitas has no such 
cure (1998:98). 
New Order Indonesia and 21
st
-century Thailand differ on some levels, 
complicating the comparison between Siegel‟s kriminalitas and Chai (and Choke‟s) 
fear of pratchagon faeng (and each idea‟s parallels to the world of ghosts). While 
Indonesia underwent the struggles of colonialism, nationalism, a revolution founded – 
at least in name – on socialist principles, and a far-right overthrow (and now the post-
Cold War reintegration into the neoliberal world order), Thailand experienced a 
different set of trials. Thailand‟s national integration, as I have detailed earlier, was 
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conducted in a top-down manner by Bangkok, but additionally, as Herzfeld (2002) 
argues, this national unity was always integrating ideas from Thailand‟s colonial 
neighbors. During the Cold War, the locus of power turned to American anti-
communist rhetoric, and Thai communists were always depicted as foreign, never 
“truly” Thai, thence giving a locus (e.g. China or Vietnam) to the idea of a communist 
menace (see Bowie 1997 for an anthropological account or Handley 2006 for a 
journalistic one). In this way, the location-free aspect of kriminalitas has, in Thailand, 
a location – always outside of the nation-state, even if its agents may faeng [แฝง - hide, 
lurk] in the population. Yet in other ways, the parallel between Indonesia and Thailand 
holds. While in Thailand there has not been the identification of this vague concept of 
kriminalitas, although Thaksin Shinawatra‟s campaign of extrajudicial killings against 
suspected drug dealers seems like the first inklings of one, the images of youth who at 
first glance appear Thai but are identified in the capiton as “Shan thieves” [โจรไทย
ใหญ่] (Chiang Mai News 2007a) reinforce the idea of a fifth column in Thailand‟s 
midst. Indeed, when in 2004 men opened fire on a school bus near Ratchaburi, Lertrat 
Ratanavanit, the army‟s assistant chief-of-staff, commented that the men were likely 
Burmese or Karen, as “Thai people are not that evil” (Bangkok Post, June 5, 2002). He 
added, “We wonder why incidents like this usually happen in Ratchaburi. There must 
be some alien movements in the province. A number of Burmese people work there. 
The men might have fled to the forest, changed their clothes and then come out 
looking like ordinary people” (ibid). Here, the police chief shows the uncanny aspect 
of the pratchagon faeng – they might blend into the population only to re-emerge as 
unknowable, violent others. 
Such an image is an evocative one in the case of Chiang Mai‟s abandoned 
buildings. As the self becomes vacated (e.g. as the guardian spirits of the city become 
unable to expel the inauspicious ghosts of bad death), other forces (e.g. the “hostile, 
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violent” Burmese or their parallels, the ghosts of bad death) move in. Here, the fears 
of secular residents parallel that of spirit cult members: the fading of Northern culture 
or the fading of Northern spirits will cause the possession of the city by an Other force. 
Even if Lanna images remain constant, the animating force has changed, rendering the 
city uncanny, possessed. This animating force lurks in the population only to show 
itself at times such as when I showed Chai the writing, rendering the city uncanny.  
Loss and Fear 
Here, I have shown the uncanny aspects of Chiang Mai‟s construction: the fear 
that the building of a new, jaroen Chiang Mai will only lead to the creation of more 
impure, empty, abandoned spaces inhabited by squatters and haunted by ghosts, and 
the uncanny return of those figures on whose labor the Northern Thai middle class‟s 
lifestyle is built. These ghosts become the representations of jaroen‟s failure, at least 
for those of Chiang Mai‟s residents living in and among the new construction. Ghost 
stories told to me by Boon or Maew (of Chiang Mai‟s “educated class”) often featured 
bloody domestic disputes and vicious revenge and downplayed ideas about jilted 
guardian spirits, although the fear of a collective loss of morality often pervaded the 
tales – they used the stories as cautions against a too-materialistic lifestyle (while 
apparently unironically participating in that lifestyle themselves). Stories from Yaam 
or Noi (lower in class than Boon or Maew) focused on a more overtly Buddhist 
narrative of a fundamental problem of rebirth – a loss of jaroen had caused more 
unenlightened souls, souls which were unable to be reborn and therefore recurred as 
ghosts in the city (the “era of bad deaths,” as Morris‟s spirit medium articulates the 
present time of urban violence (Morris 2000:93)).  In either case, ghosts were 
symptomatic of the loss of some kind of moral center in the city, a center which, once 
gone, denied the possibility for jaroen. 
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Yet, for many in Chiang Mai‟s population, spirits were that force which would 
replenish jaroen much as malevolent spirits diminished it. As I build upon my twin 
parallels of malevolent ghosts and misfortune and benevolent spirits and khwaam 
jaroen, I find that I must delve into further detail about the sorts of supernatural beliefs 
present in the city. In the next two chapters, I turn to two very different groups – spirit 
mediums and architects, each of which are vital in forming a link between Chiang 
Mai‟s past and its future, but each of which operate in entirely different spheres. The 
first of these are Chiang Mai‟s spirit mediums, people who, like Mae Kham, literally 
embody the living image of the past. I will now explore mediumship and the wider 
category of ghosts as it relates to the city. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: The Return of the Jao 
Ghosts  
Why do the anxieties concerning space, misfortune and strangers in Chiang 
Mai revert to the theme of ghosts and spirits? Many, although not a majority, of my 
informants professed not to believe in ghosts, but the way in which they talked about 
the fear of misfortune paralleled the fear of ghosts in a similar manner as I detail 
above. In this case, ghosts and ill-luck parallel each other, as do benevolent spirits and 
fortune. Without ghosts, the problem of misfortune‟s randomness remains – indeed, as 
Siegel shows, the figure of the ghost is often replaced by other, less well-defined and 
less manageable figures (1998:98). As in Evans-Pritchard‟s famous ethnographic 
example of the Azande (1937), supernatural agents give rise to misfortune; without 
their intervention, misfortune is simply chance. 
In Central Thai, the word phi [ผ]ี refers to a ghost – a usually malevolent spirit 
that has lingered after the death of a person and causes sickness and death. The word 
proliferates in mass-market bookstands specializing in tales of the supernatural or in 
popular movies. In the latter, as in many of the Japanese or American horror films that 
are their inspiration, ghosts of the wronged dead linger after their death, troubling or 
enacting misplaced vengeance on the living
147
 until the young heroes (or, more often, 
heroines) discover the ghost‟s reason for existence and then either remedy the 
misfortune or simply succumb to the ghost‟s (generally) murderous intentions. The 
images of the specters haunting the screen in Shutter (2004), Ghost of Mae Nak (2005), 
Bangkok Haunted (2001), The Unborn (2003), to name only a very few of the new 
Thai movies which ride on the success of Japanese films such as Ringu and Ju-On – 
                                                 
147
 In many of the tales that I read in mass-market books, saw on television or film, or heard told to me, 
the victims of hauntings most often had no connection with the ghost in life. 
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young women with rotting skin and long black hair - reflect a common signified to the 
signifier phi amongst many of my younger friends in Chiang Mai.  
Even though the benevolent ghosts channeled by sprit mediums were also 
called phi, at least in the North, the first association called to mind when the word phi 
was mentioned was generally the malevolent kind of ghost. In fact, mentioning the 
word to a stranger was often enough to break off a conversation. Alongside the old 
moat, where the city wall had crumbled and given way to a grass partition, was a 
dumping ground for spirit houses. These miniature buildings – done in Lanna or 
Ayutthya styles and often brightly-colored – are homes to the spirit of a particular 
house or property area [ศาลพระภูมิ - san phra phumi or เจา้ท่ี - jao thii]. As goods 
belonging to the spirits, their disposal is dangerous, but a part of the city wall to the 
southeast by an old banyan tree (a type of tree which most often was assumed to have 
spirits living within) is an acceptable place to discard old spirit houses (at least, 
acceptable to those discarding them, the authorities had placed up many signs 
proclaiming “no dumping).” I had asked nearby vendors as well as my own informants, 
but no one could (or would) tell me why this spot was so special. I was standing by the 
pile of spirit houses after chatting with Faa about the site when a man came my way, 
stopped, and looked at the houses, too. I started speaking with him, and he  asked me 
why I was so interested. “Oh,” I said, “I‟m interested in spirits in Chiang Mai [เพราะ
สนใจเร่ืองผใีนเมืองเชียงใหม่ - phro sonjai reuang phi nai meuang Chiang Mai].” This 
provoked an unexpected reaction. Whereas we had been relaxing on the bank in the 
shade of the tree, now the man immediately turned and walked away from me, down 
the road, without a word. Realizing that I‟d said something wrong, I tried to clarify for 
him: “I mean spirits like protective spirits [แบบเทพแบบเทวดา - baep thep baep 
thewadda],” but he continued walking away, saying “Ghosts are scary! I‟m scared of 
ghosts! [ผน่ากลวั กลวัผ ี- phi na klua, klua phi].”  
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While ghost stories have an unmatched level of popularity in terms of pulp 
paperback books, horror films, or everyday conversation, one does not talk about bad 
spirits when they are actually believed to be present for fear of attracting their 
attention – this was my mistake. Curiosity about ghosts likewise is tolerated (and 
encouraged) when the ghosts are believed to be far, but discouraged when they are 
near, such as at the banyan tree, by the discarded spirit houses.  
Ghosts of bad death proliferate on the roadside, often marked by special 
memorials to warn passers-by about the danger present on the road. Such sites are to 
be acknowledged in one manner, but not provoked – I had stopped once on the Chiang 
Mai-Lamphun road to photograph a tree decorated in red sashes (marking it as a place 
where an unfortunate motorist had died in a traffic accident and now haunted the 
roadside). I had pulled my motorcycle onto the sidewalk and had dismounted to get a 
better angle on the tree. As I was doing so, a truck full of laborers came down the road 
and one of them, an older man, leaned out and shouted at me, “Go! Leave! [ไป ๆ]” In 
another example, riding back to Chiang Mai from Mae Taeng at night with Noi after 
having visited Kham, we passed by a row of white flags along the side of the road, 
placed in mounds of earth. Remains of incense and candles were also littered amongst 
the flags. I suspected it to be a place where a phi taai hoong – as mentioned above, a 
“ghost of a bad death” – was being propititated, but wanted to see what Noi had to say 
about it. When I asked her, she claimed not to know anything about it, but days later, 
under the midday sun, she confessed: “I lied the other day. Those flags that we passed 
are offerings to a phi taai hoong like you thought. But, Andrew, you must be careful! 
If you see these things you have to pretend like you did not see them and just keep 
going, because you don‟t want the ghost to come and fool [หลอก- lohk] you.” When I 
asked Noi what form this hypothetical haunting would take, she replied quite simply 
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in a way that mirrored Pa‟s comment about kheut: “You would fall ill. You would 
have bad luck. You would not prosper [jaroen].” 
The ghost on the roadside which frightened Noi is an inverse of Jao Pratuu 
Phaa, who watched the roadside by Lampang. The roadside jao, while he might be 
fickle if ignored or neglected, was a being of power that was the intangible 
manifestation of the granite mountain cliffs. While the phi taai hoong is also powerful, 
its power comes from its extreme inauspiciousness. It is not sacred [ศกัด์ิสิทธ์ิ - saksit] 
nor does it have charismatic power [baaramii], unlike the lordly jao, rather, it saps the 
power to produce prosperity and health from its victims. 
The English word “haunt” captures a certain kind of activity that ghosts might 
do, but carries with it connotations which are not entirely present in the Thai. “Haunt” 
is derived from the Old Norse heimta, “to pull or claim.” Haunting things, in English, 
are tied to a place or a topic and recur in ways that are both spontaneous and 
unwelcome. Things which haunt have a claim on a place or a person – they demand 
ownership even when death should have released them. While this idea might work 
for some Thai ghosts, including both beneficient guardian spirits (who claim a plot of 
land as their own) and also ghostly figures such as Nang Nak (a famous Thai spirit 
whose claim on her husband was such that she attempted to keep him with her  after 
her death), Thai does not have such a term that combines “a claim” with “to haunt.” 
Ghosts can sing [สิง] or hian [เฮ้ีอน] in a person or a place. The former is “to possess” 
or “to dwell in” and is used for any kind of spirit, and the latter (a Chinese loanword) 
implies more of an angry, frightening hold. While ghosts can sing in someone or not, 
regardless, when they decide to affect their host or others they must lohk: as Noi 
suggests. To lohk is to decive, to trick, to cheat, or to fool. Unfaithful lovers lohk their 
partners. Unscrupulous merchants lohk their clients. Something which appears to be 
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one thing but is not is lohk (here used as an adjective). A lohk is a deception done with 
anger and with the intent to cause harm. 
To return to the lonely Chiang Mai roadside which Noi and I passed on our 
motorbikes, the ghost lived [sing] in the stretch of earth that witnessed the traffic 
accident, and might follow me to trick [lohk] me should I pay too much attention to it. 
While many of my middle-class friends and informants in Chiang Mai imagined a lohk 
to be something from popular movies or the mass-market paperbacks, where a corpse-
like figure leaps out at the victim from a dark corner, Noi imagined something much 
more different: misfortune given form.  
The ghosts which inhabited the abandoned buildings mentioned earlier and the 
ghosts which are the principal plagues of modern-day Chiang Mai are not generally 
the religious-inspired hungry ghost [เพรช - phret], suffering from eternal hunger owing 
to karmic punishment; nor are they the agricultural spirits such as the phi ma bong [ผี
มา้บอง - horse-skull ghost], although all of these spirits are signs of misfortune and 
bring suffering upon their victims. Nor even are they the phi ga spirits associated with 
forgotten ancestor cults that Anan (1984) details and about which I write more below. 
Rather, these ghosts are, like the ghost haunting the lonely roadside, the ghosts of 
inauspicious death: phi taai hoong.  
Phi taai hoong are those that die suddenly, violently (e.g. via a traffic accident), 
or through certain inauspicious accidents (e.g. being trampled by an elephant or falling 
into a waterfall) (Mala 2008:48-9). A person‟s death, when it occurs, is either normal 
[ปรกติ - prokoti] – a person succumbs to a long illness, an elderly person or child dies 
of dysentery or influenza - or abnormal [ผดิปรกติ - phit pokoti] – a child falls from a 
tree, a healthy person is suddenly struck by cholera, or, as was the case during my own 
research, a person was electrocuted while trying to unplug a fan. Abnormal, 
inauspicious deaths require special treatment. The temple manuscript of Wat Dohk 
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Daeng compiles a long list of the situations in which a child‟s death could be 
considered ordinary or not. In the latter case, the manuscript advises: “Regarding the 
many people who die hoong like this, [you] are forbidden and not allowed to keep the 
corpse out for a day or for a night, and [you] are not allowed to cremate the body. That 
is very kheut
148
. If [you] cremate the body, it will bring danger [จกัแป๊ – Northern] 
upon the parents, the family, the lineage, and the rice. Even the animals will all die” 
(Buntha et al 1997:124, translation mine). Similar prohibitions exist regarding adult 
deaths that are unnatural (e.g. someone stabbed by a sword), and distinctly modern 
forms of death also fall under this category, such as deaths from AIDS (Khomnet 
1997:137, Tanabe 1999: 106). These deaths are all hoong, and cases of misfortune 
beyond the norm are both caused by and the cause of phi taai hoong (Tanabe 
1999:106). As Tanabe describes, “such a death [one which is hoong] is abhorred as a 
death filled with extraordinary danger and strong pollution. In such an abnormal case 
of death, the funeral is held with Buddhist monks like a normal one, but the period of 
mourning during which the dead body is laid out in the house is shortened, and eating 
and drinking in that house is avoided” (ibid). Indeed, a colleague of mine who, during 
the course of my fieldwork, was suddenly electrocuted and died did not have a full 
funeral as would an ordinarily-deceased person; rather, his was a small affair in the 
afternoon near the school, where well-wishers would come and donate some merit to 
the man, instead of having a large festival.   
As victims of such misfortune, phi taai hoong are unable to approach sacred 
spaces (such as temple) and are therefore also called those that than khao nohk wat 
[ทานขา้วนอกวดั - eat rice outside of temples]; where they are fed and given merit149 is 
                                                 
148
 Kheut, as I explain above, means forbidden or a taboo which causes misfortune if violated. 
149
 Ghosts in Thailand have to be fed. Additionally, if one wishes to dispel a ghost or to gain karma for 
oneself, a person can offer merit at a temple on behalf of a ghost, thereby speeding up the ghost‟s 
transition to the next world. 
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at the roadside spot where they died (Mala 2008:49). These ghosts, if not placated and 
fed by their relatives, travel around the neighborhood harming people and causing 
misfortune (ibid 50). Hence, residents of a neighborhood rely upon their neighbors to 
observe all of the proper regulations regarding placating their relatives who may have 
fallen victim to misfortune. But with strangers as neighbors, as in the new housing 
blocks or developments, one does not know whether or not they will indeed follow the 
appropriate rules, therefore, one fears phi taai hoong – the ghosts become stand-ins for 
one‟s fear of the unknown inhabiting the houses next door.  
According to phaya Phom, the spirit of Morris‟s medium interlocutor, among 
others, the current time period is one in which bad deaths are increasing rapidly 
(Morris 2000:158). The increase in bad deaths means an increase in bad ghosts, which 
then leads to further misfortune, and so on. The (perceived) rise in violence, disorder, 
and urban chaos in the city, reflected and amplified by newspaper reports, supports the 
sense of impending crisis: the explosion in violence and the economic decline of the 
city is both cause and result of the rise in bad ghosts. Wijeyewardene describes his 
own medium interlocutor describing the connection between phi taai hoong, stasis, 
and violent (traffic-oriented) death: 
 
Caw (possessed)
150
: phi taai hoong don‟t become gods. They watch the roadside. 
Tang Khaaw (officiant): They don‟t go anywhere. When someone comes, they greet 
them. (To be greeted by a phi is dangerous).  (1986:167) 
These deaths are examples of the worst sort of karmic sins – their presence is a 
sign of both bad karmic legacy affecting the current generation but also a lack of 
progress into the next generation – the “don‟t go anywhere”. As Turton writes, “spirits 
of those dying bad deaths (phi taaj hong)
151
 are of great interest. It is said that their 
material remains and continued ghostly presence may harm the living because their 
                                                 
150
 Wijeyewardene uses a different transliteration than I do. Here, he means what I would transliterate as 
jao, “lord.” 
151
 Note the different Romanization. 
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bad deaths, a punishment for moral wrongs, did not allow them to receive ritually 
proper funerals” (1972:67). A place afflicted by hoong deaths is one which will not 
jaroen. He also notes that these deaths “negate social values” – hoong deaths include 
those of the young dying suddenly, and especially the violent deaths of gangsters or 
wild youth (1972:68), recalling Siegel‟s slippage between ghosts and criminals. In turn, 
their postmortem treatment likewise negates the social (e.g. the corpses were not 
cremated and the funerals are not the festive and social events that Thai funerals 
normally involve) but provides for the possibility of subverting the social rules 
through necromancy: “physical matter from the corpse is believed to provide magic 
that can be used to cause the separation or death of living persons. In turn this double 
negative may be said positively to balance the relative jural and ritual inferiority of 
women and of the young, and to contribute to a system of magical vengeance for 
which other juridical institutions are lacking. Thirdly those dying violent deaths… are 
often men who in their lifetime were nakleng [gangsters]… negate the Buddhist moral 
value of non-violence” (ibid). For another example of modern use of corpses in 
necromantic rituals intended to destabilize the social (in this case, the military 
dictatorship of Suchinda in 1992), see Klima 2002. 
Quelling Urban Chaos 
These evil spirits, caught and unable to progress beyond their traumatized state 
to a new, reborn existence threaten to cause others to remain in stasis as well. They 
hinder movement and prevent jaroen. Yet other kinds of spirits are present in Northern 
Thailand, other beings who by choice have not gone on to become reborn, these are 
the benevolent phi, those which possess. 
 In Northern Thai, phi refers to benevolent ghosts as well, or the animate spirits 
of objects and places, up to, although not always (depending on the speaker) including 
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the category of Buddho-Hindu deva (เทวดา - thaewadda). These less obviously deadly 
phi include the spirits of trees, lakes, buildings, houses, ancestors, and cities.  
 The more general definition of phi to mean any sort of supernatural entity in 
Northern is reflected in the classifier used for such spirits.
152
 While Central has a long 
list of various classifiers used for spirits, monks, and kings, Northern combines them 
all into one: ton [ต๋น in Northern Thai and referring to spirits, monks and kings; ตน in 
Central Thai and only referring to spirits]. Monks, spirits, and kings are all beings that 
have some sort of supernatural presence above and beyond that of ordinary humans, 
and as such are categorized as something extraordinary. What the Northern distinction 
erases is the hierarchy embedded in Central: supernatural is supernatural, regardless of 
whether or not the spirit is diabolical (and hence lower in karmic value – an evil ghost) 
or angelic (and thence higher – a monk or king).  
Yet such a classification – of benevolent spirits as phi - is on the wane in 
regions where Central Thai influence is strong (such as in Chiang Mai). Spirits and 
their mediums, while they would agree to be classified as ผมีด - phi mot or ผเีมง็ -  phi 
meng or ผเีจา้นาย - phi jao naai, often preferred to be referred to as simply “jao naai,” 
“jao [lord],” or the more Hindu and Sanskrit-derived เทพ - thep or เทวดา - thaewadda 
[angelic spirits]. As Denes points out, the sorts of spirits chosen to be channeled 
reflects the prevailing symbolic capital of different sorts of spirit: “Channelling [Thai] 
national heroes and kings was by far a more prestigious enterprise than channeling 
local ancestral spirits (phi)” (Denes 2006:336). Indeed, among the new wave of spirit 
mediums discussed by Pattana (2005) and Irvine (1984) that I discuss below, ancestral 
spirits of locality were on the wane in favor of more national and historical warrior-
king spirits. 
                                                 
152
 Classifiers are those words that accompany a noun and can serve as markers when counting or to 
refer to the noun as a pronoun.  
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 Of my informants, some believed in these protective spirits [ผอีารักษเ์มือง - phi 
a-hak (a-rak in Central) meuang], others emphatically did not, and still others were 
more comfortable to exist in the gray area of “I don‟t believe in them, but I don‟t 
offend them” [ไม่เช่ือ อยา่ลบหลู่ - mai cheua, yaa lop-loo] that Pattana Kitiasara 
discusses elsewhere (Pattana 2005). What I wish to emphasize in the light of the 
previous discussion of watthanatham is the interplay between watthanatham and 
sayasaat [ไสยศาสตร์ - the supernatural, especially religious practices that are not 
wholly Buddhist]: the two fulfill similar roles with regards to Chiang Mai‟s city walls.  
 Watthanatham, as I explore in the above chapters, is in Thai a quality inherent 
in a well-developed, advanced civilization. It informs and lays the foundation for 
jaroen – prosperity - as the Ministry of Culture stated on their website, watthanatham 
is the basis of development. Indeed, the separate Thai terms watthana and patthana 
[พฒันา -development] stem from the same Pali word. Similar to how the Ministry of 
Culture imagines the effects of propitiation and bolstering of culture, the worship of 
the guardian spirits of a city also ensures and development. In fact, the term raksa is 
used both to describe the guardian spirits [อารักษ์ – the term “a-rak” contains at its end 
a silent “ษ - s”] and the process of preserving [รักษา - raksa] watthanatham. Each use 
of the term focuses on retaining and protecting something of value. 
The two terms are also used to describe the same activities by different 
informants: a ceremony may be termed to be preserving culture [raksa watthanatham] 
when performed by a middle-class crowd, and to be propitiating the guardian spirits 
[phi a-rak] when performed by the (often lower-class) devotees of a spirit cult. While 
a yok khruu [ยกครู] ceremony – a rite honoring the spirits of ancestral teachers – 
undoubtedly has sayasaat elements when performed by spirit mediums, the same rite 
is described by many middle-class Chiang Mai residents as being beneficial in terms 
of bolstering watthanatham, citing the same benefits as those believing in the 
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supernatural elements. Each reading: sayasaat describing how the spirits will work for 
the benefit of the community, and watthanatham describing how the sense of 
community values and cultural advancement will ensure the benefit of the community, 
shows the rite as having use-value. Either way, those performing a yok khruu intend to 
help the community to prosper and develop. 
Such a parallel between watthanatham and sayasaat should not be surprising. 
In the same manner as Thai nationalists saw ancient culture (whether invented or not) 
as something with use-value, Chiang Mai‟s culture brokers re-interpret activities such 
as the yok khruu as resulting in rational benefit in a process that parallels the re-
interpretation of kheut from the previous chapter. Yet, as was the case with nationalist 
and Cold War visions of tradition, the content of such cultural displays must be edited 
and re-configured for greater commensurability with modern, bourgeois norms.  
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Figure 15: A spirit medium prepares for possession on the traffic median of the 
superhighway. Khuang Singh intersection 
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Figure 16: Mediums possessed by Hindu deities dance. Traffic median, Khuang 
Singh intersection. 
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The Re-casting of Ritual 
I attended many yok khruu ceremonies, but I would like to compare two: one 
conducted with attention to supernatural benefit and the second with attention to 
cultural benefit (of course, attendees at either might identify both qualities as being 
present). The first was held in the center of a newly-constructed superhighway 
encircling the city. This expanded median was the site of a ruined temple, of which 
only the chedi [spire, stupa] remained. It was also near khuang
153
 singh [ข่วงสิงห์], the 
Plaza of Lions, a field outside of the city proper where Chiang Mai‟s kings would 
marshal their forces. A spirit medium was to be the sponsor of a yok khruu ceremony, 
honoring the spirits that would soon descend for the benefit of the city.  
Resurrecting the spirits of the past 
The spirit mediums‟ ritual was difficult to miss (see figures 15 and 16). As I 
came down the superhighway near khuang singh and passed by a construction site 
(where the city was building an underpass), a blast of electronically amplified brass 
music blared out, temporarily drowning out the highway noise. I pulled onto the side 
of the road, where an impromptu altar had been set up, complete with pigs‟ heads, 
flowers, candles and incense. While this altar received many offerings, the major 
ceremony was taking place across the west-bound traffic lanes, in the traffic island. I 
waited for my chance and then dashed over, climbing a makeshift bridge erected over 
the guardrail. On the traffic median, two long tents had been set up and a band was 
already playing. 
One tent, centrally located, contained a semicircle of chairs facing another altar 
where a microphone was set up and next to which sat the band. Between the altar and 
the chairs was the center of activity - mediums actively dancing while under the 
influence of spirits [ฟ้อนผ ี- fohn phi]. In the rear tent, vendors sold drinks (some 
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 For a discussion of the Northern Thai word khuang, see chapter eight. 
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alcohol, but mostly energy drinks, water, and soda) as well as food and cigarettes 
(including the leaf-wrapped tobacco favored by some of the mediums). In front of the 
vendors, supplicants or family members sat and waited, sometimes chatting with a 
medium, but largely waiting – that particular rite was primarily for the medium 
community and only secondarily for the lay audience. 
These spirit mediums [มา้ข่ี - maa khii, “the ridden horse,” in Northern Thai] 
were generally middle-aged women and wore brightly-colored polyester costumes and 
turbans in yellow, white, blue, or a multi-colored pattern. Older mediums were 
interspersed with younger (and largely male) mediums
154
. Each medium was the host 
of several spirits, and as the day progressed each medium was possessed by a 
succession of these. These spirits were phi jao naai, but included a smattering of other 
sorts of possessing beneficial spirits: phi mot [ผมีด], or phi meng [ผเีมง็].155 Possession 
in Chiang Mai is marked by a radically different voice or comportment and a 
loosening of the social mores that apply to middle-aged women. Some mediums drank 
heavily, and later in the afternoon the atmosphere grew more raucous. The mediums 
outnumbered the onlookers – friends, relatives, or the curious, who sat near the back. 
In their brightly-colored outfits, the mediums formed a long circle around a dance 
floor, where the possessed danced to amplified music – a sort of big-band 
reimagination of Northern Thai traditional music and gamelan. In the dance floor and 
on the sidelines, the mediums cheerfully greeted each other with prominent displays of 
respect and affection [ไหว ้ - wai]. Tired mediums would drift back to where the laity 
sat, and occasionally let out a retching sound as they expelled one spirit to welcome 
another.  
                                                 
154
 I detail the culturological reason for this in chapter five, above. 
155
 “Witch spirits” and “warrior spirits,” respectively. Significantly, meng is the Northern Thai term for 
the Mon ethnic group. 
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For a while, I sat alone on the sidelines, with the spectators. Mae Kham, my 
friend and informant, an older woman who worked in a tobacco field most days, was 
currently possessed by a young child, a spirit who so rarely descended that this was 
my first time meeting him. As such, he ignored me and watched the dancing while I 
talked with some other visitors and mediums.  
As I sat, a small group of tired mediums and supplicants formed around my 
table. One medium, a middle-aged man whose house had hosted a ritual the week 
before, sat near me. He was dressed in brown and gold, and his hands and eyes 
trembled and shook – he was also sweating a copious amount.156 He introduced 
himself as a water spirit, a naga, and asked what I was doing at the ritual (despite 
having met me the week before). I gave a brief answer about mediumship and 
watthanatham lanna, after which he smiled. “Good, good,” he said, then turned stern 
again. “Can you read Lanna script?” he asked, referring to the palm-leaf text from the 
tamnaan. I confessed that, while I had taken some courses, my ability to read and 
write the temple script was relatively limited. He then took out a scrap of paper and, 
his hands shaking to the point where he could hardly write, scrawled a Lanna k on the 
paper. He next drew an l, then an m in a loose column and handed it to me. “Lanna 
alphabet,” he said, and gave me a wan smile. 
A self-styled professor joined us and eargerly described to me his theory that 
“nanotechnology” would explain mediumship one day; that perhaps these individuals 
all had some built-in circuitry that allowed them a greater consciousness – claims that 
paralleled similar interpretations at the puu sae nya sae rite, and, as I mention before, 
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 To date, I am not sure why. Rumors about mediums being under the influence of amphetamines or 
other drugs were present, but when I tried to ask about this in relation to this particular medium with 
some mediums with whom I was more familiar, they denied knowing whether or not this was the case – 
any explanation that my medium informants offered referred back to the intense effects of possession 
by such a powerful and tempestuous spirit as a naga.  
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point towards the both past-oriented and future-oriented nature of Northern Thai 
jaroen: the power of the past was always, in this interpretation, high-tech.  
A woman with a “Development Group for Chiang Mai” shirt relaxed in 
between her errands, serving water to a group of young mediums who had all dressed 
in Indian-style saris. These women had all arrived in a massive group along with a tall, 
middle-aged man with long hair and sunglasses. The entire retinue had the attitude of 
rock stars, complete with attendant staff. I asked a nearby medium – an older woman – 
about the saris, she told me that they were all disciples of the man, who was the 
medium of a Hindu divinity. The young women were similarly possessed by his 
attendant angels [thaewadda], and as such preferred Indian clothing and dancing in a 
Bollywood-influenced style. In this case, the mediums are obviously associating 
Hindu divinities with the modern Indian film industry in the sort of ethno-nationalist 
conflation common in Thailand. 
The sponsor of the rite sat in a prominent location near the dance floor, and 
newcomers (mediums) to the ceremony came forward to wai [to show respect by 
placing the hands folded in front] her. Laity lit candles and incense at the ruined chedi, 
dashing back and forth across the lanes of the highway, and occasionally chatted or 
joked with a medium. The atmosphere was that of a party, complete with dancing and 
alcohol. The mediums greeted lay people and each other with smiles, returned wais, 
and a gentle blessing: “[may you] jaroen.” Indeed, this explicit invocation was a short 
summary of the usual blessing that a spirit medium would give (see more detail in 
chapter four): “may you jaroen, may you be happy, may you be cool, may you be rich, 
may you get a hundred [baht], may you get a thousand, may you get ten thousand, 
may you get a hundred thousand”. In each case, the medium is calling for prosperity, 
to distribute the prosperous potential that has come with the benevolent phi amongst 
the assembled followers. 
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The rite led to a culmination at four in the afternoon, as the anthem to the 
current king of Thailand played, and all the mediums turned towards the Thai flag to 
show their respect. The band finally stopped, and the noise of the traffic from the 
superhighway on either side of the ceremony emerged from the background. The 
guests drifted towards their assembled motorbikes, and, still ignored by Kham, I 
offered the naga medium, woozy and exhausted, a ride home on my motorbike. 
Resurrecting Watthanatham 
The second ceremony that I wish to compare to this first one was held on the 
campus of Chiang Mai University. It was held in order to pay respects to Withi 
Panitchaphan, one of the founders of the Fine Arts Department at the university and an 
author and promoter of Lanna cultural works. At this event, too, there was a great deal 
of dancing in the costumes of the royal past: dance troupes performed various 
traditional dances from Southeast Asia in traditional costume, while Aajaan Withi sat 
in a place of respect in the front of the ceremony in the same relative position as the 
medium being honored for the rite did during the ritual on the traffic median. The 
trappings were also the same: behind the professor were the same assortment of fruits 
and pig‟s heads that had adorned the altar at the spirit medium‟s rite. Yet no one here 
was possessed, rather, they had assembled to bring forth not the living spirits of the 
past, but the various cultural heritages of the region. 
This ceremony was held in a grove of teak trees planted by Chiang Mai 
University on campus. Some elements were similar to the other ceremony: the large, 
brightly-decorated altar and the mats laid down on the bare earth for dancing. Another 
common element were the rows and rows of young men, dressed in brightly-colored 
outfits – similar, if far more elegant and expensive-looking, to those worn by the 
mediums, albeit with more variety (some were Balinese, others were Tai Lue, etc). 
The similarity was such that when I first arrived at the event, I thought that there were 
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mediums present, confusing the dancers in “ancient” attire for more elaborate versions 
of the young male mediums at the prior ceremony. My question: “Has the spirit 
descended yet?” was taken by a group of young dancers as a joke, and a rather 
embarrassing one at that.  
At the university event, the attendees were mostly students or faculty who 
wished to show their support and respect for their teacher (khruu as in yok khruu). The 
language is the same as in the previous ceremony: the followers of the teacher will 
gain prosperity owing to their association with him. At this event, watthanatham in an 
explicit form: dances, costume, and the like; has taken the place of sayasaat at the 
spirit mediums‟ ritual. When I discussed this replacement of the supernatural by the 
cultural with attendants at the CMU ceremony, they expressed skepticism about the 
veracity of mediums‟ performances, a common theme when dealing with spirit 
mediums (Bilmes 1995, Morris 2000). But functionally, watthanatham has emerged to 
fill the void that sayasaat has vacated. Watthanatham becomes the answer to “what 
insubstantial force will ensure Northern Thailand‟s prosperity?” These “cultural” 
dancers embody the spirits of the past in the same way as do the mediums, although 
instead of being the “ridden horse” (maa khii - the direct translation of a Northern term 
for a medium), they are instead the conscious masters of culture. In each case, 
however, the inarticulate spirit of the past emerges for the direct usefulness and benefit 
of the present – it creates prosperity [khwaam jaroen]. 
If the idea of watthanatham is that calcification of culture influenced by 
European ideas of civiltà and Bildung - the enacting of the ancient in a way that is still 
modern, and the arrival of the spirits is the connection to that power that flows from 
ritual and supernatural forces, they both arrive at the same destination: khwaam jaroen, 
as Thongchai describes the term, “the sense of transformation into the new age, or 
modernity, as opposed to the traditional, the ancient, or the bygone era.” (Thongchai 
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2000a:531). Although Thongchai compares ritual power and the consumption of 
European goods as two means by which Thai elites attempted to capture khwaam 
jaroen (ibid 539), here I argue that the domestic consumption of Lanna culture, a 
process that is heavily influenced by how Lanna is constructed and consumed by the 
international touristic gaze, fulfills a similar role. In short, by consuming Lanna in the 
same manner as Europeans consumed Southeast Asian high culture – by secularizing 
cultural elements and removing them from the everyday flow of life (Anderson 
1991:184) – local elites acquire some of that percieved cosmic power that Europeans 
used in order to jaroen.    
Chaos and the Supernatural 
Evans-Pritchard points to witchcraft amongst the Azande as providing a social 
explanation for chaos – when bad things happen to those who have done nothing to 
deserve them, the reason for this is not coincidence; rather, supernatural-cum-social 
forces have acted upon the unfortunate (Evans-Pritchard 1937:65). The Comaroffs 
similarly point towards how those who suddenly became wealthy in post-apartheid 
South Africa were accused of being witches, profiting off of their bewitched neighbors 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 1999:293). While I argue in the previous section that the 
equally intangible watthanatham serves to stand in for ghosts in Chiang Mai, here I 
must explore what spirits do for the community, both “traditionally” and at present. In 
doing so, while I recognize that I have undertaken my project at a time of profound 
change in Chiang Mai, I do not wish to paint a picture of a timeless past being 
suddenly uprooted by modernity, as many Thai writers do. The past of fifty years ago 
was equally tumultuous, as Anan (1984) shows, and reflected some of the same 
concerns over jaroen, often articulated, as they are now, in supernatural terms (in 
addition to Anan, see the excerpt from the Chiang Mai Chronicle that I cite above).  
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Spirit mediumship and spirit worship, for my informants, provided answers 
when other explanatory apparati fail, especially in cases of physical or financial ruin. 
Lung (an older Northern Thai man and my landlord for part of my fieldwork) related 
the story of how he came to believe in phi: his infant son had fallen ill with colic. The 
baby would not stop crying, as if he was in terrible pain. Lung brought him to the 
hospital, but the staff there could not treat him and so Lung was left with no solution. 
Accordingly, Lung took the infant to a medium, and she agreed to consult the local 
spirit by having sending her own possessing jao naai out to find that phi which had 
dominion over that plot of land on which Lung had his house. The diviner suspended a 
ball of sticky rice from a string and proceeded to ask the spirit yes-or-no questions, the 
first of which was a query as to whether or not the child‟s affliction was truly spirit-
related. “Is the illness medical?” the diviner asked. The rice did not move. “Is it a bad 
ghost [hian]?” Again, the rice did not move. “Is it the local spirit of the land?” At this 
response, the rice began to spin, according to Lung, in a rapid circle. The spirit of the 
land [เจา้ท่ี - jao thii] had become offended at something Lung had done and was 
demanding gifts. Through more queries, it became apparent that the local spirit wished 
for a red car to ease its anger. Luckily for Lung, spirits had no need of either a full-
sized vehicle or one with an engine, so he purchased a toy car and placed it in the 
spirit house, located on the side of his property. The child, according to Lung, became 
better instantly.  
 Lung‟s story fits into the tradition of divination and explanation for misfortune 
in Chiang Mai as well as elsewhere in the Mekong region. Here, what I wish to 
emphasize is that the local spirit occupies a dual role. It is the guardian of the house, as 
it keeps out wandering hungry ghosts from attacking Lung‟s son with something truly 
deadly, but it also is fickle, and resorts to causing mischief or lesser misfortune if its 
whims – unpredictable and illogical - are not satisfied. In Lung‟s case, the spirit 
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provides a reason for the child‟s seemingly random affliction, and although the spirit’s 
reasoning are just as random as chance (Lung does not know why the spirit became 
angry with him), Lung now has something to blame when the baby begins to cry. 
Lung‟s turn towards mediums, and not monks, to cure his son‟s illness is another 
common trend. Mary Beth Mills remarks upon the turn towards folk, rather than 
Buddhist, solutions to a panic of “widow ghosts” in Isaan during the 1990s; she 
speculates that with mainstream Buddhism‟s focus on the rational and modern, 
villagers might feel that monks would look down upon them for being overly 
superstitious (Mills 1995:266).  
Lung‟s jao thii exists in a family of greater and greater spirits, all of whom 
share this capricious yet benevolent character. Many of the works in Thai and in 
English about these spirit cults attempt to categorize these spirits into a loose pantheon 
or in general groupings, but each study of these spirits seems to have a different 
conclusion
157
. Hence, any attempt to collect an authoritative catalog of the benevolent 
spirits of a city is a project doomed to failure. Rather, the mythology of Chiang Mai is 
an improvisational one, and while certain figures appear often (e.g. Kham Daeng or 
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 For instance, Withi categorizes benevolent spirits of the North into four categories: phi taen, or 
spirits on a level with thaewadda; phi puu nyaa, ancestor spirits; phi jao naai, phi arak, phi seua baan, 
ghosts of people who remain to guard a house or area; and seua meuang, guardian spirits of the city 
(Withi 2005:17-21). Chalahtchai describes a slightly different grouping: ancestor spirits and lesser arak 
spirits, phi jao naai, and phi jao baan (1984: 36-7). According to his grouping, ancestor spirits are tied 
to a particular lineage or house and do not possess, while the second (phi jao naai) are those 
autochthonous spirits of the land which do possess, and the final group includes the great guardian 
spirits of the city (a-hak meuang), such as Kham Daeng (ibid). Michael Rhum, working with similar 
spirit systems in Nan, groups arak and phi pu nya into a similar category, one consisting of benevolent 
protective spirits that have their origins elsewhere, outside of the city – a feature common to many 
spirits which claimed a link to Thai ethno-nationalist history (1994:52). Rhum further notes that with 
regards to spirits associated with particular places [phi seua], there are three sorts: those protecting state 
structures (of which he identifies city walls, palaces, and irrigation systems), those protecting temples, 
and those protecting individual houses (or, I would add, neighborhoods) (Rhum 1994:43). Rhum adds 
that, of the state-level spirits, “these spirits were typically made-to-order by the colorful custom of 
burying people alive under the foundations of new structures, a practice described by Spiro” (ibid), 
although my spirit medium informants reacted to such tales with horror and disbelief. However, such a 
process of a conversion of a phi taai hoong into a protective spirit might not be so alien to Northern 
Thai belief systems, as the unquestionably dangerous and bloodthirsty ogres Grandmother and 
Grandfather Sae were able to be tamed and their evil powers focused for the benefit of the city. 
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another famous spirit of Chiang Mai‟s near suburbs, เจา้ขอ้มือเหล็ก - jao kho meuh lek), 
their status shifts over time. The fleetingness and changeability of mediumship-related 
rituals should be bourne in mind as I move on to discuss these rites. Pattana (2005) 
gives a similar warning to those attempting to see the Thai religious system as the 
blending of two separate belief systems – instead, mediumship freely adapts to the 
times, borrowing from Buddhism (and, indeed, Buddhism often borrows back). 
The fact that nearly every scholar researching spirit possession in the North 
disagrees with other scholars over systems of categorization and over details is not 
surprising – as I describe below, my own research paints another, slightly different 
picture of the supernatural world of the North. Chalahtchai hints at one reason for 
these discrepancies when he relates the elaborate hierarchy that the medium of Kho 
Meuh Lek [“Lord Iron Wrist”], one of Chiang Mai‟s most active spirits, describes 
(1984: 38-9). Kho Meuh Lek tells Chalahtchai that spirits exist on a nine-tiered 
hierarchy (1984:38),
158
 with the highest level of spirits unable to possess as they are 
occupied with waiting in a long line to be reborn as a future Buddha. Kho Meuh Lek 
names famous and less famous spirits and places each of them in the hierarchy before 
claiming to be of the ninth level (those that wait in the line), but too bored of the line 
to wait. What I wish to draw from Koh Meuh Lek‟s analysis is the fact that she is 
engaged in aggressively promoting her own position vis-à-vis other mediums. In other 
words, the mediums (and their spirits) are in a continual process of self-promotion 
over other mediums (as I discuss below). 
 Kho Meuh Lek tellingly warns Chalahtchai of false spirits and false mediums 
(as, even should the medium be truly possessed, there is always the possibility that a 
spirit might lie, or another spirit might claim to be the possessor). All king spirits, says 
                                                 
158
 Here we should remember the significance of the number nine: the ideal mandala has nine squares, 
and the word “เกา้ - kao”, nine, in Thai is the same as the term for “to step forwards” 
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Kho Meuh Lek, are liars – in a mildly populist statement (and a dangerous one, given 
the restrictions on criticizing the monarchy in late 20
th
-century Thailand), he claims 
that kings never got the karma needed to possess, and only more humble people were 
able to do so (1984: 40). Chalahtchai does not question Kho Meuh Lek‟s statement, 
but does confess that he has met the medium of King Naowarat (ibid). Likewise, in my 
research, I met both mediums claiming to be King Mangrai and mediums of Payah 
Pahb, a famous rebel leader and one whom Kho Meuh Lek specifically denies the 
ability to possess (1984:39). Such claims of falseness – omnipresent in medium circles 
- do not damage the idea of mediumship as an authentic enterprise as a whole for its 
believers: as Siegel writes, the possibility of a false medium reinforces the idea that, 
while this particular medium is false, a true medium exists (Siegel 1998:60). 
 My point here is not to imply that mediums occasionally “fake it,” but rather to 
point out the large array of disparity and doubt that surround possession. Mediums, as 
Wijeyewardene (1986:164), Bilmes (1995), and Denes (2006:203) observe, often cast 
a doubting eye at their peers, and spirits, according to my medium informants, like to 
trick mortals. In short, as should be expected from a decentered religious system, one 
which freely adapts and hybridizes elements from other religions and popular culture 
alike (again, see Pattana 2005), there is little consistency in the ways in which spirits 
are conceived of in the North in terms of a clear pantheon or structured religious 
system.  
However, spirit cults do share commonalities – compared to Buddhism, they 
are associated more with women and matrilineality, more with the tangible resolution 
of personal problems as opposed to the attempt to make merit [บุญ - bun] for the next 
life, and more with locality and the spirits of a particular village or place rather than 
with nationalism.  
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Despite the wide range of perspectives in both the spirit medium community 
and in the academic community, there are common elements to each of the examples 
of spirit mediumship given in the anthropological literature and in my own data. First 
of all, spirits are primarily concerned with the preservation of boundaries: 
At all levels these spirits, and the territorial spirits as well, serve to mark centers and 
boundaries. They are meant to protect and keeping what is wanted in a place and keep 
out what is not wanted, such as robbers, disease, and evil spirits. If the bedroom and 
kitchen are each in their own way the center of the home, then the front staircase and 
threshold are the boundary. If the city pillar and palace are each a center of the capital 
town, then the city walls are its boundaries. Territorial spirits of the political system 
are likewise found not only in capitals but also high in the mountains at the frontiers 
along the routes by which enemies invade (Rhum 1994:44). 
While most spirits live in the city‟s center (e.g. city or village pillar) or in the 
borders of the city (e.g. the walls and gates) and act to maintain these borders, there 
are also those who manage the areas outside of the city walls, such as Grandmother 
and Grandfather Sae. Tambiah (1970), in his ethnography of a Northeastern village 
and its religious structure, provides a clear division between the good urban spirit 
(chao pho khao, a white-wearing, vegetarian spirit) and the tamed, carnivorous, wild 
spirit (tapuubaan
159
).  These spirits – both those representing urbanity (such as the jao 
naai or chao pho khao) and those representing a tamed wilderness (such as Pu Sae and 
Nya Sae or tapuubaan) – present all aspects of the world in proper order: the 
wilderness tamed, the city maintained, and all paths leading forwards towards jaroen. 
Anthropological Writings on Northern Thai Mediumship  
Older English-language ethnographies (Turton 1976, Cohen and 
Wijeyewardene 1984, Davis 1984, Rhum 1994) seek to explain spirit cults in terms of 
kinship and social structure, as the female-dominated and often hereditary spirit cults 
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 Note that Tambiah does not provide Thai script. My best guess is that this spirit is taa [ตา - maternal 
grandfather] puu [ปู่ - paternal grandfather] baan [บา้น - village], or the “Village Grandfather”. It is 
interesting to note that it is the nature spirit who has a lineage relationship with the town, and not the 
urban spirit, whose name means either (depending on the Thai language spelling) “เจา้พ่อขาว - Lord Father 
White” or “เจา้พ่อเขา - Lord Father Mountain” (as “mountain” in Northeastern dialect is more often “phu” 
[ภู] than “khao” [ขาว], I would guess the former.). 
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provided a matriarchal mirror to the male-dominated Buddhist hierarchy. But as a 
result of these structural perspectives, these studies tended to overlook mediumship‟s 
dynamic role over time. Indeed, urbanization, despite what Kraisri (1967) predicted, 
has bolstered mediumship (see discussion of Irvine 1984, Suriya 1999, Morris 2000, 
and Pattana 2005 below). 
The original concern that many English-language researchers of Northern 
Thailand‟s spirit mediums had is related to the cults‟ matrilineality. This debate was 
begun by Turton, who argued that Northern Thailand was a matrilocal society 
organized by matrilineal spirit cults consisting of all of the descendents “of a particular 
ancestress” (1976:264). This led a number of other researchers to tackle this issue and 
explore its complexities, one of which is simply the wide variation in terminology and 
structure – from both my reading of the literature and my field research, what 
constitutes a phi mot cult and a phi pu-nya to a phi seua baan or a-hak baan can be 
identical. According to Rhum: “In Ban Ta Loh, for instance, the phi ahak (which is 
what they call their phi pu-nya) are clearly and explicitly matrilineal. They are, thus, 
like the typical descent spirits described in other parts of Northern Thailand. In 
Lampang City, however, the various dancing descent spirits (the phi mot and phi 
meng) are essentially cognatic with matrilineal tendencies. That is, there is a statistical 
tendency for these spirits to be passed down through the mother‟s line, but there is no 
prescriptive rule that this must be done.” (1976:31). A similar sentiment is echoed by 
Tanabe, as he describes the luuk phi [ลูกผ ี– members of a spirit cult, literally “children 
of the ghost”] as theoretically members of the matrilineal family, but practically 
speaking simply the body of people that congregate to wai the medium (Tanabe 
1991:195). My point here is not to take one side or the other on the matrilineal or non-
matrilineal debate, but rather to note that in most cases, the practical situation rendered 
the whole idea moot; especially in a place as dynamic as Chiang Mai and its suburbs, 
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devotees often came from unrelated families in the same neighborhood or similar 
location. What was evident, however, and what is significant to my study, was that the 
spirit cults in their traditional roles are expressions of social order tied to a certain 
locale. Functionally speaking, they provide a moral authority rooted in a particular 
place, a system of indigenous psychiatry, and a forum for discussing local greiviances 
(Rangsan 2007:46). While they may be of disparate origins, as mediums often claim 
that their inhabiting spirits have been purchased from or migrated from other places, 
the spirits of a particular place root a human population (their supplicants) to a point in 
space (the central shrine). Yet such a tie is often severed, especially as urban space in 
the city rapidly changes. As I mention above, the present is not the only time when 
such a process of uprooting occurred. 
 These protectors of social order and enforcers of boundaries can also turn 
against that order. Anan Ganjanapan describes the phenomena of phi ka [ผกีะ - what 
might be termed ผปีอบ - phi pohb in Central Thai] in Northern Thailand in the context 
of the turn of the 20
th
 century. Phi ka are those lineage spirits which have, through 
neglect, become corrupt and now inflict illness and misery (rather than curing it) upon 
the populace (Anan 1984:325) – see also the above discussion about phi taai hoong 
and how familial upkeep is required in order that the entire community remains free of 
misfortune. Ka remained in the family harboring them, being passed down in the same 
manner as benevolent lineage spirits, but as they now had to seek sustenance 
elsewhere, they left the house to terrorize the neighborhood. As Hallett writes in an 
account from the early 20
th
 century: 
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No one professes to have seen it, but it is said to have the form of a horse, from the 
sound of its passage through the forest resembling the clatter of a horse‟s hoofs when 
at full gallop. These spirits are said to be reinforced by the deaths of very poor people, 
whose spirits were so disgusted with those who refused them food or shelter that they 
determined to return and place themselves at the disposal of their descendants to 
haunt their stingy and hard-hearted neighbors. Every class of spirits – even the 
ancestral spirits – are afraid of the „Phi Kah.‟ At its approach the household spirits 
take instant flight, nor will they return until it has worked its will and retired, or been 
exorcised (In Le May 1986[1926]:137). 
 
Specifically, they were said to cause harm by consuming the liver (Le May 
1986[1926]:136). The victims of phi ka would fall unconscious, with a fever and 
rolling eyes, but upon interrogation via the moh phi
160
 [หมอผี], the victim would reveal 
the source of the phi ka (Anan 1984:326). The host was often female, and also often 
someone who habitually asked for necessities (ibid). This identification opened the 
door to an accusation, culminating in the exile of the accused and the accused‟s family 
(a natural consequence of the spirit‟s lineage-based transmission). 
 The parallels to other sorts of witchcraft accusations should be self-evident. 
Like the accused among Evans-Pritchard‟s Azande and their witch-stuff (that internal 
substance which gave them the power to bewitch), the host of a phi ka harbors 
unknowingly something dangerous within her, something which requires special care 
lest it disturb the village peace. But unlike in the case of Azande witchcraft, phi ka 
accusations did not have such a peaceful resolution as the accused‟s profession that he 
meant no harm. Instead, many phi ka accusations resulted in the forced displacement 
of population and creation of pariah lineages (as no one would marry into a phi ka 
lineage) (Anan 1984:328). These displaced people were among the groups used to 
resettle depopulated areas – one of which was, strangely enough given its significance 
in Northern history (a fact that I will explore below), Chiang Saen. 
                                                 
160
 Literally a “ghost doctor”. Not a medium and often a monk, a moh phi is one who deals with ghosts 
in a combative manner, like an exorcist, rather than sending a spiritual emissary in the style of a 
medium. Moh phi are still extant, according to my informants, but rare in Chiang Mai today, having 
fallen victim to much of the modernist reformation of the Buddhist sangha 
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 To return to the question of phi ka and its relationship to social cohesion, Anan 
notes that the rise in phi ka accusations during the late 1800s was owing to historical 
factors. As the local lords [เจา้ - jao] were denied access to their customary means of 
taxation on teak (as those taxes went to the British), they began to grow jealous of 
peasants who found their own fortunes increasing and strategically used phi ka 
accusations to disenfranchise them from their land (ibid 326).  Additionally, phi ka 
proved a useful vehicle for Christian missionaries to expand their own power: by 
confronting the jao and refusing to turn over accused, they not only gained new 
converts from the ranks of the accused, but also dramatically showed the limits of 
local lords‟ power in the face of Bangkok-sanctioned institutions (Le May 136), not to 
mention the appeal that such stories – liberating the “savage” from his fear of demons 
- would make to American donors. 
Here, the guardian spirits of place have been subverted (through supposed 
inattention) in order to effect land redistribution. The increase in landlessness amongst 
rural Thais was only to increase, and with the break in economy from agricultural to 
labor-based, spirits also underwent a change to the point where today, spirit 
mediumship and the city are today far more closely linked than spirit mediumship and 
the rural. Irvine (1984) notes the dramatic increase in mediumship that accompanied 
industrialization in Chaing Mai. Wijeyewardene similarly links the rise of mediumship 
in Chiang Mai to the urbanizaing population (1986:160). In his study, Irvine 
discovered that only ten of the 250-300 mediums in Chiang Mai in 1977 had been 
mediums for long, and these mediums themselves estimated that during the 1950s 
there were perhaps thirty practicing mediums in Chiang Mai city – roughly a tenth of 
the numbers at present (Irvine 1984:315)
161. Mediumship was booming in Irvine‟s 
                                                 
161
 Accounting for the growth of Chiang Mai‟s population, Irvine still places the ratio of mediums to 
laypeople in the population at 0.45 per 1,000 in the 1950s and 3 per 1,000 in the 1970s (Irvine 
1984:315). 
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time, and continues to boom at present, but the sorts of mediums differ. Older 
mediums tended to be spirits of place – yak or phi - rather than Thai kings or jao 
(Irvine 1984:318,320), and new mediums embraced Buddhism more openly than older 
ones through such practices as donating to temples (ibid 319), or, as the mediums with 
whom I worked in Chaing Mai did, abstaining from possession during Buddhist holy 
days (including Wednesdays) or the rainy season (as monks do not venture out of 
doors). 
 Pattana, noting the continuing spread of mediumship in 2005, explains the 
need for a dynamic model of mediumship:  
 
Urban religious phenomena – especially spirit-medium cults, amulet cults, fortune-
tellers and new religious movements – have developed from indigenous religious 
beliefs and practices. They are definitely not „brand-new‟ religious innovations; rather, 
they appear to bring together pre-existing religious practices, adapt them to urban 
environments and make them meaningful to the lives of the urban population. 
(Pattana 2005:471). 
 As I examined in my previous chapter, Chiang Mai‟s “urban fabric” (Lefebvre et al 
1996:72) is rapidly changing, as older communities (such as the Chiang Mai Gate 
area) become scattered and newer settlers move in. For a rural-style, place-based spirit 
cult (such as that of Kham), the growth of urban space into the rural area raises 
problems: while a spirit cult might provide a useful organization in order to fight for 
community, once the spatial location of that community is removed (e.g. when Kham 
lost her house and the home of her land-based spirit in the face of an expanding gated 
community), the spirit cults must change. As Irvine remarks, when individuals (like 
Kham) lose access to land, the invocation of local spirits loses its significance 
(1984:315). Therefore, while the spirit mediums of “Lord Chiang Mai Gate” may be 
on the wane, the mediumship of “Lord Hundred-Thousand Coins” (as an example of a 
local spirit not associated with either city or neighborhood but instead centered on a 
specific charismatic medium) is on the rise.  
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 Here is the explanation for Irvine‟s boom in spirits and change in spirits – the 
new spirit mediums, as widely reported (Irvine 1984:318, Denes 2006:336) , channel 
the spirits of the nation or, on a smaller level, with an abstracted “Lanna”, which (as I 
argue elsewhere) provides a reference point for those individuals displaced from a 
community – as Pattana notes, it is those displaced and marginalized people who seek 
a reference point in such urban religions as spirit cults (Pattana 2005:472). As the 
uncertainties and anxieties of urban life mount, so too does the need for reassurance 
and the need to be connected to some sort of framework in the atomizing 
“metropolitan crush of persons” (Simmel 1950:334).  
Middle-class Thai Reactions to Spirit Mediumship 
As I mention above, Thai scholarship on mediumship (Chalahtchai 1984, 
Withi 2004, Mala 2008) often seeks to catalog the spirits and draw distinctions 
between different cults (e.g. mot, meng, jao naai), a catalog that invariably wears thin 
over distances of time and space and, indeed, between informant to informant. Yet the 
urge to connect spirits back to a kernel of “Lanna” authenticity and thereby create an 
archive of watthanatham lanna remains: indeed, the titles of both Withi‟s book (วิถี
ล้านนา - Withi Lanna) as well as Mala‟s book (ผีล้านนา - Phi Lanna), both published in 
mass-market middlebrow presses (not to mention other titles by Anu, e.g. Anu 2003, 
which are published in smaller presses), reflect the desire to create an image of a 
traditional Chiang Mai, under assault from the forces of globalization, but containing 
within it elements of cultural use-value, or at least the feeling of foreignness (e.g. 
“meuang nohk”-ness  [ความเป็นเมืองนอก – khwaam pen meuang nohk]) that Nidthi 
laments having disappeared (Nidthi in Natthakan 2001:14). 
Listing the sorts and kinds of spirits present as though it were a roster of 
“Northern” belief raises questions in light of the above problematizing of the category 
of khon meuang, and my note that Chiang Mai has within it diverse populations and an 
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ever-changing social/religious sphere. Accordingly, I cannot simply assume that I am 
describing what “they” believe; indeed, the question of whether or not “people believe 
in” spirit mediums in Chiang Mai rests upon a false assumption. As I mention above, 
spirit mediums themselves cast doubt upon other spirit mediums, so the category of 
“spirit mediums” is not a unitary one, as is, obviously, “people in Chiang Mai”. 
Chiang Mai and Lanna before it, despite the best attempts of culture brokers, tourism 
agents, and incautious writers alike, refuse to be calcified. 
Many Chiang Mai residents who had been educated or born in other regions 
were less credulous of mediumship while at the same time fully accepting the 
supernatural hierarchy of thep [angelic spirits] and phi. A professor (whom I do not 
name here) made a sour face after hearing me describe a yok khruu ceremony, 
complete with dancing and liquor, “Really, why would a king‟s spirit enter one of 
these people?” She offered another idea: “Don‟t you think it might be just an ordinary 
ghost [ผธีรรมดา - phi thammada]?” What is important about this question is that the 
professor does not at all deny the existence of possessing spirits - she simply doubts 
whether or not those spirits would wish to associate themselves with the lower classes. 
Indeed, many of my upper-class, college-educated informants asserted their belief in 
the possibility of possessing spirits, at least in the form of Hindu deities and nagas, 
owing to their presence in Buddhist scripture. Writing about political magic in 
Bangkok, Charles Keyes, in a Bangkok Post article from April 2009, describes the 
various forms of magic used by the Thai elite (Thaksin included) to amass power (or 
take power away from rivals); in other words, one should not leap to the conclusion 
that belief in spirits and magic resides only in those groups labeled “lower-class” or 
“uneducated” (Keyes 2009)! However, mediumship in the form of maa kii – Kham, 
for instance – is a distinctly provincial sort of magic, and therefore those upper-class 
informants that I spoke with, like this professor whom I will not name, were likely to 
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dismiss maa kii, if not spirits in general, as something not reflective of learning. In 
short, they used belief in spirit mediums as a dividing line between the educated class 
and the uneducated.  
Other reactions amongst those attempting to reframe the “image” of Lanna 
were similar. Duangchan, an ardently localist academic and activist whom I mention 
above in the context of kheut, was happy to hear about my project, but when I started 
to explain that I was working with mediums, she grew less confident. “Why aren‟t you 
working with older people about these things?” she asked. “Mediums, you can‟t 
always trust. There are false mediums, and there could be true mediums, but how do 
you know if you‟re getting the right information from a medium?” My attempts to 
explain that I was not really interested in how things actually were in the past – i.e. 
discovering an authentic Northern-ness, but that I was interested primarily in how 
people talked about or imagined the Lanna past resulted in Duangchan growing 
visibly skeptical of my own project. I changed the subject back to more comfortable 
ground. 
Mediumship, then exists on problematic semiotic ground for Chiang Mai‟s 
image-makers, even as it expands as the city changes. Much as kheut prohibitions 
needed careful editing in order to be re-interpreted as rational premodern “local 
wisdom”, for Chiang Mai‟s educated class, the institution of mediumship similarly 
requires a cleansing of its more carnivalesque aspects in order to be rendered Lanna 
“tradition.” Yet as Pattana points out (2005), mediumship is an active, ever-changing 
institution, one which has always adapted to the immediate needs of its adherents – 
calcification is not an option. The scorn which many of the more highly-educated 
Thais heaped upon mediums (one professor derided mediums in Chiang Mai city as “a 
bunch of drunks”) acquired overtones of class, as the characteristics of mediums: 
cheap, prone to vices, uneducated, was similar to the stereotype of rural uneducated 
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residents, especially their refusal to adopt a rationalist approach to religion, the nation, 
and belief. 
Possession and the Jao 
 Mae Kham was my principal informant amongst the spirit medium community 
in Chiang Mai, and she was by no means a “drunk,” as the professor implied above. I 
have detailed some aspects of her biography earlier, but here I would like to give a full 
account. Kham, the youngest daughter of two, was born in Mae Taeng, a small town to 
the north of Chiang Mai (near to Chiang Dao, the home of Kham Daeng). As a young 
woman, she married a man from a lower-middle-class family in Chiang Rai (a city 
three hours north of Chiang Mai) and moved with him to San Sai, a near suburb of 
Chiang Mai. The family, which soon included a daughter, Noi, was poor despite the 
father‟s not-impoverished upbringing and lived in a bamboo hut – not yet a house – in 
the middle of a banana grove. The life was not idyllic. Noi remembered having no 
access to power or health care, and blamed the strain of raising a family in such poor 
conditions on her father‟s affair [นอกใจ - nohk jai – his heart and feelings literally 
went outside]. After her husband‟s infidelity, Kham began to experience health 
problems. The family took her to see doctors who had no response other than that, 
according to Kham, she did not have long to live. So someone whom Kham described 
as “someone who knew” [คนท่ีรู้ - khon thii ruu] took her to go and see the local 
neighborhood medium and ask her assistance. The medium told Kham that she had 
living within her body a ผเีจา้นาย - phi jao naai, a powerful local spirit, and she had 
been doing some things that were not appropriate for a being of his status and he had 
therefore been inflicting his revenge upon her.  
 Here, it is important to remember the ideas about high and low, pure and 
impure, that I discussed in relation to the city. The violation of such hierarchies (as in 
kheut) disperses benevolent spirits and allows for the opening of the body to 
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malevolent forces or causes benevolent spirits to become angry and therefore assume a 
more dangerous aspect. As Kham was hosting an extremely powerful spirit, who had 
in his power the well-being of the entire village [หมู่บา้น - muu baan], she needed to be 
especially observant so that the spirit, more sensitive than a lesser spirit, would remain 
and not cause her pain over his (albeit unwitting) mistreatment. Such prohibitions 
extended not just to Kham but to Noi as well, and included killing birds (or any animal, 
including fish and shellfish),
162
 but also entering the ground floor of a multi-story 
house (which relates to hierarchies of high and low as I mention in the previous 
chapter).  
The transition from lay person to medium was catastrophic for the family. Noi 
became frightened of her mother. Then a child of five, Noi said that she would come 
home to have someone who looked like her mother but speaking and shouting in 
strange voices in the house. Kham‟s husband soon left her. Noi also left with her 
father, but returned seven years later to take care of her mother after her father 
remarried. When I met her, Noi worked at a branch of Tesco – a British company 
similar to Wal-Mart – selling cosmetics six days a week, and the money from this job 
went to support her mother. The income from this was not enough to keep the land in 
San Sai, and as her mother‟s old neighborhood became swallowed by a growing gated 
community, Noi had a small one-level, one-room concrete structure built for her 
mother in Mae Taeng, about an hour north of Chiang Mai in her mother‟s natal family 
compound. Noi also financed the construction of a similar concrete building in their 
old neighborhood in San Sai, on some friends‟ land near where Kham was first 
possessed by the spirit. This structure was to be a หอผ ี- ho phi [ศาลเจา้ - san jao in 
Central], a building where Kham‟s possessing spirit could hold court once a year. 
                                                 
162
 Noi expressed her disappointment at not being able to eat กุง้เตน้ kung ten, a popular dish of (partially) 
living freshwater shrimp in a chili-lime sauce. Eating such a dish would cause her mother to fall ill 
owing to the sin incurred by Noi‟s taking of the shrimps‟ lives. 
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 Kham‟s story is quite typical of spirit mediums and in fact parallels closely that 
given by Chalahtchai: a middle-aged woman (with marital troubles) has a disease 
which refuses medical attention, but is cured when a spirit medium tells her that she is 
host to a powerful spirit who is causing her grief owing to its neglect (1984:44). 
Pattana likewise details a woman, Toi, who, after years of marriage, discovers that her 
husband is having an affair (a “minor wife”) (2005:216). Toi, after having seen her 
husband and his new lover, passes out and in her delirious state begins to give people 
lottery numbers or offer them money (ibid). While a medium prounounces her to be 
the host of a crashed pilot (someone who has died hoong), Toi rejects that diagnosis 
and instead declared that she had a thep [angelic spirit] living within her (ibid 217). 
Despite Toi‟s dispute with her diagnosis, in each case there is a cycle of marital 
problems, aggressive or strange behavior, illness, and finally the declaration that one is 
possessed – as is the case with many such illnesses, it is the act of diagnosing the 
correct cause of the problem that is the cure (c.f. Herzfeld 1986:110 for a Greek 
example). Through the recognition that she is possessed (and through the measures 
taken to ensure her purity), Kham‟s illness, along with her strange and frightening 
behavior, is cured – it was the misrecognition of the disease as medical in nature that 
was in fact causing the illness. 
 I have hinted at the connection between personal trauma and grief – especially 
that relating to a failing marriage – and possession. Indeed, Kham‟s possession came 
at precisely the moment when she found her hopes failing and herself powerless. As 
Kham faced the prospect of being single, abandoned and poor, the terrifying prospect 
was filled – or, rather, deferred - by the spirit‟s arrival. Scholars working in other 
contexts, such as Sluhovsky (1996), Parle (2003), or Wolf (1990), have also noted the 
link between possession and the expression of traumatic or unatriculatable stresses, 
especially those stemming from radical changes in womens‟ status. 
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 The spirits‟ comings and goings have become more predictable since that time, 
and now Kham told me that she could tell when the spirit was likely to come and when 
it wasn‟t. Kham‟s possessions now did not interfere with her everyday work (as a day 
laborer in a tobacco field) and could be – generally – relied upon to happen on 
auspicious days or yok khruu ceremonies. Less formal occasions (such as my visits to 
Kham) were less sure: on many such occasions, the spirit did not “feel like” 
descending, and by afternoon Kham would stop waiting. 
 Public displays of spirit possession in the North are less spectacular affairs 
than their counterparts in other parts of Thailand. For a yok khruu ceremony or other 
such event, Kham would bring a suitcase with her containing a scarf, glasses, and 
brightly-colored shirt for each spirit. Once she arrived and met other spirit mediums, 
Kham would sit alone for a few moments after donning the shirt of whatever spirit was 
expected. Some mediums made retching sounds or loud throat-clearings as their spirit 
left and the new one descended, but Kham would remain silent, looking at the horizon. 
After a moment, she would slowly tie a bright scarf around her head, tuck some 
flowers (cut from her garden at home) behind her ear and turn back to the other people 
around her. Kham‟s usual mischievous smile disappeared, replaced with the spirit‟s 
reserved expression. 
 I met Kham and her spirits while attending the ritual to replenish the sima 
stone (those markers which in the premodern city ensured the city‟s sacrality) at Saen 
Pung gate – the inauspicious southwestern gate. Not only would attending the rite help 
to replenish the power of the gate, but also it would act as a place where worshippers 
could build their own personal charismatic power [สร้างบารมี- saang baaramii] through 
their interactions with the jao. The ceremony took place in a long blue-and-yellow-
striped tent on the small strip of earth between a busy street and the city moat, atop 
land where the city wall once stood. An altar with fruit and pigs‟ heads was at the back 
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of the tent, and a string ran from the altar, out of the tent and encircled the gate‟s stone. 
Next to the altar, the band (brass and electric) shared space with vendors taking 
donations, offering information about the ritual, and selling drinks. While the main 
body of the tent, in front of the band and surrounded in a ring by chairs and tables for 
mediums and spectators, was reserved for dancing by possessed mediums, this back 
area was a place for mediums to scout for new clients and socialize with visitors. One 
older medium (presumably possessed at the time, although I do not know for certain), 
after having heard me speaking Thai and tying some money on to a large tree for 
donations to make on to the nearby temple in the name of the spirit medium in charge, 
tried his luck. “Three!” he said firmly, leaning far forwards and jabbing his finger into 
my chest. “You have three in here!” I smiled in what I thought was a friendly way, 
although I had no idea what he was talking about. “Three spirits [using the Central 
Thai ong (องค)์ reserved for angelic spirits or sacred things instead of the Northern ton 
(ต๋น)] live in here!” he said again, as he stuck my chest with his finger, “You are the 
third person!” When I asked him questions to clarify what he meant, he would only 
repeat what he said, and then motioned for me to make a larger donation to the tree. 
 Such are the things expected of mediums: they, by being kings for a few hours, 
are able to invert the social hierarchy that places them towards the middle-bottom and 
act in bizarre or rude ways towards individuals who might occupy an economic, social, 
and international status above that of their ordinarly personas. They are also expected 
to reveal hidden truths – in this case, that I was harboring spirits (and were I to be 
harboring such spirits, I might well want the assistance of someone who could see 
them to deal with them). Finally, they are expected to bring prosperity. At a different 
ceremony, long after I had become well acquainted with medium spirit dances, the sky 
began to threaten rain. Several of the mediums stretched their hands up to the sky and 
a cry went up: “tok, tok, tok [ตก ตก ตก - fall, fall, fall]!” Several minutes later, a 
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medium that I did not know pulled me over to the band‟s singer. She leaned down and 
made a motion as if she was rubbing cash in between her fingers and then pointed at 
the singer (indeed, while possessed she rarely spoke). A little uncomfortable and 
confused, I pulled out a twenty-baht bill [about seventy-five cents, or the cost of a 
noodle-soup dinner]. The medium frowned and shook her head and held up one finger 
– one hundred baht [about three dollars, or a day‟s salary for someone like Kham]. 
Obligingly, I did so, but when she motioned for me to give another hundred-baht bill, 
I shook my head, feeling cheated.  
It was only later that I realized that I, being identified in these situations as a 
foreigner and therefore a source of wealth, was like that cloudy sky. By having me 
give money, the mediums were calling the actual profit out of the potentiality – they 
were making it rain. It is notable that in both the case of the older male medium asking 
me to tie more money on the tree and in the case of the silent medium asking me to 
give money to the singer, the mediums did not ask for donations for themselves, but 
rather that I donate to deserving others (the head spirit medium in the first case, the 
singer in the second example) and in doing so, I would be improving my own 
charismatic power [baaramii]. The mediums were calling prosperity – khwaam jaroen 
– out and directing it towards the people, whether it be from a cloudy sky or from a 
(presumed to be) wealthy foreigner. 
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Nationalist Origins: Lord Father Yellow 
Outlandish behavior, like that of the man who affirmed “three” to me, also 
characterized my first meeting with Kham. I had been talking with Noi about the ritual, 
and she offered to introduce me to her mother, who was at the time possessed by Lord 
Father of the Yellow-Gold Throne (see figure 17). I enthusiastically took her up on 
this offer, but when I met Lord Yellow (as I refer to him here
163
), he refused to speak 
Thai. Instead, he said many things in a staccato, rapid-fire language. I asked Noi what 
he was saying, and Noi responded: “He is speaking Burmese. I think. I don‟t 
                                                 
163
 Like ordinary Thais, many of the spirits had long formal names, such as  “jao phor saen thong kham” 
[เจา้พ่อแสนทองคาํ - Lord Father Hundred-Thousand Gold]. Those familiar with them would give them short 
nicknames for ease of remembering and familiarity (e.g. Jao Yim Ngaam [เจา้ยิม้งาม - Lord Pretty Smile]). 
Figure 17: Kham possessed by Lord Father of the Yellow-Gold Throne, San Sai 
district. 
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understand Burmese, though. It might be a heavenly language [ภาษาเทวดา - phasaa 
thaewadda].” Then, Noi spoke loudly to Lord Yellow, “He doesn‟t understand what 
you are saying! We can‟t speak that language!” Lord Yellow then smiled broadly and 
laughed, and afterwards switched into Central Thai, but was continually evasive in his 
answers: when I asked him from where he had come (a typical sort of question one 
might ask of a spirit, I thought), Lord Yellow responded with a mischievous smile and 
said, in reference to Noi, “So! You‟re going to marry this girl? You‟re going to live in 
Chiang Mai? You‟re going to build a house here?” 
Lord Yellow‟s responses bear some analysis. At first, when I arrive, a 
foreigner speaking Thai with a (mostly) Central accent and presumably with perfect 
access to that most cosmopolitan of languages, English, Lord Yellow responds with a 
foreign language of his own. Then, when I ask what he perhaps considered a boring, 
irrelevant, or undesirable question, he immediately decides to show his penetrating 
insight and vocalize what he perceives is the most obvious cause of my speaking with 
Noi: Lord Yellow assumes that I, like many other farang in Chiang Mai, have come 
seeking female companionship and cheap housing. I was offended at the time that I 
might be identified with what I saw as the large number of lecherous older farang men 
in Chaing Mai seeking to purchase youth with dollars (or pounds, or euros), but in 
retrospect Lord Yellow was also acting in the way that the rain-makers at the other 
ceremony were. He was seeking to produce prosperity – in this case a rich yet young, 
foreign yet Thai-speaking husband for Noi. But Lord Yellow‟s initially hostile-
seeming response is also perhaps a reversal of hierarchy – Yellow has the power to 
decide what language is being spoken (i.e. he assumes that I speak the language of 
America, England, and Australia, so he therefore makes it clear to me that he speaks 
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the language of heavenly realms – a place superior to London, New York, and 
Syndey) and the power to ignore my questions and guess at my true intentions.
164
 
Shortly after this exchange, Lord Yellow fell into a fit of harsh retching 
noises.
165
 He doubled over, paused, and then Kham slowly sat back upright, removing 
her scarf and yellow over-shirt. “Sa-wat dii jao [สวสัดีเจา้],” she said softly and slowly, 
in a voice very different from Lord Yellow. Her eyes had lost some of Yellow‟s firey 
spark and she seemed tired and confused. Her Central Thai had vanished, and she 
spoke with a thick Northern accent. Noi introduced me to Kham again, and we spoke 
in much more civil terms. Perhaps because of having asserted her authority as Lord 
Yellow, Kham (and all of her spirits) were afterwards much friendlier to me on 
subsequent meetings.  
 Kham had three spirits within her, all of which were identified as ผเีจา้นาย - phi 
jao naai, a similar sort of spirit mediumship as Morris (2000) identifies in her work. 
As I describe above, this term is generally translated as “Lord Spirits,” as jao naai in 
Central Thai means “nobility.” However, this link, often made (Rhum 1994), is of 
recent origin, as in Northern the spirits were until recently called เจา้ทาํนาย [jao tham 
naai] – foretelling spirits, not necessarily nobility at all (Sanguan 1969:97-98). 
Kham‟s repitoire of spirits also exactly mirrors that given by Irvine (1984: 317) as 
being typical of, as he puts it, “traditional” spirit mediumship: an older, ascetic, white-
clad jao puu [เจา้ปู่ ];166 a middle-aged, vibrant jao pho [เจา้พอ่]; and a young, naïve, 
often sunglass-wearing “little brat” (ibid) – a young lord [เจา้นอ้ย - jao noi].  
                                                 
164
 After several months, when it became plain that romance was not to bloom between Noi and me, 
Yellow admitted his mistake to me, saying that, while at first he had divined that Noi and I had been 
married in a previous life, now he saw more clearly that she and I had been siblings. 
165
 While she did not make these noises while expelling her own spirit and welcoming Lord Yellow, she 
did when she was expelling Lord Yellow to welcome Kham again. 
166
 This spirit also parallel‟s Tambiah‟s chao pho khao (1970). 
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 The first spirit of Kham‟s which I met was เจา้พอ่แท่นคาํเหลือง [jao pho thaen 
kham leuang - Lord Father, King of the Yellow-Gold Throne], whom I have already 
mentioned as Lord Yellow, and this spirit was by far the most common of the three. 
Lord Yellow spoke in a loud tenor voice and was fond of making direct comments and 
jokes, although his jokes did not tend towards the bawdy, as other spirit mediums‟ did. 
He also tended to speak in perfect Central Thai. Lord Yellow wore a bright yellow 
shirt, yellow sarong, yellow polyester head-scarf, and a giant cluster of yellow flowers 
behind his ear; in fact, each spirit wore certain objects: a particular color, a particular 
pair of glasses, etc., as Morris also notes (2000:190). While Lord Yellow would not 
provide an answer for why he liked the color yellow, the community of jao naai 
mediums of which he was a part shared a sort of color-code, and king‟s spirits always 
wore yellow.
167
 Withi‟s survey of phi jao naai in Chiang Mai and Lampang also 
identifies a color-code to the sorts of spirits, but a code which is very different from 
that which I observed (Withi 2548[2005]:28). He notes white shirts for thep [เทพ - 
angelic beings], red shirts for soldiers, and yellow or purple for the ghosts of children. 
In my own work, I identified “Indian” multicolored patterns for thaewadda or thep, 
white for old men (paralleling the white robes of an ascetic [ฤษี - reusii]), green for 
soldiers or more martial spirits, the aforementioned yellow for lords, and purple for 
children. 
 Lord Yellow did indeed identify himself as being a king from “ancient times,” 
this nebulous mythico-historical time that I discuss above in the context of Kham 
Daeng. He claimed to have ruled long ago, but centuries after his death he saw that 
Kham was in need of assistance in Chiang Mai, so he came. I asked him again (later, 
after I had gotten to know Kham quite well) from whence he had come and he replied 
                                                 
167
 While it is tempting to imagine a link between the wearing of yellow for lordly spirits and the 
wearing of yellow as a display of monarchical support for Rama IX, I could not find anyone of my 
informants who agreed with such an interpretation. 
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“Chiang Saen, to the north, by Burma”. Such a response was not unusual, indeed, 
while many of my medium informants claimed their spirits originated in and around 
Chiang Mai, those that cited an outside source for the possessing lords without 
exception mentioned Chiang Saen. 
This invocation of Chiang Saen may seem random: Chiang Saen is a small 
town in Chiang Rai province, on the Mekong near the “Golden Triangle” corner of 
Thailand, Burma, and Laos. However, Chiang Saen is an important site for the 
construction of Thai nationalist history, as it is one point on the grand narrative of the 
development of Thai culture constructed during the early 20
th
 century and, like the 
idea of watthanatham, incorporated (with some modification) into the nationalist 
narrative. The archaeological trajectory, first developed by George Coedès and 
adopted by Prince Damrong, begins at Dvaravati in present-day Lopburi, center of a 
Mon kingdom on the fringes of Khmer suzerainty, and continues chronologically 
through various stages in Thailand‟s pre-Thai past (Peleggi 2002:17). Where Coedès‟s 
narrative meets Dodd‟s ethno-nationalist narrative of a grand southward migration is 
in Chiang Saen, the point where pop-culture interpretations of Thai nationalist history 
mark the first appearance of people ethnically marked as “Thai” within the modern 
boundaries of Thailand. Chiang Saen, then, is the source of nationalist origins. 
It is notable that Morris‟s “Phayaphrom” also traces his lineage along these 
lines. In an interview, the spirit tells Morris that he “came from Chiang Saen to 
Lamphun – do you know Wat Haribunchai? – that is where I lived… Then I came to 
Chiang Mai” (Morris 2000:153).168 This progression blends Coedès‟s archaeological 
journey with Sanya‟s pseudo-historical journey: Phayaphrom, like Lord Yellow, 
                                                 
168
 Morris connects this medium‟s spirit to a poet by the name of Phayaphom from the late 19th century. 
An alternate reading of Morris‟s spirit medium‟s possessing spirit would be one stemming from 
Northern Thai history. A famous palm-leaf text describes the adventures of phrajao  phrom [พระเจา้พรอม] 
in Chiang Saen (Manit et al 2002) – here, I should note that, like phrajao, phaya [พญา] is a title meaning 
Lord,” so the difference between phrajao phom and phaya phom is negligible. 
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begins at the origin point of Thainess – the place where the “Thai race” first set foot in 
Thailand. Chiang Saen and its Lao dynasty
169
 is also the putative beginning point for 
King Mangrai, founder of Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai. Departing from Chiang Mai, 
the indisputable origin point for ethnicity and local monarchy, Phayaphrom then goes 
to Haribunchai, the origin point for Buddhism and home of Queen Jamadewi, and ends 
in Chiang Mai, recapitulating nationalist origin stories and uniting his origins with the 
origins of the nation.  
By presenting this narrative as a re-tracing of the nationalist origin story, I 
wish to point out the places and times in Chiang Mai residents‟ self-perception that 
have especial significance as sites of meaning or sites of remembrance. As I mention 
above, Irvine argues that “traditional” spirit mediums often channel the spirits of 
certain locations or natural features, or even converted malevolent spirits of the 
wilderness such as yak, as we saw with the example of Pu Sae and Nya Sae previously, 
whereas “modern” spirit mediums focus more on national figures and heroes, 
especially those who fight national enemies (Irvine 1984:317) – in other words, the 
actual landscape is transformed into the imagined landscape. Kham, therefore, 
presents us with somewhat of a mixed group of spirits: Lord Yellow is a warrior king 
from Chiang Saen, and while he does not claim to be a famous name, he fulfulls the 
qualifications for a nationalist hero by drawing his origins at the place where Thai 
nationalist history and current national sovereignity meet, wearing the yellow of a king 
(reflecting the yellow of the Thai king); Lord White and Lord Crystal (detailed below), 
on the other hand, trace their origins from the land itself (“maa jaak thii nii loei” [มา
จากท่ีน้ีเลย] said Lord White when I asked him about his origins), and do not claim to 
                                                 
169
 As I discuss above, in the tamnaan many older Northern lords have the name “Lao” within their 
titles. The meaning is unclear, although Cholthira interprets this as meaning “Lawa” (1991:70). 
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ever have been human, drawing closer to Irvine‟s “traditional” ideal or to the kinds of 
spirits present in Tambiah‟s (1970) account.  
Yet at the same time that some Northern Thai spirits recapitulate nationalist 
narratives, other spirits – occasionally within the same medium – point towards non-
Thai origins.  Tanabe, working with phi meng cults in the North, notes that meng 
spirits were purchased from a group of “Burmese” dacing in the forest – indeed, 
Tanabe remarks that tutelary spirits are often reckoned as having been purchased from 
non-Tai (1991:193). I have placed “Burmese” here in quotation marks to note that the 
use of that term probably indicates a sort of translation by the medium - meng is 
Northern Thai for “Mon.” As mentioned previously, Pu Sae and Nya Sae are 
occasionally explained as Lawa spirits, and Jamadewi herself, though Buddhist, is 
certainly non-Tai. But these non-Tai origins for spirits do not present a problem for the 
nationalist narrative or questions about authenticity. As mentioned previously, the 
Thai nationalist narrative is both a story of assimilation, migration, and hegemony as 
well as one of ethnic origins and blood. Just as the Tai, according to the national myth, 
assimilated the civilization and urbanity of the “khom” and incorporated Buddhism 
into something integral and unquestionably reflecting Thainess and Thai 
watthanatham, so these non-Thai spirits of the wilderness, by being purchased and 
thereby drawn into the urban environment of the market, are rendered Thai (see 
discussion of Pu Sae Nya Sae, above). Their raw potential has been converted to 
culture in a similar way to which Japanese yōkai [妖怪 – ghosts, spirits, monsters], 
during Japan‟s modernization, became signifiers for “a sort of primordial unified 
moment when the sign and the referent were still intimate” (Foster 2009:147) – i.e. a 
prior, imagined “past-ness” that somehow embodied the spirit of the nation.  
This process of selective assimilation with regards to spirits is similar to the 
process regarding ethnic identification in the city today. I had referred to a friend, 
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Maew, a young woman from a middle-class Northeastern family and espousing strong 
nationalist ideals, as “a Lao person” (partially in jest) after she had come back from a 
trip to Vientiane. She corrected me: “I am not Lao, I am Thai. Yes, my family was Lao 
Phuan [an ethnic minority in Laos] and we speak Phuan at home. In the past, we were 
Lao, but we have changed already [เปล่ียนไปแลว้ - plian pai laew]”. By this reading, 
khwaam pen thai appears to be an open category, where all can assimilate by desiring 
to do so. However, the idea of an assimilationist concept of the nation versus an ethnic 
one has limits, especially when applied to nationalities other than Thai. For instance, 
when a Japanese-American friend visited me in the field, her response of “American” 
to questions regarding her origins [มาจากไหน - maa jaak nai (where do you come 
from?) or ชาติอะไร – chat arai (what nationality are you?)] were met with frustration 
[แต่เป็นคนญ่ีปุ่น - tae pen kon yiipun (but you‟re a Japanese person)]. The category of 
“American” was flexible enough to allow for African-Americans as well as white 
Americans, but not Asian-Americans.  Similarly, the category of “Thai” is 
assimilationist, but requires the assimilated category to conform to certain standards: 
Mon spirits may become Northern Thai spirits in much the same as Lue silversmiths 
may become khon meuang and Phuan refugees resettled after the destruction of 
Vientiane by Siamese forces during the 19
th
 century can become Thai, but in each of 
these cases the assimilated party must acquire the outward trappings of the dominant 
group: Buddhism, nationalism, respect to the monarchy, use of Central Thai language 
in public, etc. It is this reason why all of the diverse spirits of Mon, Khmer, yak [ยกัษ ์- 
demon], naga [นาค - water-serpent], or Lanna jao end their yok khruu ceremony at 4 
p.m. sharp with a collective wai [ไหว ้- gesture of obedience and respect] towards the 
Thai national flag, as the anthem plays. Such obeisance renders them Thai spirits, their 
other-ness tamed, like the yak in the mountains who send down cool air to the city. 
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Blessings from the Jao: Lord Grandfather White 
The second spirit inhabiting Kham‟s body was, like Morris‟s Phayaphom, a 
grandfather: เจา้พอ่หม่อนทา้วแสนคาํ [jao pho morn thaw saen - Lord Hundred-Thousand 
Gold King], or Lord White (see figure 18), as I referred to him because of his white 
turban.
170
 Kham‟s transformation into Lord White was remarkable. She put on a pair 
of oversized glasses, blue or purple flowers, and a white headscarf and white shirt. Her 
face lost some of Lord Yellow‟s fire or Kham‟s femininity and became quite 
                                                 
170
 Kham‟s third spirit was, like Morris‟s “Kumaannooj” , a child, เจา้พ่อนอ้งแสนแกว้ – [jao phor nong saen 
kaew - Little Lord Hundred-Thousand Crystal], although the child-spirit had been appearing less and 
less often, and I only spoke with Lord Crystal on a handful of occasions. 
Figure 18: Kham, possessed by Lord Grandfather White, San Sai district 
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masculine. When she spoke, it was softly, in an old man‟s quavering voice and Lord 
White, like Lord Yellow (but unlike Kham herself), spoke to me in Central Thai. Lord 
White was also fond of smoking large cigars and chewing miang [เม่ียง], a strong-
tasting packet of pickled tea leaves, and he was also fond of cajoling me into doing the 
same.  
 Why did Lord Yellow and Lord White speak only Central Thai to me? This 
was the case with many (though not all) of my spirit medium interlocutors, be they the 
spirits of naga or Northern Thai soldiers. As I discuss above, Northern Thai language 
only has a sachet of authenticity in certain circles – that is, among those bourgeoisie 
who are fluent in both Northern and Central. For Chai, my Northern Thai instructor 
who was a student in engineering at Chiang Mai, speaking Northern was a point of 
pride, a way of snubbing Bangkok‟s symbolic authority and socially identifying with a 
certain group as opposed to students from other provinces attending Chiang Mai 
University. Yet this strategic positioning was only possible because Chai was also 
entirely fluent in Central Thai, and could therefore blend in seamlessly with Bangkok 
natives should the need arise. Tim, the shopkeeper who challenged my useage of maen, 
was likewise able to strategically position herself as “a Lanna woman” because she 
could suddenly become Central Thai should she wish. Kham expressed no such 
confidence, and, while her speech when possessed proved her to be able to speak in 
Central, she approached interactions in Central Thai cautiously. I examine the shifting 
degree of prestige that “Lanna” signifies in the next chapter as well as chapter four, 
above, but here I wish to note that mediums, when possessed by spirits who were 
imagined to be unquestionably jaroen, unquestionably civilized and elite, often 
abandoned the linguistic component of being Lanna in favor of the hegemonic Central 
Thai (at least when I was present). 
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Questions of Lord White‟s origins, like those of Lord Yellow, were not 
immediately welcome. Sitting with other supplicants to Kham‟s spirits, I noted that the 
sorts of questions that religious attendees asked were not the sort that I (or, for that 
matter, Morris 2000 or even Chalahtchai 1984) was inclined to ask: there were no 
questions about origins, no inquiries into metaphysical relationships between spirits in 
their spiritual home in Doi Chiang Dao cave, or other questions of metaphysics. 
Instead, supplicants wanted to know more pressing, personal matters: could Lord 
White (or another spirit) help with a family illness? Could he bestow luck upon a 
college application? Might he aid in a quest to find a suitable spouse? 
At yok khruu ceremonies, such requrests took a back seat to the main business 
of dancing, but they did happen in the rows of benches and tables set up near and 
around the dance floor. Also, supplicants would often simply ask a medium for 
blessing or luck. A typical interaction of this sort would progess as follows: I 
approached Lord White with a garland of jasmine flowers I had purchased from a 
vendor on the street. I offered the flowers to him with a wai, and he returned the sign 
before taking the flowers. I had intended for him to put the flowers around his neck, as 
many other mediums had done, but instead he blew on the flowers. “May you be cool 
and happy [มีเยน็มีสุข - mii yen mii suk],” he said, “May you jaroen.” He handed the 
flowers back to me, and motioned that I put them on. They had now been transformed, 
Noi told me, into something medicinal [ยา - ya]. 
Lord White was also เจา้พอ่บา้นหนองไคร้ศรีทรายมูล [Lord Father171 of Nong 
Khrai Sri Saai Mun Neighborhood], a guardian spirit for a small suburban 
neighborhood.  Nong Khrai was a neighborhood within the larger suburb of San Sai, 
                                                 
171
 This is a literal translation of jao [เจา้ - Lord] phor [พ่อ - Father]. Combined, the term means a person of 
high status and in everyday slang means something akin to a mafia boss [“godfather”]. I have written 
the names here in Thai as they would be pronounced by a Central Thai speaker, as Kham and Noi wrote 
the spirits names thusly. In everyday Northern speech, however, a “เจา้พ่อ” would be a “เจา้ป้อ.”  
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where Kham had lived before they lost the house and Kham moved to Mae Taeng 
district and Noi moved downtown to a high-rise apartment building [หอพกั - ho pak]. 
In his role as neighborhood guardian spirit, Lord White held a more structured, formal 
rite of supplication that took place on the day appointed for Nong Khrai‟s restoration. 
These rituals – similar in function to the rituals that recharge the city wall‟s sima but 
without the frenzied dancing of a large gathering of mediums – took place at the ho 
phi of the community. In Kham‟s case, this was that concrete structure erected on a 
former neighbor‟s land in San Sai by her daughter Noi. The ho phi was a small 
building, separate from the main structure of the house and roughly large enough for 
three people to sit in comfortably, with the label: saan jao pho MOHN THAW SAEN 
KHAM [ศาลเจา้พอ่ หม่อนท้าวแสน172 - The Court of Lord Father Hundred-Thousand 
Gold – Lord White]. It had within it an altar, draped with yellow cloth and garlands of 
jasmine flowers. Atop the altar were the offerings that the other supplicants had 
brought: bananas, dragonfruit, orange and red Fanta
173
. Next to these were two small 
trees, one of silver and one of gold, miniatures of the gold and silver trees offered to 
kings in Siamese past. Behind these was a portrait of the abbot of [วดับานปง] wat baan 
pong, a local monk whose body famously did not decompose upon his death
174
, with a 
broad grin and smoking a cigar. On the floor, towards the back, was a throne – a broad 
chair with the inscription “baan nong khrai” [บา้นหนองไคร้ - Nong Khrai Village], 
signaling Lord White‟s dominion over the village. 
                                                 
172
 I place this part in capital letters in the Romanized Thai and in bold in the Thai script as this part of 
the text on the shrine was inscribed in large letters. 
173
 Red or orange Fanta was the preferred soft drink of the spirits, as it was bright and colorful (unlike 
Sprite) and not overly dark and gloomy (unlike Coke or grape Fanta). 
174
 The body was preserved in a “โรงแกว้ - roong kaew,” a glass case where it is worshipped today. Non-
decay as a marker of sacredness is something which flies in the face of traditional Buddhist teachings 
about non-permanence and the decay of all things (see Klima 2002). Here, it is an example of the – as 
Tanabe puts it, speaking of gender – “multiplicity and inconsistency” (Tanabe 1991:183) present in 
religious discourse. The religious lives of Noi and her fellows are not structured by pure Buddhist 
doctrine, but on more vernacular systems. 
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I arrived early in the morning, bringing fruits and some fried chicken, but 
Kham had already made the longer journey from Mae Taeng and was possessed by 
Lord Yellow. He took my food and placed some of it on a large plate, which he 
offered to the jao thii – the guardian spirit of the property. He then passed some of the 
fruit around to the supplicants (of which at that early hour of eight AM, there were 
three), in order that they “eat it for medicine [กินเป็นยา - kin pen yaa175].”  These three 
included two elderly women from the neighborhood and a younger man, who had an 
application to a technical university that was concerning him. He crouched at the 
entrance to the structure. 
Lord Yellow, seated on the floor in front of the throne, listened to the boy‟s 
questions and responded to him in a low, fatherly tone. As the boy asked about 
barriers to his admission packet and whether or not it was necessary to have internal 
connections [เส้น – sen] in order to get in, the medium told him to simply be honest 
and forthright and not to forget to donate alms at the nearest temple. I sat nearby, 
talking with the elderly women and waiting my turn, although when Lord Yellow 
began performing a benediction upon the boy, I moved closer to listen. Lord Yellow 
turned towards the altar, closed his eyes and began to chant (in Thai, not Pali) in a 
singsong voice – a style reminiscent of the dramatic Thai-language chanting done by 
charismatic monks of the Northern kuba [ครูบา in Central] movement – “May you be 
cool and happy, may you jaroen, may you build baaramii. May you get a thousand 
[baht], may you get ten thousand, may you get a hundred thousand, may you get a 
million.” 
 
 
                                                 
175
 Recall the connection between the term for “medicine,” yaa, and its earlier meaning of “magic.” 
Similarly, the term for “doctor,” moh [หมอ], still retains a meaning in some contexts of “sorcerer”. 
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Mediumship, Worldliness, and Community 
The prayers that Lord Yellow offered are notable in that they are requests for 
material goods. While many monks offer similar “this-world” shortcuts to prosperity 
or magic (c.f. Jackson 1998, Pattana 2005), spirit mediums have also fulfilled this role, 
especially during times of stress and change in the Thai economy. As Peter Jackson 
writes, “The individualistic focus of sayasaat [the supernatural] may provide a more 
meaningful and immediately accessible means of expressing and dealing with the 
anxieties of life among the anonymous competitive masses of Bangkok than more 
collective religious forms and rituals of Buddhism” (Jackson 1998: 60-61). Here, 
Jackson is referring to the turn towards “magic monks” by Bangkok-dwelling Central 
Thais, but a very similar claim could be made with regards to Chiang Mai-dwellers, as 
is suggested by Irving and Pattana‟s observations that spirit mediumship and 
urbanization (with its increase in landlessness and integration into the market 
economy) are linked.  
What function does mediumship serve in contemporary Chiang Mai? Henri 
Beuchat and Marcel Mauss (Mauss 1979) describe the performative rituals that occur 
in Eskimo [Inuit, to modern readers] society to be processes by which the community 
collectively diverts the possibility of violence engendered by the congregation of 
family units into large groups during the winter. By allowing for a specific place and 
form to express social discord and gossip, ritual allows for the defusing of social 
tension. In this formulation, mediumship might act in a similar sort of mode – 
mediumship rituals, especially the yearly neighborhood-based ceremony, would act as 
a place where potentially dangerous sentiments could be expressed and safely 
attributed to forces outside of the social. Indeed, in this sort of formulation, by acting 
out these sentiments, the medium herself displaces the negative emotions from herself 
or her supplicants (e.g. examples that I give below of mediums expressing political 
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sentiments as spirits that would be impossible to express as the medium herself). She 
allows them to vicariously act out their anger and thereby displace it from themselves.  
McMorran, citing Gluckman‟s “rituals of rebellion,” supports the reading of 
expressions of anger in spirit mediumship as times when tensions can be cathartically 
released, an act that nonetheless reinforces the staus quo (1984:313). McMorran notes:  
 
Both in Lampang and Nan, where males were vested with ritual authority, women 
displayed wild and aggressive behavior when under possession of ancestral spirits 
during the annual rites. During the dances female mediums directed their aggression 
towards males by such acts as hitting and pushing the men across the pavilion floor, 
forcing them to drink alcohol and imitate dogs (1984:312). 
But does expressing anger and acting in such a way really provide a space to 
“vent” aggression? This implies both the assumption that expressing feelings means 
that they diminish and that such rituals necessarily have to have a function. As 
McMorran suggests, mediumship rituals, like many public gatherings, are often 
marred by violence, and mediums, with their habit of expressing what would go 
otherwise un-expressed (e.g. Lord Yellow‟s “insight” that I was going to marry Noi), 
are often at the center of such conflicts. But is such violence ultimately productive, as 
Mauss or McMorran would have it? Wijeyewardene anticipates such a reading of the 
often violent actions in spirit mediumship ceremonies and cites similar problems with 
a too-functional approach to violence:  “we cannot assume that these tensions are 
thereby reduced, we cannot assume [like Durkheim would] that the „ritual structure‟ 
defines or reiterates social structural forms. In fact, because possession and 
mediumship involve manipulation, they may create new divisions and disrupt where 
harmony once prevailed” (1986:161). He then cites an example where a medium at a 
phi mot [ผมีด] ceremony for a dead woman became possessed by the spirit of that dead 
woman. She [the possessing spirit] then shouted out that she [the medium] had been 
having an affair with the father of the deceased (1986:162). At a similar ritual, an 
older medium channeling the spirit of a phi meng [ผเีมง็] began to dance, but the 
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officiating phi mot medium angily told her that the mediums of phi meng cannot dance 
at mot ceremonies. As the old medium continued to dance, the officiating medium 
began to kick her, despite the fact that the meng medium was the aunt of a local 
gangster [นกัเลง - nakhleng]. The gangster then cursed at the mot spirit for kicking his 
aunt, and then the medium, like a good warrior hero, retrieved his sword. The mafioso, 
not to be outdone, went home and retrieved his machete, after which the entire 
ceremony scattered, including the medium. On her way home, the medium, now in her 
unaltered state, apologized, saying that she was unaware of what was happening, and 
that her behavior was caused by the possessing spirit, the jao, to which the nakhleng 
responded sarcastically that a spirit must have possessed him, too (1986:162). 
In this story, we see the clash between an attempt to overturn social hierarchy 
(wherein an older village woman acquires the authority to kick the aunt of a locally 
powerful gangster) and the ultimate failure of this (the gangster threatens the woman 
and casts doubt upon whether or not she was really possessed). Did such an event 
allow for the expression of tensions? Certianly the affair between the medium and the 
deceased‟s father (or at least the accusation of the affair) was brought to light, but was 
the ensuing violence cathartic? Such stories of collisions between possessing spirits‟ 
explosive anger, damaged egos of those teased or offended by the spirits, and the 
political aspirations of mediums are commonplace: Denes, working in Surin province 
in Thailand‟s northeast, likewise details a violent clash between mediums (reflecting a 
clash between what Irvine would term “modern” and “traditional” forms) in which a 
younger medium channeling a supposedly greater spirit (one based on more canonical 
Hindu texts and national origins) grew angry at having to abide by the rules set down 
by an older medium channeling a lesser spirit (one based upon local practices) 
(2006:371). After the confrontation, the younger medium complained that the older 
 292 
 
medium‟s spirit was simply a mae mot [แม่มด], a spirit of place and lineage (and a 
variation on the Northern phi mot), and not an angelic thep like his spirit (2006:374).  
Historically speaking, mediumship has allowed for the expression of the 
sentiment of a village against authorities perceived as being beyond reproach. 
Somchote Ongsakul describes the response by a famous spirit medium in 1884, when 
Bangkok began to install a national system of taxation upon the North, rather than 
having taxes collected by local lords. A medium protested loudly, criticizing the 
(Bangkok-appointed) governor and predicting that “the rain will not fall following the 
season, and the grain will not grow like it did in the days during the reign of Chiang 
Mai‟s lord [เจา้เมืองเชียงใหม่คนก่อน - jao meuang chiang mai khon kohn]” (Somchote 
1987:4). When the rain did not in fact come, the tax was rescinded (ibid).  
Dispelling chaos 
Here, I return to the figure of the individual supplicant, rather than the 
interactions between mediums and the community (or mediums as a community). 
Instead of the contests of honor present in the collective mediumship rituals, the 
individual supplicant seeks to gain something from the encounter with the spirit. 
Above, I describe how a spirit medium attempted to have me give ever-increasing tips 
to the musician at one ceremony as a process similar to rain-making: like calling rain 
from low clouds, they call wealth out of a foreigner. But one-hundred baht notes and 
raindrops are both tangible things, whereas the prospective college student does not 
receive anything immediately tangible from Lord White. Psychologically speaking, 
what does the youth gain from the episode? 
The youth, like many of those going to see Lord White, was experiencing a 
time of uncertainty: aside from applications, mediums also offer help with similar 
issues, such as military conscription, love, lottery numbers, and risky business 
ventures. Through the process of consulting with and being blessed by the spirit, the 
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inchoate anxiety felt by the supplicants is lessened – they feel that they are 
communicating with some thing which has a control over the chaos of the present time 
– see also Lung‟s experience with a diviner curing his son‟s colic. But why does this 
require a focus on ritual, on making particular offerings and receiving particular 
blessings? I provide an example from Suriya et al (1999) of a consultation between a 
betrayed wife (the supplicant) and a medium (translation mine): 
 
Supplicant: It‟s almost time for the birth month. How is the child‟s fortune [ดวง - 
duang]? 
Medium: Hm… The fortune‟s no problem. There‟s luck coming, but not a lot. The 
luck will run out around December. 
Supplicant: I would like to ask about my husband and the issue of my husband giving 
up his mistress – has he given her up? 
Medium: He has not. 
Supplicant: Has he [มนั - man]176 been honest? 
Medium: I [กู - kuu] told you [วา่ - waa] he hasn‟t!177 
Supplicant: When he goes to see her and then comes back he changes his mind. The 
woman‟s old. She‟s fifty. But she likes to dress like a teenager, letting her hair long. 
Medium: The woman won‟t let your husband go. 
Supplicant: Men don‟t give anything up, huh? 
Medium: There‟s no push [เกณฑ ์- gen] for him to give anything up. 
Supplicant: Is this about money? 
Medium: The woman is giving him money and things. 
Supplicant: Is there any way [วิถี - withi] to make her give him up? 
Medium: It‟s [a] very long [time]. It takes some time… The woman who has your [หนู 
- nuu]178 husband is very clever. 
Supplicant: I went to yell at her one day, the next day she [มนั-  man] came to see me 
at the house, but he wasn‟t at home, so I yelled at her again. 
Medium: I see that it will be hard to separate them. 
Supplicant: At first, I saw that she was old so I let it continue. It‟s better than if he ran 
after some younger woman [สาว - saao – lit. “girl”]… Is he really mine? 
Medium: He has to be with you sincerely, in front of your face. He had these women 
from before. He‟s a playboy. Who sees him will say that he‟s harmless, but the 
minute he‟s out of the house he does bad [deeds]. … [Here, the medium begins her 
benediction] I call upon everyone to be happy. Whatever happens, have it not be 
misfortunate. Be rich in Buddhism. Be rich in dharma. Be rich in religion. If we‟re 
done here, Father [i.e. “I, the spirit”] will depart. (Suriya 1999:180-181). 
                                                 
176
 Man is an extremely familiar third-person pronoun. Here, it references the close relationship between 
husband and wife and also between spirit and supplicant. 
177
 Here, the spirit is using extremely familiar terms. This is a break from “pho”, “Father,” that he uses 
earlier and here his use of familiar language shows his anger. The resultant feeling would depend on 
dialect and the nature of this particular spirit-supplicant relationship, but might be equivalent to “Damn 
it, I already told you he hasn‟t!” 
178
 Here, the spirit (and the supplicant) use pronouns that place the supplicant at the level of a child to 
the spirit – nuu is the pronoun that children use with adults. 
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 Here, the spirit adopts a tone of familiar authority coupled with near-
omniscience about the supplicant‟s problems and thereby leads her to articulate her 
fears. The spirit removes the woman‟s doubts (even if he confirms her fears) and may 
(in other cases) prescribe some corrective measure (supernatural or mundane). The 
medium points to the proper system of social exchange: the man has been engaging in 
improper relations (he has been cheating on his wife, sleeping with a woman much 
older than he is, and taking money from his mistress – these latter two invert the usual 
model of philandering wherein an older man pays for sex from a younger mistress) 
and he seeks to set such networks right. Ultimately, the spirit adds a further corrective 
measure – a blessing upon his supplicants – before his departure.  
 What, then, is the woman left with? Her anxieties have been given form – they 
are, as Levi-Strauss points out in his study of shamanic healing, in “an order” (Levi-
Strauss 1963:198). The uncertiantly and chaos in the question “is my husband still 
unfaithful?” has been resolved: “yes.” Also, the question “why?” now has an answer: 
“he is receiving money from his mistress.” While the betrayed wife may feel anger 
now, she no longer feels uncertain about the situation, and, further, while she perhaps 
obliquely asks for love-magic to be performed on her behalf when she asks about “any 
way to make her give him up” (the term withi can occasionally also be used to refer to 
magic) and is denied, she is now assured that a higher authority than her husband is 
wishing her well and interceding with the chaotic universe on her behalf.  
 When faced with anxiety, the spirit cult members turn towards mediumship as 
a device which resolves these fears and renders them into something certain – a 
foundation upon which one can then take action, be it direct, as in the case of a monk 
whose wallet had been stolen by another monk and who asked the medium to identify 
the thief (Suriya 1999:180), or indirect, as in the case of the youth applying to school 
who is told to go make merit.  
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 In this sense, it becomes apparent why bad ghosts and the possessing jao are 
juxtaposed: the ghosts of bad death and their ilk are those forces that represent the 
chaotic and unpredictable nature of misfortune in the North. Stemming from car 
crashes or criminal action, they represent the unforeseen and unforeseeable nature of 
misfortune, traits that the North has in abundance as it grows and expands, especially 
following its (controversial) rapid expansion and then equally rapid crisis owing to 
Thaksin Shinawatra‟s arrival in power and ouster from power. Aside from the political 
situation, the North had additionally been seeing the increase in refugees and 
methamphetamine from neighboring Burma over the last decade, and, even as fears of 
outright war between Thailand and its neighbors declined at the end of the Cold War, 
fears about a less well-defined criminality increased. Countering this is the figure of 
the jao and their parallels in the trope of Lanna watthanatham, benevolent spirits that 
render that misfortune knowable and predictable. While they do provide assurances of 
luck and fortune, they also provide the diminishment of uncertainty and anxiety. 
 By applying to these spectral figures of Lanna‟s past, supplicants hope to 
triumph over the chaotic ruinousness of the present by recalling something containing 
charismatic, attractive power [baaramii]. But this process is not limited to spirit 
mediums. Rather, as I describe above, the attempt to call upon charismatic power to 
quell chaos parallels the attempt to revitalize the watthanatham of Chiang Mai: that 
“image” of Lanna which, though created in the past, has within it the seeds of a new 
Chiang Mai. To examine this new revitalization of watthanatham Lanna, often in the 
guise of Lanna satai [ลา้นนาสไตล ์- “Lanna Style”], I now turn to a different sub-
section of Chiang Mai‟s urban population: its artists, designers, and architects. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT:   Lanna Markets 
 
ยอดดอยสวยๆ แปลงเป็นตึกสูงๆ 
แม่หญิงดอยตุง เจา้บ่นุ่งซ่ินลาย 
วฒันธรรมกาํลงัสูญหาย 
พอ่ขนุมงัราย ลูกหลานลืมไหวกันัแลว้กา 
 
The top of the beautiful mountain, divided into tall buildings 
The women of Doi Tung don‟t wear the striped skirt [ซ่ิน - sin] 
Watthanatham is disappearing 
Lord Mangrai, your descendants have forgotten to pray to you 
 
Mai Meuang [Northern Wood], “Doi Suai, Nam Sai [Beautiful Mountain, Clear 
Water]” 
 
 Mai Meuang‟s singer, the daughter of Suntree Wechanon, the Northern folk 
singer detailed in chapter four, above, continues to chastise “those who come” for 
seeing only profit [เห็นแก่ได ้- hen kae dai] and laments the disappearance of 
watthanatham as it flows away, like the Ping, Wang and Kok rivers. Also present in 
the song is the fear of tall buildings recalling the haunted high-rises or Kham‟s refusal 
to enter a two-story building which I detail in chapter six. Finally, the singer offers a 
clear parallel between the lack of respect given towards ancestral spirits and the 
disappearance of watthanatham and the effects of both of these towards the 
environment and society.  
 Her concern about the rise of tall buildings near Doi Suthep reflects the 
concern amongst a group of Chiang Mai‟s academic and activist community (headed 
in a large part by Duangchan and Thanet), and which I mention in chapter six, above. 
This ultimately resulted in an ordinance preventing tall buildings from being built next 
to “religious structures179” or “historical sites180” in city planning regulations limiting 
the height of buildings in certain parts of town. This concern about height has within it 
                                                 
179
 Technically including Christian churches and Muslim mosques. 
180
 Including the city wall, which is significantly not in the previous category. 
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two embedded rationales. The first one, voiced in public, in city planning conferences 
and by architects, is the worry over the city‟s skyline. To find solutions for Chiang 
Mai‟s increasingly gray and blocky skyline, a conference of Japanese and Thai 
architects, was focused around the problem of tall buildings close to scenic mountains. 
The Japanese architects presented a solution from Nara – buildings increased in height 
closer to the peak, so that the top of the peak was visible from anywhere in the city. 
This solution would provide a green vista from any point in the city and help to allow 
for growth while still preserving a relatively natural aesthetic. Thai architecture 
solutions, however, were centered on the exact opposite: the buildings would be 
smaller, not taller, as they approached the peak.  
 Why did the two solutions differ so widely? The answer comes in the second 
reason for limiting the height of buildings near religious monuments, and is an answer 
that stems from the discussion in chapter six over hierarchies of space and height: in 
the magico-religious system which is the foundation of both spirit beliefs and Thai 
constructions of watthanatham, profane space must not rise above sacred (or 
“cultural”) space, or else such space becomes somehow sapped of its aura and 
restorative power.  Activists such as Duangchan emphasize the cultural, scientific and 
social risks of tall buildings, but, as I suggested in chapter six, these parallel the 
magic-religious risks. In this way, the Japanese architects had given a rationalistic 
solution, one which was concerned with the visibility of the peak to Nara‟s tourists 
and residents and, although Japanese mountains often have Shintō spirit shrines, 
Japanese shrines are not concerned with lowness as a potentially polluting quality. 
The concern over tall buildings and the way in which magico-religious 
explanations are sidelined but still present (as they are in the discussion over kheut) in 
favor of socio-cultural or environmental explanations (which nonetheless end up 
predicting similar disasters from similar causes) highlights one way of looking at 
 298 
 
Chiang Mai‟s cultural heritage as a well of “local knowledge” [phumipanya] which 
has practical application and which I briefly discuss in chapter six, above. In this way, 
beliefs regarding space which seem at first to the educated, mainstream Buddhist 
urbanite to be irrational (e.g.  the idea that a tall building next to a temple would cause 
the temple‟s purty and therefore power to wane) are given a functional meaning 
through a reference to “ancient knowledge” and watthanatham that prefigures modern 
norms in a similar way to early nationalist interpretations of Sukhothai.  
A Contestation of Symbols 
A similar debate emerged over the Mandarin Oriental Dhara Dhevi hotel. The 
Dhara Dhevi was protested by many, including both academics and local government 
(the Chiang Mai provincial cultural office) for using cultural symbols inappropriately. 
It was also that hotel which Tam, the security guard who led me through the deserted 
Boi Luang hotel, mentioned, citing the feature that had gained the most publicity: the 
design of residential accommodation in the form of temple architecture (in particular, 
the bathroom doors were styled after the bathroom doors of a temple‟s ordination hall).  
Aek, an officer in the provincial cultural office, described an encounter 
between the regional government and the hotel: 
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The Dhara Dhevi uses things from the temple in the hotel, so this is an example of the 
Thais selling off their culture for money.
181
 This Dhara Dhevi, the Office went to go 
talk to them, and to go tell them that these things aren‟t really appropriate for a hotel. 
The Dhara Dhevi replied that they wanted foreigners to know that Thailand is a 
Buddhist country,
182
 which is indeed a good thing, but these are symbols that mean 
something. Like having lions [สิงห์ - singha] in front of a building. You can‟t have that 
and have it not be a place where people go to pray [ไหวพ้ระ - wai phra]. A foreigner 
might see that and then go and put nagas in front of their house. It‟s not appropriate.  
Like the Chedi
183
 hotel. Does it have a real chedi [Buddhist stupa] inside? They use 
these symbols just because they are good-looking [สวย – suay], but do they know the 
consequences of using them?  
Aek describes the unintended consequences of such an inappropriate use of 
symbols as being that a foreigner might use sacred symbols (see discussion of the 
Craft Design Services Center, below). But this begs the question: what are the 
consequences of having a foreigner use sacred symbols inappropriately? Aek left the 
response as simply “not appropriate”, but then, after launching into a denunciation of 
the jatukam ramathep [จตุคามรามเทพ] amulet craze,184 he lamented the loss of a prior 
time when there was not so much international influence and when, as he said, “if you 
needed a bicycle you could just ask your neighbor,” when everyone “was following 
the sufficiency economy according to the royal proclaimation.”  
Here, I wish to point the reader to Aek‟s claim that the jatukarm ramathep 
amulet craze as being an example of foreign [ต่างชาติ – taang chat] influence – a claim 
which omits the long history of marketing Buddhist amulets and charms in Thailand 
(see Pattana 2005 and Jackson 1998). But this statement allows Aek to edit the archive 
                                                 
181
 Aek, as a government official in charge of culture, was a staunch promoter of nationalist and royalist 
readings of culture and history. He presented the struggle as between naïve but well-meaning “Thais” 
against greedy forces “from other nations,” with only the figure of the monarch standing between them. 
182
 On paper, Thailand is not a Buddhist country, a fact which Aek, as a government official, should 
know. Yet Buddhism and nation are unofficially intertwined – the cultural office also handled “religious” 
affairs, explicitly stated as “phuttasasana” [Buddhism]. 
183
 The Chedi hotel was one of a small chain of luxury hotels begun in Phuket but with a new building 
in Chiang Mai. Chedi, in Thai, means a stupa. Aek‟s guess is wrong – the Chedi had no chedi inside of 
it and was instead a high-modern space. 
184
 A series of amulets which gained sudden popularity in Thailand owing to their purported powers of 
protection and ensuring wealth. During the time of my fieldwork, many temples were involved in mass-
producing the amulets, although a few years later the craze seemed to have died. 
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of Thai religion and remove certain elements by calling them “un-Thai” and “un-
Lanna,”  especially those aspects of popular life which smack of materialism or 
superstition – by labeling them foreign, Aek keeps the category of “Thai” pure. 
To return to the use and misuse of symbols, I pressed Aek on these 
“unintended consequences” of the Dhara Dhevi‟s plan. He demurred for a while, and 
then offered me an indirect answer: “We just tell people the teachings of the Buddha, 
about doing what is right, and thinking about the consequences.”  
For Aek, the Dhara Dhevi‟s décor was not “right” for a reason he could not 
exactly articulate, yet echoed nationalism, a fear of globalization, and an assertion of a 
certain kind of Buddhist belief. The perceived undermining of Buddhist symbols, as in 
the case of the Dhara Dhevi or the jatukarm amulets – the latter having a long 
pedigree in , is something which Aek identifies as foreign, or at least foreign-inspired, 
a feature which resonates with Kasian‟s (2002) Thai “postmodern”. But what is 
significant here is that the “consequences” that Aek perceives as stemming from 
improper use of Chiang Mai‟s symbols has repercussions on the city itself. 
 The work of art in Walter Benjamin‟s famous article has its “aura” – that 
quality which grants it charismatic power - diminished through replication (1968:222). 
But this is not always the case in Thailand – Buddha images often replicate themselves 
through mystical means, and monks are themselves supposedly living replications of 
the Buddha. Rather than the replication losing power, there remains a link of 
sympathetic magic between the source of power (e.g. the Buddha) and its 
representation (e.g. an image), and the concern is not the spread of the image, but 
damage to its reproduction which could be visited upon the original. I discussed such a 
system in chapter five, above, in relation to the city – the city is a mirror of the 
heavens and by being so, it captures some of the divine power of the gods (albeit 
imperfectly, being an imperfect reproduction). In fact, Thongchai argues that the 
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attention towards reproducing Western forms by late 19
th
- and early 20
th
-century 
Siamese elites was a similar process of attempting to appropriate the mystical power 
of the colonizer (Thongchai 2000a:539).   
Yet damaging the image – even a mass-produced image – in this system has 
negative effects upon the source‟s ability to manifest its power. This fear of a 
diminished prosperity owing to the damaging of the perceived sources of prosperity is 
what lies behind Aek‟s discomfort with the Dhara Dhevi, and in fact lies behind the 
fear involved with other symbols: the moving of the statue of Khuba Siwichai away 
from the line of pubs in Prasertland (see chapter one), the lynching of a man who 
destroyed the Erawan shrine to Brahma in Bangkok in 2006, and Thailand‟s harsh 
lèse-majesté laws – a fear that the misuse of symbols damages the baaramii of the 
original and removes its ability to attract. 
 But the Dhara Dhevi and other such “Lanna style” projects are not always 
examples of Thais “selling off their culture” as Aek would have it. In fact, those 
promoting and building “Lanna style” areas have their own idea – like Aek – of the 
possibility of a culture-driven utopia, albeit one which is commensurable with their 
own lifestyle. Indeed, many of those whom Aek might accuse of misappropriating 
symbols see themselves as defenders of Lanna art and culture - both Aek and those 
whom he criticizes are each attempting to manage and control the representation of 
images of the Lanna past. 
Lanna style 
Peleggi suggests that the growth of manufactured past nostalgia in Thailand 
reflects an anxiety about the future of the country and the future of Thainess – i.e. as 
Thailand‟s future becomes less certain (for instance, after the economic crash or as the 
problem of royal succession looms ever nearer), there is an urge to revitalize that 
inchoate quality that could in turn revitalize the country (Peleggi 1996:434). The 
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concern over the promotion and reconstruction of watthanatham make this linkage 
more than implicit: the utilization of the past (for tourist purposes or through the 
utilitarian idea of “local knowledge”) will lead to jaroen, but in instances where the 
past fails to match the ideal jaroen image, the past needs to be improved upon (recall 
the Culture Ministry‟s goal to “revive” and “improve” watthanatham that I cite in 
chapter two, above). This formulation is similar to Askew‟s (1996) description, 
discussed further in chapter six, above, of how the Thai government focused upon 
building the moradok [heritage] of Rattanakosin Island (in Bangkok) to the detriment 
of the yaan [neighborhood]. Bangkok favored a monumental approach, clearing out 
“crowded” yaan to better make room for national heritage (Askew 1996:203 – recall 
the parallels between 19
th
-century urban planners and the desire to “hygienically” 
remake the city, discussed in chapter six, above) – heritage and history are fuel for 
jaroen, but they need to be refined and purged of those elements which are perceived 
to be impure or retrogressive by those in power first. 
The new re-imagining of Lanna as, in Peleggi‟s words, “manufactured past 
nostalgia” is often termed “Lanna Style:” ลา้นนาสไตล.์ This phrase is repeated in 
glossy coffee-table books - e.g. Lanna Style (Ping 2000), Lanna Renaissance 
(Cummings 2006) - occasionally in magazines such as HIP or Compass, as well as 
shopping spaces in the city. In these spaces and texts, “Lanna Style” is manifest in 
architecture and home décor. The term itself remains vague – in Lanna Style, a glossy 
coffee-table book, William Warren defines Lanna as “a subtle blend of many 
ingredients, some of them stretching back into the realm of legend, others of 
comparatively recent discovery” (Ping 2000:14). Here, Lanna is something which is 
always inherent in the landscape: old elements are mystically “legend,” while newer 
elements are themselves not new, but “discovered.” Something which is “discovered” 
has always been present, latent. It is, in short, the opposite of an “invention.” Lanna 
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Renaissance is a similar book, a collaboration between the Dhara Dhevi‟s marketing 
wing and Joe Cummings, a writer for the Lonely Planet line of travel books. It features 
large, glossy pictures of dancing, crafts, and festivals, albeit dancing, crafts, and 
festivals conducted by professional re-enactors at the hotel for the benefit of its guests. 
It is Lanna codified, museum-ized, and put on show. 
While the Dhara Dhevi portrays an allochronous, exotic mountain paradise for 
its tourist guests, middle-class publications aimed at Thais perform parallel edits with 
different results. “Chiang Mai: New City or Old City [เชียงใหม่: เมืองใหม่หรือเมืองเก่า-  
chiang mai: meuang mai reu meuang gao]?” asks an article in Lanna @ Home 
magazine. The article goes through a brief chronicle-based history of the city from the 
Lawa to the present (very similar to the one presented in the national museum 
discussed above) and features large, glossy images of the สืบชะตาเมือง - seup chataa 
meuang ceremony, with white-clad government officials and yellow-shirt wearing 
attendants – a careful editing out of the spirit medium festivals occurring at the same 
time and in the same places, but one that serves the purpose of re-casting “Lanna” as 
something orderly, clean, and civilized 
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 In an interview with the director of Chiang Mai University‟s Craft and Design 
Service Center (CDSC), an organization based on promoting and selling the “Lanna 
Brand” (in English), he described the organization‟s goal as making Lanna less of an 
ethnic\national entity [ชาติธรรม - chatitham] and more of a cultural\stylistic one, 
something which could be applied to a commodity: according to the CDSC‟s press 
release, “this development is fundamentally built upon the cultural cost (or capital) of 
Lanna in order to design such craft products that will be highly acceptable both 
domestically and internationally” (ThaiPR.net 2009). The CDSC then marketed a 
number of products – furniture, mostly (see figure 19) – which exhibited this “Lanna 
Brand” or “Lanna Style.” Marketing these products involved, according to the director, 
rendering products symbolically palatable to both an international and domestic 
Figure 19: "Lanna style" furniture, Chiang Mai University. 
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audience. When I brought up the topic of those elements of “Lanna Style” which had 
been protested by Chiang Mai activists as culturally inappropriate (such as the Dhara 
Dhevi hotel), he offered examples of home décor where a woman‟s skirt hem [ซ่ิน- sin 
– often in Northern and Laotian skirts the most embellished] had been used as a 
decoration above the head of the bed. Naporn cited this as an example of the inversion 
of high and low - kheut, and incommensurable with local values (the same design was 
used to decorate the roofline of the Airport Plaza shopping mall – see below).  
But even with the attention towards the CDSC‟s interpretation of “local values,” 
the CDSC‟s products received a great deal of criticism - said one young architect 
about the CDSC, “it looks like Lanna but it costs 700 baht or more [about twenty 
dollars].” Academics such as Thanet Jaroenmeuang also criticized the trend towards 
marketing a lanna phaanit [ลา้นนาพาณิชย์ -  commercial Lanna, to be compared with the 
term for “commercial Buddhism,” phuttha phaanit, พุทธพาณิชย ์– see Jackson 1998 or 
Pattana 2005 for more on this] (Thanet 2004:114), but the CDSC is only one point in a 
larger trend to market and sell the cultural capital of Lanna to consumers both foreign 
and domestic. Lanna as a stylistic brand was present across the city, in venues both 
large and small, but here I focus upon two of the large shopping malls in Chiang Mai: 
Kaad
185
 Suan Kaew [กาดสวนแกว้] and the Aiport Plaza, both of which feature an 
internal section specifically dedicated to “Lanna style” products.  
Northern Markets 
 The former structure, Kaad Suan Kaew, was built during the height of the 
economic boom in Thailand and was a utopian structure aiming to produce, as its 
designer stated, “a new legend [tamnaan] in Lanna.” The massive red-brick structure 
dominated the skyline just beyond Hua Rin corner and had within it, aside from the 
shopping mall, over ten stories of offices, a conference center, a luxury hotel, several 
                                                 
185
 Kaad is the Northern Thai term for “market.” Kaad Suan Kaew means “The Crystal Garden Market.” 
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restaurants, and an all-teak theater for stage productions. It was meant to be an 
example of a place which is both Lanna and modern – in the entranceway lies a shrine 
to Chiang Mai‟s “Three Kings,” and in the central courtyard, a giant sculpture of a 
naga winds its way in and out of a fountain.Yet, as I explore in chapter six, like so 
much other construction in the city, Kaad Suan Kaew fell victim to the economic crisis. 
Although the structure remained the fashionable center of Chiang Mai for a time after 
the economic crisis (until the new Aiport Plaza mall was built), nearly half of the 
floors and a large number of the stores were never filled and remain empty today.  
 In the center of Kaad Suan Kaew is kaad meuang [กาดเมือง], a market devoted 
to selling Lanna style goods. What constitutes a “Lanna” product is up for debate – 
potential vendors must prove that their goods are “Northern” with the floor supervisor 
– but include the sorts of goods sold in the more tourist-oriented Night Bazaar or 
weekly walking street [ถนนคนเดิน - thanon khon deun]: portraits of the Buddha, t-
shirts with Northern writing, silk scarves, incense and candles, silverwork. In the 
direct center of the market are food stalls selling local dishes (e.g. khao soi, ขา้วซอย, 
thick egg noodles in spicy curry identified with Northern Thailand, but also commonly 
eaten in Burma‟s Shan states). Around the perimeter of this area other, non-Lanna 
related, stalls have begun to encroach: gold sellers or mobile phone outlets.  
 The newer Aiport Plaza mall was built near Chiang Mai‟s small airport as the 
next step up from Kaad Suan Kaew, albeit with a less grand vision. The mall ran into 
trouble towards the end of its construction, as local officials protested its concrete and 
glass façade. Doi, an architect with the Chiang Mai Architects‟ Collaborative 
described the protest as this: “as a significant building along an entrance into the city 
of Chiang Mai – the road from the airport, the mall must ohk ekkalak lanna [ออก
เอกลกัษณ์ลา้นนา - bring out the identity of Lanna] more than a standard glass block 
would.” In response, the mall put tile patterns that matched the brocade patterns at the 
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base of a Lanna woman‟s skirt  across the roofline and marked each section of its 
parking garage with a different Chiang Mai symbol – golden fingernail extensions, the 
kalae [กาแล, crossed gables on the roof of a Northern house], wind-rung bells hung 
from temple rafters. While these efforts satisfied some, Doi remarked that the choice 
of a woman‟s skirt pattern for the top of the mall was particularly poor, as women‟s 
feet are, in traditional cosmology, the most polluting part of the body.
186
  Yet the fact 
that the building was constructed with this design shows how far Lanna imagery has 
come – what was dangerous to some was a marker of culture to others. 
                                                 
186
 This is nowhere more clearly evinced than in the YouTube videos of the king‟s portrait underneath a 
pair of female feet. These videos caused YouTube to be banned in Thailand and calls for the trial and 
prosecution of the video‟s creator. The Lanna skirt, however, is far enough removed from the everyday 
lives of the architects and most shoppers so as to simply be associated with “Lanna” and not “feet.” 
Figure 20: Banner advertising the "Northern" section of the shopping mall. 
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In further attempts to make the Airport Mall more “Lanna,” it has a similar 
section: the “Northern Village”. Northern Village is the more upscale verson of kaad 
meuang, in a teak-colored area separated off from the tile-and-glass mall. Entering 
Northern Village is entering a zone free from the pop music and bustle of the mall and 
moving into an area where soft music plays over the PA system and the crowds of 
shoppers moving from department store to electronics store gives way to a nearly 
empty two-story cluster of vendors. The space is laid out to give the feeling of a 
traditional market – the wood-paneled floor rises at points and winds back to simulate 
wandering through narrow alleyways. In the back, near the exit, there is an outlet of 
Doi Chaang coffee, with its logo of a turbaned hill tribesman.  
In the banner advertisement for the Northern Village (figure 20), note the 
combination of international, cosmopolitan and “Lanna” symbols. The model is 
extremely pale, with partially European features. She is wearing a fur collar atop a 
shirt evocative of a Karen villager‟s shirt. While the English slogan advertises 
“Contemporary Thai Arts and Crafts,” the Thai slogan reads in a slightly more 
sensuous manner: “Charm; handicrafts of many time periods. [It] gives [you] 
fascination… [you will] want to touch/experience.” The image of the tribal-yet-
European, sexualized Northern woman recalls my discussion of Northern 
representations in chapter four, above.  
 The goods in Northern Village also reflect a hybrid form. Here, as in kaad 
meuang, vendors must promote themselves as being specifically Northern. This allows 
for some semiotic slippage, as one vendor explained regarding her temari [手まり – 
the word is Japanese, not Thai]. A temari is a traditional Japanese hand ball, originally 
made from kimono scraps for children to play with but later becoming art objects. The 
Northern Village vendor was selling these as “Thai temari”[เตมารี] - indeed, a temari 
presented as a product explicitly marked as “Japanese” would not have been able to be 
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sold in the Northern Village section as, like in Kaad Suan Kaew, the products must be 
“Lanna.” What, then, made these temari Thai or, as she suggested, “Lanna?”187 “I am 
Thai,” the vendor explained, “and I am living now in Chiang Mai. So now when I 
make these temari, I make them in a Thai way [แบบไทย - baep thai].” She did not 
elaborate on what “a Thai way” was; instead, she simply reiterated that she was, 
indeed, a Thai person. Here, ethnicity and the fact that the vendor lives in Chiang Mai, 
not any connection to tradition or a specific stylistic invention, removes the national 
“Japanese” label from the temari and makes them, according to her, a local, Lanna, art 
form. 
 Such an explanation – “Thainess” being something invisible yet available 
simply by articulating that it exists, runs very close to Kasian Tejapira‟s 
characterization of „the postmodern of Thainess” (Kasian 2002). Kasian characterizes 
Thainess in its “fossilized form” as “ripped away from its traditional social contexts, 
deprived of its aura and turned into a free-floating signifier which can then be 
commodified by goods of any nationality” (Kasian 2002:215). However, Kasian‟s 
analysis implies a previously-existing pure state of Thainess (a creature must have 
once been alive in order to end up a fossil), where Thainess had an “aura” in 
Benjamin‟s formulation – my analysis in previous chapters suggests that, while certain 
entities had an aura of baaramii (the city, for instance, or other habitations of spirits) 
at one time or another, the national ethnic community – the population imagined as 
such – did not. “Thainess” and “Lanna” both are recent inventions, and what aura 
existed before (fetishized as the supernatural power of the city, for instance) was a 
continually changing entity.  
 While the temari vendor‟s specific explanation might have been forced owing 
to her need to highlight “local” aspects to her products in order to obtain a stall in the 
                                                 
187
 While her temari were explicitly labeled as “Thai,” she freely used “Lanna” as a synonym of “Thai.” 
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Northern Village – other vendors offered similar explanations. Nu, a woman who sold 
higher-end clothing in a mixture of “Lanna” and contemporary or contemporary Asian 
styles, explained the process of negotiation between being “local” and being 
cosmopolitan: in order to sell goods in Northern Village, “you have to have something 
to do with local products and local culture. But if we were to sell people things which 
were in a very local style [พื้นเมืองดิบๆ - pheun meuang dip dip – lit. “raw”], they 
wouldn‟t like it so much, so we have to mix things together [ผสมประสาน - phasom 
prasaan]. For instance, we might take a Lanna pattern or cloth and make a kimono out 
of it, like that. Here is just such a thing [she flipped through a rack of clothing]. And 
here are some local cloth patterns and we‟ve made a Chinese-style shirt out of it.” 
 Nu‟s products anticipate the fact that her customers – by her estimates half 
farang and half Thai “from another province” – are not actually interested in “raw” 
goods, but rather want something similar to what they know or what they expect - in 
Nash‟s terms, they must show “compatibility with metropolitan dreams” (Nash 
1977:38), or, in Nidthi‟s terms, they present an image of difference (Nidthi uses the 
term khwaam pen meuang nohk  - “foreign-meuang-ness”) which is different, but not 
too different from what the [Bangkokian] consumer expects (Nidthi in Nathakaan 
2001:14). But these alterations, according to Nu and the temari seller, can be made 
“Lanna style” without damaging the content of “Lanna” or showing divisions between 
“Lanna style” and middle-class aesthetics. In this way, these new inventions are 
examples of watthanatham in its sense of a progress and orientation towards the 
assimilation of foreign and new goods. They highlight the unproblematic way in 
which invented traditions become read as “Lanna”. 
 Such a configuration helps to illuminate what Lefebvre remarks as a change of 
the city – Lefebvre‟s oeuvre – from a lived-in space into “place of consumption and 
consumption of place” (1996:73). This assimilation and the turning of Lanna from a 
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designation of a folk art or lived-in community into a luxury good or place for 
consumption was also evident in the several expensive home-furnishing markets that 
opened up during 2005 and 2006 in Chiang Mai – a boom that parallels and is in fact 
linked to the boom and bust in the luxury condominium and home market discussed in 
chapter six. JJ Market (referencing, but not to be confused with the massive jatujak 
weekend market in Bangkok) was a series of white buildings located inside the ring 
road but outside of the walled city. It specialized in art objects and home furnishings, 
and despite having been open for nearly a year, was only rougly half-full when during 
my fieldwork. JJ Market was one of a number of similar entitites, including Chaiyo 
Plaza, Nimman Promenade, Kaad Klang Wiang (taking a term for an old central 
market), etc. 
 JJ Market, like the Airport Plaza‟s Northern Village, was designed to evoke a 
small-town market feeling (albeit with a different aesthetic than the Northern Village – 
whereas the latter was low lighting, teak-colored floors, and “traditional” music, JJ 
market featured white concrete, green lawns, and jazz music) yet with the orderliness 
and rationality that comes with modernity. It had originally been built to sell high-end 
artwork and home furnishings, but, according to the owner, had been forced to allow 
restaurants and pubs to rent space, too. Façades in white concrete and glass bordered 
the roadside: a pub, a Japanese restaurant, outlets of the royally-owned franchises Doi 
Tung Coffee and the clothing store Mae Fah Luang. Inside the stores, the floors were 
poured concrete, light music was playing, and tables were metal and glass. Through 
these stores, one came into the main body of the market. Here, white concrete square 
houses stood out in stark contrast with the green, close-cropped lawn, split on occasion 
by a concrete walkway. In the center of the market, there was a sala [ศาลา - pavilion], 
designed to evoke a Northern temple – open on all sides, but with a cool breeze and a 
tiered roof. Around the sala, pipes sprayed a cool mist, although inside the sala the 
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floor was unfurnished and featureless – while the place was a cool respite from the 
heat, there was absolutely nothing inside. JJ was predominately quiet – the 
coffeehouse played bossa nova or light jazz softly, and inside the market, one moves 
largely in silence from places with soft recorded music (jazz, or “Lanna” style 
traditional music from antiques stores) or muted sounds from the nearby road. 
The owner of the complex was a Bangkok-born, American-educated woman 
who admitted that the business was not what she had hoped for, but after they had 
allowed pubs to rent out space, business had recovered somewhat and now had a 
brighter future. Yet a coffee-shop owner who had moved his shop out of the complex 
after only a few months vented his own frustrations about the market, claiming that the 
market simply sold high-end goods from the nearby Baan Tawai handicrafts center 
and did not have enough variety to sustain customers‟ interest – “at first it was full,” 
he said, referring to the rental of vendors‟ booths, “but after a short time people started 
to leave. We couldn‟t pay the rent, it was so much! And all the stores sold the same 
things. Now, I don‟t know what they‟ll do.” He had closed his shop in JJ Market, and 
opened it further south, on the road leading towards the Ratchaphreuk floral 
expedition, another site where the new image of Chiang Mai was being actively 
created and promoted (which I detail below). 
 Part of the problem was that a number of other shopping complexes had 
opened with the same business model – taking expensive woodcarvings and other 
goods from local outlets (especially the massive Baan Tawai woodcraft market) and 
bringing them together to sell in a location with higher-quality architecture and 
presentation. Indeed, a number of these places had the same architectural aesthetic as 
JJ Market, such as Kaad Farang. This market in particular had a rather unfortunate 
name. Kaad is the Northern Thai term for “market,” and farang, as mentioned above, 
is the term for “white person,” but also means “guava” in Central Thai (makuai 
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[หมะก๊วย] means “guava” in Northern, although the word occasionally is pronounced 
baak guai or bak kluai). I joked to the manager that, for the sake of consistency, the 
name should be kaad makuai, to say “Guava Market” in one language rather than 
having “market” in local dialect and “guava” in Bangkok dialect. “No, it doesn‟t mean 
„guava!‟” said the manager, missing my joke and being earnest. “Farang has another 
meaning, you know… It means a person like you [a Caucasian]! It is called kaad 
farang because we want Caucasians to come!” Having a market where farang came 
would be a coup for the place – foreigners brought money but also prestige, as many 
of my friends joked when I joined them on social occasions: “Oh! Now we go inter 
[using the English words, by which they mean “we have become international”].” The 
owners had hoped that by explicitly terming the space as a place for foreigners, it 
would attract these foreigners and wealthy Thais to shop there (although perhaps 
failing to realize that such explicit labeling might be considered off-putting to foreign 
shoppers). 
In contrast to these newly re-imagined spaces of Lanna consumption, I 
compare an older re-imagined space of Lanna consumption: kaad luang [กาดหลวง - 
“the great market”] in Chiang Mai‟s Chinatown. A massive concrete structure built in 
the 1950s with three floors and a (now-defunct) escalator connecting them, Kaad 
luang must have been impressive when it was built. In truth, kaad luang comprises 
two markets: Talaat Waorot which is across the street from Talaat Ton Lamyai
188
. 
Surrounding the two identical buildings and stretching towards the north are fruit 
vendors and other food vendors, technically also part of the “great market.” 
One arrives at Kaad Luang a variety of ways, but the long line of red pickup 
truck taxis outside attests to its dependence on public – rather than personal - 
                                                 
188
 Note the difference in dialect between the informal name, using the local kaad, and the official name, 
using the Central talaat [ตลาด]. The local dialect‟s use in the 1950s, the era in which the markets were 
constructed, was discouraged.  
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transportation
189
. Red trucks take customers to and from local spots within Chiang Mai, 
yellow trucks go north towards Mae Rim, white trucks, green trucks, and blue trucks 
all head out in different directions: and most leave from Kaad Luang. Exiting the truck, 
the visitor is suddenly in a nest of stalls with their entrances on the road (without the 
air conditioning so prevalent in JJ Market). Outside, one smells the smells of the 
street: the odors of sewage seep up from openings in the street, dirty water (coming 
from the nearby Mae Kha river), and above all, the exhaust of all of those trucks. 
During the rainy season, runoff pours from the rooftops, making certain places along 
the pavement prone to showers of rain water, causing navigation along the outside 
dangerous.  
The openings of the two markets appear cavelike – dark, cool, and quieter after 
the loud street, making entering the main market a relief. Goods line either side of the 
path, as do shoppers, and one is therefore always navigating around people moving 
back and forth (a far cry from JJ Market‟s uncluttered space). Around the edges – near 
the entrance – vendors sell umbrellas (functional, not decorative), plastic tins, 
specialty outfits (such as costumes for traditional dancers), pillows and the like. Then, 
the tight and dark lane opens into a large central space, open all three floors. The 
vendors, sitting on small chairs in circles around shared plates of food, chat with each 
other in a dialect that is, unlike JJ Market, overwhelmingly Northern in inflection. In 
the very center there is a pit with foods: curry powders, sausages, meat products [ไส้อัว่ 
- sai oua], dried fish, and the like, all spread in the open under the lights as vendors 
swat away the flies. From the food court to the center of the food sales section, the 
market acquires a pickled, sour smell from the preserved goods.  
                                                 
189
 The taxis are not in fact public, but in the absence of a wide-ranging bus system are the most 
common means of transporation for those without their own vehicles. They are “public” in the way that 
a New York City cab is public. 
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The clientele of Kaad Luang is mixed. While the central floor sells many 
varieties of Northern foodstuffs, most of my Northern informants identified those 
sections of Kaad Luang as a place for shoppers from elsewhere in Thailand. “Why 
would I go over there to get sai oua?” said Ja, a woman in her thirties, “when I know 
that it is fresh at the local market down the road? You go there to get things that you 
can‟t get anywhere else – clothes maybe, cloth, school uniforms, those kinds of things.” 
She also cited shopping at Kaad Luang for a “Lanna”-style outfit for her workplace‟s 
mandatory Friday “local dress” rule, where employees had to wear clothes that were 
“Northern” in style in the way re-imagined by Kraisri (see chapter three, above).   
 Recalling the division between the Boi Luang and Dhara Dhevi that I 
mentioned in chapter six, above, Kaad Luang was intended to be a modern fixture to 
be contrasted with JJ Market‟s postmodern aesthetic. The explosion of the latter across 
the city during the early 2000s reflects the deep feeling of hope which businesspeople 
had in the market for luxury goods, especially luxury home furnishings, in the North. 
As the decade progressed, these places shrank, leaving ruins of white concrete and 
once-manucured lawns in their wake. 
Constructing new spaces and images 
Aroon Puritat, writing in the journal of the Association of Siamese Architects, 
neatly lays out the architectural crisis confronting Chiang Mai. According to Aroon, 
the influx of different consumer groups – laborers, expatriates, artists (who come 
seeking nature and peace, but with it the urban convenience that their lifestyle 
requires), etc. -  has all led to a growth of an “‟individualistic‟ quality” (Aroon 
2007:32) in the psyche of Chiang Mai residents, even as Chiang Mai‟s architecture 
acquires a more and more historical image. Aroon means that he perceives a shift in 
the way of life from a city where strangers often interacted with each other towards 
one where individuals existed alone (and which Aroon identifies with an “American” 
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way of life) (ibid). This atomization of the population is most evident in the growth of 
planned communities along new major highways around the city, and, according to 
Aroon, even state or city projects centered on the creation of commercial space, such 
as the weekly walking street, do not do allow for a space where the “public” as such 
can truly gather (ibid).  
In late 2007, I attended a conference in Chiang Mai University about the future 
of local architecture. The conference featured a panel of young architects based in 
Chiang Mai and their debate about the future of Chiang Mai architecture. Before the 
panel was to open and during the question session after the keynote speech, a middle-
aged architect – older and less stylishly-dressed than those on stage - leapt up from the 
front row and grabbed the microphone. He pulled it close to his mouth, causing his 
voice to boom out across the lecture hall. While the moderator stood close to reclaim 
the microphone, he allowed the man to speak. 
 “I have been deceived [หลอก - lohk – incidentally the same word for “to haunt,” 
as a ghost] by my teachers!” he cried, speaking, as all of the architects did, in the 
Central dialect. “They should have told me that I have only three options: to study 
abroad, to go to work in Bangkok, or to be a teacher. But instead I tried to be an 
architect here in Chiang Mai. It‟s a deception [again, lohk]! It‟s so hard to find work, 
and what work you do find doesn‟t pay! Now people always use modern styles [of 
architecture]. Who knows Lanna-ness [ความเป็นคนลา้นนา - khwaam pen khon lanna] or 
Thai-ness more than us? We have had seven hundred years to develop our architecture, 
why do we now have to follow trends from Caucasians [farang]? Local architects 
don‟t do anything for the local society!” 
 After this, the moderator reclaimed the microphone and the man sat down. The 
session continued, ignoring the man‟s comments.  The panel turned first to the idea of 
Lanna, or, rather, to the Lanna “brand,” as the moderator put it in English (notably 
 317 
 
different from the older architect‟s more nationalistically-framed “khwaam pen khon 
lanna”). The first respondent groaned: “Lanna is boring!” he complained [เร่ืองลา้นนา
น่าเบ่ือ - reuang lanna na beua]. Other architects responded with similar complaints: 
“Lanna architecture,” said one man in his late twenties, “is a metaphor for Thai people 
– the face is first, the substance is second.190 You want Lanna? Put a kalae [crossed 
gables] on it. Finished! Modern? Traditional? It‟s all the same!” 
 Other speakers expressed a similar level of frustration with the idea of Lanna 
architecture. An architectural engineer in his late twenties – Ger - discussed khwaam 
pen chiang mai: “Khwaam pen [the essence; something-ness] reflects the life of 
people in that age. … Look at the space, the function, the culture [watthanatham]. It‟s 
up to the owner to decide how he wants to be. Are we modern or Lanna? We‟re not 
modern. We‟re  Chiang Mai people [คนเชียงใหม่ – khon chiang mai]. The designs that 
we‟re doing will reflect this time in our history.” 
 Ger earlier had characterized his desire for Chiang Mai to be considered not 
phumiphak [ภูมิภาค - provincial], but buriphak [บุรีภาค - an urban region] and thus 
connected to international discourses and international trends. Ger felt pressure from 
both inside and outside of the architectural discipline to reproduce traditional styles 
and his architectural projects resisted those trends. He asked rhetorically, “why can 
other people do it [make modern architecture] and Chiang Mai can‟t?” 
  Ger had his critics, though, at the conference and elsewhere. A professor of 
architecture (and mutual friend) criticized Ger‟s approach to me over coffee later, 
remarking that Ger‟s idea of a modern Chiang Mai architecture was simply concrete 
and glass construction, and disregarded the long history of craftsmanship in the 
Chiang Mai population. Another architect at the conference more obliquely critiqued 
this aspect of Ger‟s stance as being based on international trends in architecture (of 
                                                 
190
 ปากเป็นเอก เลขเป็นโท - Paak pen aek, lek pen tho: literally “Mouth is one, numbers are two”. 
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which Germany and Japan were the examples given), and in response he called for a 
new, uniquely local architecture: “What‟s used in Germany or Japan is mua [มัว่ - 
inappropriate, ugly, a thing which is out of place]! … There is a hierarchy – like in 
fashion! Instead, we have to understand our own standards! What should we develop 
[พฒันา - pattana]? What can we develop?” 
 Another architect chimed in on the call for a new architecture that was both 
modern and “Lanna” – calling for, as do mediums, a connection between past and 
future ways of being. He cited the CDSC and their “Lanna Brand” line of furniture 
and other goods as a place to begin thinking about re-branding Lanna: “The other day 
I went to the CDSC to see what they had. I saw their chair and thought: „would I sit in 
this chair?‟ I don‟t know; it looked a little old. [That being said,] we have to do like 
them, only better. What we have to remember is that something really, really Lanna 
[ลา้นนามากๆ - lanna maak maak] might not be appropriate [for the consumer‟s 
lifestyle]. Like the old wooden houses that let the wind in – they‟re really hot! An old 
leaf roof – it lets the rain in! It‟s not our generation; it must reflect our own life.”  
 This architect and the angry architect from the beginning of the conference 
highlight divisions within the architectural community surrounding the creation of a 
new image for the city. While the older architect – not among those invited to be on 
stage - affirms a value in Lanna architecture and khwaam pen lanna that is founded in 
its history, he is vague on the specifics – what exactly does he mean by Lanna? How 
would one recognize “Lanna” architecture as opposed to “farang” architecture? 
Indeed, one of the architects on stage criticizes the empty repetition of “Lanna” in 
forms such as the kalae. Yet the angry man‟s expression of his feeling of loss in 
modern architecture (“I have been tricked! ... Why do we have to follow trends from 
Caucasians?”) points to the fact that, despite these younger architects on stage‟s 
affirmation that architecture must “reflect our own life”, this is a life which is an 
 319 
 
individualized thing, without a contribution to a greater society – as the older man says 
“local architects don‟t do anything for the local society!” 
Creating a new city 
 The Nimmanhaemin Arts & Design Promenade (NAP)
191
 takes place once a 
year in the first lane of Nimmanhaemin Road (described above) and caters to the well-
heeled Thai and expatriate community. It consists of a row of stalls operated by local 
vendors, some live music (jazz, in 2006 and 2007
192
), and a beer garden. Merchandise 
for sale features local art (ศิลป - sinlapa - explicitly not local handicraft [หตัถกรรม - 
hatthakam]) such as carved wooden frames, modern-style silverwork, herbal and 
organic lotions and insect repellant, as well as goods imported from other parts of the 
world (e.g. India). Also featured are corporate sponsors both domestic and foreign (e.g. 
Nokia).  
 I first met Joe and Dao at NAP in 2006, where they were sitting drinking beer 
and smoking a nargile
193
 along with a group of their friends at a stall specializing in 
selling artistic lamps of paper and wood (Joe‟s creations) and home furnishings from 
India (which La, Joe‟s friend, had imported). Surprised to see a water pipe outside of 
Arabic parts of Bangkok, I struck up a conversation with the group and they invited 
me to sit down with them.  
 Joe was in his late thirties and lived – as I mention above - in the fashionable 
Mae Sa suburb of Chiang Mai with Ian, his British partner, where he claimed that he 
was the only person on his street with the commoner title naai [นาย - Mister] – 
                                                 
191
 Not to be confused with Nimman Promenade, a luxury outdoor shopping area across the street which 
I mention in comparison with JJ Market, above. 
192
 The connection between jazz and these spaces is not a trivial one. As the favorite music of Rama IX, 
the current (as of 2010) Thai monarch, an appreciation for jazz music becomes a way for middle and 
upper-class Thais to display their monarchical piety. 
193
 An Arabic water pipe (nargile or sheesha in the Middle or Near East, hookah in South Asia).  
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everyone else had some sort of (Central Thai) royal title.
194
 His home included a 
studio for his artwork (the aforementioned lamps, but also several paintings and 
sketches given to local magazines). Living in Bangkok and having been raised there, 
he had developed a pain in his side, and upon going to the hospital had been told that it 
came from not inhaling deeply enough, at which point Joe realized that he had been 
stifling himself with Bangkok‟s congested air.195 Accordingly, he moved to the North, 
and although he did not regret the move, he would often reminisce to me about how 
many celebrities or fashionable places he knew back in Bangkok.  
 What brought Joe, a visual artist; Dao, a flamenco dancer; La, the owner of a 
spa; and their friends (DJs, professors, young lesser royalty, etc) together was a close-
knit sense of being members of an avant-garde social elite, a group which was 
organized around certain sections of the city and specific sites and gatherings in much 
the same way as that of the spirit mediums. Different disconnected sites – bars, 
galleries, shopping centers, and coffeeshops – were places where members of this 
group not only socialized and patronized, but in some cases built and owned. These 
places were the central points out of which Joe‟s new image of Chiang Mai as a 
modern, artistic paradise emerged, an image that, as I detail below, has its genealogy 
both back in Wichit‟s characterization of the North as being more authentically “Thai” 
as well as being somehow intrinsically “international” (สากล - sakhorn - a phrase that, 
as I mention above in reference to the cataloging of films, is used synonymously with 
“Western”). 
 Before I delve into an analysis of this “new” Chiang Mai, I must first describe 
the networks which produce it. The sheer number of visual artists and writers aids in 
                                                 
194
 Thai royal names and titles are of many different types – not surprising given that, until the 20th 
century, Thai kings often had eighty or so children. Further swelling the ranks of the royals is the 
system of granting royal titles to commoners of distinction.  
195
 Here, I cite this not as medical fact, but to show how Joe framed Bangkok as a polluted, diseased 
place. 
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this – the “new” Chiang Mai has a long history of documentation in independent 
magazines and websites. Chief among these is the mostly Thai-language HIP – a 
monthly collection of photography, art, fiction, and reviews of local social spaces 
published by Khanasa, a local mogul and owner of a trendy bar of the same name. The 
artists that HIP highlights are normally those who engage in internationally-focused, 
cosmopolitan pursuits. In the June 2009 edition, for instance, the magazine profiled an 
artist who built marionettes, the owner of a flute studio, and the general manager of a 
hotel (HIP 2009). What makes HIP and its readers so unique in Thailand is that its 
kind does not exist elsewhere in the country outside of Bangkok – a young, urban elite 
population with aspirations of bohemian and avant-garde lifestyle is simply absent 
from Khon Kaen, Hat Yai, Khorat, or any of Thailand‟s other large cities (although 
Phuket has had some growth of an upper-class Thai avant-garde). Indeed, such an idea 
– of a “HIP Khon Kaen” – received mocking laughs when I asked about it to Joe‟s 
circle of friends. Chiang Mai occupies a certain space, one where urbanity can exist 
outside of the primate city, where there remains a certain attractive power – a charm – 
to the city despite its non-centrality in national affairs. Bangkok is certainly the 
charismatic center of Thailand, but Chiang Mai alone amongst Thailand‟s other cities 
retains an ability to be a center of attractive charisma - that quality which, it should be 
remembered, was the defining principle of the meuang. Here, HIP and its readers are 
those who – like the mediums – are active in creating and promoting this sense of 
attraction, this insubstantial quality which brings people and prosperity to the city. 
 After a certain period of time spent reading HIP, Compass, and other such 
magazines (e.g. Citylife) and living in the spaces around Nimmanhaemin road, I began 
to notice common elements of the built and social landscapes repeating themselves. 
Places detailed in HIP or Compass would often contain buildings constructed by 
Tong‟s architecture firm or feature art by some of Joe‟s friends. For instance, a section 
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in HIP on “Coffee in Chiang Mai” describes a number of coffee shops along 
Nimmanhaemin Road (some of which are detailed in chapters one and six, above) 
(HIP 2006: 36-7). In the same issue, the reviewers look at a new club in JJ Market 
(also detailed above), and a birthday party held at the Dhara Dhevi resort (ibid 18, 28, 
29). The image presented is one of newness: bar openings, club openings, and coffee 
shop openings. The city, according to HIP, is a steady stream of opening space – new 
construction, new surfaces, and new creation are the defining features of Chiang Mai, 
all of which stand in sharp contrast to the closing spaces that I discuss in chapter six, 
above. Also in the forefront of HIP‟s image is the idea of Chiang Mai as an artistic 
community: each issue profiles a different artist living in Chiang Mai, constructing the 
image of a sophisticated urban artistic community. In short, HIP becomes a who‟s who 
of the fashion scene in Chiang Mai: the list of fashionable places and trendy bars. Here, 
art, architecture, and business were in seamless lockstep: a creation of smooth, poured-
concrete artists‟ galleries which doubled as boutique hotels, expensive shops, or 
coffeehouses. 
 Yet the expansion of a new, hypercapitalist artists‟ aesthetic in Chiang Mai 
was not without criticism from artistic or architectural circles. Criticism often centered 
on these new spaces‟ perceived obsession with image over substance – Mak, an 
aspiring architect, frowned across the street at the crowd at Khanasa‟s bar: “[the 
clientele] all dress like famous people, but they aren‟t! Do they think that dressing as 
famous people will make them famous?” I laughed, but Mak did not – the fashionable 
crowd spilling out of the bar had disturbed him. In a similar way, Taan (a restaurant 
owner in her thirties along Nimmanhaemin road) cited the image of a impeccably 
coiffed, hyper-maquillaged young woman sitting right at the glass window of a 
coffeeshop nursing the same cup of coffee for hours (e.g. just sitting there in order to 
be on display).  
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 Something in the idea that the adoption of an image would in turn bring that 
image about – a concept which resonates across Thai history, from Jackson‟s 20th-
century “regime of images” (2004a) to the Lanna-era modeling of the city after the 
heavens – struck a discordant note with Mak and Taan. The fashionable crowd was, 
for Mak, simply empty shells of fashionable things, full of the appearance of 
popularity but empty of meaning, much as the shallow and image-obsessed young 
woman was for Taan. Indeed, such an idea was given further criticism in stories of 
college-aged girls going into prostitution in order to purchase designer handbags or in 
films depicting morally corrupt and consumption-obsessed young women (e.g. Sick 
Nurses). 
Coffee and discomfort 
 The Maze Café was a new structure constructed by one of the architecture 
firms arguing for a new, avant-garde Chiang Mai. The building lies alongside the road 
ringing the square of the old city (near Hua Rin corner and a short walk or drive from 
Nimmanhaemin road). It is a rectangular box made of poured concrete and smoothed 
to a shiny finish on three sides and glass on the fourth. The entire structure is raised 
slightly, so that in order to come up from the parking lot, one has to step up on to a 
small ramp. Through the glass doors, the high-ceilinged space is decorated with glass 
tables and low-slung couches. Flat-panel televisions on the wall play music videos or 
are tuned to “Fashion TV” (on silent), while bossa nova plays over the speakers. The 
interior is air-conditioned to a comfortable, almost cold temperature, a welcome break 
after the hot, busy street.  
 Inside, the bar advertises “Wawee Coffee,” a brand of coffee grown in 
Thailand‟s North and featuring a Starbucks-esque logo with the head of an Akha 
woman in the place of Starbucks‟s siren. The place serves food as well, both 
European-style, Central Thai-style, and some Northern-style dishes, although sticky 
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rice [ขา้วน่ึง - khao neung, ขา้วเหนียว -  khao niao, traditional Northern or Laotian 
rice]
196
 is notably absent as it was in many of the higher-end restaurants – sticky rice 
was one dish which had not been re-incorpoated into the “new” Chiang Mai. The 
clientele included many of my architect friends, some foreign expatriates (albeit rarely 
tourists - the restaurant is located far from the tourist centers, and one needs a car in 
order to go), and members of Chiang Mai‟s local elite. Once, I was present when a 
film star from Bangkok visited and the staff came up to him, one by one, asking for a 
photograph.  
 Yet such spaces, while magazines such as HIP and architects such as Tong and 
Mak present them as being the new face of Chiang Mai, are not places designed for all 
of Chiang Mai‟s residents. Instead, they echo the language of gated communities or 
the Punna: they are places for people of a certain background. I took Chai, one of my 
friends and informants in Chiang Mai, to a similar coffee shop, Café Nero on 
Nimmanhaemin Road next to the Cotto Tiles Library. Chai, an engineer in his mid-
twenties and from Chiang Mai, had never been in a café on that road before, and I was 
eager to gauge his reaction to Chiang Mai‟s new spaces. Chai was certainly middle-
class, but had neither the symbolic nor the economic capital that other patrons of the 
café had. As we entered the café, he suddenly fell silent.
197
 When we sat at a small 
glass table with black (faux) leather chairs, the normally loquacious Chai commented 
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 An analysis of rice and its meaning vis-à-vis Northern or Northeastern Thai identity is outside of the 
scope of this dissertation. Here, I wish only to note that eating sticky rice was a marker for “being 
Northern.” Examples abound: Withi (2005) posits a “sticky rice culture” spread along the Mekong, 
while the Northern folk singer Jaran Manopetch famously sang about Northerners being the “luuk phu 
jaai khao neung” [ลูกผูจ้ายขา้วน่ึง - sons of sticky rice]. Sticky rice is juxtaposed with jasmine rice, or 
“pretty rice,” ขา้วสวย - khao suai. I often asked for sticky rice in Chiang Mai‟s trendier restaurants in 
order to provoke a reaction from the Northern Thai waitstaff. They were often sympathetic. In fact, 
once in a place similar to Maze, I had asked for sticky rice and the apologetic waiter offered to go to the 
street vendor and get me some, as he himself was going to eat dinner after he took my order and wanted 
sticky, rather than jasmine, rice. 
197
 In Thai, the emotion evoked by a situation where one is receiving a favor from someone which is 
beyond your capacity to repay is termed kreng jai [เกรงใจ] and does not have a good English equivalent. 
Although Chai denied feeling kreng jai, I believe this played some part in his discomfort. 
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on the cold briefly before sitting quietly. He gazed at a concrete support pillar painted 
in gold-on-red leaf motif characteristic of a Northern Thai temple for some time – an 
example of the re-emergence of a postmodern “Lanna style” in architecture which the 
Maze Café lacked. “Do you like that pillar?” he asked me, and, before I answered, he 
launched into an explanation of the terminology for this style of gold-leaf painting and 
where one might find it in temples in the city.
198
 After this, he became more like his 
ordinary loquacious self again, but later he confessed that he did not like the 
experience. The food – Italian or Central Thai-style food – was bland, he said, the 
drinks were not very good, and he didn‟t know why they had that style of a pillar. 
 By taking Chai away from areas where we usually met and where he was 
comfortable – outdoor restaurants and stalls in campus food courts – I had suddenly 
drawn attention to the vast income gap between us and between him and those living 
in and around Nimmanhaemin. While before, he had been the authority on the 
environment around us – teaching me Northern Thai history, alphabet, and language – 
suddenly he was placed outside of his element only several blocks from his home. He 
was unfamiliar with much of the food and drink, and unfamiliar with how to act in 
such a space. He said afterwards that he was glad to have seen it, but he found the 
whole street distasteful. 
 Chai‟s reaction parallels his earlier reaction to graffiti from the Boi Luang 
hotel. I had again presented him with direct evidence of other Chiang Mais – places 
which were far from his own experience and yet intimated entangled with the Chiang 
Mai that he knew. This newly-constructed Chiang Mai is one which is built with an 
                                                 
198
 In fact, Wat Chiang Man, Chiang Mai‟s oldest temple, had recently undergone a renovation during 
the 1990s, replacing older 20
th
-century temple murals with gold-on-red paintings depicting tamnaan 
events such as Pu Sae Nya Sae and Jamadewi. These new paintings were complete with Lanna-alphabet 
script redone in a Central Thai style: with consonants written all on the same line rather than stacked 
one atop the other, as they often are in palm-leaf texts. Such a reconfiguration of Lanna alphabet recalls 
Wichit‟s valorization of the Sukhothai inscription script. 
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idea of spatial segregation based on image: certain images repel and others attract, and 
one function of spatial design is to craft space in such a manner that attracts desirables 
and repels others. It is, in short, a model for society, whether that society is a nation or 
a group of consumers. Such an idea – the creation of a utopic society through the 
manipulation of the inherent potentiality in aesthetics and space - was explicit amongst 
many of the architects with whom I worked. In the next section, I further explore the 
creation of a new image of Chiang Mai through the work of high-modern architects, 
and the attempt to unleash a utopic (albeit segregated) potential through art. 
Art, the avant-garde, and the new meuang. 
 One example of the attempt to realize the potentiality in space is the Mo 
Rooms project, the brainchild of artist Thaiwijit Poengkasemsomboon in collaboration 
with several other Chiang Mai-based artists and designers, including Ger and Tong‟s 
company
199
. The concept behind Mo Rooms was that each of the twelve rooms was to 
be designed by a team of designers, architects (including several of my key 
informants), and astrologers in order to reflect the character of a certain sign of the 
Chinese
200
 zodiac. Additionally, rooms would focus on recycled and re-used products 
for room décor. As the production crew state on their website, the “[the] mo design 
team seeks new possibilities of spatial organization via the blending of past and 
present ideologies into a livable sculpture” (Mo Rooms 2009). The actual content of 
what “past and present ideologies” might entail was vague, but seemed to refer to the 
use of modern materials and artists with Chinese astrology and re-used materials, 
creating an aesthetic that was at once nostalgic and high-modern, Thai and 
international.  
                                                 
199
 Ger and Tong are pseudonyms. Thaiwijit and Mo Rooms are not.  
200
 While the system of twelve animals, each one corresponding to a year is indeed Chinese in origin, it 
has long been present in Thailand (although Lanna zodiac animals substitute an elephant for the boar 
and a naga for the dragon – the Mo Rooms crew used the Central Thai or Chinese version).  
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For all of its utopian aspirations of “new possibilities of spatial organization”, 
class does not enter into the picture. Mo Rooms is still a high-end hotel along Tha 
Phae Road – room prices range from around $130 to $500 (at times exceeding that of 
the Dhara Dhevi resort and far beyond the means of the majority of my informants) – 
and despite the fact that guests will “gain new dimensions of art experiences through 
sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste along with alternative thoughts and individual 
interpretation of the environment” (Mo Rooms 2009), Mo‟s utopian spatiality ends at 
the front gate. While Mo Rooms was imagined by its designers to be an artists‟ colony 
like Thaiwijit‟s Mo Shop (also along Tha Phae road), it primarily becomes a space for 
well-heeled and fashionable Thais to stay and socialize in Chiang Mai. It exists as an 
island of artistic endeavor (in the guise of, of course, luxury commercial space) lodged 
in between large shophouses on a busy section of Tha Phae road. The building is a 
series of concrete blocks stacked in a chiral fashion, winding upwards without a 
straight pillar inside in a sea of concrete blocks of the more conventional stacked-
cubes variety. But criticism of Mo Rooms did not focus upon its unorthodox 
architecture or avant-garde design, but rather upon the placement of such a design in 
its particular location in the wider city. An architect and critic whom I do not name 
here claimed:  
 
[One] has to look at the overall character of the city. Take for instance Mo Rooms. [I] 
told [Tong that it was] very dangerous and [he] had to be very careful because he built 
it so close to the old wall, and in such an old neighborhood. But he‟s very confident 
and brave in his own style of thinking. Because there were a number of architects – 
older architects – who really disagree with what he‟s doing. Andrew, you have to 
think about the villagers [i.e. permanent residents of the Tha Phae Road area] in his 
case. He might think that for the people staying at his hotel, they sit there and look out 
and see this lovely old neighborhood, but you have to think about the people living in 
those nice old houses, when they look over and see these strange spiraling blocks 
rising up. What will they think? Will they like it? [I] don‟t think so…  
 
This architect criticizes Mo Rooms not for offending the possessing spirits of 
the city walls, but rather for offending the local population. While he pays little 
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credence to beliefs about kheut (in a similar manner to Tong), he still cites the walls in 
his criticism, as he perceives the design of Mo Rooms to be offensive to local tastes 
and social mores. While it might not be kheut to the city, the deleterious effects on 
society of inappropriate architecture are similar. 
The contest over Mo Rooms and its appropriateness (in whose eyes?) for 
Chiang Mai is one point in the wider contest over the refashioning of Chiang Mai‟s 
image that I detail here. But what exactly is meant by “Chiang Mai” or “Lanna” in 
terms of image? Broadly speaking, what do planners and artists mean when they are 
being “Lanna” or, indeed, “Thai?” When these terms are invoked, they have within 
them utopic potentiality, much as the ancestral lords invoked by spirit mediums do. 
Yet the exact content of these terms is difficult to locate. In my own research, my 
interlocutors in Chiang Mai‟s artistic circles, frustrated with my line of questioning, 
would often retort with a flat assertion, as La did when I frustrated her with persistent 
questions: “คนเหนือรู้ - khon neua ruu,” “Northerners just know”. Such a framing of 
knowledge as a pre-linguistic thing, stemming from blood and birth, places the foreign 
researcher in his proverbial place: someone who is unqualified to be plumbing the 
depths of national or regional aesthetics. 
To return to Ger and his building projects, the Mo Rooms as a site of 
artistic/utopic creation is, like other aesthetic projects in the city, intimately connected 
with ideas of national belonging and this kind of intimate knowledge. In his 
biographical sketch on the Mo Rooms website, Thaiwijit is described as a champion of 
avant-garde Thainess and a voice of Thai urbanity (the city to which the biographical 
sketch refers is not his new home and work space, Chiang Mai, but his natal village, 
Bangkok, perhaps unintentionally giving more ammunition to the previously-cited 
architect‟s criticism of the Mo project as being out of touch with local aesthetics):  
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Like his personality, Thaiwijit‟s aesthetics are rather Thai, but they upend traditional 
Thai style. Conventional Thai aesthetics-as expressed in textiles, palace crafts and 
classical architecture-call for symmetry, harmony, fine pattern and detail, true colours 
and prettiness. In contrast, Thaiwijit‟s shapes are oblong, his proportions 
asymmetrical. His colours are often the neutral tones of raw plywood, cement and 
unfinished metal. Other times he uses paint in offbeat industrial hues: fluorescent 
orange, powder green, grey-purple. 
The Thainess of all this lies in the artist‟s genius for transposition. His work conveys 
both the primitive, folkish sensibility of rural crafts and the gritty, densely layered 
textures and imagery of Thailand‟s endearingly ramshackle urban environment. It‟s 
not just that you can sense Bangkok in his work. It‟s that you begin to see Thaiwijit in 
the Bangkok all around: the storefronts with their layers of paint, handmade signage, 
gates and wires; the colourful trucks decorated by their drivers; the maze of 
impromptu construction. In this, his functional objects transcend the usual boundaries 
of design, and reveal themselves as works of real art. (Mo Rooms 2009) 
In this description, the use of the terms “Thai” and “Thainess” is particularly 
illuminating in its opacity. According to the biography, Thaiwijit‟s aesthetics are 
quintessentially Thai, yet they stand in opposition to Thai aesthetics. This paradox is 
possible, according to the biographical sketch, because his works embody the true 
state of Thailand – contrasts and contradictions. They are Thai because they reject 
conventional “Thai” stereotypes. Recalling the architect from the conference‟s 
metaphor of “the face is first, the substance second,” Thaiwijit has moved what he 
perceives to be the “true” colors and shapes of Bangkok: those present on taxis, buses, 
or vendor carts, for instance, to the fore, replacing the smooth surface image with a 
more accurate depiction of what lies beneath. While this could be seen as a challenge 
to the idea of a unified, harmonious “Thainess,” Thaiwijit does not go this far. Instead, 
he retains “Thainess” as a stable signifier for an ever-shifting, unstable signified. In 
short, if symmetry and harmony embody Thainess and asymmetry and dissonance are 
also inherently Thai, what, then, is not Thai? The answer lies in the temari seller‟s 
response to my question, “what makes your temari Thai?” Since the creator is 
ethnically Thai, the product then is, regardless of the context or content. It is the 
assertion of Thainess which is meaningful in the case of these new artistic projects in 
the city, and not its actual content. 
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Yet, as I have indicated elsewhere in this manuscript, not all simply accept a 
recourse to blood and birth as being the definition of what makes something “Lanna.” 
The content of “Lanna” was a continually contested quantity, as various forces in the 
city attempted to mediate between an (imagined to be) authentic past quality and the 
present – in short, artists and architects in the North often cast themselves 
unintentionally as mediums. Such a struggle to define what is meant by Chiang Mai‟s 
“image” was the driving force behind the conference that I described above: the 
meetings of the Association of Lanna Architects, a subset of the Association of 
Siamese Architects. In each year that I was present, the ASA - Lanna had contests 
revolving around the issue of how to best institute large public projects (such as a 
rebuilding of the Three Kings monument, a reconstruction of Tha Phae gate area, and 
others) in order to promote “Lanna” space in Chiang Mai. Responding to these calls 
for an increasingly Lanna-styled city, Tong responded out of frustration, with 
presentation emphasizing a  new, utopian Chiang Mai struggling to emerge out of the 
– as he put it in English – “frozen form” of Lanna architecture. His (and others‟) 
resistance to the “frozen form” represents a resistance to the totalizing discourses that 
place all Northern artists and architects in the “traditional” style. Tong, like Ger in the 
conference cited above, felt cheated by an architectural field that allowed Bangkok-
based artists to produce whatever they liked, but limited Northern artists to repeating 
the same tired trope of “Lanna,” a “Lanna” that contained a certain image or façade.  
Tong‟s focus was the idea of meuang. Rejecting calls for localist [พื้นเมือง – 
pheun meuang] architecture in revising the Three Kings monument, Tong instead used 
his presentation to advocate for an idea of meuang that engaged with and displayed the 
international zeitgeist of each particular age, thereby rejecting the ASA-Lanna‟s call 
for any sort of work to be done on the Three Kings. As he writes (translation mine): 
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Meuang 
“Chiang Mai” [quotes in original] is in the process of changing and growing 
quickly before our eyes. There are more cars and more tourists. We are in the position 
of trailblazing designers in this age of change. [Our company is but] one part of the 
building of this [new avant-garde] role, and new issues [เร่ือง – reuang] are being built 
and mixed [in with older material] so that it‟s impossible to separate anything out.  
“Chiang Mai” cannot be a meuang that is filled any more with history. 
“Chiang Mai” always contains new images [ภาพ - phaap] and new roles until the 
point where we cannot expand or build a more historical image. We are therefore not 
interested in ancient architectural details or designs from the past or to bring up 
ancient elements from past architecture to come and influence the age and way of life 
in which our city exists. We are interested [instead] in continually experimenting in 
architectural work and laying the foundation for [new] thought.  
Tong‟s frustration with the genre of “Lanna architecture” and “Lanna culture” 
is quite strongly-stated in this statement, and although this attitude is on the fringe 
owing to its aggressive splitting from the idea of a “historical city” (and the dominant 
expressions of a desire to rebuild a city in the re-imagined style of Lanna), as Ger and 
other architects that I cite above in the Chiang Mai University conference show, it 
strikes a chord with other designers. But what Tong is attempting to do, as the Mo 
Rooms project shows, is no less than create a new utopic space, one with, as he says, 
“new possibilities” and a new idea of the meuang (see also the language of the Punna 
building in chapter six, above), one which rejects the aura of provinciality present in 
the word “local” [pheun meuang] and instead captures a vibrant, creative, artistic force 
blended with international element – ironically something common to earlier 
conceptualizations of meuang (recall Kawila‟s communities of foreign artisans in the 
Wua Lai area). 
Tong‟s frustrations towards Chiang Mai architecture were shared by many. In 
an interview, Nawit, another architect at Chiang Mai University, described the 
continual repetition of “Lanna” motifs (such as the kalae) as “the crisis of our 
generation” - the idea that continual repetition of a feature or symbol means a 
continuity of culture. Yet according to Nawit, the attempt to create continuity always 
alters the images of the past. Architects seeking to build in “Lanna style” turn to 
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temple or palatial motifs without paying attention to their larger meaning, but rather 
they take and repeat different elements or symbols (such as the kalae) that strike them 
as being exotic or strange – but not too exotic (recall the Cotto Tiles book‟s 
characterization of Northern food being “just right for Thai mouths”). Such designers, 
according to Nawit, assume that they already know the meaning and function of 
Northern images and use them (recall the women‟s skirt hem design atop the Airport 
Plaza shopping center).
201
 
Nawit‟s characterization of the new generation of architects runs parallel to 
Nidthi‟s characterization of Central Thai consumers of Northern Thai images and 
products. Nidthi notes that the regional policy of putting a kalae on buildings had been 
executed by the Central Thai authorities in the provincial government, an act which 
was “appropriate with the dream of sao khrua faa [see above]… the dream [that] 
Bangkok [has of Chiang Mai]” (Nidthi 1991:184). Naturally, Nidthi is speaking in 
broad generalizations about “Chiang Mai people” and “Bangkok people” and 
conveniently sets up a villainous Bangkok-based authority versus a naïve (and, 
somewhere in the past, authentic) Chiang Mai victim. Yet his central point – of anger 
at a misuse of symbols and the desire that such symbols be used “correctly” – was also 
the drive underlying competitions such as that at the ASA-Lanna.  
Choke, the young Bangkok-born architect and professor of architecture whom 
I describe above, recounted the surprise that an interviewer for HIP magazine 
expressed when he told them that the future of Chiang Mai‟s architecture lay in the 
past: “He had to ask twice!” said Choke. Choke was enthusiastic about his ideas for 
creating and streamlining the entire “image” of the city (unwittingly falling into 
                                                 
201
 Here, the reader should note that I am recording Nawit‟s interpretation. I do not mean to imply that 
symbols have defined meanings, some of which are more “authentic” than others. My point here is to 
point out planners‟ assumption that they already know the content of such symbols as the kalae, or that 
the meaning is, as Thaiwijit‟s Thainess, something which is implicit. 
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Nidthi‟s stereotype of the Bangkok designer who wishes to jat fun [arrange the 
dreams] of Chiang Mai). “First of all, you must control the three gates of the city – do 
you know the three gates?” I floundered for a second, before rattling off three of the 
four (or five or six, depending on the time period) gates of the old city. “No!” said 
Choke, smiling with anticipation at my incorrect answer, “I mean the airport, train 
station, and highway! At each of those points you need something to let the visitor 
know that they‟re in a different place now.” Choke also detailed his ideas for having 
such “Lanna” furnishings as water jugs or benches along the sidewalk for the 
refreshment of travelers. Choke proposed that certain areas of the city become distinct 
in terms of aesthetics. “Take this place, for instance,” said Choke, reclining in his 
Nimmanhaemin Road coffee-shop chair. “One place you can really see an identity is 
in this yaan
202
 nimman [Nimmanhaemin road area]”. He cited the architecture, people, 
and way of life as being internally consistent as well as different from other regions in 
the city.   
Choke sees the job of the urban planner to render different parts of the 
neighborhood distinct in function, population, and image. One such image would be 
that re-imagined “Lanna” suggested by those advocating for “Lanna style,” but like 
any product, this aesthetic would be one of many in the city, and the resident or tourist 
could experience each aesthetic as he or she pleased, freely browsing. In this way, the 
figure of the urban flâneur becomes entwined with the shopper in the mall – he or she 
is a consumer of images, taking in their aesthetic but not interacting as a resident or 
member of the inhabiting (to echo Lefebvre‟s idea of habire) community. 
Neighborhoods, in this vision, are products for consumption by individuals.  
                                                 
202
 A yaan, as I discuss above, is a term referring to a particular neighborhood in Bangkok. The term is 
not generally used in Chiang Mai, except to refer to Nimmanhaemin road. See discussion above or in 
Askew 1998.  
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Yet such re-inventions of space in the city occasionally serve interests other 
than the consumer society. The largest force influencing construction and re-invention 
of space in the city is not any one design firm, but rather the nation. In the first few 
months of my field research and in the years leading up to it, Chiang Mai was the 
recipient of a great deal of attention from the national government under Northern-
born Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who attempted a drastic reinvention of 
Northern space which was then taken up by the military government which ousted him. 
State Imaginings  
During the summer of 2006, Chiang Mai was set for a transformation. With 
Thaksin then prime minister in Bangkok, Chiang Mai was to be the site of his 
enormous tourist development project: the “Chiang Mai World.” Thaksin and his local 
allies in the northern political and business community planned to turn a large part of 
the Doi Suthep / Doi Pui national park into a kind of Disneyland, with a night safari, 
floral exhibition, elephant camp, and cable car running from the peak of Doi Suthep to 
the peak of Doi Kham – site of the Grandfather and Grandmother Sae shrines detailed 
above. It was, in theory, to be a refurbishing of Chiang Mai‟s tourist industry, one 
which would attract wealthy foreign as well as Thai tourists to the area, increasing 
income by moving the industry away from thrifty backpackers and hippies towards 
wealthier spa-going Europeans, Chinese, and Japanese (characterized by the Tourist 
Authority of Thailand as tourists “with value [คุณค่า - khun khaa”]).  
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The Chiang Mai World projects met with stiff opposition from many local 
groups, some of which were associated with anti-Thaskin movements later to become 
the People‟s Alliance for Democracy (e.g. the ภาคีกลุ่มคนฮกัเจียงใหม่ -  phakii klum 
khon hak jiang mai
203
) despite Thaksin‟s popularity in the region. Other concerned 
groups included largely academics and activists (such as Duangchan) worried about 
overdevelopment in the Chiang Mai area. On a practical level, anti-Chiang Mai World 
groups attacked the amount of water that the projects would drain from the mountains‟ 
aquifers, the symbolic effects of the proximity of these projects to the sacred peaks, 
the scale of corruption in the projects‟ administration,204 and the wear on the city‟s 
                                                 
203
 http://www.hugchiangmai.com/ 
204
 A common complaint was that contracts were handed to Thaksin‟s allies without being available to 
other vendors in the city. 
Figure 21: Main plaza of Ratchaphreuk. Note the ho kham in the backgrond and, in 
the far distance, the hilltop temple atop Doi Kham, Wat Prathat Doi Kham. 
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infrastructure that the masses of tourists would inflict. Ultimately, they argued, the 
local population would reap only the problems of the projects and see none of the 
benefits. Such protests were harbingers of the later conflict that would oust Thaksin 
and continue to divide the country to the present day. 
Yet despite the increasing opposition, the jungle on the slopes of Doi Kham 
was cut down, the Night Safari built (and opened in February 2006) and Ratchaphruek 
begun. Extensive sections were slashed out of the jungle on Doi Suthep as well, 
ostensibly to control wildfires blamed on hill-tribe minorities, but rumored to be in 
preparation for the as-yet unapproved elephant camp and cable cars. And then, 
suddenly, two months before the opening of the Royal Flora Ratchaphruek site, the 
Thai military under General Sonthi Boonyaratglin (and, it is widely rumored, at the 
behest of the king) instigated a coup d‟etat aginst Thaksin while he was abroad, 
effectively exiling him in England and placing a military junta in charge of the country. 
While the elephant camp and cable car were scrapped and the Night Safari sidelined in 
importance,
205
 Ratchaphruek went on as scheduled, albeit with a makeover from the 
new government (see figure 21). 
Yet despite Thaksin‟s divisive role in Thai politics and the drama of the 2006 
coup d‟etat, Ratchaphreuk, with its emphasis on piety towards the monarch, was a 
politically expedient symbol for the military as much as for Thaksin. Indeed, as the 
place became a rallying spot for yellow-shirted royalists, it quickly lost whatever 
association it originally had with Thaksin. My point here is not to examine the Thaksin 
or post-Thaksin effects of political change upon the project, which would involve 
insights into bureaucratic and financial deals to which I do not have access, but rather 
                                                 
205
 The Night Safari, as another Thaksin megaproject, is also an interesting study. It was in 2006 and 
2007  administered by Plodprasop Suraswadi, a political ally of Thaksin, but its future is continually put 
into doubt. After over three hundred animal deaths and two escapes (of Canadian wolves), foreign 
governments refused to send more animals to the project.   
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to examine Ratchaphreuk in the perception of my informants and those working at the 
site. Here, I see it as a site of pilgrimage, a place which quickly rose to a central 
position in the baaramii of Chiang Mai, and just as quickly had been abandoned. As 
such, it is a potent symbol of both potential fortune and potential ruin. 
Empty Origins 
When I asked the day manager at Ratchaphreuk about what existed before the 
project, she said: “Nothing was here.”  
“What, though?” I pressed “Forest? Farmland? [ป่า - pa? นา - na?].”  
“Exactly!” she responded: “it had no value [khun khaa]. Now, look around 
yourself!”  
She pointed across the square to the green artificial hills rolling in front of the 
naturally-formed peak of Doi Kham. In the foreground was a strip of perhaps thirty 
small concrete stalls, of which four were open. Ratchaphreuk was officially over, yet 
the Ministry of Agriculture was still allowing visitors to enter (free of charge) as they 
decided what to do with the space. The garden had been carved out of Doi Suthep – 
Doi Pui National Park, planted, served as a tourist destination for three months, and 
now scaled back to a small open section in a large withering field.  
To create this new space, Ratchaphreuk, now under the aegis of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Horticultural Society of Thailand, invited investors from some of 
the largest companies operating in Thailand, including Singha beer, the Thai power 
company, Toyota, and others, as well as several nations: Iran, Kenya, Japan, Holland, 
and Turkey, among others, to build gardens, as the department invited, “to express 
respect for HM the King or highlight historic links between His Majesty‟s royal 
activities [between the activities and what remained unspecified]” (Royal Flora 
2007).
206
 For Thai audiences, the international pavilions reinforced the idea (repeated 
                                                 
206
 http://www.royalfloraexpo.com , accessed May 2007, now offline. 
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continually in royal-related news) that the king was revered internationally as well as 
within Thailand
207
 – these pavilions were smaller and subordinate to the royal one, and 
each was required to show its relationship to the king‟s activities. Here, the king is 
presented as a source of knowledge and merit extending to a worldwide network. 
These gardens were laid out in two clusters: corporate gardens and national gardens, 
and outside of these gardens were several large buildings by the Ministry, including an 
insect museum, a desert greenhouse, and a “shady jungle” building. The site was 
named after the national flower, in English the “golden shower” flower. I was told that 
this flower had been chosen as the color reflected the hue of both Buddhism and the 
king, and that the flowers bloomed all at once, which was intended to represent the 
spiritual and royalist unity of Thais.
208
 
The center of the site was the หอคาํ - ho kham,209 the Golden Hall, a shrine built 
of teak (visible in the background of figure 21). Its architect told me that the Northern 
style, with its Burmese influence, was perfect as a symbol for the project: “The Lanna 
style ho kham has its inspiration from Burma, you know? That‟s what makes it so 
perfect for the project. Here, in the heart of the region, we have a building that 
combines all of the elements that comprise Lanna: from Thailand and all the provinces 
of the north and Burma as well. We wanted it to be a symbol to unite Indochina, 
especially Burma and Thailand, where there‟s been so much strife.” 
                                                 
207
 Such an idea is pervasive: a common portrait of the king has him seated at the center of a gathering 
of the world‟s monarchs – Mak, looking at the photo, smirked and remarked: “Thais don‟t often think 
of their country as being „third world.‟ [They] think that they have the world‟s longest-reigning 
monarch.” Mak stopped abruptly before going on, lowered his voice, gave me a conspiratorial smile 
and said “It‟s better not to say [ไม่พดูดีกวา่ – mai phuut dii kwaa].” Although I do not know what Mak 
intended to say next, comments deemed unfavorable to the monarch are punishable under Thailand‟s 
lese majeste laws, and “it‟s better not to say” was a safe way of conveying his sentiment. “Mak” is, of 
course, a pseudonym. 
208
 Thailand‟s Muslim, Christian, and animist populations are presumably left out of this supposed unity. 
209
 A Northern Thai and Lao term for the dwelling place of a king. 
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A shrine for the king in “Lanna style” as a unifying image for the entire region 
may at first appear incongruous – why should Burmese and Lao care about the Thai 
monarch? One interpretation would echo Wichit‟s proposal for an ethnic unity for all 
tai groups (including Shan, Lao, Chinese Dai, etc) under the aegis of Thailand. Yet 
such ethno-nationalism, while it has seeped into the everyday speech of Thais, 
becomes associated with nationalist symbols: the language of chat, the national (as 
opposed to royal) anthem, and the nationalist movements in the 1930s. Ratchaphreuk 
and the ho kham were no such symbols. Instead, they were images for the royalty, the 
supposed center of Theravada Buddhism, the religion of Burma, Laos, and Cambodia 
as well as Thailand. Hence, Theravada Buddhist Burmese would, by this interpretation, 
feel drawn towards the figure of the Thai king. 
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The structure, with its dark wood, gold trimmings, and white statues, stood out 
starkly in contrast with the green slopes of Doi Kham, and was the eponymous image 
from the exhibition. Significantly, its image stood next to Doi Suthep and the Chiang 
Mai city pillar – Chiang Mai‟s two most auspicious sites for pilgrimage as detailed in 
chapter five - on Thai-language tourist placards (figure 22) placed throughout the city, 
framing it as more than a sight for simple tourist exploration, but rather as a place to 
make merit and come into contact with charismatic power [baaramii].  
Pilgrimages and Tours 
Ratchaphruek officially opened on the first of November, 2006. For those in 
Chiang Mai, the opening was heralded by a flood of Thai tourists: based on figures 
Figure 22: Map of important sites in Chiang Mai. The images are, right-to-left: Doi 
Suthep, an image of the Northern activist monk Khuba Siwichai, the Three Kings 
Monument, the ho kham of Ratchaphreuk, and the sao Inthakin. 
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provided to me by the Tourist Authority of Thailand, while foreign tourist numbers 
decreased from 2005-2007 presumably owing to fears about the coup, Thai tourists, 
clad in the yellow shirts that echoed the colors worn by coup supporters, increased to 
three times the amount of 2005. Especially in and around the streets that cater to Thai 
tourists, such as Nimmanhaemin, new condominiums and hotels attempted to cash in 
on the boom with names like the “Chiang Mai Flora.”  
Yet the proposed images often differed from the reality. While promotional 
materials depicted a cool, misty mountain paradise, the midday temperature often 
broke thirty degrees Celsius. The exhibition‟s namesake flower, a yellow blossom 
echoing the color of the tourists‟ shirts, failed to appear on the plants in the exhibit 
owing to the heat. Further off, in Mae Hong Son province, tourists flocked to the 
yellow flowers on the slopes of mountains, but in the hot Mae Ping river valley, these 
plants stayed dormant, and had to be chemically dosed in order to coax out a brief 
blossom for the Crown Prince‟s visit. Visitors had also been enticed by the picture of a 
field of tulips in the Dutch exhibit, which was to be a major draw to the international 
gardens. These tulips were dutifully planted, but subsequently died in the heat. A new 
crop was planted for the Prince‟s visit, but after these also died, the actual flowers 
were replaced by a giant poster of tulips.   
The heat and crowds were the primary complaint among the people that I 
talked with both in and out of Ratchaphreuk. The wide open thoroughfares and plazas 
thronged with people became unbearably hot after midday. As the asphalt paths in the 
exhibit were too hot to walk on even in the evening, tourists either stayed on the tram 
or hid in the scant shade provided by trees flanking the path or in the “shady jungle” 
building, a profoundly ironic place, considering it was just such a shady jungle which 
was destroyed in order to build the site. The large, open-air theater, lake, and fountain 
remained mostly empty, but the plaza in front of the royal pavilion, the ho kham, was 
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flooded with visitors, where tourists stood to take pictures before heading inside to the 
shade.  
Each of these miscalculations involved planners from the Ministry of 
Agriculture relying too heavily upon their image of a cool, misty Chiang Mai. As the 
rock band in Prasertland or The Letter implies (both examples detailed in chapter four, 
above), Chiang Mai is a cold place, so that once one goes there (as the rock singer 
said), “there‟s no need to go to Europe.” This image becomes powerful: discussing 
rumors of a planned outdoor ski resort in Chiang Mai during a conference in 
Washington DC, one Thai university student from Bangkok cited her superior 
knowledge of Thailand in telling me that this sort of project wasn‟t as ridiculous as it 
seemed. Snows, according to her, were common to Chiang Mai
210
 - a statement that is, 
of course, false, yet I, the foreigner, was in no position to tell her, the Thai national, 
this. 
Despite these examples of dissonance between the image of the North and the 
actual North, many of my informants continued to cite this imagined North in the face 
of the evidence. When I suggested that perhaps the chemically-dosed, artificially-
sustained flower gardens were the result of poor planning and design and that open 
fields of flowers were somehow ecologically unsustainable in the North, Maew, even 
as she sweated in the blazing sun of the main Ratchaphreuk plaza, responded that this 
was not the case, but rather the North and flowers simply “go together” [เหมาะกนั - 
moh gan], using the same terminology as Duangchan and other activists used to 
protest Northern images in places such as the Dhara Dhevi as mai moh [ไม่เหมาะ].  
                                                 
210
 While in the higher country there will occasionally be frost on the ground in the morning in winter, 
such events make the front page of the newspaper. None of my informants had ever seen or heard of 
actual snow falling in the North, not even on the tallest peak. The word for “snow,” หิมะ  - hi-ma, is 
Sanskrit and not Tai in origin. 
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During the time when the exhibition was open, I attended Ratchaphreuk three 
times in the company of local tourists (once with Fah, a middle-aged woman from 
Fang district and her American boyfriend Bruce; once with Maew, a graduate student 
at Chiang Mai University taking her family around Chiang Mai from their home 
province of Udon Thani; and once with Noi, Kham‟s daughter) in addition to talking 
with a number of visitors from Chiang Mai and elsewhere about their experience. 
After the exhibition had closed, I regularly visited the site and talked with employees 
and local sightseers as the Ministry of Agriculture attempted to figure out what to do 
with it.  
 Many Chiang Mai residents were given free tickets from their workplaces, 
valid for a certain month, and for my first trip I took one of these from Lung, my 
landlord. In fact, nearly all of my middle-class informants in Chiang Mai had received 
a large bundle of these from friends, work, or family and were looking to dispose of 
them on anyone who seemed interested. Many of them had not been to the exhibition 
and weren‟t planning on it, but were very interested in having me go and visit. Lung 
spent nearly thirty minutes lecturing me on the marvels of the exhibition upon giving 
me my ticket. “They have nearly four hundred rai [ไร่]211 of flowers!” he said, then 
going on to tell me about all the work that engineers and planners did to design the 
exhibit. Finally, he added “and make sure you see the tulips!” After I returned, Lung 
questioned me about my experience, then confided that he hadn‟t in fact gone and 
didn‟t plan to go, as seeing it on the TV was good enough [พอแลว้ - poh laew].212 
Heading to the exhibition, blue signs directed tourists down the highway 
towards the site, which was roughly twenty minutes away at the base of Doi Kham. 
                                                 
211
 A Thai unit dividing land. 2.5 rai is equal to one acre.  
212
 Lung was a staunch Thaksin supporter. His sense of anger at Thaksin‟s ouster conflicting with pride 
in Thaksin‟s proposed feats may have been the underlying reason why he so adamantly refused to go, 
but still lauded the site. 
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Buses left the city from large hotels or the new Tesco Lotus shopping center 
(incidentally, Noi‟s workplace), but from other spots (such as the city center or Kaad 
Luang market) one had to take a private taxi. The road to Ratchaphreuk from the 
highway was lined with footpaths and banners depicting the royal family, although the 
footpaths led from the park to nowhere – they extended alongside of the road to the 
highway, which was not a place where one could walk. In front of the entrance, large 
letters show the name of the site in Thai: Ratchaphruek 2549.
213
 One road headed out 
towards the Night Safari, a second led to the Doi Kham temple, and the central route 
led into the floral exhibition, passing manicured lawns and artificial hills. Prominently 
displayed near the entrance was the slogan: rak poh, poh phiang [รักพอ่... พอเพียง - 
“Love Father (the king)…. Sufficiency…”]214. Once parked and inside, there was a 
series of lines: an entrance line, then another line to board the tram or private electric 
car. All told, the initial waits took on average for my trips two to three hours. Visitors 
packed the entrance area, the majority of them wearing yellow shirts with “We love 
the King” emblazoned on them.  
 The yellow shirts are far more than a fashion statement.
215
  Royal astrologers 
had predicted yellow to be a prosperous color for the king, and as such the choice of 
                                                 
213
 One subtracts 543 from BE dates to arrive at CE. Buddhist Era 2549 is therefore 2006 CE. 
214
 The “Sufficiency Economy” – เศรษฐกิจพอเพียง - sethakit pho phiang - is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. It was a vaguely-defined policy (yet one which the military government in 2006-2007 
claimed formed the basis of the Thai economic policy) based on royal edicts which, in the interpretation 
of the 2006-2007 government, meant something akin to “do not spend beyond your means.” However, 
should one‟s means be sufficient, wasteful spending was quite “sufficient,” as Ratchaphreuk – a 
massive construction project that closed after three months - suggests. 
 Yet even with this explanation, the reader might be confused as to what “Love the King… 
Sufficiency” means. Does the sign attempt to convey that the park‟s excess is the only “sufficient” 
reward for a king? I asked a number of my informants about the slogan, and none of them answered my 
question directly. Those of my informants who considered themselves royalists (e.g. Maew, Ger) 
countered with “It means Thai people love the king” (often stated to me in English, even when I had 
previously conducted the entire conversation in Thai – here was a chance to show the foreigner that he 
was truly foreign here); those of my informants who were (quietly and privately) opposed to the 
monarchy claimed that the slogan was meaningless.  
215
 As I write this, the “red”/”yellow” divide in Thailand is currently raging. However, this split only 
really became apparent around the time of the new constitution, later in 2007. At the time of 
Ratchaphreuk, the yellow shirts were unchallenged as symbols of monarchical love, and worn by the 
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color becomes a display of piety, as anthropologist Pattana Kitiasara has argued, 
especially when coupled with the booming Jatukarm Ramathep amulets that had 
become popular that year (Pattana, pers. comm., 2007). According to Pattana, wearing 
the shirt and the Jatukarm are ways in which middle-class or lower middle-class Thais 
can directly involve themselves with the nation (a costume that was to change 
dramatically with the association of the yellow shirt with the PAD in later 2007 and 
2008) and with magical means of bolstering their luck. At a time of political crisis and 
the growing sense of economic malaise, a means by which Thais can take concrete 
action is in this public display of Buddhist faith and monarchical sentiment.
216
 Aek, 
the government worker at the Chiang Mai city hall who criticized the amulet as being 
an example of foreign influence (see above), expressed it thusly: “people today have 
no confidence in the economy, they want confidence, so they go and get the amulet.” 
In Aek‟s formulation, the amulet performed a functional role, alleviating the fear 
about those things over which the nation‟s middle-class had no control. 
While the yellow shirt and amulet was a style common at the time across the 
country, Ratchaphreuk was also a showcase for regional symbols in addition to the ho 
kham. One feature in the exhibition was a collection of houses from each of Thailand‟s 
four regions, including one in Lanna style. This was a dark teak house, up on stilts, 
similar to houses from other regions aside from the kalae on the roof, but what 
particularly caught my eye were two displays along the wall, next to the flat-panel 
television: one showing a line of sailing ships (unusual, perhaps for landlocked Chiang 
                                                                                                                                            
supporters of Thaksin as well as his opponents. During the course of my fieldwork, the first few red 
shirts appeared in Chiang Mai, often sold at the very same places where yellow or blue shirts (for the 
queen) were sold. In the months just after Thaksin‟s ouster, while there was a good deal of anger in 
Chiang Mai, this anger had not yet coalesced into the street protest movement of the UDD. 
216
 The Jatukarm amulets had the image of a deity (of disputed origin) on one side and an auspicious 
symbol that varied from brand to brand. These deities originated in a temple in Nakhon Sri Thammarat 
in Thailand‟s south, and the amulets were widely believed to be capable of bestowing miraculous 
amounts of wealth onto their bearers. 
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Mai, but evoking the same sepia-tinted 19
th
 century image that the hotel Yesterday or 
the television show Mua Dok Rak Baan that I describe in chapter four, above, evoked), 
and another with dolls representing hill tribes. Here we had a trifecta of Northern 
symbols – the ships indicated historical nostalgia, the television assured us that the 
resident was modern, and the dolls indicated the ethnographic interests of the 
supposed inhabitant of the house and reinforced the connection between “Lanna” and 
the hill tribes.    
Back in the main square of the exhibition, we piled on the electric tram and 
wound back and forth around the country pavilions rapidly. The tram conductior gave 
roughly time enough for an introduction to each pavilion and a sentence or two, 
occasionally poking fun at the problems of the exhibition, e.g.: “To the left we have 
the Dutch pavilion, and look at all the lovely tulips! Look at all those tulips! No, it’s 
just a photograph, ladies and gentlemen, no tulips here…”  
The passengers on the tram almost uniformly stayed seated, glancing to either 
side as Iran, Turkey, or Kenya rolled by. On each of my visits, the day was simply too 
hot for a walk on the asphalt roads winding in between gardens (later during my trip 
with Fah, after she and Bruce had left and I was alone, I braved the heat and saw the 
country pavilions in turn). But shortly thereafter, the tram emerged from the maze of 
country-specific pavilions to a dramatic view of the royal ho kham with the green 
backdrop of Doi Kham. Here, the visitors sprang to life, getting out of the tram to head 
over the bridge to the royal pavilion, many pausing on the bridge to take a picture in 
front of the pavilion. In each case, my informants did likewise.  
The hilltop temple of Doi Kham and the floral exhibition showed the 
difference in the aesthetic imaginings of the Lanna rebirth and older ways of creating 
religious spectacle. The ho kham was made of dark teak, the chocolate-cinnamon color 
contrasting with the bright white, unpainted statues of religious creatures (guardian 
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yak, lions, etc) dancing outside. The stark whiteness of the paintings echoed the 
aesthetics of another new Northern pilgrimage site, วดัร่องขุ่น - Wat Rong Khun in 
Chiang Rai province, designed with the same style of realistic yet uncolored statues in 
the same blinding white (a color notoriously requiring a lot of labor to keep clean in 
the sooty and damp Chiang Mai air). In contrast, the part of Wat Prathat Doi Kham, 
the home of shrines to Jamadevi, Wilangkha, Wasuthep, and Grandfather and 
Grandmother Sae (see chapters three and five, above – Doi Kham was the point from 
which Wilangkha threw his fateful spear towards Jamadevi), that was visible to the 
exhibition was the gigantic concrete Buddha, simply made and brightly painted, with 
bright red lips, yellow robe (the paint chipping and cracking from the weather), and 
pleased-looking smile. The contrast between ho kham and Buddha was dramatic: the 
first showed Lanna and Lanna-style aesthetics as imagined by Chiang Mai‟s “educated” 
classes (not to mention Bangkok‟s imagination of Chiang Mai), the second showed 
religious aesthetics as imagined by others in the local population. 
The ho kham was a space devoted to the current monarch – indeed, while the 
entire exhibition was space devoted to the monarchy, the ho kham was that part where 
the monarch‟s baaramii was most manifest. As such, this was the centerpiece for 
visitors – while the gardens, with their open plazas and bright sun, were only 
moderately crowded even during the height of the exhibition, and the country 
pavilions remained largely ignored, the ho kham was, for many, according to tourist 
surveys filled out by visitors leaving the park, the sole stop that they made in the place.  
In the pavilion, the first floors were devoted to the King‟s royal projects and art 
devoted to the King. The former included both irrigation projects, agricultural projects, 
hill tribe development projects, and the King‟s theory of sethakit poh phiang, the 
“sufficiency economy.” As I mention above, the philosophy was a call for Thais, 
especially rural Thais, to consume only within their means and limit their aspirations 
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to reasonable goals. Critics of this idea pointed to the fact that it had been increasingly 
used to de-legitimate political action on the part of poorer or rural populations (i.e. the 
rural poor should leave politics to the elite). It was also a simplifying and largely 
imagined picture of rural life. For instance, one artist, having painted a portrait of a 
hill tribe woman harvesting coffee, claimed it was “[p]resented from the angle of Thai 
hill type people from the far areas, who live in peace, simplicity and happiness by 
following the advice of the King‟s speech concerning the sufficiency economy”217, 
implying that the tribes‟ poverty was a result of a conscious choice to abstain, and that 
their frugality is a demonstration of their royal piety. Outside of the gallery, in the hall 
devoted to the sufficiency economy, posters explained not only the concept, but also 
the different applications of the theory to different professions. A poster detailed the 
application of “sethakit poh phiang” to teachers, to academics, to business people, to 
farmers, and so forth, each exhorting the individual not to reach beyond his or her 
means, and to realize his or her role in society. 
After this presentation, we shuffled out of from beneath the ho kham to climb 
the stairs to the display above – a tree fashioned from various precious metals, 
designed after the gold and silver trees presented to Siamese kings as tribute during 
the feudal period. This particular one held leaves of copper, gold, and platinum, 
representing the progression of royal thinking during the sixty years of Bhumibol‟s 
reign. This tree was at the center of Ratchaphreuk – the primary gift to the monarchy 
from the Agriculture department. As such, controls over visitors were at their height 
here. After moving around a long queue to the entrance and removing our shoes, we 
climbed the stairs into the main hall. Inside the hall, a red carpet lined the walls, and 
staff with megaphones chastised anyone who stepped too close to the carpet. 
                                                 
217 English by the painter. The original Thai reads: “นาํเสนอแง่มุมของชาวไทยภูเขาในพ้ืนท่ีห่างไกล ท่ีใชชี้วติอยู่
อยา่งสงบเร่ียบง่าย แสะร่มเยน็เป็นสุข ดาํเนินไปตามแนวพระราชดาํริแบบเศรษฐกิจพอเพียง”.  
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 This was the center of the exhibition for all of the visitors, and was the site 
where the true purpose of the exhibition was shown. Noi removed her shoes and 
crowded into the sea of yellow-clad tourists, shuffling in front of the massive gold, 
copper, and platinum tree. She sat on the ground, hands folded in a wai, then bent 
forward in a similar manner to the respect that she paid to any other sacred image. 
Then, she had me take her picture in front of it, just as she had me take her picture in 
front of the ho kham outside. Here, at the center of Ratchaphreuk, she is part tourist 
and part pilgrim, coming to showcase not only her ability to identify and consume 
images, but also her connection to the king‟s baaramii.  
The connection between the monarchy and supernatural power is in many 
circles explicit. Royalists point to miraculous happenings as evidence for the power 
that the king‟s baaramii has in everyday life: amulets sold or given away by the palace 
showing the king‟s image supposedly protect soldiers from bullets, the national 
lottery‟s selection of the number 999 on the king‟s birthday in 1999218, to the king‟s 
supposed ability to stop or cause a rain shower (Handley 2006:436). At Ratchaphreuk, 
the monarchy, dressed figuratively in Lanna style, has created another pilgrimage site, 
another place where royal baaramii is emitted and available for supplicants (especially 
those middle-class supplicants like Maew who would be less likely to to visit more 
explicitly phi–related spirit shrines). At the point in time when it opened, in the wake 
of a coup and a time of economic crisis, the place became a source of pilgrimage and 
comfort in a time of anxiety. Yet ironies were brewing. The site which was to be a 
demonstration of Thaksin‟s grand vision had turned into the rallying place for a group 
which would be rabidly anti-Thaksin. Indeed, many of those opposing Thaksin‟s 
influence in the North would later come to Ratchaphreuk as a demonstration of 
                                                 
218
 A number which is significant both in that the current king is the ninth Chakri king of Thailand and 
that the number nine – เกา้ - gao – is a homonym for the word “to step forward,” thus making it an 
auspicious number. 
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monarchical piety. And, finally, that site which was to be a booming, “sustainable” 
tourist draw for the North closed its doors and let the gardens wither and die. 
Ratchaphruek closed on January 31
st
, 2007. As the hot season drew near and the 
tourist low season began in the north, the flowers continued to be watered and the 
grounds taken care of, but visitors were barred. Then, in May, the exhibition was re-
opened on a trial basis: many of the exhibits were closed, and the flowers were mostly 
replaced with greenery, but the royal tree remained on display. Admittance was free 
provided one filled out a tourist survey and the groups that came did so expressly for 
the ho kham. The site remained open like this for 2007, with small groups of people 
coming in as a stop on the tour bus circuit. During this time, I sat for several days at 
the front desk of the exhibition, talking with tourists and the workers at the desk and 
occasionally wandering around the mostly-empty site. The international exhibits and 
much of the other exhibits were closed and untended, and stray dogs from the 
neighboring area had crept in. Many of my informants in Chiang Mai city were 
doubtful about the future of the site, saying that no one knew what was to be done 
about it and no one wanted the responsibility of paying for its maintenance. The new 
font of jaroen had become a ruin. 
The site, despite the wild dogs and weeds, retained its function as a site of 
royal pilgrimage, although overall reactions were mixed. One well-dressed older Thai 
woman stopped at the desk on her way out when I was talking with the manager. “I 
am very impressed!” she began, “Do you know, we just went to Buckingham Palace in 
England and they charge twenty pounds to get in! But it was nothing compared to this! 
Those countries think that they have so much, but they don‟t have anything to 
compare to here”. Concerns about corruption, the loss of national park land, and the 
sheer waste of all that space now home to weeds and stray dogs were balanced by the 
united image of a grand, developed spectacle in the heart of the North (Kamol 2007).  
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 Here, Ratchaphreuk is on a larger scale what the condominiums are: contested 
symbols of jaroen. Indeed, in the case of Ratchaphreuk, it is a site where a new source 
of supernaturally-conceived prosperity has been founded, yet one dressed in the style 
of a past age. The past (i.e. the Lanna-style ho kham) and the future (e.g. the king‟s 
development projects), are each rendered as mutually commensurable ideal types – 
echoing Choke‟s comment about Chiang Mai‟s urban aesthetics, “the future will go 
back to the past!”. For many of the visitors, such as the wealthy woman who had been 
to London, Ratchaphreuk was proof of Chiang Mai‟s entrance into the realm of 
developed, jaroen places and her comparison to Buckingham Palace recalled royalist 
propaganda‟s emphasis on the king‟s seniority over other monarchs. For the 
developers, and for those for whom Ratchaphreuk was a positive symbol, it became, 
like the sao inthakin, a font of baaramii – that attractive charismatic power - and a 
place where the revitalization of Chiang Mai was possible: a revitalization that was 
explicitly national (the place, after all, was a government-funded and run site), 
Buddhist (the ho kham was designed after a temple, after all, and Buddhist yak 
guarded the site, just as they do in Central Thai temples), and monarchical. 
According to one day manager at the site, Ratchaphreuk was to be the 
vanguard of a new Chiang Mai, one which would have its roots in a more aesthetic 
way of being (recalling Thaiwijit‟s manifesto on Mo Rooms). “You have development 
[pattana] to the north – there is Mae Sa and Mae Rim,” said the manager, referring to 
a fashionable suburb with a number of five-star resorts and houses, “You have 
development to the east – there is Bo Sang [a tourist attraction involving umbrella-
making and other handicrafts], and to the west you have Doi Suthep. But here, to the 
south, you don‟t really have anything. Now that we have built this [Ratchaphreuk and 
the Night Safari], it has jaroen. It is balanced – it is poh phiang [พอเพียง - sufficient, 
enough, referencing the royal “sufficiency economy” edict].” For the manager and the 
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architect, Ratchaphreuk would be a symbol that would bring “balanced” prosperity to 
the area, help to ease border tensions with Burma, and ultimately place another sacred 
site onto Chiang Mai‟s map. But for those like Duangchan or Boon, who complained 
about the problems of smog, traffic, and heat and blamed these on the exhibition, the 
site was a sign of waste and corruption, another ruin along a road already littered with 
ruins. 
The idea of an aesthetic revitalization is not limited to the massive state 
projects such as Ratchaphreuk; examples of the sorts of projects that take, as one 
poster at the ASA-Lanna conference described it, the “way of life [วถีิชีวติ - withii 
chiwit] and culture [watthanatham] of the past” for the use of the present, abound 
elsewhere. The effectiveness of “Lanna” as a symbol sparks a debate over how and 
where it should be deployed as such, and who has the authority to do so. As with the 
spirits or kheut, misusing symbols might be dangerous – as I discuss above, offending 
the spirits or doing something kheut not only endangers the offender but also the entire 
city, as offended spirits cease their protection, become unable to protect, or become 
malevolent through their anger. In the case of “Lanna” symbols, the damage was 
somewhat less clearly-stated, but followed parallel lines: a loss of culture, a loss of 
identity, a loss of a shared sense of morality and belonging. In the next section, I 
examine the contestations of what constitutes a “real” Lanna revitalization and what is 
a dangerous misuse of symbols. 
Rebuilding Lanna Space 
As the above discussion of “Lanna style” suggests, what exactly constitutes 
“Lanna” is an often-debated point. The prior definition of Lanna as a political unit, 
centered in meuang  Chiang Mai (and combining elements from Burma, Laos, and 
elsewhere) has been obsolete for over a century, and Central Thai religious norms, 
language, and script have been instituted at the state level for an equal amount of time. 
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Now, as I have suggested above, with the attention towards reconstructing a Lanna 
identity, the logic of authenticity – what constitutes a “Lanna” thing – turns more and 
more towards the logic of the market, paralleling the rise in urban, charismatically-
focused spirit mediums. For architects, there is no unified source dictating what is and 
is not a “Lanna” use of space; rather, “Lanna” becomes a stylistic motif. This lack of a 
central vision has led to the explosion of multiple visions of Lanna: Lanna becomes a 
blank slate, imbued with watthanatham (a quality that, as I argue above, retains the 
ring of supernatural power about it) but watthanatham conceived of as in need of 
refinement (paralleling images of Northern women in Central Thai literature - see also 
my discussion of Sao Khura Faa in chapter four, above). Hence, Lanna becomes a 
field of contestation for the realization of personal dreams and aspirations of architects 
and academics. For example, two features of the ancient Lanna landscape that had 
religious, social, and aesthetic significance have now become foci of architectural and 
planning efforts at rebuilding Lanna in the new “Lanna style.” Namely, these two 
features of the city are a revitalization of the ข่วง [khuang], a plaza and public space, 
and the ทกัษา [thaksaa] meuang, the system of sacrality involving the gates and walls 
of the city which I dealt with briefly in chapter five.  
The Lanna Plaza 
The word khuang  - as in khuang singh, mentioned above as a site of spirit 
mediumship -  denotes an open space used communally by members of a certain group. 
Temples and housing compounds had their own khuang, but on a larger scale, cities 
and capitals had special plazas for ritual functions as well. Such a system of 
replication, where smaller units (e.g. the house) recapitulate larger units (e.g. the city), 
which in turn is designed around the idea of the cosmos in miniature brings to mind 
Georges Condominas‟s (1990) characterization of Northern Thai political units as 
systems à emboîtement, mentioned above in the context of spirits and in comparison to 
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the Nuer cieng, but applicable here. As space becomes more individualized in Chiang 
Mai, areas of public use such as the khuang are widely disappearing in favor of 
privately-owned, commercial space – the aforementioned shopping malls and the 
Punna, for instance. Planners with concerns about public life and public space 
therefore have turned towards proposing open, publically-owned sites for social 
gathering. Here, I detail these planners‟ efforts to improve and re-create an explicitly 
“Lanna” spatiality, but in order to do so I must revisit the premodern urban layout that 
I described in chapter five with specific attention towards space in the old city. 
The main space which planners wished to re-create was the central square of 
the city. The khuang of the capital city – ข่วงหลวง, khuang luang – existed at the 
intersection of the city‟s north-south and east-west axes and was the social heart of the 
city (Withi 2005:49). At one point in time, this central square would be home to the 
city pillar and the site of of the major urban renewal rituals (in addition to those at the 
city walls and gates). In essence, this central point, in the supernatural idiom, would be 
the fountain out of which the city‟s merit poured. In the planners‟ vision, it would be 
the center of Chiang Mai‟s symbolic and social network. Yet the central problem with 
doing so was identifying exactly where that point would be. 
Niwat (not to be confused with Nawit, another architect whom I mention 
above), an older architect and city planner, drew a neat diagram of a square divided 
into four smaller squares to represent the old city of Chiang Mai. At the center, he 
drove down his pen: “A city is like a body! So who is the mother? The earth! Mae 
thorani [แม่พระธรณี-  the Thai earth deity, “Mother Earth”]. How is a body connected 
to its mother? Through a navel! What is the name of this spot here? Sadeu meuang 
[สะดือเมือง the city navel].”  
Niwat‟s map mirrored Duncan (1990)‟s depictions of the magico-religious 
design of Southeast Asian capital cities: squares quartered into four smaller units. But 
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Niwat‟s map was not entirely accurate. Chiang Mai does not have four main roads 
forming a cross in the middle as the ideal would have it. Instead, two roads meander 
out from one northern gate towards the two southern gates. One of these roads (the 
one going to the inauspicious southwestern corner) never reaches its destination – it 
terminates near the city center. The east-west axis road is also not a straight line, 
bending to avoid a temple in the center-west of the city. The city, then, has multiple 
central points, and many of these were slated to receive a full renovation and 
anointment as the khuang luang by the ASA-Lanna architects. 
The place Niwat identified as the city navel and site of the khuang luang is a 
temple that lies next to the old governor‟s residence (now a museum) in the center-
north part of the city. It is not currently a favored spot for re-designers of the city and 
has been split down the middle by a busy road, cutting off its stupa from its Buddha 
images. The abbot of Doi Suthep was reportedly in favor of re-establishing the temple 
and closing the road, but monks in the nearby temple cynically remarked that this was 
simply a bid for power by an already powerful abbott, and one who was significantly 
not associated with the Northern khuba movement.
219
 This temple was also formerly 
the home of the city pillar, now moved to the central-southern part of town at Wat 
Chedi Luang (see chapter five, above). 
Another central point is the site of the market in the center of the city (kaad 
klang wiang – กาดกลางเวยีง, literally “market in the middle of the city”), the 
predecessor of Kaad Luang. The original site of the central market is now the location 
of the spirit shrine of the city‟s founder, Mangrai, who was struck by lightning while 
standing in the market square. While the title of Kaad Klang Wiang has been 
appropriated by a privately-owned market catering to wealthy tourists and an outdoor 
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jazz venue in near Wat Chedi Luang, the spirit shrine of Mangrai lies hidden behind a 
shophouse off of the main street.  
While the title of Kaad Klang Wiang has been eagerly taken up by planners as 
a place of urban spatiality (albeit a private space, as opposed to the ideal khuang, a 
public space) and reconstructed near the original site, the spirit shrine, with its 
association with mediumship and lower-class religious practices, has been ignored (it 
now exists in a side alley a block away from the market). The Kaad Klang Wiang 
contains within it all those elements which Chiang Mai‟s educated classes associate 
with jaroen: international food (the market has within it both Italian and Thai 
restaurants), coffee (a new branch of Waawee Coffee borders both the lawn and the 
main street), and jazz. Indeed, these last two elements tie the space back into the figure 
not of Mangrai, but the current Thai monarch, who has championed coffee production 
in the North and whose love of jazz music caused an appreciation for jazz to be nearly 
mandatory amongst educated royalist Thais. 
Yet the most favored spot by ASA-Lanna architects to fix the central point of 
the city was the Three Kings Monument. While I discuss the Three Kings monument‟s 
symbolism above, here I address the way in which planners decided to remake the 
square. The area in front of the monument already is the site of a wide plaza used for a 
weekend market, spirit medium festivals, and other annual festivals such as yii peng [ยี่
เป็ง, a holiday that has become associated with loi krathong – ลอยกระทง, a 
November/December holiday invented in recent years as something “going back to 
Sukhothai”]. This square – bordered on three sides with busy roads and blistering hot 
during the day, but full of breakdancing youth, musicians, and vendors during the 
nighttime weekend markets – occupies the function of a gathering place for markets 
and festivals, although the relocation of the provincial offices to a distant suburb 
neatly removed the opportunity for mass public debate or protest at the doors of the 
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government offices. As this space – a large central square near (if not directly in) the 
center of town – already existed, what, then, needed to be done by architects to 
improve upon this space? The proposals were unified: the square needed to be made 
more “Lanna” and needed to show an increased connection with “the land.” 
One proposal was to raise the entire square so that the traffic passed 
underneath the square. On top would be a three-tiered garden with the Three Kings 
monument at the highest point. This would be, according to the architect, in keeping 
with the Indian idea of the mandala, traditional Lanna layout, the mountain-like shape 
of Borobudur, and the natural shape of the palm tree. The invocation of these disparate 
symbols placed Chiang Mai within not only a regional cultural and Hindu-Buddhist 
context, but one which was reflected in the natural world around it as well as evoking 
the international idea of cultural heritage sites – indeed, this proposal recalls Herzfeld 
and Vidler‟s emphasis on the monumentalization of public space to the detriment of 
public sociality in the city (mentioned in chapter six, above). Ironically for a project 
advocating public space, such a structure would eliminate a great deal of the open 
space currently used for vendors, rituals, or foot traffic.  
Another proposed restructuring of the Three Kings monument was to put 
sunken plazas running north to south and decorate them according to the season. This 
minor change would have a profound impact, as, according to the architect, the “true 
Chiang Mai people” [ชาวเชียงใหม่แท ้- chao chiang mai thae thae] have almost 
forgotten the beauty of seaons and the value of their own watthanatham owing to the 
corrosive influence of consumer space. Having a more colorful central space and one 
which changed with the seasons would “fix the wiang [เวยีง - older term for walled 
city] and fix the lives of the people who are inside of it, giving an open space without 
the need for commerce.” The architect also makes clear that this was not to be an 
image of a static Lanna, but rather “not only do cultures that reflect authentic values 
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[ต่างเดิม - tang doem, meaning literally “from the origin”] but also contemporary 
cultures could be pursued.” 
The architect provides a clear image of a once-pure people drowning in a sea 
of commercial interests, at risk of losing their watthanatham owing to rampant 
consumerism. The cure lies in the rebuilding of the wiang – by using this term, the 
architect is making reference to the city as a walled square, instead of the new, avant-
garde city which is imagined by Joe or Tong. Indeed, the push for public space on the 
part of Chiang Mai intellectuals and architects (such as Nidthi Auerwongsie, 
Duangchan Jaroenmeuang, and the architects at the ASA-Lanna conference – despite 
the very real differences between what each of these people imagined as public space, 
they each advocate for the space) was undertaken in the hope that this public space 
would somehow lead to a social transformation in Chiang Mai – a growth of civil 
society and an increase in participatory democracy – that would mirror a (perceived to 
be) utopian past. I have hinted at the depiction of this past in previous chapters, but 
here I revisit the notion in order to show how it directly applies to projects such as the 
revitalization of the kheung.  
These revitalizations of traditional public space using contemporary 
architecture as means towards a utopian future are echoed in Lanna studies writings 
and the line of academic reimagination of Lanna by contemporary culture brokers. 
They are concrete examples of the re-imagining and rebuilding of the archive of Lanna 
to be commensurable with present social norms. For instance, echoing many of the 
ideas that the underlay the architectural revitalization of the khuang, especially those 
about premodern spatiality and society, Duangchan characterizes Chiang Mai‟s past as 
being one of especially tight social relationships owing to the availability of public 
space (translation mine): 
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The way of life of the ancestors of the Chiang Mai folk gave the opportunity for 
people to have the time to meet together all of the time. Walking [instead of driving] 
together and riding bicycles down the orchard road made people on the same route 
greet each other and built a sense of family. It also created a close-knit bond and the 
feeling of being a community together [ความเป็นชุมชนเดียวกนั - khwaam pen chum-chon 
diaw kan]. The ability to share various thoughts often increased the feeling of being a 
community and everyone helped to improve their community in order to make it 
better. (Duangchan 1998:149). 
Duangchan continues to claim that, in the past, Chiang Mai‟s residents did not 
attempt to trick people in order to make a profit, and they respected ancient sites such 
as the khuang and did not destroy them (ibid 150) – a claim which, I should note, 
glosses over the history of structural modifications to the city (e.g. destroying the 
northeastern corner of the city wall). Indeed, as Askew (1996) argues, the very idea of 
a valued, unalterable heritage in Chaing Mai stems from the latter half of the 20
th
 
century, not from “the way of life of the ancestors”. 
In the future, according to Duangchan, it is the knowledge from the past that 
will correct the problems Chiang Mai is facing in the present (ibid 158). It is the 
rediscovery of that local knowledge [phumiphanya] which has been lost and now 
needs rediscovery. As Duangchan writes [translation mine]: “Our society has looked 
down upon local wisdoms and no longer believed in them. Not until this society faced 
economic crisis did people review their thoughts and revived local wisdom. Examples 
can be seen from the violation of the kheut that led to the recent severe flood problems” 
(Duangchan 2005:16). In a similar vein, she writes that “in the past” Chiang Mai was a 
center of kindness and neighborly love, something which has been broken by a growth 
in gangs, the loss of public space, and the loss of the feeling that “people who live 
there have lost the feeling of being owners of the city” (ibid 34). What needs to be 
restored, then, is the feeling of being a community, of being the owners of the city and 
a remembrance of lost knowledge. One ironic parallel about this statement is how 
closely it mirrors the advertisements for the Punna residence: while Duangchan was a 
fierce advocate against the growth of high-rise residences in the city and especially 
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near the slopes of Doi Suthep, she and the high-rise condominium developers both 
argue that what Chiang Mai needs is a return to the wisdom of the past and the sense 
of community that existed in the past. 
Pisit, another professor at Chiang Mai University, echoed this sentiment when 
he discussed with me the idea of kheut. As I discussed in chapter six, above, kheut was 
a diverse and varied collection of prohibitions, yet in the discourse of Duangchan and 
Pisit, it has rational application. For Duangchan, not observing kheut
220
 led to the 
flooding, and for Pisit, kheut “is a code of life that teaches how to sucessfuly live 
together in a society – it addresses issues like teen pregnancy, drugs, et cetera. The 
curse of kheut is that if one violates kheut, one will not develop [jaroen].” Here, local 
knowledge points the way towards jaroen. Pisit provides more examples of how 
forward-thinking “Lanna wisdom” was: “Today, the nuclear family is the organizing 
principle. It‟s not a tight-knit society; people largely look after themselves [เราดูแล
ตวัเอง - rao duu lae tua eng]. But in the past [สมยัโบราณ - samai boraan], we 
emphasized a person‟s responsibilities towards other people, which in a way is very 
like today‟s idea of human rights.” Here, Pisit both claims that the present way of 
doing things (in terms of the nuclear family) has forgotten the superior past way of 
doing things, but then suddenly implies that the past way of doing things anticipates 
the present. Such a contradiction can be resolved if we compare Pisit‟s statement with 
Wichit‟s discourse on watthanatham sukhothai: the past knowledge (edited to be more 
rational, of course), because it has watthanatham somewhere embedded within it, 
points the direction for jaroen beyond the present, which has somehow become 
corrupted by outside influences. Like Wichit‟s Ayutthya, which had become a home 
for Khmer-style oppression, the modern-day family has been invaded by anomie. A 
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 Specifically, she means the prohibitions on filling in streams, streams which would have diverted the 
water that then flooded the city. 
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return to a prior time, a prior utopia, (Sukhothai, for Wichit; Lanna for Duangchan and 
Pisit) provides the insight needed to point towards a burgeoning future utopia (a 
developed and ethnically unified Thailand for Wichit and a Chiang Mai governed by 
international concepts of human rights, for Pisit). 
Here, according to Duangchan and Pisit, the utopia that is to emerge (should 
the past be givin its proper merit) is one of universal human rights, environmental 
consciousness, and regional autonomy, all informed by the wisdom of the past. Such a 
configuration is reflected in the ASA-Lanna‟s call for a revitalization of the khuang in 
order to inspire Chiang Mai‟s residents to be more in touch with “Lanna” as well as 
“the land.” Yet, as I suggested in my discussion of kheut in chapter six, such a 
construction of a wise local wisdom [e.g. phumiphanya] often requires ignoring 
contradictory or conflicting sources and treating phumiphanya as being a rational and 
internally consistent body of knowledge. Such a problem in the attempt to create a 
unified archive of watthanatham Lanna is exactly what happened when the Chiang 
Mai academic community attempted to mobilize an idea about suburban spatiality in 
defense of a temple.  
Suburban Sacred Space 
 As detailed above, the urban layout of Chiang Mai and its city walls have 
spiritual significance. Each corner and gate is inhabited by a different spirit, but 
according to Sanguan‟s tamnaan meuang nua, each corner and gate also have 
jurisdiction over a certain aspect of Chiang Mai‟s fortunes, a system called thaksaa. 
The word itself is Pali, meaning simply “border” or “boundary” (Phra Maha Sangaa 
2004:33). These fortunes are, in clockwise order beginning from the “head of the city” 
– the northern gate:  
1) เดชเมือง [the might of the city] – chang phuak gate. 
2) ศรีเมือง [the splendor of the city] – sri pum corner. 
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3) มูลเมือง [the foundation of the city] – tha phae gate. 
4) อุตสาหเมือง [the persistence of the city] – ka tam corner. 
5) มนตรีเมือง [the advisor of the city] – Chiang Mai gate. 
6) กาลกิณีเมือง [the doom of the city] – ku heuang corner (note: between Chiang 
Mai gate and ku heuang corner lies saen pung gate, the “corpse gate”) 
7) บริวารเมือง [the follower of the city] – suan dohk gate. 
8) อายเุมือง [the lifespan of the city] – hua lin corner. 
9) Finally, in the center, เกตุเมือง – the city navel and Inthakin pillar. 
During the past ten years, the key point of contestation regarding the thaksaa 
of the city was whether or not this system extends beyond the city walls. Academic 
couple Saratsawadi and Somchote Ohngsakul invoked thaksaa in order to protest the 
expansion of the superhighway – the “ring road” – to Rin Kham corner, at the 
intersection of Nimmanaheminda and Huay Kaew roads. The widening of the road 
meant expansion over the land belonging to Wat Chet Yot, built around 1455 by the 
king Tilokarat for a famous visiting monk. What Somchote and Saratsawadi (and the 
monks of Chet Yot) found particularly offensive was the routing of a sewage pipe 
through the temple‟s lotus pool.  
While Saratsawadi does mention the temple‟s long history as a reason for its 
preservation, her central point was that the temple was a key node in the thaksaa of 
Chiang Mai and as such had special importance for “Lanna”, a claim which aroused 
the ire of other academics, planners, and monks. Saratsawadi bases her argument on a 
palm-leaf text from Wat Chai Sriphumi, a large temple on the northeast corner of the 
city (Saratsawadi n.d. 20). This text argues that in the renovation of Chiang Mai under 
Tilokarat, each direction was assigned a different temple to oversee each auspicious 
facet of the city‟s thaksaa outside of the city walls, in the city suburbs. These temples 
were, in the same order as I have listed them above: Wat Chiang Yeun, Wat Chai 
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Sriphumi, Wat Bupparam, Wat Chaimongkhol, Wat Nantharam, Wat Tapotharam 
[Ramphoeng], Wat Suan Dok, and Wat Chet Yot, with Wat Chedi Luang occupying 
the center position (ibid). The argument continues that, as pillars sustaining the future 
and fortune of the city, these temples are still vital spots in maintaining Chiang Mai‟s 
spiritual legacy – albeit a legacy perceived of by Somchote as having to do more with 
watthanatham than with supernatural power.  
Opposing Somchote and Saratsawadi is a large group of academics including 
Duangchan. These academics argue that, while the efforts to preserve Wat Chet Yot 
have merit, the system of thaksaa that involves temples is simply a promotional effort 
on the part of the author of the chronicle of Wat Chai Sriphumi. Indeed, one academic 
whom I do not name here hinted darkly to me that “no one has ever seen this 
manuscript! Somchote supposedly took it and hid it!” – implying (but not openly 
saying) that Somchote and Saratsawadi invented the whole story.
221
  
These arguments reached their peak in a collection of rebuttals to Somchote 
and Saratsawadi published in 2004 called simply Mai Mii Wat Nai Thaksaa Meuang 
[ไม่มีวดัในทกัษาเมือง - “There are no temples in the thaksaa of the city”] which centered 
on the fact that each of the temples supposedly tied together in this system were built 
at different times, for different purposes, and are in many cases only generally located 
in the direction to which they are supposedly assigned (Wat Ramphoeng, for instance, 
lies quite some distance to the south-southwest, while Wat Chai Sriphumi temple lies 
adjacent to the moat) (Duangchan 2004). Others in the volume chose other elements of 
the thaksaa debate to criticize: Thanet, in the same volume, bemoaned the attempt to 
commercialize Lanna‟s past, or to manufacture aspects of Lanna history for the benefit 
of the present (Thanet 2004:114). 
                                                 
221
 I wish to make it clear that I do not have any evidence to support this conclusion nor do I wish to 
imply that it is the case. I  cite it here to  show the vitriol with which this debate was argued. 
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What interested me about the thaksaa debate was its vitriol, especially 
considering the fact that it pertained to an admittedly obscure aspect of ancient 
astrology. I interviewed both Duangchan and Somchote, as well as well as monks – 
both abbots and recent ordainees – at each of the temples associated with the thaksaa 
system, but what I noticed was that thaksaa continually re-emerged in some places 
and not others. Like claims about the inherently “free” nature of Thai-ness (see 
chapters two and three, above), claims about thaksaa arise in unexpected places in the 
English-language literature as well: for instance, in the online material collected in 
preparation for a popular book on Chiang Mai, the Chiang Mai-based, English-
Figure 23: Map of thaksaa meuang, Wat Buppharam, Tha Phae Road. The nine 
large stupas are those featured in the thaksaa model of the city. Note also the 
presence of six gates to the city, including “Chang Moi” gate as well as the “ghost 
gate.” 
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language publishing house CPAmedia makes Saratsawadi‟s claims for each temple 
that, for instance, “Jaeng [corner] Ku Ruang influences the city's misfortune [by which 
they mean กาลกิณีเมือง - kalakinii meuang]. It is associated cosmologically with Wat 
Rampoeng” (CPAmedia site 2009). 
In a similar vein, visiting Wat Buppharam on Tha Phae road, I noticed a large 
painting in the wihaan [วหิาร -temple hall] depicting the stupas of each temple featured 
in the thaksaa system arranged in their proper positions at the city‟s cardinal points 
(see figure 22). A monk at nearby Wat Chai Sriphumi described the system to me, 
precisely following the points laid out by Saratsawadi and Somchote, and then offered 
me a relativistic explanation: “but it‟s all really a matter of belief. Some people believe 
in these things, some people do not.” Indeed, in Wat Ramphoeng, the abbot angrily 
denied the thaksaa system as a self-promotional effort undertaken by a writer at Wat 
Chai Sriphumi, even though his disciple to whom I had been speaking the minute 
before affirmed it as an auspicious boon for the city of Chiang Mai and a source of the 
city‟s supernatural power.  
The concern over thaksaa makes tangible or speakable that intransigent and 
intangible spirit of Chiang Mai: the city as a spirit in its own right demanding 
veneration, rituals, offerings, and observance of laws set as specific taboos. Thaksaa 
animates the notion that violation of the sanctity of Chiang Mai, Lanna space as a total 
spiritual force, ends in some form of disaster. As is the case in Benjamin‟s notion of 
the cultic symbol, representations of Chiang Mai have power for all of my informants: 
from project planners to mediums to academics, from those who advocate the thaksaa 
system to those who deny it. Additionally, as I have argued, in the representations of 
Chiang Mai‟s culture brokers, damage to these representations has negative 
repercussions on the original. The attention to image production – symbol production 
– and the concern over the mediation of these images is therefore not surprising.  
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In regards to spirit mediumship, this role of the expert mediator between past 
prosperity and the present belongs to the medium, but in regards to watthanatham 
Lanna, the role belongs to the artist, designer, or even, in the case of thaksaa meuang 
or kheut, the academic. While each academic blamed the other for betraying Chiang 
Mai‟s cultural heritage for their own personal reasons, the vitriol of these debates were 
owing to the perceived danger of doing so. The debates revolved around the hope that 
“correct” knowledge of watthanatham in its form as thaksaa or kheut would indeed 
have transformative power to restore what is imagined as lost in Lanna‟s utopian past. 
Somchote‟s reference to the palm-leaf texts, much as Duangchan‟s reference to the 
texts citing kheut, is a way to legitimate their authority and power as arbiters of what 
“Lanna” is. As Duangchan evokes the watthanatham of old neighborhoods (such as 
Wat Gate) in Chiang Mai in order to call for their preservation, and Somchote invokes 
an obscure palm-leaf text in order to call for a moratorium on highway construction, 
each attempts to become the privileged voice setting the boundaries and making 
explicit the what means “Lanna.”. 
Here, I have discussed the concern with and attempt to create an image of the 
city of Chiang Mai amongst the city‟s educated elite. The artists and architects 
responsible for Mo Rooms and the Nimmanhaemin Arts Promenade envisioned a 
home for avant-garde art and architecture which would be free of Bangkok‟s excesses 
and missteps. As the Cotto Tiles brochure, Yesterday and Eurana boutique hotels, and 
Punna high-rise complex implied, Chiang Mai was a fertile ground to plant a new city, 
one where a latent watthanatham (bearing some resemblance to a vaguely European 
past) could be utilized for the benefit of the present. The examples from Ratchaphruek 
and the shopping malls showed how this “raw” Northernness (as Nu, the vendor in the 
Airport Plaza mall, put it, neua dip dip [เหนือดิบๆ] – literally “raw”) was “cooked” in a 
way that attempted to blend it with international and national ways of life, regardless 
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of how this might contradict other notions in the archive of Northern watthanatham. 
Finally, academics also engage in this attempt to selectively utilize the cultural 
heritage – cast as culture [watthanatham], heritage [moradok], or local wisdom 
[phumiphanya] – in order to advocate their own image of the future city.  
 These artists and architects allow a certain spirit in Chiang Mai (which, in their 
configuration, Bangkok has squandered) to become realized in the city. In this way, 
they act in a similar manner to those mediums who allow the voices of the ancient past 
to inform and influence the present, and in the same way as the repetition of ghost 
stories allows the unspoken trauma of urbanity to be voiced (albeit through its 
uncanny return). 
What the mediums and architects have in common is the positing of an ideal 
future society rooted in a selective reading of Lanna history. The negative aspects of 
the city discussed in chapter six – crime, abandoned buildings, the loss of prosperity – 
these represent that which will be overcome through an adherence to and belief in this 
new-old symbol of the city.   
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CONCLUSION: The City, Mediated and Medium 
Urban Images 
In the preceding chapters, I discuss the attractive power of the city and trace 
the idea of an insubstantial positive force within the city through historical and 
modern-day accounts. This force, whether expressed as watthanatham or as the 
charismatic influence [baaramii] of locality-centered spirits, or, as I have argued, a 
combination of the two concepts, becomes, for my informants, that quality which 
sustains and drives the prosperity [khwaam jaroen] of the city; it is that urban quality 
which separates the meuang from the countryside. Linked to this forward-oriented 
concept of power is its uncanny reverse: those building projects like the Boi Luang 
hotel, which, in their attempt to build a prosperous and bright future, failed and have 
become sites of fear: the fear that the promise of jaroen will remain unfulfilled and 
that the city will become ruinous and the habitation of ghosts. Representations from 
the orientation towards cultural heritage or towards the supernatural always place 
Chiang Mai in a moment of crisis and transformation, from the era of encroaching 
globalization to the era of bad deaths, but just as often posit a new efflorescence of 
Lanna about to emerge.  
With regards to watthanatham, I discuss how Chiang Mai‟s culture has been 
transformed in Thai representations from foreign and uncivilized to a source of jaroen, 
however raw and untempered. As the examples from the Punna, CDSC, or JJ Market 
show, what watthanatham Lanna signifies is continually edited to be made 
commensurable with what those constructing it imagine to be a more “modern,” 
desirable lifestyle, one calling for a community but defining this community in terms 
that are already atomized and alienated, be it within high-rise dwellings, gated 
communities  marked off from undesirables by guarded walls, or in the presentation of 
Lanna as consumable object. These new aesthetics of Lanna are such that they cater to 
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the anonymous, atomized resident of Chiang Mai‟s educated class – that person who is 
not in fact a member of the urban, according to Lefebvre‟s definition of the category 
(Lefebvre 1996:79). As films such as The Letter or Rak Jang suggest, one‟s 
relationship to the new North is as lone outsider, untroubled by any demands which 
might be placed by community. The new housing developments allow one to live “at 
your level,” and allow one to socialize – as Joe and his crowd of artists show - with 
who one chooses, rather than having to deal with such complex formulations as 
communities. Nostalgia is something consumed alone.  
Withi Panichaphan was quoted by Compass as saying: “Lanna is whatever you 
wish. Whatever you desire Lanna can provide.” Withi laughed when I asked him about 
this quote, “I was trying to say [mimics an exasperated voice] „Lanna is whatever you 
say it is!‟” As we drove down the highway towards Lampang province together, he 
expressed frustration at the use and misuse of symbols regarding Lanna. We passed a 
spa under construction that was designed to look just like the Bayon temple of Angkor 
and he sighed “What is that supposed to be? That‟s not even Lanna. You want to know 
about Lanna?” he asked. “There,” he said, pointing down the road from the spa at a 
weathered stone head of a naga peering from the jungle undergrowth. “That’s Lanna.” 
Withi‟s identification of an “authentic” Lanna peering out from the forest is, of 
course, fraught with the same sorts of essentializations that plague Chiang Mai‟s new 
designers and developers. What is the substance of “Lanna” urbanity and how can it 
be mobilized to help the city prosper into the future? How does one rebuild the new 
city? 
In analyzing the explosion of symbols and images seemingly – in Withi‟s 
formulation, at least – divorced from their signifiers, Baudrillard is useful up to a point. 
The newly-created Lanna in the form of the proposed Three Kings khuang or the 
“Lanna style” shopping mall are both examples where the image has overlaid, 
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“mask[ed] and denature[d]” (Baudrillard 1994:6) what was there originally. Herein 
lies Nidthi and Withi‟s concern: what “Lanna” signifies has been altered to fit an 
image which does not really reflect what is or what has been and instead posits a 
hyperreal ideal which then replaces and obscures the original. The next step in 
Baudrillard‟s model – a simulation that exists entirely outside of the real – would be 
the inevitable conclusion. By becoming consumers of Lanna who can design their 
homes to look like temples or palaces without actually having to be monks or kings, 
the educated class removes one set of signifieds from their signifiers. As Tong told me, 
in reference to the continual construction of the kalae as a signifier of Lanna 
architecture: “Everyone puts up a kalae, but nobody knows the real meaning of a 
kalae.” I responded by asking him what, in fact, was the true meaning of the kalae. He 
laughed, “I don‟t know! I don‟t put the kalae on my buildings!” In fact, no architect 
that I spoke with could answer the question “what does the kalae mean?” The 
common response was generally that of an architect from the Chaingmai Architects 
Collaborative: “Well, it means Lanna. It is a symbol for Lanna architecture.” Another 
architect speculated (as the Chiang Mai National Museum does) that the kalae has its 
origins in Lua house designs, but no more explanation followed: the kalae has been 
reduced to simply signifying for “Lanna” without a reason why much as Thaiwijit‟s 
art can be “Thai” by not being “Thai” and the Thai temari can be so simply by 
assertion. Here, Lanna signified by the kalae becomes a symbol as elusive as Thainess 
itself – a reference which has a shifting referent, selectively deployed (as in the case of 
the khuang or thaksaa) to fit certain wishes. 
  Yet this calls forth the question: did the kalae ever have a meaning? What sort 
of meaning would suffice as “authentic” enough? Using Baudrillard here would 
suppose a foundation, something real which is capable of being changed – those 
Tasaday, in Baurdillard‟s example, that through the process of ethnology cease 
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becoming what the ethnologists seek (Baudrillard 1994:7). For Baudrillard, there must 
be a real which has been supplanted by the hyperreal. Such a supposition is far too 
messianic to hold up to a historical-anthropological perspective: it supposes that there 
was a time that the kalae meant something more than simply “a Northern house,” and 
that this form of existence had more meaning to those dwelling within than the present 
one.  
  To return to Withi‟s example of the hyperreal Angkorean spa and the authentic 
stone naga, they both are Lanna – or, rather, neither are the “real” Lanna. Nidthi and 
Withi‟s crisis: the dissolution of authentic culture for inauthentic culture and the 
creation of an inauthentic city that has overridden the older, authentic one; is the same 
crisis bemoaned in the Chiang Mai chronicle‟s nineteenth-century depiction of Rahu 
eating the old city (Wijeyewardene 1986:88). But like in the story of Rahu eating the 
sun during eclipses, the process occurs continually.  
Yet this, too, does not mean that there is no continuity between past and 
present. What continues is the sense of crisis associated with the charismatic power 
inherent in the urban image in a time of rapid change. This fear is something which is 
reflected across many different groups within the city and, as I show in the earlier 
chapters, many different eras, as failed attempts at building the meuang often create 
ruinous, uncanny landscapes where the attractive power of the city becomes perceived 
of as repulsive, or imbued with misfortune [atthan] and evil spirits rather than fortune 
and benevolent spirits. From Mangrai‟s initial selection of a building site (in the wake 
of the destruction of Wiang Khum Kham – Chiang Mai‟s original abandoned 
buildings), to the concern expressed over Tilokarat‟s decision to demolish the 
northeastern corner, historical texts express both the need to improve upon the city in 
terms of brick and mortar and in terms of historiography in order to make manifest the 
city‟s potential power. The wake of the economic crisis of 1997 and continuing to the 
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political crises of the late 2000s was such a time, where residents articulated their fears 
about the supernatural fortunes of the city by reference to the urban landscape. 
Hope and Anxiety 
 The crisis caused by the hyperreal (as perceived by Withi) present or the era of 
bad deaths are the reverse side of the hope which can emerge from this crisis. In 
Hirokazu Miyazaki‟s formulation, hope is when people “discover that reality is still in 
a state of not-yet” (Miyazaki 2004:9). Faced with a ruinous present of decaying 
buildings, cacophonous streets, and increasing landlessness, Chiang Mai‟s residents 
reassure themselves that the future contains something different, a place where, as 
Miyazaki writes, referencing Benjamin, “The past points towards the future moment 
of its own salvation” (Miyazaki 2004:22).  In Chiang Mai‟s terms, this means that the 
past must first be purged of those elements which are not conducible to the future – its 
watthanatham must first be cleansed before it can be realized, a prospect that should 
not be so counterintuitive given the discussion of watthanatham‟s forward-oriented 
perspective in chapter two. Such an editing serves the function of building baaramii 
for the city – the same sort of power that was to ensure the city‟s prosperity in the 
premodern time. 
Miyazaki mentions the prospect of hope‟s limits – of the failure to achieve the 
hoped-for conclusion, but he does not fully explore hope‟s shadow: the uncanny 
anxiety that the hoped-for utopia will in fact be a dystopia. Reality being in a state of 
not-yet also implies that it can get worse. This is the sentiment made manifest by 
Chiang Mai‟s ghosts: those car-crash victims that “watch the roadside” 
(Wijeyewardene 1986:167). They point to the prospect of watthanatham‟s failures: the 
wide roads which were to Wichit so emblematic of Sukhothai‟s watthanatham have 
become sites of death; young people in modern high-rise buildings commit suicide; 
and new, utopian projects end as ruins. From a psychoanalytic approach, the 
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malevolent ghosts are the embodiment of the fears inherent in Chiang Mai‟s progress. 
As those on the outside – like Yaam, the night watchman at the foot of the new 
construction - watch the new structures rise, they fear that these structures do not spell 
hope for them. 
 In this way, global capital and spirits, as Alan Klima has suggested in his 
recent film project Ghosts and Numbers (2009), are interreleated. The intangibility of 
the market coupled with increased uncertainty brought about by a new, atomized style 
of living and rapid demographic changes calls forth that force which previously 
managed accident and fortune. Secularized, this force becomes fetishized in the 
symbolisms of localism and nationalism (the idea of moradok and watthanatham), but 
the idea remains: an inchoate force, managed by professional mediums, is recalled for 
the construction of a utopic future.  
Possessing the City 
 Ultimately, I build upon these twin figures of the architect and the medium to 
examine the city itself, specifically those skeletal frames of new construction rising up 
to join their counterparts that were left after the crash of 1997. As empty frames, they 
are potentiality, waiting for some force to fill them with power, much as they wait for 
residents. In this way, the empty (ร้าง - raang) shells echo the empty body (ร่าง - raang) 
of the spirit medium.
222
 Yet like an empty vessel, they each await an infusion of power 
from the outside.  
 Such a power source can be conceived of as self or other, homely or unhomely, 
auspicious or inauspicious. As the empty shells remain full of potential, they can 
become inhabited by new residents, a “Lanna community,” and bring prosperity to the 
city; alternately, they can remain empty and fill with squatters, lost youth, or ghosts – 
                                                 
222
 I do not intend to imply a linguistic link between the two words, “empty” and “vessel.” They differ 
in tone and part of speech (adjective and noun, respectively), and as such an etymological link between 
them is unlikely. I use them here for stylistic purposes, as they, in Thai, rhyme. 
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an alien community. As artists and planners channel watthanatham, and spirit 
mediums channel local spirits, the city also acts as a medium, potentially inhabited by 
fortune or misfortune. 
Future Constructions 
 Urban anthropology, being conducted in such hyper-connected, always-
changing environments, faces the problem of being nearly instantly rendered historical 
instead of current. The political upheavals that began with the 2006 coup had not yet 
settled by the time that I finished my fieldwork, and now Chiang Mai has become 
more sharply divided than before. The popular press characterizes the split between 
the “red shirts” and the “yellow shirts” as being a split between poor Northerners and 
Northeasterners loyal to Thaksin and upper-class Bangkok-based groups calling for an 
increased royal and military presence in politics, apparently unironically in the name 
of democracy. Newer scholarship has tackled these issues (see Nostitz 2009), and 
many scholars see this division as oversimplified. Nonetheless, many (but not nearly 
all) of my informants in Chiang Mai‟s educated class have now embraced the PAD 
royalist cause: Maew and Goong, for instance, each on separate instances confided 
that “politicians are all corrupt,” implying that the only figure impartial enough to rule 
the country was the monarch, and a standard anti-Thaksin rallying cry. At the same 
time, while Kham and Noi were never involved in politics, others amongst the spirit 
medium community wore red shirts by the end of my fieldwork. 
  Yet this does not mean that my study has become dated. On the contrary, I 
describe the anxiety and hope present in that immediate post-coup period, where the 
utopian possibilities of urban rebirth promised by some of Thaksin‟s new projects 
(such as Ratchaphreuk) or the boom in urban construction marking Chiang Mai‟s 
recovery from the 1997 economic crisis contrasted sharply with the fear of pollution 
and invasion of the city by harmful forces. The growth in urban fear and ghost 
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sightings captures the anxiety and fear surrounding the future of the city, a fear which 
could all too easily be transformed into the anger and rage exhibited by the color-
coded protesters on either side of the political scene. Future work should delve into 
this increasing sense of crisis in Thailand, especially as the possibility of royal 
succession rises, as well as looking at the link between ideas about culture and the 
supernatural amongst the middle classes, and how both of these concepts are 
influenced by urban chaos. 
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